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The sub-Saharan African people experience the greatest burden of disease in the 
world although medicines exist that can treat the majority of the illnesses afflicting them. 
In fact, many essential medicines are not accessible for most of the people in the region. 
While the lack of resources is apparently a major impediment for access to medicines, 
man-made deliberations are also consequential, and can to some extent be influenced by 
regulation. The research question of this thesis therefore is: “can a human right to 
medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”. In effect, in the last decade the notion of an international human right to 
medicines has started to develop in the human rights law and literature, prescribing that 
ultimately all individuals shall have access to medicines. This work contributes to the 
international human rights law doctrine by studying this area of the law, which is still 
largely uncharted. 
The thesis, furthermore, moves from a descriptive analysis of the law and 
undertakes a critical normative enquiry, underscoring the challenges of utilising human 
rights law to guide and redress access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, the 
contingencies of access to medicines within complex health systems make it practically 
difficult to identify the appropriate arrangement of access to medicines in a country. 
Moreover, policies and regulation for access to medicines can be morally questionable if 
conflicting with individuals’ legitimate rights, interests, needs and liberties. The 
relevance and merits of my arguments are grounded on different instances of critical-
analytical research. I will use in particular interdisciplinary and empirical research on 
access to medicines, including a two-month field work in Tanzania, as well as the 
theoretical insights drawn from Luhmann’s social systems theory and Foucault’s theory 
of biopower. Therefore the thesis provides an ethical analysis of the potential 
operationalisation and implementation of the human right to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This analysis is also a case-study intervention to the debates concerning more 
generally health care, public health, development and human rights in the region. 
Moreover, the thesis contributes to socio-legal studies identifying the phenomena of 
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Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler. 
Albert Einstein 
 
In order to know anything it is necessary to know everything, but in order to talk about 
anything it is necessary to neglect a great deal. 
John Robertson 
 
The best and most beautiful things in the world cannot be seen or even touched. They 











1.1 Introduction  
This introductory chapter presents my research question relating to the human 
right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa: “can a human right to medicines be utilised to 
solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?”. The chapter first 
illustrates the current events which have predominantly galvanised attention to the theme 
of access to medicines worldwide, in particular with regard to the situation of sub-
Saharan Africa. It then frames my research question with respect to the existing scholarly 
debates regarding the human right to medicines. Consequently, the chapter presents the 
arguments defended by the thesis relating to the challenges of utilising human rights law 
to guide and redress access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The relevance and merits 
of my arguments are grounded on different instances of critical-analytical research, 
which are considered in dialectic between them. Namely, these features are: the legal 
study of the human right to medicines de jure; interdisciplinary and empirical research on 
the realisation of the right de facto; and theoretical insights from socio-legal studies, in 
particular drawn from Luhmann’s social systems theory and Foucault’s theory of 
biopower. The chapter consequently delineates my methodology, states the contribution 
to knowledge I seek and provides the outline of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Access to medicines and current events  
The theme of access to medicines has gained attention in contemporary debates 
due to the coincidence of some momentous events that occurred throughout the last three 
decades. 1  Some of those events specifically relate to sub-Saharan Africa. 2  A non-
exhaustive list counts, first, the diffusion of the HIV/AIDS pandemic from the 1980s 
onwards which has attracted discussion about access to treatment across the world 
[Leach et al 2005: 23]. Second, the establishment of international arrangements on 
                                            
1 On the emergence of the theme of access to medicines see generally WHO, How to 
Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy [2001: vii]; Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 
[2004]; Leach et al [2005]; and Klug [2005]. 




intellectual property have conveyed attention to access to medicines as they can curtail 
access to cheaper generic medicines, especially to poorer countries. In particular, in 1995 
the Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement has entered into force. The 
Agreement sets out duties, enforceable at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to 
protect a minimum standard of intellectual property rights, including patents on 
medicines [Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 2004: 9]. Third, old, widely-marketed medicines, 
such as those used in developing countries for the treatment of AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis, have encountered resistance and had to be replaced by innovative products 
which are patentable and often more expensive, raising again the issue of access to 
patented medicines [Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 2004: 9]. Fourth, since the 1980s many 
countries have undertaken structural adjustment of the public sector and health-care 
reform which have imposed a critical reconsideration of the provision of health services 
by the public health sector, including the provision of medicines. Fifth, health has 
increasingly been recognised as an instrument and a goal of international development. 
For example, three out of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are related to 
health and entail access to medicines.3 Sixth, the problem of priorities in health care is 
subject to intense public debate in ‘developed’ countries where the state provides health 
assistance. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) the advice on treatment based on 
cost-effectiveness undertaken by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) often raises fierce criticism with regard to the failure to recommend certain 
cancer therapies at the national level [Rawlins and Culyer 2004]. The public eye has also 
been alerted worldwide about the rationing of vaccines and treatments for the last 
treacherous outbreaks of influenza pandemics, such as the recent 2009 ‘swine flu’ 
pandemic.4 Seventh, in effect, civil society has become increasingly vocal in advocating 
for access to medicines [Klug 2005]. With regard to sub-Saharan Africa, it can be 
recalled that civil society groups campaigning worldwide obtained the withdrawal of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association from the notorious case it presented at the 
South African Constitutional Court [Klug 2008: 222-3]. In this case, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association argued that the provisions in the South Africa’s Patent Act 
favouring parallel importation and compulsory licenses were unconstitutional [South 
Africa, PMA v. South Africa, 2001]. Those pieces of law can in effect be used in South 
Africa to procure cheaper generic medicines [South Africa, PMA v. South Africa, 2001; 
                                            
3 See Chapter 4 section 4.3.1 and Chapter 6 section 6.4.1. 
4 See, e.g., the article tellingly titled on the Wall Street Journal: “If We Must Ration 




Klug 2008: 222-3]. Always in South Africa, the South African non-governmental 
organisation Treatment Action Campaign set up and won a legal case against the 
government for the provision of nevirapine – an antiretroviral medicine which helps 
preventing mother to child transmission of HIV – in public health facilities [South Africa, 
Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002; Klug 2008].5 The case was decided considering inter 
alia the government’s constitutional obligations with regard to the human right to health 
[id.]. In sum, as Lewis-Lettington and Munyi put it:  
Within the health care sector, access to medicines has traditionally been 
considered within the context of broader issues of health care provision. 
However, the resurgence of, and emergence of drug resistance in 
historically problematic public health problems, particularly tuberculosis 
(TB) and malaria, together with the emergence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
over the last 20 years, has increasingly focused attention on the cost and 
supply of medicines. These questions have become particularly sensitive 
with the increasing enforcement of intellectual property rights since… the 
entry into force of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995. [Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 
2004: 9] 
In particular, my study focuses on access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where medicines are particularly needed but access to medicines is particularly poor. The 
sub-Saharan African people are afflicted by poorest health conditions. These allegations 
are discussed in Chapter 2 but it is mentioned here that the level of mortality is by far 
higher than that in other regions, as life expectancy at birth is on average 46 years 
[Adetunji and Bos 2006: 12]. Also, the measurement of disability adjusted life years 
(DALYs) lost to disease suggests that sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 25% of the world 
burden of disease, the largest share [WHO, The World Health Report, 2003: 120]. Yet 
most of the burden is engendered by preventable, treatable and contagious diseases: some 
medicines exist which can contribute to cure or alleviate the conditions affecting the 
people of the region. However, reportedly, basic medicines are not accessible – ie 
available and affordable – to approximately one half of the people living in sub-Saharan 
Africa [WHO, The World Medicines Situation, 2004: 62].6 Only India fares worse in 
terms of percentage of WHO regional population without access [id.].  
 
 
                                            
5 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.3 




1.3 The human right to medicines: my research question 
The problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, in principle, could be 
countered by the international human right to medicines. The notion of a human right to 
medicines has started to develop in the human rights discourse and prescribes that 
ultimately all individuals shall have access to medicines. In the last decade, for example, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which monitors the 
implementation of the United Nations-sanctioned International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), has identified the provision of essential medicines 
as a duty that the signatories to the ICESCR shall realise immediately [CESCR 2000: 
para. 17]. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter African 
Commission) has recently issued a resolution recognising that “access to needed 
medicines is a fundamental component of the human right to health” [AC Res. 141 
(2008): preambular para. 5]. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the human 
right to health has expressly reported to the UN General Assembly on the human right to 
medicines [Hunt 2006]. At the domestic level the human right to medicines is not 
generally explicitly declared de jure. However, access to essential medicines has been 
successfully claimed – although sporadically – in court cases with reference to the human 
right to health, or to applicable human rights treaties.7 The human right to health or the 
human right to health care is in effect recognised in at least 115 constitutions (at least six 
other constitutions set out duties in relation to health, such as the duty on the State to 
develop health services or to allocate a specific budget to them) [UNOHCHR and WHO 
2008: 10]. Among the 48 sub-Saharan African countries I could count the human right to 
health or health care as enshrined in 31 countries [Kinney and Clark 2004]. In the 
doctrine, some scholars have started investigating a human right to medicines. The 
scholarly literature on the human right to medicines is however still scarcely developed, 
and this thesis also aims at overcoming this gap. Among the rare examples, Hestermeyer 
and Yamin have written articles, respectively, on “Access to Medication as a Human 
Right” [Hestermeyer 2004], and “Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right 
                                            
7 Hogerzeil and colleagues for example have identified and analysed 71 completed court 
cases from 12 low-income and middle-income countries in which individuals or groups 
had claimed access to essential medicines with reference to the right to health in general, 
or to specific human rights treaties ratified by the government. They found that in 59 
cases access to essential medicines as part of the fulfilment of the right to health could 
indeed be enforced through the courts. Most cases came from Central and Latin America, 
with South Africa being the only African case identified [Hogerzeil et al 2006: 305]. See 




under International Law” [Yamin 2003]. Non-governmental organisations and the WHO 
also see access to medicines (or ‘essential’ medicines) as a human right [Oxfam 2007: 
31; South Centre 2001; WHO, WHO Medicines Strategy 2004-2007: 32].  
Thus my research question is: “can a human right to medicines be utilised to 
solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?” By asking ‘can’, the 
question is two-fold. First, I intend a descriptive enquiry of the law asking whether 
access to medicines can be framed in international human rights law as a human right to 
medicines. If so, I ask what duties the human right to medicines imposes, on what actors, 
and how the right can be enforced. Second, I intend a normative enquiry asking if the 
problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa ought to be solved by utilising the 
hypothetical human right to medicines. From a normative point of view, a human right to 
medicines presents, in principle, two interesting features for access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. First, a human right could give to access to medicines supremacy to 
overrule ordinary law and government policies. Secondly, the international human right 
to medicines could provide a regulatory and policy framework for a comprehensive 
approach to access to medicines, at the national and international level. Indeed, as it will 
be shown, access to medicines involves a variety of interwoven factors and actors. In 
effect, however, interventions on access to medicines are problematic. Given the 
contingencies of access to medicines within complex health systems it may be difficult to 
identify the appropriate arrangements for access to medicines in a country. Moreover, 
policies and regulation for access to medicines can conflict with legitimate needs, 
interests and rights in society. Therefore, the normative question cannot but be answered 
by enquiring about how the right is to be operationalised (ie provided with a precise 
content through the identification of good practices and policies) and implemented.8 
Some problematic issues relating to the operationalisation and implementation of 
a human right to medicines are mentioned here by way of illustration. Certain important 
instances of international human rights law oblige home states to provide ‘essential’ 
medicines [CESCR 2000; Yamin 2003; Hestermeyer 2004; Hunt 2006; AC Res. 141 
(2008)]. However health needs are virtually infinite while financial resources are scarce. 
Therefore, the government has to make choices as to which treatment and medicines are 
                                            
8 Operationalisation is here defined as the attribution of precise content to a concept, in 
this case the human right to medicines, through the identification of good practices and 
policies. This definition has been used by the UN Human Rights Council [Human Right 




‘essential’. This prioritisation poses questions of medical ethics. ‘Essential’ medicines 
and essential care, in effect, are not necessarily identified as those for mortal or common 
diseases. Rather the identification of essential treatment can be informed by different 
criteria such as how diffused the condition is, what effects it has on society, who is 
principally affected by it, how debilitating it is on the individual, how cost-effective it is 
to treat it [Brock 2002; Daniels 1981, 1983, 1985, 2002, 2008; Gruskin and Daniels 
2008; Hope et al 2002; Kamm 2002; McKie and Richardson 2003; Menzel 1990; Menzel 
2002; Ozar 1983; Sheaff 1996; Stell 2002]. Furthermore, if more resources are to be 
raised, how much burden can be justified? In operational terms, choices have to be made 
on the proportion of primary (first point of consultation), secondary (specialist) and 
tertiary (specialised on referral) care to be provided or if favouring horizontal (which 
regard the health-care system at once, for instance through primary health care) or 
vertical (disease-oriented) interventions [id.]. Next, it has to be considered that the state 
is not necessarily efficient and effective when operating the health-care system and 
providing medicines [Lush 2002, 2004; Leach et al 2005: 80-81].9 
With regard to intellectual property, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human 
right to health and the African Commission both demand the government to utilise the 
so-called TRIPS flexibilities (e.g. parallel trading, compulsory licensing) and at the same 
time to stimulate innovation and/or intellectual property [Hunt 2006: para. 47; AC Res. 
141 (2008): para. 2(b)]. Some authors in political science instead argue that international 
obligations on intellectual property and intellectual property rights protection in 
developing countries should be avoided [Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; May 2000; Sell 
2003; Pugatch 2004]. They point out that intellectual property policy has been 
determined by the lobbying of private economic interests, rather than by a rational 
account of the good for the society (social utility) and its access to medicines. Such 
‘distortion’ occurs at the national level, and all the more at the international level, 
through the coercion of developing countries by developed ones [id.]. However, 
intellectual property rights foster the development of new pharmaceutical products, 
encourage local pharmaceutical sector, foster economic development and can be morally 
warranted in terms of reward for the effort undertaken by the inventor [Burns 2005; 
                                            
9 On the problems of provision of treatment at the state level see Chapter 5. On the 
problems of provision of treatment through the initiative of foreign states and non-state 




Grabowski 2002; IFPMA 1997; Maskus 2000; Royal Society 2003; Scherer 2001].10 
Also, it is often argued that pharmaceutical companies have some human rights – or 
moral – obligations to facilitate access to medicines to the worse-off, for instance through 
differential pricing (discounts for the lower-income countries) [Bluestone et al 2002; 
Hunt 2007]. Some pharmaceutical companies do already engage in differential pricing, 
also as a fruit of self-regulation and corporate social responsibility. However, these 
initiatives are voluntary, ad hoc policies, lacking predictability. Some authors in fact 
propose internationally regulated differential prices schemes for essential medicines. 
Such initiatives yet are difficult to configure in the detail and to implement. In fact, 
mandatory schemes can be economically unsustainable and morally questionable in 
selecting what products should be included, identifying what countries and peoples 
should benefit from them, and in distorting the private initiative.11  
Furthermore, access to medicines is sometimes seen in light of ‘development’. 
‘Underdevelopment’ affects or impairs access to medicines and access to medicines can 
prop up development.12 Access to medicines is also an indicator of development, as per 
the Millennium Development Goals. 13  When relating about the human right to 
medicines, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human right to health for instance refers to 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [Hunt 2006: para. 39]. Health has been 
categorised as a development issue also by WHO (the role of WHO in formulating public 
health programmes is recommended by the CESCR in its ‘General Comment’ on the 
realisation of the human right to health [CESCR 2000: paras. 1, 63]). 14  Access to 
medicines policies are often pledged and adopted as components of objectives such as 
development [Abuja Declaration 2000: preambular para. 3; Abuja Declaration 2001: 
paras 13, 15, 23; Abuja Call 2006: para. 8]. Reference to development can however be 
problematic when it focuses on the economic output of a health intervention (e.g., work 
days saved, productivity, reduction of burden of disability) [Preker 2004]. It is 
questionable in fact, under the perspective of medical ethics, to conceive priorities in 
health as subordinated to the concept of development, or to assume that special principles 
should be followed for the national design of health systems and the prioritisation of 
                                            
10 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
11 See, generally, the articles collected in Granville [2002] and Attaran and Granville 
[2004]. See Chapter 6. 
12 See Preker [Preker 2004] on the reciprocal influence between health and economics. 
13 See also Chapter 6 section 6.4.1. 




health intervention in developing countries. If considerations of burden of disease and 
cost-effectiveness are heeded, for example, the principle of aggregate status of a 
population may take unwarranted pre-eminence over the attention to the individual 
medical needs, a cornerstone principle of medical ethics [Brock and Wikler 2006; 
Kumaranayake and Walker 2002]. Finally, foreign aid can also be problematic, for 
instance distorting local health systems being volatile and not responding to local needs 
[Hanefeld et al 2007; Horton 2006; Jones 2003; Navarro 2000].15  
 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
As illustrated in section 1.3, regulation and policies relating to access to 
medicines have to face practical complexities and ethical dilemmas. Ought a human right 
to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa? Ought a human right to medicines overrule the current settings of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa? In order to analyse these questions I utilise a variety of 
research tools, namely: legal analysis, interdisciplinary studies, empirical work, and 
socio-legal theories. This section presents my use of socio-legal studies, while the other 
tools will be discussed in infra section 1.5 on methodology. The thesis draws from 
different contributions such as: critical approaches to law and human rights [e.g., Arendt 
1958, 1986; Douzinas 2000; Kennedy 2004; Luhmann 2004; 2002/1965]; theories of 
rights [Steiner 1994; Sumner 1987] discourse analysis [e.g., Foucault 1990/1976]; 
sociology and critique of ‘modernity’ [e.g., Bauman 1993; Luhmann 1995, 1998], 
positivism and quantification in science and public life [e.g., Marcuse 1964; Porter 
1995]; critical approaches to development [e.g., Escobar 1991, 1992, 1997; W. Sachs 
1992]; public health and medical ethics [e.g., Kumaranayake and Damian Walker 2000; 
Navarro 1977, 2000; Sheaff 1996]; social systems theory [e.g. Luhmann 1995; 2004; 
Paterson 1996, 2010; Philippopolous-Mihalopoulos 2010] critique of biopolitics and 
biopower [e.g., Agamben 1998, Fassin 2000, 2007; Foucault 2001/1976-1988; Pandolfi 
2001, 2003, 2003]. These theoretical approaches are not used as exhaustive, all-
encompassing grand theories. Rather, they are utilised as critical-analytical devices (see 
infra section 1.5 Methodology). I make more extensive use, nonetheless, of Luhmann’s 
                                            




social systems theory, enriched by the concept of biopolitics and biopower pioneered by 
Foucault and further elaborated in sociology, socio-legal studies and critical theories.  
With regard to Luhmann’s theory of social systems, I will utilise in particular the 
analysis of ‘autopoiesis’, ‘contingency’, ‘structural coupling’ and ‘steering’ in law and 
politics.16 Furthermore, I will refer to Luhmann’s critique of human rights. With regard 
to autopoiesis (literally, self-creation), according to Luhmann systems exist by 
differentiating themselves self-referentially – through autopoiesis – from what is 
residually identified as the ‘environment’ [Luhmann 1995: 9]. As Luhmann stated:  
… systems can differentiate only by self-reference… only is insofar as systems 
refer to themselves in constituting their elements and their elemental operations. 
To make this possible, systems must create and employ a description of 
themselves; they must at least be able to use the difference between system and 
environment within themselves, for orientation and as a principle for creating 
information [id.].  
Social systems, in particular, are constituted by communications [Luhmann 1995: 
59].17 Among social systems there are ‘subsystems’, ie functional systems which focus 
on a specific problem of society [Luhmann 2004: 93]. The autopoiesis and differentiation 
of the subsystems occurs along communications coded in binary opposites [id.]. For 
example, the subsystem of law is construed on the opposite legal (the system)/illegal (the 
environment), the subsystem of politics on the opposite power (the system)/not power 
(the environment), the subsystem of economics on the opposite payment (the system)/not 
payment (the environment), the subsystem of science on the opposite truth (the 
system)/not truth (the environment) [Luhmann 1995: 425-6; 2004: 162, 390]. Indeed, 
Luhmann sees modern society as characterised by differentiation – the specialisation of 
functional subsystems (functions). 18  Such differentiation occurs, however, through 
generalisation and simplification of complex, contingent, multidimensional problems 
[Luhmann 2002/1965: 70]. 
                                            
16 In this introduction I briefly present the aspects of Luhmann’s social systems theory 
and of the concept of biopower which are more salient for my thesis. An apt exegesis of 
Luhmann’s work is instead undertaken, e.g., by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos [2010]. 
17 Social systems are one type of systems. Other types are machines, organisms and 
psychic systems [Luhmann 1995: 2]. 
18  According to Luhmann, “… civilization and its consequences are a result of the 
differentiation of human communicative performances from their natural conditions” 
[Luhmann 1990: 31]. Rationalism, division of labour and other controlling features of 
‘modernity’ can have unfortunate consequences. See, e.g., Bauman [1993] arguing that 




Luhmann gives further insight on the autopoiesis of social systems in his analysis 
of the role of ‘contingency’. Recalling Aristotle, Luhmann defines as contingent 
something which “is neither necessary nor impossible; it is just what it is (or was or will 
be), though it could also be otherwise” [Luhmann 1995: 115].19 Contingency can be seen 
as the disorder in the environment, and the raw material of the system. Luhmann notably 
maintains that social systems operate in a “paradoxical world, the paradox being the 
necessity of contingency” [Luhmann 1985: 7 emph. orig.]. Thus contingency is a threat to 
stability but the concealment of contingency through generalisation permits the self-
referential expansion of subsystems in the ‘erratic’, ‘unruly’ environment – still bearing 
in mind that the operation of each system can only connect with other communications 
from the same system: each system must construct its environment for itself [Luhmann 
2004: 357]. The expansion occurs through thematization of complexity. The environment 
is always more complex than the system and it therefore presents a constant pressure to 
develop and refine strategies for the reduction of complexity [Luhmann 1990: 11-12]. In 
effect, the autopoietic generalisations and simplifications exercised through the binary 
coding adopt and conceal the environment’s contingency. Such contingency therefore re-
enters the social systems in the form of indeterminacy.20  
To note, social subsystems do not interact with ‘reality’. They can however 
‘irritate’ their environments for example by ‘structurally coupling’ to other subsystems 
(which are part of their environments), ‘programming’ and ‘steering’. Structural 
couplings occur when subsystem need events to occur within their environment that they 
cannot achieve through their own operations [Luhmann 2004: 382]. Nevertheless, 
mechanisms of structural coupling must be self-referentially compatible with the 
separation of these systems and their respective operative closures [id.: 391]. As 
Luhmann remarked: “[w]hat [structural coupling] includes (couples with) is as important 
as what it excludes. Accordingly the forms of a structural coupling reduce and so 
facilitate influences of the environment on the system” [id.: 382, emph. orig.]. In effect, 
in structural coupling, systems refer to each other as environments, ie generalising and 
simplifying according to their binary communications, thereby concealing contingencies. 
‘Programming’ can be used by subsystems for external interventions but programmes are 
always framed within the subsystem code [Luhmann 1997: 53]. If a subsystem is to 
influence a social sphere outside its competence it has to solicit the self-steering of 
                                            
19 See also Luhmann [1995: 25]. 




another subsystem [id.]. ‘Steering’ is more specifically a difference-minimising 
programme (for example, the reduction of health inequality). To note, within system 
theory, “[w]hat is seen in the steering process as input is only information constructed in 
the system itself and this construction is nothing else than a component of the distinction 
of which difference the system tries to minimize” [Luhmann 1997: 46].  
These notions are relevant for our analysis of law and politics. For example laws 
can conceal their indeterminacy through a vague, general and abstract language. But 
there are no general and abstract realities; the legal subsystem is autopoietic it its 
distinction legal/illegal, forcing contingency within its communications. With regard to 
the steering of law, “law does not necessarily solve the original conflicts but only those 
that it can construct on its own terms” [Luhmann 2004: 169]. The function of politics, the 
subsystem differentiated through communications power/non power, is to take binding 
decisions and indeed it is eased by generalising and simplifying the environment and its 
contingencies. Therefore, it avoids complexity and systemic, multidimensional ethical 
problems [Luhmann 2002/1965: 55, 58]. 21  With regard to the steering of politics, 
“politics too can only steer itself, and if the steering refers to the environment then it is 
only its environment” [Luhmann 1997: 46]. Therefore, the (self-)steering of the political 
system encounters three typical practical problems: 1) the unexpected and/or undesired 
side-effects 2) the so-called ‘deficits of execution’ and 3) the so-called ‘self-fulfilling’ or 
‘self-defeating prophecies’ (obtain the opposite of what sought) [id.: 44]. Notably, the 
legal and political subsystems structurally couple between themselves: “[i]n order for law 
to be enforced it needs politics, and without the prospect of enforcement there is no 
stability to norms that are credible to (or which are expected by) everybody. Conversely, 
politics uses law to diversify access to politically concentrated power” [Luhmann 2004: 
162]. Law and politics also structurally couple to other subsystems, for example science 
or morality. However, structural coupling does not overcome the functional and 
cognitive limits of a subsystem in dealing with its environment; rather it introduces 
foreign uncertainty. In effect, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos sharply pointed out, 
structural coupling is ultimately ‘environmental coupling’ [Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
2010: 129-136].  
                                            
21 Luhmann sees the modern state as a specific political organisation of society, ie as the 





Luhmann also presents an important critique of human rights. A ‘human rights 
subsystem’ can be identified – even though Luhmann does not explicitly name it – as 
coded on the binary opposites humanity (the system)/non humanity (the environment) 
[Luhmann 2004: 135, 468]. Human rights are distinct from law: they are in the 
environment of law, they can actually conflict with the law [Luhmann 2002/1965: 45: 
2004: 468-9; 483].22 Or, they can be positivised by the legal subsystem. Indeed the 
subsystem of human rights can be seen as ‘meta-positive’ law [Luhmann 2004: 483]. In 
sum, as Luhmann wrote, “this form of normative expectation of normative expectations 
lies largely beyond the established juridical world of forms and is also directed against 
the law. Legal or illegal – what counts is humanity” [id.: 469]. A substantially similar 
view is, to note, shared by the international law and international relations literatures. For 
example, Armstrong et al analyse international human rights as rules of positive law, 
principles and discourse [Armstrong et al 2007: 152-157].  
The presumption of human rights (that is, what the system says of itself) is that 
they are the ultimate utopia, the programme of ‘humanity’ [Luhmann 1997(b): 992-3]. 
Luhmann however cautions against a ‘fundamentalist’ use of human rights.23 To begin 
with, human rights are justified as indisputable values. But there are as many values as 
stars in heaven and they can actually collide between each other [Luhmann 2008: 28, 29]. 
To note, collisions of fundamental values are resolved in a contingent manner, with ad 
hoc decisions: 
Values are necessary in order to give decisions recourse to indisputability. 
Decisions however bring this necessity into the form of contingency. The 
necessity of adhering to values becomes for its part a contingent evaluation – 
when it comes to deciding – which can turn out differently depending on value 
constellations, the site of decision, and influences on the course of decision. 
[Luhmann 2008: 30].  
The thesis will therefore explore the problems and paradoxes of the positivisation 
of a human right to medicines in the legal subsystem, and of the utilisation of human 
rights as political programmes. For example, the positivisation of human rights – and 
their contingencies – can result in a positive law which lacks of clarity [Luhmann 2004: 
483]. Furthermore, human rights are utilised to include individual human beings in the 
                                            
22 Cf. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s reading of Luhmann as placing fundamental rights 
“on the very boundary between system and environment, which means in no particular 
system or, to put it more abstractly, always on the other side of the systemic boundary” 
[Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 154]. 




legal system [id.: 414]. The paradox is, however, that subjective rights are legally valid 
only as objective rights, that which entails forgoing the unity and uniqueness of the 
individual:  
Human rights are always generalized; I cannot claim them simply ‘as myself’, but 
only, for instance, as a woman, as a worker, or as a member of a racial minority. 
In that way, one has actually to disavow one’s unique individuality in order to be 
able to rely on human rights. A subject can only claim them ‘objectively’ in the 
form ‘as X’.24 
Moreover, human rights have a complex relationship with politics. Such 
relationship will be further explored in the thesis but it can be mentioned that human 
rights, in their utopian communication, are meant to control the assault of the state. As 
Luhmann notes, in fact, by maintaining the functional differentiation (and autopoiesis) of 
politics from other social subsystems in society (e.g., the legal, moral, economic 
subsystems) human rights also serve the autopoiesis of the political subsystem [Luhmann 
2002/1965: 60-61]. Without human rights the other social subsystems would collapse 
into the absolute power of politics – and politics itself would no longer be ‘politics’ [id.]. 
Furthermore, it is underlined that in order to realise their utopia human rights attribute 
roles and powers to the very actors which bear human-rights duties (states as well as, in 
some cases, non-state actors). Therefore, it will be observed, the human right to 
medicines can legitimise power and biopower to take decisions relating to sensitive, 
morally problematic issues.  
The concepts of power and biopower need further theoretical definition. As Lukes 
aptly put it, indeed, the notion of power is problematic: 
… for instance Bertrand Russell defines power as ‘the production of intended 
effects’. But is power the actual production of such effects or the capacity to 
produce them? ... And is it necessary that the effects be intended? … And is it 
sufficient that the results be intended? … And which effects are going to count? 
Surely not all intended effects? Am I powerful (as opposed to you) if the effects I 
intentionally produce are produced because you have threatened or induced me, 
or if I produce them because I know they are the effects you want me to produce? 
And am I powerful if I can only produce such effects at enormous cost, say by 
sacrificing my life or what gives it value, or if I produce nothing but trivial and 
unimportant effects (and how do we decide what is and what is not important)? 
[Lukes 1986: 1-2, emph. orig.] 
                                            




The concept of power adopted in this thesis builds on the theories of Foucault and 
his followers. Foucault writes from a different sociological perspective but his view is to 
some extent compatible with that of Luhmann, as some scholars have argumentatively 
maintained [Borch 2005; Pottage 1988].25 Thus, when referring to power, I will draw 
from both Luhmann and Foucault considering that power: is the capacity to determine 
behaviour, not the actual production of effects; can derive from multiple sources, 
therefore it is not confined to juridico-political concept [Foucault 1980; Luhmann 1979: 
168];26 is ontologically a nominal entity [Foucault 1990/1976: 93; Luhmann 1990: 157]; 
is fostered by autopoietic, contingent decision-making [Luhmann 1979: 139] and the 
entrenchment of regimes of truth and right, also through disciplinary power [Foucault 
1980]. More narrowly, as Foucault also does, I will be concerned with the ‘external 
visage’ of power, ie the relationship with the object rather than the intents of the power-
holder [Foucault 1980].27 In effect, I am interested in the moral problems of power. Two 
main problems can be identified: first, by definition, power is a reduction of liberty for 
the individual subject to power. The second problem is that power can impose morally 
undesirable policies and actions impairing legitimate interests, rights, needs and liberties 
in society. Such features are not merely pathological of a ruthless use of power; power is 
in fact inherently eased by simplifying complexity, generalising and avoiding ethical 
problems [Luhmann 1979: 116]. 
With regard to biopower, in particular, Foucault identifies the birth of biopolitics 
in the 18th century, with the rationalisation of the problems posed to the public 
governance by the phenomena deriving from a population, such as health, hygiene, 
nativity, longevity, and races [Foucault 2001/1976-1988: 818]. Biopower is distinguished 
                                            
25 Borch remarks that a major difference between the approach of Luhmann and Foucault 
is that Luhmann investigates general and very abstractly formulated sociology whereas 
Foucault studies non-sociological genealogies of concrete historical phenomena [Borch 
2005: 155]. Yet I note that also Luhmann indulges in historical considerations (for 
example with regard to the increasing scope of power in the evolution and differentiation 
of society) and Foucault in sociological generalisations, for example with regard to 
power [Foucault 1990/1976; Luhmann 1979: 116]. 
26 However, Luhmann does recognise the action of the rule of law so that “[t]he political 
system of the society takes over the creation, administration, and control of power for the 
society” [Luhmann 1979: 139]. 
27 Therefore, I avoid the question (posed by Lukes, above) whether A’s power on B is 
constitutively identified as an influence exerted against B’s interest (and therefore the 
identification of the authentic B's interest). Cf. Luhmann, on the usefulness of power in 
societal development [Luhmann 1979: 163] and Parsons’ identification of power as 




from traditional sovereignty as while the latter entails the ‘right to take life or let live’ 
(‘de faire mourir ou de laisser vivre’), the former is the ‘power to foster life or disallow it 
to the point of death’ (‘faire vivre ou rejeter dans la mort’) [Foucault 1976: 138]. As 
Foucault identified it, power is not addressed anymore at ‘deduction’ [prélèvement] but 
is exerted positively on life, aiming at managing, growing, multiplying it and exerting 
precise controls and regulations on it [id.: 136]. Biopower is therefore problematic in as 
much as it informs vital issues. In effect, power is likely to endorse a particular approach 
to the human right to health, as we shall see, focussed on the aggregate status of the 
population rather than on the health of the individual.  
Foucault’s notion of ‘security’ further sensitises on the potential problems of the 
exercise of biopower [Foucault 1990/1976; 2007]. According to Foucault, security is a 
form of power based on the growth and production of a population [Foucault 2007].28 
Under the security approach, ‘population’ is not conceived of as a collection of 
individual juridical subjects but as “a set of elements in which we can note constants and 
regularities even in accidents… and with regard to which we can identify a number of 
modifiable variables on which it depends” [id.: 74]. Moreover, the security paradigm 
follows ‘normalisation’ rather than ‘normation’. While according to normation, “there is 
an originally prescriptive character of the norm and the determination and the 
identification of the normal and the abnormal becomes possible in relation to this posited 
norm” [id.: 57], according to normalisation different immanent normalities are observed 
within the population as a whole and a norm is fixed on the basis of these normalities: 
“[t]he norm is an interplay of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the 
norm is deduced from it” [id.: 63]. To note, Foucault’s concept of normalisation in effect 
recalls Luhmann’s analysis of steering, as difference-minimising programmes [Luhmann 
1997]. For example, in the case of an epidemic, the security approach manages the 
interplay of the different normalities in order to act on the sections of the population that 
fall without such ‘normality’ [id.: 63]. This may involve, for example, specifically 
tailored interventions to arrest the spread of disease in certain areas, as well as leaving 
other areas or groups untreated [id.].29 Thus, the health of a ‘population’ is ultimately 
instrumental to security and translates into more biopower. 
                                            
28 To be precise, I see security as both an end of biopower and a means of biopower to 
perpetuate itself. 





Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics have subsequently been utilised 
by Agamben, who analyses biopolitics in connection with human rights [Agamben 
1998]. Agamben identifies in certain sociological phenomena the creation of the bios, the 
bare life, as opposed to zoe, the political life [id.: 10]. Bios is subject to the sovereign 
whom Schmitt depicted as s/he who can claim the state of exception. Agamben sees 
human rights most properly as rights of citizenship, and pessimistically remarks that  
… the very rights of man that once made sense as the presupposition of the rights 
of the citizen are now progressively separated from and used outside the context 
of citizenship, for the sake of the supposed representation and protection of bare 
life that is more and more driven to the margins of the nation-states… [id.: 132].30  
Agamben interestingly expands the argument to certain trends occurring in 
emergency international humanitarian interventions, noting that “[t]he separation 
between humanitarianism and politics that we are experiencing today is the extreme 
phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen” [id.: 133]. 
Building on Agamben’s ideas Pandolfi subsequently asks what can be more an exception 
than humanitarianism, and what can be more a bare life, a homo sacer, than one whose 
life depends on the humanitarians [Pandolfi 2002]. Pandolfi also underscores the fugacity 
of aid, as emergency ends somewhere and bursts elsewhere [id.]. The perverse sovereign-
subject relationship of biopower is fostered by the non-territorial accountability of the 
decision-makers for such health interventions. In sum there is a risk that both at the 
national and international level the human right to medicines serve unwarranted 







                                            
30 Cf. Foucault: “[f]or millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal 
with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose 





The methodology comprises legal analysis of the international human right to 
medicines de jure, a broad study of the literature concerning access to medicines, 
empirical work, and theoretical insights from socio-legal studies. With regard to the 
critical analysis of the right de jure, I focus on international law, where human rights 
obligations with regard to access to medicines are arguably consolidating. The right is 
nonetheless to be applied at the national as well as the international level. Indeed 
international and national law intertwine, and are both analysed.31  For the study of 
international law, I have researched the sources of international law as recognised by the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – ie primarily treaties, international 
custom, general principles of law and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the 
opinions of authoritative publicists [ICJ Statute art. 38]. It is highlighted here that in 
addition to treaty law, the identification of the international customary law on the human 
right to medicines is potentially important for access to medicines as, among other 
reasons, it is legally binding on all states. However, it has proved to be particularly 
problematic and not thoroughly investigated in the literature. Thus, I have undertaken an 
original investigation in the state practice and opinio juris relating to the human right to 
medicines. Very experimental has also been the research with regard to the obligations 
relating to the human right to medicines borne in treaty as well as customary law by 
extra-governmental actors, ie the actors other than home states (the traditional recipients 
of human right obligations), which therefore include foreign states and non-state actors. I 
have furthermore investigated the sources of law which do not strictly qualify as 
international law according to the ICJ statute such as international soft law, the ‘jure 
ferenda’ and instances of regulation which relate to access to medicines concerning 
extra-governmental actors. Such non-binding formulations of the human right to 
medicines can in effect be seen as communications of the ‘human rights subsystem’. The 
legal value of those instances is critically analysed in the thesis.  
With regard to the literature concerning the realisation of access to medicines, I 
have researched other fields of law and a variety of disciplines including public health, 
medicine, ethics, medical ethics, development studies, economics, political economy, 
political science. Sources of such material have been academic books and articles in 
specialised journals as well as data and reports circulated by governments, international 
                                            




organisations, NGOs and other advocacy groups. All material is utilised with a critical 
view and the approach is interdisciplinary rather than multidisciplinary.32 This means that 
my aim is not to study the disciplines in their self-referential isolation, but to utilise their 
insights in order to critically investigate the different dimensions of the problem of 
access to medicines. In particular I utilise ethics, as I normatively research if the human 
right to medicines ought to be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. To be clear, ‘ethics’ is distinguished from ‘morality’. Ethics is 
“concerned with what is morally good and bad, right and wrong. The term is also applied 
to any system or theory of moral values or principles” [Singer 1985]. The term 
“morality”, instead, can be used “either 1. descriptively to refer to a code of conduct put 
forward by a society or, a. some other group, such as a religion, or b. accepted by an 
individual for her own behavior or 2. normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given 
specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons” [Gert 2008]. Thus 
ethics is “the field of study, or branch of inquiry, that has morality as its subject matter” 
[Singer 1985].  
Another main standing regarding my methodology is the critical view of 
aggregative measures and quantitative data. Quantitative data are supposed to represent 
precisely and objectively certain situations. Thus they are often utilised by the literature 
and advocacy concerning access to medicines as premises for their arguments. I will use 
such data too but they have to be considered prudently. For example, the collection in 
sub-Saharan Africa of, among the others, economic and health data is practically taxing 
due to the scarcity of official, regular recording. In fact, statistics often ultimately rest on 
estimates and subjective assumptions. Furthermore, I found considerable amount of 
discrepancies within the literature utilising quantitative data.33 Importantly, the value of 
quantitative studies is arguably limited, as they are inherently aggregative, overlooking 
the personal situations of individuals.34 The use of quantitative data for justifying public 
policies is therefore questionable.35 Qualitative studies and empirical work are used to 
complement quantitative approaches, even though they also suffer from limited 
objectivity.  
                                            
32 On the potential and challenges of ‘interdisciplinarity’ as a method of research in 
socio-legal studies see Banakar and Travers [2005: 4-6]. 
33 See Chapter 2 section 2.1. 
34  The ethical and legal limitations of aggregative considerations with regard to the 
realisation of the human right to medicines is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 




With regard to my empirical work, to begin with, I have undertaken field research 
in Tanzania. 36  The field research has encompassed background study of access to 
medicines in Tanzania and a two-month visit to the country. The visit to Tanzania took 
place in July-August 2009. I spent approximately five weeks in Dar es Salaam (where 
most institutions are based) and three weeks travelling up-country to see first-hand the 
situation of access to medicines in more remote areas (namely Sumbawanga, Mbeya, 
Mikumi and Ifakara. See map at page 31), visiting public health facilities and 
interviewing the competent authorities. Overall, I conducted more than 50 relevant 
interviews about access to medicines, healthcare, human rights, with officials from the 
Tanzanian government (central and local), international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, foreign aid, medical practitioners, health facilities personnel and others 
(see Annexe A). The method of my interviews has been semi-structured interviews, 
therefore based on a set of themes and topics to form questions in the course of 
conversation [Burgess 1984: 102], but also including specific questions. I prepared my 
themes, topics and questions specifically for every interviewee. I generally started my 
interviews by asking the interlocutor to talk about his career and present position. I 
would consequently ask the substantial questions, which could be very technical, as I 
intended to learn the practicalities of health, medicine and access to medicines in 
Tanzania. Finally, I would always ask to freely comment on the idea of access to 
medicines as a human right. I recorded approximately half of my interviews, and I 
always collected the informed consent form. In order to safeguard the privacy of the 
interviewees, throughout the thesis I generally refer to them anonymously by their 
professional role and position.  
 
                                            
36 The term ‘field research’ is utilised broadly, as in Burgess, who intends it to cover 
“what is colloquially known as participant observation, unstructured interviews and 





Maps’ sources: map on the left: Katie Fortuna, website. Map on the rights, US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [University of Texas 2010]. I have marked in this 
map (in the squares) the biggest towns I have visited during my empirical work (Dar es 
Salaam, Ifakara, Mbeya, Sumbawanga). 
I managed to organise this empirical work through a long background preparation 
preceding the journey and through the logistic and technical support of the Tanzania 
Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) during my stay in Tanzania. With regard to the 
background preparation, I have undertaken considerable reading which has spanned 
books, journals, newspapers, reports written on health care and access to medicines in 
Tanzania. I have furthermore participated to meetings and conferences on this matter in 
London. Both the readings and the meetings have not only provided familiarity on the 
subject but also contacts for the interviews. By far, I must acknowledge, the most 
important connection has been Emmanuel Alphonce who introduced me to TFDA. I 
interviewed him several times in the UK (both in Leeds where he was undertaking his 
MSc in Public Health and in London). In Tanzania, he provided me with indispensable 
support, indications and suggestions notwithstanding his work overload as manager at 
TFDA. With regard to the role of TFDA, the institution has provided me with a desk, 
logistic support during my travelling and has formally presented me to governmental 
authorities. I am immensely grateful for this help. 
With regard to the merits of my empirical work in Tanzania, I firstly focussed on 
a case study, the Duka la Dawa Muhimu, known internationally as Accredited Drugs 




in underserved areas. The project aims at training the shopkeepers of over-the-counter 
(OTCs) shops so that they can sell a few ‘necessary’ (‘muhimu’) products which are 
otherwise supposed to be sold under prescription in Tanzania. This arrangement is 
important for instance for malaria, considering that reportedly up to 70 percent of fevers 
are managed in the private sector [Lynch et al 2006: 20; See also Kachur et al 2006]. 
OTC shops are a favoured option for access to medicines in remote areas because they 
are more diffused and less expensive than pharmacies, but the first-line antimalarial in 
Tanzania (artemether-lumefantrine) is a prescription medicine [id.]. 37  As opposed to 
other OTC shops, ADDOs are authorised to sell artemether-lumefantrine. The ADDO 
project also offers an interesting hook for observing the operation of extra-governmental 
actors on access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa as, while the TFDA is the main 
implementer of the programme, ADDOs are an international public private partnership 
(PPP) which involves foreign NGOs (e.g. Management Science for Health), bilateral aid 
(e.g. the US President’s Malaria Initiative), and international aid (e.g., the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).38 Thus I conducted interviews on the subject and 
visited ADDOs. 39   However, since ADDOs are just one component of access to 
medicines, I have also enquired on the other elements of access to medicines such as the 
supply chain of distribution (for example interviewing the state’s Medical Stores 
Department as well as private suppliers), the role of the public health facilities (key note 
has been joining the council team of Sumbawanga in its periodic inspection of tens of 
dispensaries), the role of foreign aid (for example by meeting with USAID officials, 
implementing NGOs and the local coordinators of the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria), medical research in Tanzania (visiting the Ifakara Health 
Institute that is supported among the others by the Tanzanian government, the Swiss 
Tropical Institute and the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development), the work 
on quality and safety of medicines by TFDA. With regard to the disease focus I have 
definitely learnt a lot about malaria (especially thanks to Molteni from the National 
                                            
37 See Chapter 2 section 2.4. 
38  PPPs are commonly defined as voluntary and collaborative relationships between 
various parties, both state and nonstate, in which all participants agree to work together 
to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, 
responsibilities, resources, competencies, and benefits [UN Secretary General, Enhanced 
Cooperation between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners, in Particular the 
Private Sector, 2003]. 




Malaria Control Program and to the researchers at the Ifakara Health Institute and at the 
KEMRI-Wellcome Trust in Kenya, which I also visited).  
I furthermore consider as empirical experience the innumerable conferences, 
debates, interviews and discussions that I have attended during my research in the UK. 
These events saw the participation of, among the others, governmental and 
intergovernmental officials, pharmaceutical industry and business people, lawyers 
working on access to medicines in Africa, people from implementing NGOs, medical 
researchers and practitioners on health care in Africa. In these occasions I had the chance 
not only to learn the practicalities of access to medicines but also to interact proactively 
and network with the people influent in the sector. Important empirical experience has 
also been my one-week visit to Dr James Berkley in Kilifi, Kenya. Dr Berkley is a 
paediatrician active in research at the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI)-
Wellcome Trust Collaborative Programme Centre for Geographic Medicine Research. I 
got in touch with him as he is the son of Jean and Barrie Berkley, who set up the Alistair 
Berkley Charitable Trust which has also funded my PhD studies. It had been extremely 
interesting to exchange views and insights with Dr Berkley and his colleagues at the 
research centre. I finally travelled to Nairobi, Kenya, where I met other researchers on 
the topic of access to medicines in developing countries. Lastly, I could mention some 
empirical experience in Africa which I had lived before engaging in this thesis but is, I 
reckon, still relevant. Namely, in 2005 I undertook a three-month internship at the Italian 
Embassy in Eritrea, which gave me great insight of problems of one of the poorest 
African country and about the work of foreign cooperation, international aid, NGOs and 
other non-sate actors. Finally, with regard to the empirical work, I acknowledge that such 
research can raise a few issues of academic independence considering especially my 
work in close contact with the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority or my meeting with 
Jean, Barrie and James Berkley. With regard to the former, I am happy to acknowledge 
that TFDA gave me indispensible support but I have conducted most of the networking 
and enquiring on my own without interference. With regard to the acquaintance with the 
Berkley family, again, I received a lot of expert and passionate knowledge on medicine 
in Africa but no pressure on the merits of my thesis. Finally, I must note that due to the 
vast amount of material that is dealt with in this thesis, the field work receives less 
explicit reference than it probably should. The empirical experience nonetheless often 




With regard to the theoretical enquiry, I have undertaken a wide exploration but I 
have chosen the systems theory elaborated by Luhmann and his followers, among whom 
in particular Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, as the driving framework. I have mentioned 
above the reasons of such selection. As far as the methodology is concerned, I use the 
contribution of Luhmann and of the other authors as critical-analytical, heuristic tools 
which can guide and explain the findings, not as a deductive grand theory. Such 
methodology is for example supported by Ziegert who argues that “Luhmann’s concepts 
are, contrary to widely held opinion, an excellent mapping device in the methodological 
framework of qualitative empirical research” [Ziegert 2005: 51]. 40  Other theoretical 
insights, such as Foucault’s theory of power and biopower, are also considered as 
suggestions rather than deductive guidelines. Indeed complexity and contingency impede 
a match between reality and abstract formulations of it in all but generalised and 
simplified formulations. Therefore I am not interested in uncovering general laws 
concerning society, pretending to describe and predict its trends with certainty. Instead, I 
am interested in pointing out the ‘logic’, the possible outcomes and the scenarios relating 
to the realisation of the human right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Thus theory, interdisciplinary study on access to medicines and empirical work 
have operated in a triadic exchange with regard to the human right to medicines. I chose 
Luhmann’s social systems theory because of a certain perception of reality which was 
developed through academic research as well as life and experience of sub-Saharan 
Africa. My approach to the theory yet has pre-existed the 2009 field-work in Tanzania 
and Kenya, and has helped me as a critical-analytical tool in appreciating the empirical 
findings. The empirical work, consequently, has contributed to build on the theory. 
Moreover, the theory has functioned as a critical-analytical tool with regard to the law 
and the other literature on access to medicines. In sum, the triadic exchange is aimed at 
deconstructing the social systems and subsystems relating to access to essential 
                                            
40 In his essay Ziegert compares grounded theory and system theory, even stating that 
“[t]he fundamental difference between the systems theory approach and grounded theory 
approaches is the much more serious reflection of the human condition in the theoretical 
(conceptual) groundwork of the systems theory approach. This provides a clear sense of 
theoretical direction and gives researchers a head start through the case-specific and area 
specific dense conceptual groundwork already done and stimulated by systems theory” 
[Ziegert 2005: 59]. The human condition is intended “in the sense of evolutionary 
conditions for the possibility of social systems” [id.] (Cf. Flood proposing ethnography as 
an interpretivist approach to socio-legal research [Flood 2005]). I detach, however, from 
Ziegert’s focus on sociology, as my research is, rather, interdisciplinary and ultimately 




medicines revealing the contingencies, realities and subjectivities which are often 
demoted by the standardised communications of access to medicines in Africa or human 
rights. In the thesis I critically analyse and elaborate such insights, problematising the 
international human right to medicines. 
 
1.6 Contributions to knowledge 
I envisage four main contributions originating from the investigation of the 
research questions. The first contribution concerns international human rights law. The 
thesis offers a thorough identification and analysis of the obligations concerning access 
to medicines in international human rights law applicable de jure in African countries. 
Very limited scholarly literature exists so far on that matter. In particular, the literature is 
poor with regard to the obligations originating from international customary law and soft 
law. With regard to the range of duty-bearers, very scarce thorough research exists on the 
obligations of extra-governmental actors and non-state actors. The second contribution 
regards the ethical analysis of policies for operationalising and implementing the human 
right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Such analysis is also a case-study intervention 
to the debates concerning health care, public health, development and human rights in the 
region. The practical and ethical problems of access to medicines, as well as health care 
more generally, are critically analysed through an interdisciplinary study drawing from 
an array of disciplines (which include public health, medical ethics, economics, law) and 
empirical work which includes a two-month field work in Tanzania. Therefore I will 
identify the limits of steering and the possible conflicts between legitimate rights, 
interests and needs that policies for access to medicines can engender. This approach, 
incidentally, challenges a previous work of mine on the human right to food wherein I 
maintained that human rights law identify a framework for action which should be 
immediately used by states in order to design policies for realising the right [Niada 
2006].41 It is acknowledged at this point that a dissertation on the access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa may be questionable for instance as its scope is too broad or, as it is 
produced outside the region, it cannot but be ‘alien’ to certain realities. Nevertheless, I 
find that the thesis is still relevant as it provides an original view to the problems of that 
area from an external perspective. Moreover, it problematises the existing contributions 
                                            




on this matter that foreigners export to Africa, for example through development studies 
and interventions.  
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the socio-legal studies identifying the 
phenomena of autopoiesis, contingency, and limits of steering affecting human rights, 
law and politics. Such framework is also utilised in order to analyse the exercise of 
power and biopower to control issues of life in a population through the use of law 
(including the human right to medicines) and politics. The fourth contribution is the 
answer to the research question: “can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the 
problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?”. As explained in section 1.3 
above this question is two-fold asking if – descriptively – the right has the capacity and if 
– normatively – it ought to be applied to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
1.7 Outline 
Chapter 1 is the ‘introduction’ and presents the research question, its justification 
and the methodology for answering it. Chapter 2 illustrates the problem of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. It first outlines the health status of sub-Saharan African 
countries underlining the severe burden of disease and the relevance of medicines to 
overcome several health conditions. It subsequently provides an overview of the 
economic and regulatory features of the supply chain that brings medicines from the 
manufacturers to the people. It finally describes the situation of access to medicines in 
Tanzania, which I studied with my empirical work. Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the 
prescriptions of a human right to medicines in international law. They demonstrate that 
certain instances of international law enshrine human rights obligations in relation to 
access to medicines, especially as part of the human right to health, which are applicable 
de jure to the situation of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. However, these 
chapters also illustrate that the international human rights law often does not give clear 
indications about what the duty-bearers are expected to do in order to comply with their 
obligations. The law is to great extent characterised by paradoxes and contingencies. In 
particular, Chapter 3 analyses the duties held by home states and Chapter 4 analyses the 
duties of ‘extra-governmental’ actors, that is, foreign states and non-state actors 




Chapters 5, on home states, and 6, on extra-governmental actors, investigate how 
the duties identified in Chapters 3 and 4 can and ought to be operationalised, 
implemented and enforced. Both chapters are structured following the tripartite division 
of duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to medicines. The 
operationalisation of the obligations is examined through a critical approach considering 
the conflicts that can possibly originate between legitimate interests, needs and rights. 
Empirical and interdisciplinary perspectives, mainly drawing from public health, medical 
ethics and economics help identifying the challenges of the operationalisation of the 
human right to medicines. Luhmann’s theory of social systems and ideas from other 
socio-legal theories are utilised to identify contingency, autopoiesis, biopower and 
thereby the weight of taking decisions relative to complex, sensitive and morally 
challenging issues of access to medicines. Chapter 7 provides the conclusion to the 
thesis, reporting about the ‘contributions to knowledge’ sought. 
 
1.8 Note on language and references  
The term ‘medicine’ is used as a synonym of ‘drug’. The term ‘medicine’ is being 
replaced in the public health literature as the term drug can denote an ‘illicit drug’.  
The term ‘human right to medicines’ will be generally used as a short-hand expression 
for “fundamental component of the human right to health regarding access to medicines”. 
Therefore it does not denote, unless otherwise specified, a self-standing human right. 
With regard to the style of referencing, I use the Harvard system. However, for the sake 
of clarity, I report in the brackets also the titles of the works of certain authors and 
institutions (for example, courts or international institutions), if they have published 
several pieces in the same year. When the reference is a website, I indicate in the 









Chapter 1 has presented the research questions of the thesis: “can a human right 
to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”  The question is two-fold: first I intend a descriptive enquiry of the law and its 
practice as they are. Secondly, I intend a normative enquiry of the law and its practice as 
they ought to be. This research inserts in the context of increasing attention to access to 
medicines in current affairs and of the emerging notion of a human right to medicines in 
international and national human rights law. However, the consequences of this right are 
not appreciated in the literature. Generally, policies for access to medicines can conflict 
with legitimate needs, interests and rights in society. In particular, legal and political 
decisions regarding medicines can constrain the freedom of individuals concerning their 
health, thereby sanctioning biopower. I therefore approach this topic reserving a critical 
approach with regard to the idea that the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of access to medicines shall be channelled through a ‘human right to 
medicines’ in sub-Saharan Africa. The relevance and merits of my arguments are 
grounded on legal, socio-legal, interdisciplinary and empirical critical analyses, which 














CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA. THE CASE-STUDY ON TANZANIA 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims at presenting the circumstances, problems and relevance of 
access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter is divided into three parts: 
section 2.2 outlines the health status of sub-Saharan African countries illustrating the 
severe burden of disease and the possibilities offered by medicines to overcome health 
problems. Section 2.3 deals with the economic and regulatory features of the supply 
chain that brings medicines from the manufacturers to the end-consumers. Section 2.4 
presents the situation of access to medicines in Tanzania that I studied with my empirical 
work. A conclusion is finally provided in section 2.5 arguing that access to medicines is 
to some extent arbitrary, dependent on man-made deliberations. Therefore, there is scope 
for a human right to medicines to intervene regulating such actions and policies. 
However, the chapter also shows the complexities and contingencies of access to 
medicines in the sub-Saharan African health systems. Those complexities, as it will be 
shown in Chapters 5 and 6, can represent challenges to the identification of ideal 
regulatory and policy frameworks to operationalise the human right to medicines. 
Some limitations have to be preliminarily disclosed with regard to the account 
provided in this chapter. To begin with, the object of study, sub-Saharan Africa, is not an 
entirely homogenous entity. The region is constituted by 48 countries which are fully 
located south of the Sahara.42 At a general level, sub-Saharan African countries share 
history, culture, economy and health situations.43 The distinction between sub-Saharan 
Africa and North Africa is generally adopted by international organisations such as the 
UN or the World Bank [WHO AFRO 2006: xxv]. However, other institutions do not 
divide Africa along those lines. The WHO AFRO region, for instance, excludes Djibouti, 
Somalia and Sudan but includes Algeria [WHO AFRO 2006: xxv]. The African Union, 
                                            
42 See Chabal and Daloz [1999: xxi] and The Economist, The Power of the Angry Voter 
[2010]. Sub-Saharan Africa is often simply referred to as ‘Africa’ [Chabal and Daloz 
1999: xxi]. 
43 See Stock in “Africa South of the Sahara: A Geographical Interpretation” [2004: 6, 7]. 
For history, culture and politics see, e.g., Chabal and Daloz [1999], Herbst [2000], Hyden 
[2006], Mamdani [1996]. For the economics see Barratt-Brown [1995]; for the 




in fact, includes 53 continental African countries except Morocco [African Union, 
website, Member States, last accessed 17 February 2010]. Indeed, on a closer look, the 
countries within the region can be quite diverse. The contexts and situations with regard 
to disease and access to medicines vary. Nevertheless, there are some features that make 
sub-Saharan Africa quite homogenous with respect to the rest of the world. 44  The 
relevance of national contexts is analysed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Another caveat is expressed with regard to the value of the quantitative data, such 
as those relating to health systems and economics, presented in the chapter. Quantitative 
data are presumed to represent precisely and objectively the general characters of the 
health systems and access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus they are often 
utilised by the literature and advocacy concerning access to medicines as premises for 
their arguments.45 However, they have to be assessed critically, as discussed throughout 
this chapter. The data offered by the literature often present discrepancies or are out-of-
date.46 Primary data themselves suffer from scarcity of official, systematic recording. In 
fact statistics often ultimately rest on estimates and hypotheses. Moreover, the 
significance of quantitative studies is arguably limited as they are inherently aggregative, 
overlooking the personal situations of individuals.47 Qualitative studies and empirical 
work are used to complement quantitative approaches, even though they also suffer from 
limited objectivity. Furthermore, it is noted that the medical theories on disease and 
treatment which are presented in the chapter may not be definitive, as they are often 
drawn from studies that are ‘in progress’, still based on restricted samples of the 
population, and that are always subject to scientific falsification.  
                                            
44 With regard to health, see generally WHO AFRO [2006]. See infra in this chapter. 
45 For examples of the use of quantitative studies in the scholarly literature on the human 
right to medicines see Hestermayer [2004: 103], Yamin [2003: 102-103]. For the 
scholarly literature on access to medicines see, e.g., Tetteh [2008: 569-570]; for WHO’s 
literature see WHO, “How to Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy” [2001], 
“The World Medicines Situation” [2004], WHO AFRO [2006]. For UN literature on 
access to medicines as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) see Leach et 
al [2005: 1-4]. For advocacy literature see Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “A guide to 
the post-2005 world: TRIPS, R&D and Access to Medicines” [2005], Oxfam’s “Patents 
Versus Patients” [2006]. 
46  For example, with regard to the cases of death caused each year by malaria in 
Tanzania, the US President’s Malaria Initiative reported between 100,000 and 125,000 
lives per year while the WHO reported 38,730 for 2006 [US President’s Malaria 
Initiative 2005: 12; WHO, World Malaria Report 2008: 142].  
47  The ethical and legal limitations of aggregative considerations with regard to the 




2.2 The state of health in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
2.2.1 Epidemiological overview of sub-Saharan Africa: mortality, morbidity, 
burden of disease  
This section presents the diffusion of health problems in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
illustrates the proportion with which the most prevalent diseases affect the region as well 
as the interconnectedness between the health conditions. The method mainly utilised for 
this purpose is the study of mortality and morbidity rates.48 Mortality and morbidity rates 
are often used in epidemiological studies as a proxy of the ‘burden of disease’. Other 
indexes can be used for the burden of disease, such as the disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs).49  DALYs are a summary measure, also ultimately founded on mortality and 
morbidity, and will also be referred to in the thesis.50 Some important limitations to the 
rendition given here have to be mentioned. First, the account provided in this section 
only relates to approximately two thirds of the health problems causing death in sub-
Saharan Africa. Another third of deaths is due to other causes, as shown in Annexe B. 
The factors of morbidity in sub-Saharan Africa are even more numerous, as shown in 
Annexe C. Second, I realised during my research that the accuracy and value of 
                                            
48  Morbidity is defined as the prevalence of illness in the community. Mortality is 
defined as causes of death and rates of death [Last 1983 in Phillips 1990: 31]. 
49 In its study “The Global Burden of Disease and Risk Factors”, the World Bank defines 
the global burden of disease as a “[a] comprehensive demographic and epidemiological 
framework to estimate health gaps… for an extensive set of disease and injury causes, 
and for major risk factors, using all available mortality and health data and methods to 
ensure internal consistency and comparability of estimates” [World Bank, The Global 
Burden of Disease and Risk Factors, 2006: 3]. As a proxy for the global burden of 
disease, the authors utilise disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) [id.]. However, other 
estimates can be chosen. The study of mortality and morbidity has been adopted, for 
example, by the Tanzanian Ministry of Health in “Burden of Disease 2001- The 
Morogoro District” and by the World Bank in the study “Disease and Mortality in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, which will be extensively utilised in this section [Tanzania Ministry of 
Health, Burden of Disease 2001 – The Morogoro District, 2001; Adetunji and Bos 2006]. 
See, in particular, Rao et al [2006]. 
50 DALYs are defined as “a measure of the future stream of healthy life (years expected 
to be lived in full health) lost as a result of the incidence of specific diseases and 
injuries”, ie a sum of “both premature mortality (years of life lost because of premature 
mortality or YLL) and disability (years  of healthy life lost as a result of disability or 
YLD, weighted by the severity of the disability)” [World Bank, The Global Burden of 




epidemiological studies on burden of disease in sub-Saharan Africa are doubtful.51 To 
begin with, the causes of morbidity and death are often multiple and correlated. 
Therefore it may be difficult to identify a single health problem as the cause of death or 
bad health. Moreover, since the production of health statistics in the region does not 
occur on a regular basis, the data used in the literature are generally several years old. 
Next, due to the scarcity of official, systematic recording, statistics often ultimately rest 
on estimates and subjective assumptions.52 Furthermore, there are variations between – 
and within – countries in the burden of disease. A major distinguishing factor across 
African countries is, reportedly, the HIV infection rate (see below) [WHO, World Health 
Report 2003: 233; Rao et al 2006: 55]. Lastly, the data that will be presented often come 
from the very same global health policy-makers and policy-advocates, which include UN 
agencies (WHO, UNAIDS, World Bank) and NGOs. The conflict of interests can impair 
the objectivity of such studies.53  
                                            
51 Epidemiology has at its core “the use of quantitative methods to study diseases in 
human populations so that they might be prevented and controlled” [Beaglehole and 
Bonita 2004: 107]. 
52 For instance, good vital records – necessary as denominators for estimating the overall 
mortality of cause-specific rates – are absent in almost all sub-Saharan Africa countries. 
See Baingana and Bos discussing the efforts for health data collection in the World Bank 
study on “Disease and Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa” [2006]. In World Bank’s 
“Disease and Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa”, from which I draw substantively in this 
section, the authors endeavour to complement the records by utilising sources such as 
household surveys, including demographic and health surveys, the UNICEF Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys, the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys and 
other surveys conducted by WHO, as well as country statistical offices [Baingana and 
Bos, 2006: 8]. Antenatal clinics have been used for assessing AIDS prevalence [id.]. 
53 On the WHO see Scruton [2000: 44]. See Navarro pointing out the manipulation of 
statistical data by Frenk and Murray in the “World Health Report 2000: Health Systems: 
Improving Performance” [Navarro 2006; Murray and Frenk, World Health Report 2000: 
Health Systems: Improving Performance, 2000]. Reportedly, Professor Philip Musgrove, 
the technical director of the study supervised and directed by Frenk and Murray, tried to 
prevent the publication of such data. Unsuccessful, Musgrove later publicly denounced 
their manipulation thereby supporting the accusations pronounced by Navarro and others. 
The story has been object of a querelle in medical including the Lancet and the American 
Journal of Public Health [Murray and Frank, World Health Report 2000¸ 2000; Murray 
and Frank World Health Report 2000: A Step Towards Evidence Based Health Policy, 
2000; Navarro, Assessment of the World Health Report 2000, 2000; Navarro, World 
Health Report 2000: Responses to Murray and Frenk, 2000; Musgrove 2006]. A recent 
(November 2007) scandal on the worldwide diffusion of the AIDS has stimulated a flurry 
of speculation about the good faith of the WHO in gathering data that constitute the 
factual basis of its action and therefore funding. UNAIDS, the joint UN programme on 
HIV/AIDS, to which WHO is a main participant, has in effect admitted with a 2007 




Overall, WHO proclaims Sub-Saharan Africa to be the region in the world cursed 
by the highest burden of disease, accounting for 25% of the global burden [WHO 2003, 
The World Health Report: 120].54 The level of mortality in the region is the highest by 
far: life expectancy at birth is 46 years whereas in Asia, which endures the second lowest 
life expectancy, it amounts to 67 [Adetunji and Bos 2006: 12]. WHO reckons that adult 
mortality in Africa has reversed since 1990, shifting from a state of steady decline into a 
situation characterized by rapidly increasing mortality rate which “exceed[s] the levels of 
three decades ago” [WHO, The World Health Report 2003: 16]. The literature on health 
and development often expresses alarm on the current situation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
For example Madavo, the former Vice-President Africa Region of the World Bank has 
remarked that: 
… the sobering reality is that life expectancy has decreased by almost five 
years for the continent as a whole since the 1991 publication, and by much 
more in some countries… children under five are dying at unacceptably high 
rates from causes for which effective interventions exist, and adult mortality 
from infectious diseases has risen to extraordinary levels. HIV/AIDS has 
spread from eastern Africa to the rest of the continent, affecting southern 
African countries the most. Malaria mortality of children increased during the 
1990s, and TB has reemerged as a leading cause of death for adults, largely 
due to the spread of AIDS. Not surprisingly, at this time Sub-Saharan Africa 
is not on track to reach any of the health Millennium Development Goals. 
[Jamison 2006: xiii]55  
Analysing the burden for each disease, HIV/AIDS is deemed to be the leading 
cause of death in the region, being responsible for approximately 20% of total deaths 
[Rao, Lopez and Hemed 2005]. Nearly 80% of the almost three million global deaths 
from HIV/AIDS in 2002 occurred in sub-Saharan Africa [WHO, The World Health 
Report 2003, 2003: 18]. UNAIDS and WHO have estimated, in 2005, that 25.8 million 
                                                                                                                                 
India, it was reducing its 2006 figures from 39.5m to 32.7m infected people” [Jack, UN 
lowers estimate of people with Aids to 33m, 2007]. Caldwell reports some polemic 
accounts by Chin (infectious-disease epidemiologist at Berkeley), and Epstein (molecular 
biologist and author): “Dr Chin describes UNAids’ epidemiology with the Horatian 
expression splendide mendax – meaning untruthful to a noble end. It sought ‘to avoid 
further stigmatisation’ of infected groups, Dr Chin believes, and fostered a climate in 
which the public remained ‘fearful about HIV infections ‘jumping out’ from these foci of 
infection to spread into the ‘general population’’. This was an unlikely outcome, in Dr 
Chin’s view, but such worries kept vigilance and fundraising high. Helen Epstein… also 
said this week that the old numbers had ‘fitted perhaps a certain fundraising agenda’” 
[Caldwell 2007].  
54 The burden of disease is here approximated in DALYs. 
55  The statement can however be seen as slightly alarmist, for instance indicating 




people are currently infected, representing 64% of the world HIV positive population 
[UNAIDS and WHO 2005]. In Swaziland, Botswana and parts of South Africa women 
antenatal clinics reveal a shocking 30% seropositivity rate [Craddock 2004: 1]. Women 
are disproportionately affected, as they account for approximately 60% of estimated HIV 
infections in sub-Saharan Africa [UNAIDS 2009: 22]. The reasons are both greater 
physiological susceptibility and the social, legal and economic disadvantages they often 
confront [id.].56 HIV/AIDS is also worsening the trends of many communicable diseases 
such as tuberculosis, malaria and lower respiratory tract infections.57 With regard to 
noncommunicable diseases, HIV positive children are more prone to developmental 
disabilities [Baingana and Bos 2006: 3]. Maternal HIV seropositivity compromises the 
provision of care and undermines global cognitive development [Baingana, Thomas, and 
Comblain 2005]. The Kaposi’s sarcoma is now the leading cancer in children where there 
is high HIV prevalence [Baingana and Bos 2006: 4].58 Finally, 30% of HIV positive 
individuals show some evidence of cardiac involvement [Mbewu and Mbanya 2006: 
312]. To note, there are conspicuous variations in the incidence and mortality due to 
AIDS within Africa.59  
                                            
56 See also section 2.2.2 below. 
57 Baingana and Bos report that the caseload of tuberculosis has increased by a factor of 
five or more in the regions of eastern and southern Africa most affected by HIV 
[Baingana and Bos 2006: 3]. HIV positive individuals are also more vulnerable to 
malaria, suffering from higher density of parasitemia and more severe symptoms of 
malaria in adults. HIV seropositivity approximately doubles the risk of malaria 
parisetemia and clinical malaria in nonpregnant adults. Consequently HIV infection 
increases incidence and severity of clinical malaria in adults [Snow and Omumbo 2006: 
205]. 45% of the children hospitalised for lower respiratory tract infections are HIV 
positive. The HIV positive patients represent 80% of the deaths among the children 
hospitalised for the respiratory condition. 
58 Noteworthy, before the HIV epidemic, the Kaposi’s sarcoma was a rare condition, 
which has now increased 20-fold [Baingana and Bos 2006: 4]. 
59 The sub-Saharan African countries most affected by the AIDS epidemic endure a 
particularly high rate of morbidity and mortality and, to mean, are the only countries 
classified by WHO in its mortality strata as subgroup  ‘E’, characterised by ‘high child, 
very high adult mortality’. The other African countries classify as ‘D’, implying ‘high 
child, high adult mortality’. Even in ‘D’ countries, AIDS represents the leading cause of 
death for individuals aged 15-59 [Roa et al 2006: 55]. In AFR D countries 25.8% of 
deaths at 15-59 are due to HIV/AIDS. In AFR E countries, the quota arises to 54.1% 
[Roa et al 2006: 55]. The WHO’s regional subgroup AFR E countries are: Botswana, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, the Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 




Malaria is the second leading cause of mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, 
accounting for 10% of deaths [Rao, Lopez and Hemed 2006]. It is the main killer for the 
0-14 years old youths, causing 20% of deaths [id.: 53]. In the last 20 years children 
mortality due to malaria in sub-Saharan Africa has reportedly risen [Snow and Omumbo 
2006: 205]. Moreover, besides the deaths occurring as a direct result of the infection by 
P. falciparum, malaria also causes consequential and indirect mortality which, according 
to Snow and Omumbo, increase the amount of deaths due to this disease by 10%.60 Also, 
it seems that high density of exposure to malaria infections may increase the rate of 
progression of HIV in Africa.61 The third killer in sub-Saharan Africa is again related to 
an infection. The acute respiratory infections, a category of lung infections including the 
particularly severe lower respiratory tract infections such as pneumonia and bronchiolitis, 
are responsible for 9.8% of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa each year [Rao, Lopez and 
Hemed 2006: 53]. The burden of lower respiratory tract infections doubles where HIV is 
more virulent [Madhi and Klugman 2006: 151]. HIV-infected children are up to 40 times 
more likely to get a pneumococcal disease [The Economist, New Vaccines for Old 
Killers, 2007]. Sub-Saharan Africa is suspected to have the world’s highest incidence of 
acute respiratory infections. The death toll is particularly heavy for children under five 
years of age, for which acute respiratory infections represent the leading cause of death. 
                                                                                                                                 
World Bank (see infra) [Roa et al 2006: 55]. AFR D countries are: Algeria, Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Togo [Roa et al 2006]. The WHO estimates that without HIV/AIDS, life expectancy at 
birth in the African region would have been almost 6.1 years higher in 2002. In effect, 
the reduction in life expectancy varies significantly across the African region. The 
greatest impact has been in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, where 
HIV/AIDS has reduced male and female life expectancies by more than 20 years [WHO, 
The World Health Report 2003, 2003: 204].  
60 With regard to consequential mortality, death can occur as a consequence of certain 
situations caused by malaria such as antimalarial adverse drug reaction, anaemia, HIV 
infection through transfusion, neurological disability associated with severe malaria 
[Snow and Omumbo 2006: 203]. With regard to indirect mortality, malaria: can also 
increase mortality both for the child and the mother during pregnancy; is a major 
contributor of anaemia in children; is concomitant to undernutrition, even though the 
precise causal relationship is difficult quantify (probably, the two conditions enjoy a 
synergic relationship rather than a unilateral causality); and can facilitate the severity of 
HIV in an individual [Snow and Omumbo 2006: 203]. 
61 According to a study in Malawi reported by the authors, HIV blood viral levels were 
found to be seven times higher in HIV positive adults with acute, uncomplicated malaria 
than in HIV positive blood donors without malaria. Importantly, the increased HIV viral 
burden was reversed by effective malaria therapy [Snow and Omumbo 2006: 206]. Note, 




Estimates indicate that, in 2000, 70% of the worldwide 1.9 million children deaths due to 
acute respiratory infections occurred in Africa and Southeast Asia [Williams et al 2002].  
Diarrhoeal diseases are the next major cause of mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. 
They are responsible for 6.5% of total deaths and are particularly harsh on children, 
accounting for 12.7% of the deaths in the age group 0-14 [Rao, Lopez and Hemed 2006: 
55]. 62  Sub-Saharan Africa, again, holds a sad worldwide record relating to an 
epidemiological phenomenon. As Bryce et al reckon, of the estimated total 10.6 million 
deaths among children younger than five years of age worldwide, 42 percent occur in the 
WHO African region.63 HIV/AIDS contributes also to the incidence of this condition 
[Boschi-Pinto, Lanata, Mendoza, Habte 2006: 107]. Leading to 3% of all deaths in sub-
Saharan Africa, tuberculosis (TB) is gaining ground in the region as its incidence rate is 
increasing at 3% per year [Dye et al 2006: 183]. WHO notes that while the largest 
number of new tuberculosis cases in 2004 occurred in WHO’s South-East Asia Region, 
the estimated incidence per capita in sub-Saharan Africa is nearly twice that of the South-
East Asia Region, at nearly 400 cases per 100,000 population, the highest in the world. 
Both the highest number of deaths and the highest mortality per capita take place in the 
WHO Africa region [WHO, website, Tuberculosis, 2006]. The mortality rate is 
increasing. The main responsible for this situation is the diffusion of HIV, which not only 
facilitates the infection, but also undermines the possibilities of recovery from 
tuberculosis [Dye et al 2005: 187].64 In return, tuberculosis is a leading cause of death 
among HIV-positive people, accounting for about 13% of AIDS deaths worldwide 
[WHO, website, Tuberculosis, 2006]. In 2000, sub-Saharan Africa was aggrieved by the 
70% of world HIV-TB co-infections, affecting 17 million people [Dye et al 2006: 183]. 
A last mention can be made to the recent emergence of drug resistance to the standard 
tuberculosis treatment in sub-Saharan Africa, where it has been traditionally low.65  
                                            
62 The major causes of diarrhoea are enteropathogens such as rotavirus, entero-adherent 
Escherichia coli, enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli and Giardia lamblia [Boschi-Pinto, 
Lanata, Mendoza, Habte 2005]. 
63 The study is quoted in Boschi-Pinto, Lanata, Mendoza, Habte [2006: 107]. 
64 Up to 15% of tuberculin-positive, HIV-positive adults will develop tuberculosis each 
year [WHO 1999 in Dye et al 2005: 188], while the lifetime risk is 50% or higher [Dye et 
al 2005: 182]. Without HIV coinfection, the average lifetime risk of infected individuals 
developing tuberculosis is 5 to 10% [Dye et al 2005: 181]. The interval between HIV 
infection and the onset of tuberculosis is four to six years [Dye et al 2005: 188]. 
65 Beside MDR-TB, cases of XDR-TB, practically incurable, are occurring in South 




Sub-Saharan Africa also bears the greatest burden of vaccine-preventable 
diseases. This region accounts for 59% of all measles deaths, 41% of tetanus deaths, 80% 
of yellow fever deaths, and 58% of pertussis (whooping cough) deaths [Disease Control 
Priority Project, online, 2006]. It is estimated that the African continent suffers as much 
as 59% of all global cases of measles [US Coalition for Child Survival, website, 2007]. 
Measles alone accounts for 4% of total deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, 8.75% for children 
under 14 [Rao, Lopez and Hemed 2006: 55]. Finally, sub-Saharan Africa is not spared 
from the chronic diseases that mostly affect richer regions in the world. In fact, if 
circulatory system (ischemic heart diseases and hypertensive diseases) and 
cerebrovascular diseases are lumped together as cardiovascular diseases, they account for 
11% of total deaths in sub-Saharan Africa amounting to the second most common cause 
of adult deaths [Mbewu and Mbanya 2005: 305].66 Interestingly, half of cardiovascular 
diseases deaths occur among people 30 to 69 years of age, which is ten or more years 
younger than in more developed countries [Baingana and Bos 2005: 2,3].  
 
2.2.2 Determinants of health and public health  
The epidemiological situation described above is due to a multiplicity of 
contingent factors, some of them human and some natural, which together constitute the 
sub-Saharan African ‘health systems’. Namely these factors include geography, climate, 
infrastructures (e.g., access to drinking water and sanitation), nourishment, knowledge 
about health issues and hygiene, culture, mores, attitudes, behaviours and the health care 
systems.67 The role of the health-care systems will be analysed in the following sections 
                                            
66 Cardiovascular diseases encompass a wide array of disorders, including diseases of the 
cardiac muscle and of the vascular system supplying the heart, brain, and other vital 
organs. Ischemic heart disease, stroke, congestive heart failure account for at least 80% 
of the burden of cardiovascular diseases in all income regions. A fourth manifestation, 
rheumatic heart disease accounts for three percent of all DALYs lost as a result of 
cardiovascular diseases, does not contribute significantly to the overall global burden of 
cardiovascular diseases [Gaziano et al 2006: 645].  
67 The WHO “World Health Report – Health Systems: Improving Performance” defines 
health system “to include all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore 
or maintain health” [WHO, World Health Report 2000, 2000: 5]. According to Sheaff, 
“[a] health system… includes a healthcare system plus methods for influencing health 




with particular regard to access to medicines. This section presents the role of other 
aspects of health systems and public health.68  
With regard to environmental risks, WHO AFRO reports that hundreds of 
thousands of Africans, particularly children, die every year from diseases caused by 
micro-organisms, certain chemicals in the water supply, or diseases caused by poor 
sanitation. Poor water and sanitation also bring with them a host of non-fatal but 
debilitating diseases as well as severe problems of environmental degradation that have a 
further impact on health. Without safe water for drinking and for use in food preparation, 
populations are vulnerable to an array of waterborne diseases including cholera, typhoid 
and other diarrhoeal infections as well as to parasites, such as guinea worm and 
schistosomes [WHO AFRO 2006: 86]. The UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme 
for Water and Sanitation found that in 2002 the percentage of the population of sub-
Saharan Africa with access to a safe water supply was 58%. Just 36% of African 
individuals have access to adequate sanitation facilities [WHO/UNICEF 2005]. Deadly 
malaria parasites are particularly diffused in the equatorial and tropical areas of Africa, as 
shown in the following map representing the global distribution of malaria transmission 
risk in 2003 [World Malaria Report 2005].69 
 
Global distribution of malaria transmission risk, 2003. The burden of Africa in 
apparent. Source: World Malaria Report 2005 [Roll Back Malaria website, last accessed 
February 2010] 
                                            
68 Beaglehole and Bonita in their “Public Health at the Crossroad” normatively define 
public health as the “collective action for sustained population-wide health 
improvement” [Beaglehole and Bonita 2004: 174]. The notion of public health is 
normatively controversial. See Chapter 4 section 4.4.4. 
69 The 2005 World Malaria Report is the last available [Roll Back Malaria, website, 




Undernourishment can originate both from insufficient calories intake and from 
inadequate micronutrients blend [Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine 2002]. The latter is 
particularly crucial for infants, young children, teenagers, pregnant or breastfeeding 
women. Deficiencies in essential vitamins (etymologically ‘the amines of life’) such as 
vitamin A, and minerals, such as iron, folic acid and iodine, can have life-long dire 
consequences. Moreover, undernourishment readily crosses generations through a 
phenomenon called biological programming. The infants of undernourished women 
begin their own lives malnourished, and face increased risk of early death, childhood 
disease and life-long impairments. Undernourished women are more likely to die in 
childbirth, or to suffer debilitating complications of pregnancy and childbirth [FAO 
2002]. More generally, undernourishment is the major risk factor for over 28% of all 
deaths in Africa – some 2.9 million deaths annually [Benson and Shekar 2006: 87]. An 
estimated 200 million people in Africa are undernourished [FAO 2003]. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region in the world where famines are endemic [Deveraux 2000].  
 
Underweight prevalence and population density of underweight children. Sub-
Saharan Africa is severely affected by this condition [Shepherd 2008; UN Millennium 
Project, Halving Hunger, It Can Be Done, 2005] 
Lack of knowledge about hygiene and health-relevant information may result in 
people not getting the full health gain from inputs that are available to them. It is 
sometimes claimed that one of the most effective interventions against diarrhoea is hand-




often requires further purification [id.: 78]. It has been estimated that secondary 
education can exert a significant effect on infant mortality. The use of almost all child 
health interventions is higher in households with better-educated mothers [Wagstaff and 
Claeson 2004: 40]. In sub-Saharan Africa an average of only 30% of each age cohort 
completes junior secondary education and 12% senior secondary education [World Bank, 
Secondary Education and Training in Africa]. According to Gaziano et al, high blood 
pressure, high cholesterol, extensive tobacco and alcohol use, and low vegetable and fruit 
consumption are already among top (behavioural) risk factors for disease in Sub-Saharan 
Africa [Gaziano et al 2006: 659]. 
With specific regard to AIDS, a flourishing literature researches the characters of 
the AIDS pandemic ‘beyond epidemiology’, to borrow the expression used by Kalipeni 
et al, focusing on the behavioural and social contexts of AIDS contagions [Chin 2007; 
Craddock 2004; Barnett and Whiteside 2002/2006; Epstein 2007; Kalipeni et al 2004; 
Pisani 2008]. Craddock emphasises some socio-economic features underpinning the 
AIDS problem such as children abandonment and women exploitation [Craddock 2004]. 
Gender can in effect be made a ‘risk factor’. Women are often unable to protect 
themselves from unprotected intercourse and sexual violence makes them more 
vulnerable to HIV infection [Craddock 2004; McCoy 2003: 9].
 
Such weakness also 
contributes to the diffusion of ‘unsafe sexual practices’ and enhances the burden of 
sexually-transmitted diseases in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, WHO reckons that more 
than 99% of the HIV infections prevalent in Africa in 2001 are attributable to unsafe sex 
[WHO, World Health Report 2002: 62]. Globally, about 2.9 million deaths (5.2% of total) 
are attributable to unsafe sex [id.: 63]. The vast majority of this burden results from 
HIV/AIDS infections occurring in the African region [id.]. Furthermore, Barnett and 
Whiteside in effect identify different causes for the epidemics depending on the context 
of each region. 70  Epstein, moreover, finds a strong correlation between the sexual 
lifestyle that she dubs ‘concurrency’ of long-term sexual relationships – as opposed to 
serial monogamy – and the diffusion of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa [Epstein 2007]. 
Therefore, preventive interventions of social campaigning can modify those behaviours 
                                            
70 Barnett and Whiteside argue for example that in Uganda and Democratic Republic of 
Congo the AIDS epidemic originated from the scourge of corrupt governments and war; 
in Tanzania AIDS diffused within gradual economic and social changes; in South Africa, 
the epidemic originated from the legacy of apartheid, and especially the utilisation of 
migrant black workers at mines which were separated from the families and turned to 




and/or the risks associated with them: Epstein for instance appeals to social mobilisation 
on the issue, taking inspiration from what has happened in San Francisco (US) and 
Uganda [id.]. 
 
2.2.3 The possibilities offered by medical prevention and treatment  
This section illustrates the bio-medical approaches which can prevent, alleviate or 
cure the health problems affecting the people in sub-Saharan Africa. Curative (as 
opposed to preventive) bio-medical interventions in particular act on the identifiable 
patient, seeking to heal or alleviate the condition she suffers from. Bio-medical 
approaches generally use pharmaceutical products. It has always to be considered, 
nonetheless, that bio-medical treatment often is not sufficient on its own to cure diseases 
– let alone to deliver health; its success generally depends on the patient’s conditions and 
on the quality of the health assistance accessible to her. Again, extensive reference is 
made in the following paragraphs to medical studies often supported or compiled by UN 
agencies.  
With regard to HIV, as of today it is not possible to eliminate the virus after it 
settles in a body.71 In the absence of a therapy, after a median of between nine to ten 
years of latency, HIV progresses to the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
after which the remaining median survival time is 9.2 months [Morgan et al 2002]. Yet, 
the highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) can increase the life expectancy of a 
HIV positive person to 32 years from the time of infection if treatment is started when 
the CD4 count is 350/µL [Schackman et al 2006]. The effectiveness of the treatment can 
vary according to the patient’s viral load, medication tolerance and environment, also 
including the availability of medical care such as monitoring of the progress of the 
treatment and care of side effects. A major determinant of treatment effectiveness, 
though, is adherence, ie the continuous utilisation of the prescribed medicines, which has 
to be maintained at 98% [Department of Health and Human Services 2006]. 
Encouragingly, studies conducted in several African countries indicate high degree of 
success and patients demonstrated a strong commitment to adhere to the prescribed 
                                            
71 Some cases have been reported where HIV prevalence became so low that it could not 




regimen of drugs [Mboup et al 2005: 244]. 72  As in most developing countries, the 
standard regimen is now a three-drug combination that includes two nucleoside analogue 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs) and one nonnucleoside transcriptase inhibitor 
(NNRTI) [Mboup et al 2005: 243].73 However, in 2005, only 17% of the people in need 
of treatment in the African Region were receiving it (ie 810,000 people out of 4.7 
million). 74  One major problem, moreover, is that the antiretroviral therapy requires 
regular and nutritious food intake, which is often a problem for people in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as seen in section 2.2.2.75  
Malaria used to be treated with chloroquine and sulfadoxine–pyrimethamine (SP), 
but in recent years plasmodium falciparum has developed resistance to such remedies in 
most of the African continent [WHO AFRO 2006: 53]. So far, combination treatments 
based on artemisinin do not encounter resistance, and many African countries are shifting 
to this as first-line treatment. However, while a total of 33 out of the 42 malaria-endemic 
countries in the African Region have adopted artemisinin combinations as first-line 
treatment, only nine of these are currently implementing such treatment policies [id.: 
55].76 It is reported that the number of people receiving effective antimalarial medicines 
within 24 hours of onset of symptoms remains low [id.]. 
If left untreated, 50–80% of patients with smear-positive tuberculosis will die of 
their disease.77 In contrast, death rates in directly observed therapy, short-course (DOTS) 
                                            
72 As Mboup et al report, these include survival rates of 85% or higher, and escalation of 
CD4 cell counts of 150 CD4+ cells per cubic millimetre or more by a year after drug 
initiation. Moreover, surprisingly positive responses also came from patients who began 
drug therapy at cell counts below 50 CD4+ cells per cubic millimitre, most of whom 
would have probably died within a year if left untreated [Mboup et al 2005: 244]. These 
results are important, as scepticism originally abounded on the possibility of maintaining 
the required adherence in the African health setting.  
73  Common reverse transcriptase inhibitors are for example zidovudine (AZT) and 
lamivudine (3TC); a common nonnucleoside transcriptase inhibitor is nevirapine (NVP). 
74 From WHO [Report on the State of the Global AIDS Pandemic, 2006]. See also Losse 
et al holding that “[i]n 2001, in high-income countries, 500,000 patients took 
antiretrovirals and fewer than 25,000 died; in sub-Saharan Africa, fewer than 30,000 
patients took antiretrovirals and 2.2 million died” [Losse et al 2007:1]. 
75 See WHO, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic [2006: 171]. The World Food 
Programme is intervening by collaborating with the WHO/UNAIDS 3 by 5 programme 
[id.]. On the 3 by 5 programme see also Chapter 6 section 6.4.1. 
76  See also MSF, Malaria still kills needlessly in Africa – Effective Drugs are not 
Reaching Patients [2006]. 
77 For the majority of countries, pulmonary TB (PTB) is diagnosed by sputum smear 




programmes throughout the world are generally less than 5% [Frieden 2002: 895]. DOTS 
consists of a combination of antibiotics, usually rifampicin and isoniazid, and takes 
around 6 to 12 months to entirely eliminate the mycobacteria from the body [American 
Lung Association 2005: 7]. However, in a poorly implemented tuberculosis programme, 
as many as 30% of patients with smear-positive tuberculosis die [Frieden 2002: 895]. In 
fact, as WHO reports, the “treatment success in the 2003 DOTS cohort of 1.7 million 
patients was 82% on average” [WHO 2006, Tuberculosis, Fact Sheet N°104, Revised 
March 2006]. As for Africa, the proportion of success amounted to 72% [Dye et al 2005: 
187].78 It should be observed, though, that the estimated case detection rate under DOTS 
was 48%.79 Treatment of HIV positive tuberculosis patients is particularly problematic as 
they are more likely to develop adverse reaction to anti-TB medicines and their immune 
status is compromised. Accordingly, Dye et al state that antiretroviral therapy could 
greatly extend the lives of HIV-infected patients [Dye et al 2005: 189]. A preventive 
treatment for tuberculosis is also possible, which reduces the short-term risk of 
developing the active disease.80 It is particularly indicated for tuberculin positive, HIV 
positive individuals, for whom isionazid preventive treatment reduces tuberculosis 
prevalence by about 60% [Corbett et al 2006: 933]. However, as Corbett et al note, this 
low-cost intervention has been little used in Africa, with only Botswana attempting 
widespread implementation [Corbett et al 2006: 933]. 
Lower respiratory tract infections are due to a variety of pathogen agents. The 
dominant pathogens in sub-Saharan Africa are the respiratory synctial virus and two 
bacteria: Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus influenzae, which can be defied 
with antibiotics. Drawing conclusion from the evaluation of a programme in Malawi, 
                                                                                                                                 
Although smear-negative PTB cases are less infectious than smear-positive cases, a 
significant proportion of secondary cases have been traced to exposure to smear-negative 
patients. In HIV/AIDS patients, an increase in the proportion of smear-negative PTB has 
been observed. HIV-infected smear-negative PTB cases have also been shown to have a 
poor prognosis compared to smear-positive PTB patients. Therefore, the Stop TB 
Strategy emphasizes the need for timely diagnosis and treatment of all tuberculosis cases, 
including smear-negative PTB. Worryingly, in the presence of HIV infection, altered 
clinical and radiological presentations make the diagnosis of tuberculosis difficult. In 
HIV-infected patients, PTB with normal chest X-rays and without clinical symptoms has 
been documented frequently, furthering the need for high-quality microscopic and 
microbiologic examinations [Tamahane et al 2009: 347]. 
78 The HIV coinfection increases the death rate in some countries [Dye et al 2005: 187]. 
79 The global average is 53% [Dye et al 2005: 186]. 
80 The protection has a limited duration, approximately 2.5 years where transmission rate 




Madhi and Klugman state that “standard inpatient case management of severe and very 
severe pneumonia by trained staff with a regular supply of antibiotics produced a striking 
impact on the number of deaths occurring after 24 hours of hospital admission, even in 
the adverse conditions of Malawi, where the prevalence of HIV infection is high, 
malnutrition is rife, the level of maternal literacy is low, and an efficient transport system 
from peripheral to district hospitals is lacking” [Madhi and Klugman 2005: 155-6]. 
Indeed the overall success of treating lower respiratory tract infections improved from 
55% at the time of the start of the programme to 82%, 26 months later [Madhi and 
Klugman 2005: 155-6]. The risk of developing lower respiratory tract infections can be 
preventively reduced through the administration of vaccines such as the measles 
vaccine,81 the Hib conjugate vaccine82 and the S. Pneumoniae conjugate vaccine.83 The 
heavy burden of lower respiratory tract infections notwithstanding, the latter two 
vaccines are not but exceptionally routinely adopted in sub-Saharan Africa.84  
Diarrhoea is a symptom that, as pneumonia, can be caused by different 
pathogens. The most relevant pathogens in terms of morbidity and mortality in sub-
Saharan Africa are entheropathogens such as rotavirus, entero-adherent pathogenic 
Escherichia Coli, enterotoxigenic Escherichia Coli and Shigella. Effective medical 
interventions for the treatment of diarrhoea include oral rehydration therapy and 
antimicrobials. These latter are especially necessary for bloody diarrhoea, and their 
prescription has to be accurate considering the increasing occurrence of drug resistance 
by the pathogens involved [Keusch et al 2006: 378]. According to Jones et al the 
                                            
81 Under-five children immunised with the measles vaccine had a mortality rate due to 
lower respiratory-tract infections two-fold less common [Madhi and Klugman 2005: 
155]. 
82 In The Gambia the Hib conjugate vaccine reduced the incidence of radiologically 
confirmed pneumonia by 21% [Mulholland et al 1993 in Madhi and Klugman 2005: 
156]. 
83 Among South African children, the S. Pneumoniae conjugate vaccine was shown to 
reduce culture-confirmed invasive pneumococcal disease by 83% and radiologically 
confirmed pneumonia, irrespective of microbiological diagnosis, by 20% [Klugman et al 
2003 in Madhi and Klugman 2005: 157]. In The Gambia it was also found to reduce all-
cause hospitalisation by 15% and all-cause mortality by 16% [Cutts et al 2005 in Madhi 
and Klugman 2005: 158]. 
84 Despite Hib conjugate vaccines being available since the late 1980s, the only sub-
Saharan African country to have introduced it in its routine immunisation programme 
was South Africa (since 1999) [Madhi and Klugman 2005: 156]. In 2000, fewer than 1% 
children living in the 42 countries with 90% of worldwide child deaths (which roughly 
represent sub-Saharan Africa) received the vaccine [Jones et al 2003: 67, referring to 




utilisation of oral rehydration therapy and antibiotics could save 15% and 3% 
respectively of all under-5 deaths in the 42 countries with 90% of worldwide child deaths 
in 2000 [Jones et al 2003: 67]. Yet, the coverage estimates for these child survival 
interventions is respectively 20% and 10% [Jones et al 2003: 67, referring to UNICEF, 
State of the World’s Children 2003, 2003]. 
According to Yusuf et al, up to 22% of premature all-cause mortality by 
cardiovascular diseases and 45% of stroke mortality can be reduced by appropriate 
detection and treatment [Mbewu and Mbanya 2005: 321 referring to Yusuf et al 2004]. 
Gaziano et al report some medical interventions which they consider cost-effective in 
developing countries because they “result in large reductions in cardiovascular diseases 
events, are inexpensive, or the prevalence or incidence of the diseases to which they are 
directed is significant” [Gaziano et al 2006].85 For instance, with regard to ischemic heart 
disease,86  the treatment of acute myocardial infarction uses beta-blockers, aspirin or 
thrombolytics or an invasive intervention with cardiac catheterization and angioplasty, 
while the long-term medical management of existing vascular disease involves 
pharmacotherapy and can use invasive techniques.87 Congestive heart failure88 is to be 
treated with diuretics, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, 89  and beta-blockers. 
                                            
85 See also Mbewu and Mbanya stating that cheap, effective therapy for cardiovascular 
diseases is available [Mbewu and Mbanya 2005: 321]. 
86 Ischemic heart disease is the clinical manifestation of the coronary heart disease. Two 
leading manifestations of ischemic heart disease are acute myocardial infarction and 
angina pectoris [Mbewu and Mbanya 2005: 310; Gaziano et al 2006: 645]. 
87  Beta-blockers reduce myocardial oxygen demand and fatal arrhythmias. Aspirin 
restores blood flow by inhibiting platelet aggregation. Thrombolytics dissolve the 
thrombus occluding the arterial lumen [Gaziano et al 2006: 650-53]. The 
pharmacological interventions either prevent thrombosis, as does aspirin, or target the 
individual risk factors, as do the antihypertensives (diuretics, beta-blockers, and 
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors) or statins targeting cholesterol. Furthermore, 
these agents may possibly have additional properties of reducing the risk of fatal 
arrhythmias, improving repair after AMI (remodeling), or stabilizing the atherosclerotic 
plaque. Invasive techniques are angioplasty or percutaneous coronary intervention 
[Gaziano et al 2006: 650-53]. 
88 Congestive heart failure is the end stage of many heart diseases. Ischemic heart disease 
and hypertension-related heart disease are the most common etiologies [Gaziano et al 
2006: 646]. 
89  Angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors reduce risks related to a variety of 
endpoints, including mortality, hospitalization, major coronary events, deterioration of 
symptoms, and progression from asymptomatic to symptomatic left ventricular 
dysfunction, by 25 to 33%. Angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors has proved to be 




With regard to the rheumatic heart disease, 90  antistreptococcal treatment (such as 
penicillin) manages clinical manifestations. Secondary prophylaxis to prevent 
colonization of the upper respiratory tract consists of penicillin or sulfadiazine for the 
first five years. Tertiary treatment entails surgery for valve replacement or valvuloplasty 
[Gaziano et al 2006: 650-53]. However, Mbewu and Mbanya note that “[c]ardiovascular 
disorders currently receive little or no attention in most African countries” [Mbewu and 
Mbanya 2005: 322]. Lastly, supplementary and therapeutic foods can be administered to 
overcome undernourishment and malnourishment. Fortified peanut butter-like pastes 
have proved to be particularly effective for malnourished children [Enserink 2008]. 
 
2.3 Access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.3.1 Estimate and dimensions of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
The account provided in the previous section maintains that some medical 
interventions which would improve the health of the people in sub-Saharan Africa are 
technically feasible but are seldom put into practice. One of the necessary components 
for treatment lacking in sub-Saharan Africa is access to medicines. 91  A precise 
quantification of access to medicines overall is difficult, but the WHO has estimated that 
47% of the people in Africa lack access to ‘essential’ medicines [WHO, The World 
Medicines Situation, 2004: 62].92 To note, the identification and selection of ‘essential’ 
medicines is ethically, medically, economically and legally problematic, as it will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.93 In fact, the approximation utilised by WHO in this study 
relates to a mere minimum list of 20 essential medicines; the list most probably does not 
include the latest artemisinin-based combination therapy adopted since 2004 by African 
countries in their drug policies [WHO AFRO 2006: 54] or antiretrovirals, which have 
                                            
90 Rheumatic heart disease is the consequence of an acute rheumatic fever. It can entail 
several complications which may lead to sudden cardiac deaths [Gaziano et al 2006: 
647]. 
91 See Sheaff on the elements of health-care systems [Sheaff 1996: 172]. 
92 WHO estimate for 1999. In 37 out of the 45 countries in the African Region the 
percentage of people with regular access to essential medicines was inferior to 50%, 
accordingly defined ‘very low’ [WHO 2004: 62]. 




been recommended for the first time in WHO model essential drug lists (EDLs)94 only in 
2002 [Laing 2004: 1724].95 More analytical are the surveys on medicine prices and 
availability undertaken by some African countries within the ‘Medicines Prices’ 
project. 96  The surveys revealed a diversity in prices and availability of medicines 
between geographical areas (and most evidently between urban and rural areas), as well 
as between the public, private and non-profit sectors.97 Moreover they underscore the 
discrepancies between the procurement prices and the private retail prices, also 
comparing those to the international reference price. Again, to be noted, these studies are 
indicative, focussing on a restricted sample of products which provide comparable data 
(30 common core medicines to which other supplementary products can be added by 
each country).98 
These studies highlight that access to medicines is an elaborate concept, which 
has to be operationalised. The WHO has produced a seminal definition and a framework 
for access to medicines which are also referred to by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (the treaty-body which oversees the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the treaty-body which oversees the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) when they prescribe access to medicines as a human right [CESCR 
2000: para. 43(d); AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 2(3)(a)]. WHO defines ‘access’ to essential 
medicines as having essential medicines “continuously available and affordable at public 
or private health facilities or drug outlets that are within one hour walk of the population” 
                                            
94 WHO’s essential drug lists (EDLs) are meant  to recommend which medicines should 
be available to a population, therby indicating what priority WHO gives to certain 
medicines. See more in Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.1.  
95 Indeed, the data presented in “The World Medicines Situation” refer to a 1999 survey. 
I was unable to find out which medicines were included in the survey. My letters written 
in July 2008 to several WHO email addresses have not been replied.  
96 The ‘Medicine Prices’ project originates in a collaboration between WHO and Health 
Action International. It provides a framework and encouragement for governments to 
undertake medicine price and availability surveys. So far, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
South Africa Gauteng province, South Africa Kwa Zulu Natal state, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia have participated [HAI, website, last accessed February 2010]. 
97 See, e.g., Candau and Guimier on Senegal [2001]; Chweya et al on Kenya [2003]; the 
Kenya Ministry of Health’s “Medicine Prices in Kenya” [2004]; The Ghanaian Ministry 
of Health’s “Pharmaceutical Sector Baseline” [2004] and the Ghanaian Ministry of 
Health’s “Medicines Prices in Ghana” [2004]. 
98 See WHO and HAI [website, Medicine Prices: A New Approach to Measurement, last 




[WHO, The World Medicines Situation, 1999]. Access, therefore entails two main 
components: availability and affordability. Availability implies the physical presence of 
medicines, while affordability relates to the individuals’ entitlements to acquire 
medicines. The notion of ‘essential’ medicines has also been worked out by the WHO 
and will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.99  
 
2.3.2 Medicines manufacturing and sale: the pharmaceutical and retail sector 
The section above has anticipated that access to medicines is a multidimensional 
matter, not limited to the cost of medicines. Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 present the 
economics and regulation that mainly affect access to medicines in sub-Saharan African 
countries. They illustrate how the actions of the business, non-profit and public sector 
can and do influence access to medicines. Some of these conducts can be influenced by 
different policies and regulations – and this provides the room of manoeuvre for the 
prescriptions of a human right to medicines. In particular, section 2.3.2 reviews the role 
of pharmaceutical companies, retailers and the state in the supply of medicines. Section 
2.3.3 will present the main alternative arrangements for medicines distribution and 
financing.  
Many pharmaceutical products utilise cheap raw material and greatly benefit from 
economies of scale.100 However, the availability and affordability of medicines is weakly 
                                            
99 In particular see Chapter 5 section 5.4.1. 
100 Since the internal costing of pharmaceuticals production is notoriously secretive, such 
allegation has to be actually inferred from a series of evidence. Economists Mossialos 
and Dukes offer some insights, suggesting to look at the following signs: “(a) [t]he 
proven ability of numerous ‘generic’ producers to supply products of high quality at a 
small fraction of their original cost once patents have expired or where they do not apply. 
For example: in India, where the originator company has sold a 500 mg dose of 
ciprofloxacin for US$ 4.40, the Indian company Cipla is able to make and sell an 
identical product profitably for $ 0.12, a 36-fold difference in price… [F]luconazole in 
Thailand costs $ 14.00 per treatment day in branded form, whereas, a generic Thai 
version of the same drug is available at a price corresponding to $ 0.75 per treatment 
day… (b) The fact that in a series of negotiated agreements on minimum-level pricing 
major manufacturers have reduced their asking prices for specific markets to as little as 
1% of their original levels. There is no evidence that in doing so they have sold these 
products at a loss…(c) The experience of those independent investigators who have in 
the past occupied senior posts within industry. (d) Estimates by international 
organisations. WHO has estimated that most patented medicines are sold at 20-100 times 




related to the cost of production. With regard to the role of pharmaceutical companies, 
they often operate in regimes of non-perfect competition. Therefore, in order to maximise 
their profits, they may be able to charge the maximum price that consumers are willing to 
pay instead of a price close to the marginal cost of production, as it should be expected in 
regimes of perfect competition.101 Competition can be restricted by natural and legal 
barriers [Gwartney et al 2006: 508], and both types of barriers can take place in the 
pharmaceutical sector. With regard to natural barriers to competition, the pharmaceutical 
market is ‘dynamic’. As Evans and Padilla note, “in dynamic industries, where typically 
fixed costs are high and incremental costs are low, the ‘competitive price’ is not given by 
marginal costs. Rather, it is efficient to charge prices according to customers’ willingness 
to pay so as to cover costs in the least output restricting way” [Evans and Padilla 2005: 
101]. Oligopolies are naturally created because the production of pharmaceuticals 
requires high fixed and sunk costs, that which creates natural barrier to the entry in the 
market [Burns 2005]. It is remarked that the pharmaceutical industry is strongly 
concentrated. In 2002 the ten largest firms accounted for almost 50 percent of sales 
[Oberholzer-Gee and Inamdar 2004: 2147].102 However, as Klimek and Peters underline, 
it is especially the concentration in specific markets/products that determines the nature 
of competition [Klimek & Peters 1995: 74]. Namely, some authors have identified a 
‘rule-of-fives’ according to which the lowest prices are achieved when at least five 
therapeutic alternatives produced by five competing firms are present in the market 
[WHO and WTO Secretariats 2001: 16]. However, competition can be regulated and 
controlled by states. For example, competition law can redress abuses of dominance in a 
market. This has occurred, for instance, in 2002 in South Africa, when accusation of 
excessive pricing had been upheld by the South Africa Competition Commission in 
2002.103 States can also impose price controls, as for example Greece, Belgium and 
France do [Danzon et al 2005]. African countries however do not implement price 
controls policies [Tetteh 2008: 571]. The implementation of price controls is indeed 
problematic as it can reduce the availability of medicines. 104  On the other hand, 
                                            
101 According to the microeconomics tenet, firms have a stimulus to enter competitive 
markets and compete on the price until the market price allows for some profit. See, e.g., 
Katz and Rosen [1997]. 
102  The trend is one of increasing concentration: in 1987, the 10 largest companies 
represented approximately 12 percent of worldwide sales [Oberholzer-Gee and Inamdar 
2004: 2147]. 
103 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.2. 




regulation can provide legal barriers to the entry of potential competitors in a market, 
thereby constituting legal monopolies. Market power can be legally entrenched through 
the protection of intellectual property rights for pharmaceutical innovations which 
confers time-limited legal monopolies [Gwartney et al 2006: 508]. Such legal artifice is 
diffused and relevant in African countries. In Africa, only Angola and Eritrea do not 
currently protect patents on pharmaceuticals [Grace 2003: 53; CIPR: 46, 27; Thorpe 
2002]. The consequences of the implementation of intellectual property law on access to 
medicines in Africa can be enormous, for instance with regard to the newest 
antiretrovirals and malaria treatments.105  
Imperfect competition, however, does not necessarily imply that firms will adopt 
inconsiderate prices. Beside the distortion of imperfect competition, the price offered by 
the manufacturer can differ from the producing cost, for example, if the firm adopts 
differential pricing, which means that it charges different prices according to the different 
willingness to pay of the consumers. The segmentation of consumers generally occurs at 
the country level, in favour of poorer countries. This pricing policy is theoretically 
advantageous to firms, as it permits to get revenues from the worse-off purchasers. 
Furthermore, differential pricing can be based on equity pricing, nemaly the 
consideration that developing countries should not be asked to pay for medicine 
development cost, marketing, and shareholder returns [Leach et al 2005: 156].106 The 
reluctance that pharmaceutical corporations have often demonstrated in adopting 
differential pricing is sometimes due to the technical difficulty of market segmentation 
and the ensuing problem of price and product leakages [Grace 2003]. Again, states can 
intervene supporting such schemes by impeding the re-exportation of concessionally-
priced merchandise to other states. 107  Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies can 
implement other policies with explicit concern to access to medicines such as medicines 
donations, voluntary licenses of patented medicines, and not to patent medicines in some 
                                            
105 New treatments are necessary to overcome the resistance to treatment that the human 
immunodeficiency virus and the malaria parasite develop by mutating throughout time. 
On the problem of patents on new treatments see Drahos and Braithwaite [2002: 11]; 
MSF’s “A guide to the post-2005 world: TRIPS, R&D and Access to Medicines” [2005], 
Oxfam’s “Patents Versus Patients” [2006], WHO’s “Globalisation and Access to Drugs” 
[1999: 41]. On intellectual property see Chapter 5 section 5.2.1 and Chapter 6 section 
6.2.1. 
106  See also Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.2. 
107 Purchasers in these third countries would otherwise take advantage from the so-called 
parallel importation, ie the importation in parallel to, and competing with, the official 




countries. Often, pharmaceutical companies enter into agreements with other private and 
with public parties to provide medicines offering favourable conditions. Examples of 
such initiatives abound, with regard to Africa. For instance, pharmaceutical companies 
collaborate sometimes with the Accelerating Access Initiative, the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Roll Back Malaria, the Global Alliance to Eliminate 
Leprosy, The Global Program to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis, the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative, as it will be seen in Chapters 4 and 6 [WHO Programmes and 
Projects; IFPMA partnerships].  
Moreover, the availability and affordability of quality medicines depend on the 
retail of medicines. The retail price can more than double the manufacturer’s price 
because of the addition of ‘hidden costs’, ie, “costs for transportation, storage, import 
tariffs and taxes, wholesale and retail markups, staff salaries, stock losses and 
procurement practices” [Levison and Laing 2003: 20]. States can influence the amount of 
hidden costs of pharmaceutical products, such as regulatory, transport and distribution 
costs [Madden, Balasubramaniam and Kibwage 2003: 18].108 States can also directly 
regulate the retail prices of medicines, as it happens in Italy or France, even though retail 
price controls can discourage the availability of medicines and are not widely used in 
Africa.109 With regard to the distribution of medicines, these can be provided through 
health centres, dispensaries, pharmacies and other outlets managed by the private for 
profit, non profit and the public sector. The availability of medicines in African rural 
areas, more sparsely populated, is particularly problematic, as highlighted by national 
surveys on access to medicines 110  and by my empirical work in Tanzania. 111  The 
modalities of financing of such forms of distribution are presented in the next section. 
Finally, with regard to the quality of medicines, pharmaceutical companies and the retail 
sector are responsible for the quality of medicines, but governments can regulate and 
monitor the safety, quality and efficacy of pharmaceutical products marketed in a country. 
                                            
108 It has been noted that delivery costs are much higher in sub-Saharan Africa because of 
the low population density [Foster 1987]. 
109 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.2. 
110 See, e.g., the surveys of Candau and Guimier on Senegal [2001]; Chweya et al on 
Kenya [2003]; the Kenya Ministry of Health’s “Medicine Prices in Kenya” [2004]; The 
Ghanaian Ministry of Health’s “Pharmaceutical Sector Baseline” [2004] and the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Health’s “Medicines Prices in Ghana” [2004]. For Tanzania see 
infra section 2.4. See also, generally, Leach et al [2005: 80]. 




Substandard and counterfeit medicines are a common problem in Africa.112 Governments 
can also influence the ‘rational use of medicines’, ie the promotion of therapeutically 
sound and cost-effective use of drugs by health professionals and consumers for instance 
by promoting generic medicines [WHO, How to Develop and Implement a National 
Drug Policy, 2001].113 
 
2.3.3 Medicines financing  
As seen in above section 2.3.2, pharmaceutical companies, retailers and 
regulatory institutions can influence the supply of medicines, ie the quality, availability 
and affordability of medicines. Access to medicines also depends on the characters of the 
demand. With regard to affordability for instance it is noted that certain most needed 
treatments are out of the reach of the majority of the people in sub-Saharan Africa, who 
have to pay out-of-pocket for their purchases, even if the prices of these treatments are 
reduced to the manufacturing costs. Affordability is contextual; in effect is often assessed 
considering the relationship between daily wage and price rather than the absolute 
prices.114 In sub-Saharan Africa, 76% of the population lives on less than US$ 2 a day, 
and 46.4% on less than US$ 1 a day. Still, for example, the minimum cost of a first-line 
antiretroviral triple-combination (stavudine, lamivudine, nevirapine) is around US$ 132 
per patient per year.115 US$ 2.40 for artemether-lumefantrine,116 the first-line treatment 
for malaria in many African countries today, are also unaffordable for many African 
people especially living in the rural areas, the most affected by malaria [WHO AFRO 
2006: 53]. Other vital medicines as well, such as natural insulin, have prohibitively high 
costs [Leach et al 2005: 66].  
In fact, access to medicines (affordability and availability of quality medicines) is 
also determined by the health-care system of a country, as operated by both the private 
                                            
112 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.1. 
113 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.1. 
114  See, e.g., WHO and HAI, website, Medicine Prices: A New Approach to 
Measurement, last accessed 9 February 2010. 
115 This anti-retroviral treatment is sold by Cipla, an Indian generic manufacturer, and is 
the cheapest version available in the world market. Notably, in 2000 the originator was 
selling the same product for US$ 10,438 [MSF, Too Little for Too Few, 2006: 6]. 
116 This is, reportedly, the price obtained by WHO for low-income malarious countries 




and public sectors. With regard to medicines financing and provision, medicines need not 
to be purchased out-of-pocket payments but can be alternatively acquired through 
collective financing (health insurance, public health service) and external resources (such 
as aid, donations). 117  Out-of-pocket payment are commonly utilised in sub-Saharan 
Africa countries. Reportedly, in some countries the individual expenditures for health are 
90% out-of-pocket [WHO and WTO Secretariats 2001: 7]. Like in other developing 
countries, medicines constitute 50-90% of out-of-pocket spending (depending on the 
level of health care) [WHO, More Equitable Pricing, 2001; WHO and WTO Secretariats 
2001]. Myhr (from the NGO Médecins sans Frontières), has estimated that indeed most 
Africans must pay 80% prescription-drug costs out-of-pocket [Myhr in Mcneil 2000]. It 
should be considered that, in economic jargon, consumption of medicines is sensitive to 
price [CIPR 2002: 33; McKinsey et al 2000; Oxfam, Generic Competition, Price and 
Access to Medicines, 2002; Borrell and Watal 2002]. In other words, price does 
determine the decision to purchase treatment. Thus, Guimier et al estimate that, in sub-
Saharan Africa, paying the full out of pocket price for a complete treatment for a disease 
episode is out of the reach of as much as 40-70% of the population once this price is over 
US$ 1 [Guimier 2004: 16].118  
Collective financing, private or public, instead, promotes risk pooling. As WHO 
put it, “as a result of large pools, society takes advantage of economies of scale, the law 
of large numbers, and cross-subsidies from low-risk to high-risk individuals” [WHO, 
World Health Report 2000: 99]. WHO data indicate that the private prepaid plans as 
percentage of private expenditure on health is around 8.7% in sub-Saharan Africa.119 The 
economic advantage of pooling in the region can in fact be less than profitable or even 
sustainable for non-profit organisations. States, as well, can organise insurance, or 
subsidise/provide medicines as part of the public health service. The public health sector 
has alternative avenues to collect financial resources for distributing health care and 
medicines. Mainly, those are cost-sharing, mandated social health insurance 
                                            
117 See Huttin [2002]; Rietveld et al [2002]; WHO, World Health Report [2000: 99]. For 
‘external resources’ reference is made to all grants and loans whether passing through 
governments or private entities for health goods and services, in cash or in kind [WHO 
AFRO 2006: 156]. 
118 See also Candau [2001] for Senegal. 
119 I utilised the data from WHOSIS selecting WHO AFRO region subtracting Algeria 
and Sao Tome and Principe [WHOSIS, online, 2005]. I noticed strong variations among 
those data: in Namibia and South Africa the private prepaid plans as percentage of 




contributions, general taxation and external resources [WHO, World Health Report 2000, 
2000]. Cost-sharing can be used to finance the continuous provision of medicines at the 
health facilities. However, it restricts the access to treatment, exerting a direct impact on 
the sick’s finances.120 Mandated social health insurance, conversely, grants the separation 
between contribution and utilisation of health-care services. Such scheme is particularly 
uncommon in Africa, where the protection by social insurance covers less than 8% of the 
population [WHO and WTO Secretariats 2001: 7]. A reason can be found in the 
predominance of the informal sector. Diop reports that just 10% of active population are 
waged employees and officials and, therefore, generally eligible for social insurance 
[Diop 2006].  
General taxation is the last method of gathering resources at the national level, ie 
without recurring to external resources. WHO statistics suggest that the central 
government expenditure on health as a percentage of government expenditure of the 
African Region countries is lower than in other higher-income less disease-burdened 
countries, amounting to 9.1%, as opposed to 15.8% in the UK, 12.8% in Italy, 14.7% in 
Argentina [WHO, website, World Health Statistics 2006, my elaboration]. Such 
proportion of government expenditure, however, is even lower in South East Asia, with 
an average of 8.36% [id.].121 It is also noted that the percentage of contributions raised on 
GDP, amounting to 20%, is lower than in OECD, where it is 40% [WHO, World Health 
Report 2000, 2000: 98]. Commentators and experts of global public health have 
suggested that African states could try to raise more money through this avenue noting 
that low-income countries often dedicate a smaller fraction of GDP to health [Claeson 
and Wagstaff 2004: 145]. It is recalled, however, that sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest 
area in the world, with an average gross national product per capita at parity of 
purchasing power of US$ 1970 [PRB 2006: 5]. This figure is lower than the per capita 
annual general expenditures on health are in OECD countries such as France (US$ 2646), 
Italy (US$ 1894), the UK (US$ 2261), the US (US$ 2862) [WHOSIS, website, 2005, last 
accessed 30 October 2009]. In effect, the per capita annual general expenditures on 
health in the WHO AFRO region in 2007 was purchase power parity US$ 137 [WHOSIS, 
website, 2007, last accessed July 2010]. 
                                            
120 See also Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.1. 
121 The proportion of government expenditures in South-East Asia would be even lower, 
at 6.1%, if Maldives and Timor Leste, which stand out the average but are 
unrepresentative in terms of population, are excluded [WHO, World Health Statistics 




Finally, sub-Saharan African countries can raise resources for health from abroad. 
According to WHO data, external funding amounts to 15% of total health expenditures in 
sub-Saharan Africa [WHO, website, World Health Statistics 2006, my elaboration].  
More to the point, foreign aid for improving access to essential medicines falls within the 
so-called ‘development assistance for health’ (DAH). This category has been identified 
by the WHO Commission on Macroeconomic and Health as including: official 
development assistance (ODA);122 nonconcessional loans provided by the World Bank 
and regional development banks to developing countries; and funds from private 
foundations and NGOs (own funds) “that contribute directly to the promotion of 
development and welfare in the health sector in developing countries” [CMH Working 
Group 6, 2002: 10]. Commitments from all external sources including foundations are 
rising. Reportedly, they rose from an average of US$ 6.4 billion in 1997–1999 to about 
US$ 8.1 billion in 2002 [Claeson and Wagstaff: 156], and Africa is traditionally the 
major beneficiary [CMH Working Group 6, 2002: 14]. Approximately US$ 500 million 
of this funding goes specifically to the transfer of equipment, which includes drugs, 
vaccines, contraceptives, other supplies, and local institutional capacity building [id.: 
17].123  
Indeed, it is possible to observe a proliferation of initiatives for improving the 
access to medicines in foreign countries. Besides bilateral donors (which include the 
Danish International Development Agency, the UK Department for International 
Development, the Dutch Directorate General for Development Cooperation, the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, the US Agency for International 
Development), and multilateral governmental agencies (such as the UN WHO, UNICEF, 
the World Bank), also the private sector is increasingly concerned [Leach et al 2005: 41-
57].124 Very relevant are private foundations (most prominently, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, the William J. Clinton Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation). The 
                                            
122 Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD as grants and loans to countries and territories on Part I 
of the DAC list of aid recipients (developing countries), which are undertaken by the 
official sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main 
objective, on concessional financial terms (if a loan, with a grant element of at least 25%) 
[CMH, Working Group 6, 2002: 10]. 
123  In effect, also activities categorised as disease-specific projects and programmes, 
systemic support to the health system, and family planning & reproductive health involve 
the provision of medicines [CMH, Working Group 6, 2002: 17]. 
124 See also Ravishanker et al for an account of global health development assistance for 




private also participates to public-private partnerships coordinated by multilateral 
(governmental and non-governmental) organisations, such as the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), 125  the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisation (GAVI),126 or the Partnership for Quality Medical Donations. This latter 
reports, for instance, that in 2003 the pharmaceutical corporations party thereof 
contributed US$1.4 billion in medicines donated to the poor in developing countries 
[Leach et al 2005: 55]. Moreover, such public-private partnerships have acted as 
intermediaries for the grant of voluntary price-reductions by innovator pharmaceutical 
corporations.127 
 
2.4 The context of access to medicines in Tanzania  
This chapter so far illustrated the need for pharmaceutical products in sub-
Saharan Africa and the technicalities relative to the provision, access and financing of 
medicines in the region. This section presents my case-study on Tanzania. I have 
considered that Tanzania can represent the emblematic problems – and possible solutions 
– of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania is a country heavily burdened 
by preventable and curable diseases; relatively poor; and with problems in access to 
medicines. Tanzania is a big African country, with a population of 41 million (2009 
estimate) [CIA, website, Factbook, last accessed 5 February 2010]. With regard to the 
burden of disease, in 2009, the life expectancy at birth has been estimated to be 52 years 
(ranked 206th worldwide) and the under-five mortality rate 69.28/1000 deaths (the 25th 
highest worldwide) [id.]. Tanzania is the 6th country in the world for number of people 
living with HIV/AIDS, which has been estimated to be 1,400,000 [UNAIDS, 2008 
Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 2008], and the 7th for HIV/AIDS annual deaths, 
which have been estimated to be 96,000 in 2007 [CIA, website, Factbook, Tanzania, last 
accessed 4 February 2010]. The rate of infections peaked 10% of the population in 2002 
                                            
125 Launched in 2001, the Global Fund is a financing mechanism for country-level efforts 
to combat AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. It is an independent entity, governed by a 
board of directors that includes representatives from donors, the UN, civil society, and 
the private sector [Leach et al 2005: 44-5] (yet 98% of the funds are pledged by 
governments [Feachem and Sabot 2006]). See also Chapter 6. 
126 Partners include the GAVI Fund, national governments, UNICEF, WHO, The World 
Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the vaccine industry, public health 
institutions and NGOs [GAVI website].  




and has reportedly declined to 6.2 in 2007 [IRIN News 2006; UNAIDS, 2008 Report on 
the Global AIDS Epidemic, 2008]. HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death and 
morbidity in the country. While respiratory infections are the second cause of morbidity 
and mortality (2004 estimates) [WHOSIS, last accessed 6 February 2010], Tanzania is 
heavily affected by malaria which, according to WHO estimates, in 2006 infected 
11,539,867 people and killed 38,730 [WHO, World Malaria Report 2008: 142]. 128 
Cardiovascular diseases and diarrhoea are respectively the fourth and fifth causes of 
morbidity and mortality (2004 estimates) [WHOSIS, last accessed 6 February 2010]. 
With regard to tuberculosis, 54,956 new cases originated in 2008 [WHO, Global 
Tuberculosis Control: Epidemiology, Strategy, Financing, 2009].  
Economically, Tanzania is a low-income country. Its GDP, US$ 57.5 billion, 
places Tanzania at the 85th position worldwide while with a per capita GDP of US$ 1400 
the country locates at the 206th place [CIA, website, Factbook, Tanzania, last accessed 4 
February 2010].129 36% of the population lives below the national poverty line [id.; 
UNDP 2005: 114].130 Politically, Tanzania is a democracy, with a socialist experiment in 
its past and a governmental commitment to development and improvement in its present. 
The Tanzanian Constitution does not provide for a right to health but sanctions a role of 
the state against ‘disease’: “the state authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct 
their policies and programmes towards ensuring… (i) that the use of national resources 
places emphasis on the development of the people and in particular is geared towards the 
eradication of poverty, ignorance, and disease […]” [Tanzanian Constitution 1995: Ch.1, 
Part II, art. 9(i)]. With regard to the health system, since the Arusha Declaration in 1967 
the government is the major provider and financier of health services, but the private 
sector is now also prominent. In particular, non-profit faith-based organisations (FBOs) 
are reported to provide 40% of hospital care in the country.131 Funding for the public 
                                            
128  I found great variance among the literature, the officials and the external extra-
governmental actors about the figures relating to the morbidity and mortality of malaria 
in Tanzania. Officials and foreign aid often rated at 16-18 million the yearly morbidity 
and at between 100,000 and 125,000 the yearly mortality. See, e.g., US President’s 
Malaria Initiative [2005: 12]. 
129  The GDP is calculated at parity of purchasing power [CIA, website, Factbook, 
Tanzania, last accessed 4 February 2010]. 
130 Note that according to the UNDP 2005 report, if poverty in Tanzania was calculated 
using the poverty line of one international dollar a day the poverty incidence in Tanzania 
would be around 57.5% of the population [UNDP 2005: 114]. 
131 See GFATM [website, Report on the involvement of faith-based organizations in the 




sector originates from general government expenditures, including external resources, 
and to a smaller extent from out-of-pocket cost sharing [Tanzania MOH, 2003, National 
Health Policy: 27].132 A National Health Insurance Fund is in place for civil servants 
which also sponsors private care [Tanzania MOHSW, Survey of the Medicines Prices in 
Tanzania, 2004: 2]. The Community Health Funds are still experimental, so far 
economically unsustainable. 133  Historically, Tanzania has been a major recipient of 
foreign aid. In 2002 external resources for health as percentage of total expenditure on 
health amounted to 26.9% [WHO, The World Health Report 2005, 2005]. The per capita 
government expenditure on health in 2005 was US$ 23 [WHOSIS 2005, my elaboration]. 
The medicine budget for year 2003/04 was US$ 28.5 million, ie US$ 0.75 per capita.134 
According to an official from the Medical Stores Department (MSD), the national 
procurer and distributor of pharmaceutical products (see infra), essential medicines at 
Medical Stores Department are funded 85% by the government and 15% through other 
funding (such as sales to the non-profit sector).135 The official also stated that out of the 
government share, 60% come from the government purse and 40% from the basket fund 
of donors. In particular, treatment for HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis are 90% supplied 
by development partners to the Medical Stores Department which re-distributes the 
medicines throughout the territory. Foreign agencies, international organisations and 
NGOs also donate in kind and provide technical assistance for access to medicines, for 
example by quantifying the needs for medicines and organising the logistics of medicines 
procurement and distribution.136 
                                            
132 According to Laterveer et al [2004] user fees contribute around 4% of the total health 
budget. 
133 The idea is that rural communities would integrate their community health needs by 
contributing with a Tsh. 5000-10,000 per household per year. However, such amount is 
considerable for certain economies and is not sufficient to cover the health needs [field 
work, interviews]. 
134 My elaboration from raw data in Tanzania MOHSW, “Survey of the Medicines Prices 
in Tanzania” [2004]. 
135 Interview [Medical Stores Department, Dar es Salaam, 20 July 2009]. 
136 For example, John Snow International (JSI) works on different projects: Supply Chain 
Management System procures and donates HIV/AIDS commodities; US Deliver works 
on reproductive and child health, for instance donating contraceptives; Making Medical 
Injections Safer (MMIS) works on blood infections prevention. The first two projects are 
funded by USAID, while MMIS is funded by the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC) 
[Interview, JSI/SCMS, Dar es Salaam, 15 July 2009]. For more information see Tanzania 





With regard to pharmaceutical regulation, the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority 
(TFDA) is in charge of the registration of new products and of monitoring and inspecting 
the quality, efficacy and safety of the medicines in the market. A Fair Competition 
Commission has been established in 2005 but has not been operative as of yet on matters 
concerning medicines such as counterfeit drugs [Tanzania, Fair Competition Act, 
2005].137 With regard to the rational use of medicines, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MOHSW) compiles the “National Essential Medicines List for Tanzania” 
(NEMLIT), which lists different classes of products that should be available at the 
different levels of care [Tanzania MOHSW, NEMLIT, 2007]. Interviews with different 
health care workers and local and foreign officials working on access to medicines claim 
that the list is comprehensive.138 The Medical Stores Department procures and distributes 
medicines for all the public sector and occasionally for the non-profit sector. The public 
health facilities order medicines through the account and the allocation that they hold 
with the Medical Stores Department. The private sector has to utilise other suppliers and 
wholesalers.139 With regard to intellectual property rights on medicines, Tanzania grants 
patents for both processes and products, including pharmaceuticals [Tanzania’s Patents 
Act, 1987: Art 7(1)]. Such legislation is strict with regard to compulsory licenses, parallel 
importation and other exceptions to patent rights [Losse et al 2007: 8-10]. 140  The 
international patent system is important to Tanzania as the country imports 70%-85% of 
the medicines procured by the government through the Medical Stores Department, even 
though the majority are not currently on-patent in Tanzania.141 In fact the originator 
pharmaceutical companies, so far, have not patented important innovative (thence 
patentable) medicines such as the first-line antiretrovirals and the first-line antimalarial 
(the branded artemether-lumefantrine ‘Coartem’). Nevertheless the Patents Act 1987 is 
                                            
137 Interview with Fair Competition Commission [Dar es Salaam, 17 August 2009]. 
138 Interviews, Tanzania, July-August 2009. The list also includes several antiretrovirals 
[Tanzania MOHSW, NEMLIT, 2007]. 
139  For comprehensive information see the MOHSW “In-Depth Assessment of the 
Medicines Supply System in Tanzania” [2008]. 
140 See also Chapter 5 section 5.2.1 and Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.1. 
141  According to an interviewee at the Medical Stores Department, 80-85% of the 
medicines procured by Medical Stores Department are imported [Interview, MSD, Dar es 
Salaam, 20 July 2009]. According to an interviewee at the TFDA, 70% medicines 
circulating in the country are imported [Interview, TFDA, in Dar es Salaam, 17 August 
2009]. With regard to the use of on-patent medicines, according to interviewee, 99% of 




being revised to have the TRIPS flexibilities introduced. Inter alia, the flexibilities are 
supposed to allow the importation of patented medicines.142   
With regard to access to medicines in Tanzania, it is indicative to note that out of 
the estimated 600,000 HIV-infected Tanzanians who qualify for antiretroviral therapy, 
136,700 (22.2%) were on therapy in 2007 [Tanzania NACP, National Guidelines for the 
Management of HIV and AIDS, 2008: 15]. With regard to tuberculosis, the case 
detection rate under DOTS was 47% (50% for smear-positive cases) and the treatment 
success rate of smear positive was 85% in 2006 [WHO, Global Tuberculosis Control: 
Epidemiology, Strategy, Financing, 2009: 157]. More systemic insights come from the 
‘Medicine Price Monitor’, compiled by the MOHSW in collaboration with WHO and 
Health Action International Africa [Tanzania MOHSW, Medicine Price Monitor, June-
July 2008]. The survey analyses the availability, prices and affordability of a selection of 
40 essential medicines in the public, private and mission sector.143 Five regions have 
been surveyed, namely Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Morogoro and Mtwara (see also 
the map of Tanzania in Chapter 1 section 1.5). With regard to the availability of the 40 
medicines surveyed, 26 (55%), 21 (34%), and 22 (55%) were available in up to 50% of 
public, private and mission health facilities, respectively; 7 (17.5%), 12 (30%) and 10 
(25%) medicines were available in more than 50% to 75% of the public, private and 
mission health facilities, respectively; and 7 (17.5%), 7 (17.5%) and 8 (20%) medicines 
were available in more than 75% of the public, private and mission health facilities 
respectively. In particular, artemether-lumefantrine as first line treatment for malaria was 
found in more than 75% of the health facilities in the public sector.144 Antiretrovirals 
were stocked in 20 out of 43 facilities in the selected public sector facilities, but the 
                                            
142 Interview with TFDA [Dar es Salaam, 17 August 2009]. The prospective problems of 
intellectual property rights for access to medicines in Tanzania are analysed in Chapter 6 
section 6.2.1.1. 
143 The selected medicines are part to the NEMLIT [Tanzania MOHSW, Medicine Price 
Monitor, June-July 2008; Tanzania MOHSW, NEMLIT, 2007].   
144 Although, sulfadoxine–pyrimethamine is no longer the first line medicine for malaria 
treatment, it remains the medicine of choice for intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) 
for pregnant women. Its availability went down from 88% in November 2006 to 44% in 
July 2008 for the public sector. Since sulfadoxine–pyrimethamine is a medicine of choice 
for intermittent preventive treatment, the medicine should be available in all health 
facilities all the time. In the private sector, there was no change as sulfadoxine–
pyrimethamine was at around 80% in both surveys of November 2006 and June 2007 




availability of treatment was deemed satisfactory.145 Finally, it was noted that a medicine 
for asthma, the (user-friendly) beclomethasone inhaler, was not available in the health 
facilities but salbutamol, an alternative product for asthma, occasionally was. Oral 
rehydration salts, to contrast diarrhoea, were available in more than 75% health facilities 
including ADDOs. A medicine for diabetes, glibenlamide, was available for the first time 
in the public health facilities, but the price was 567% higher than that charged by the 
Medical Stores Department to the facilities. Affordability is calculated in the survey in 
terms of the days the lowest paid civil servant would have to work to pay for one 
treatment course of an acute condition or one month’s treatment of a chronic condition. 
The daily wage of the lowest paid civil servant was Tshs. 3613.67 during the price 
survey. The survey reckoned that the cost of treatment of malaria with the currently 
introduced first-line antimalarial medicine ALu is 0.2 days wage from the public and 
3.32 days from the private, 3.9 in ADDOs and 0.14 in mission hospitals. The following 
graph illustrates the affordability of a selection of medicines. 
 
Affordability of treatment for a child with acute respiratory infection 



































Affordability of treatment for a child with acute respiratory infection, diabetes, 
adult hypertension and malaria, in different sectors. Data from Tanzania MOHSW 
Medicine Price Monitor, June-July 2008 [2008: 4], my elaboration. 
                                            
145  Out of these facilities, 15 (75%) had stavudine/lamivudine/nervirapine 
(d4T/3TC/NVP) 30mg while 7 (35%) had d4T/3TC/NVP 40mg. The second product, 
apparently, was being withdrawn from the programme because of side-effects [Tanzania 




With my qualitative empirical work visiting the country and interviewing relevant 
people146 I aimed at complementing those quantitative studies.147 Early interviews with 
people working in the sector confirmed to me that indeed the aforementioned surveys are 
not conclusive. With regard to the availability of medicines in the public sector, I 
appraised that stock-outs are frequent.148 Certain vertical programmes are better off as 
antiretrovirals, artemether-lumefantrine and anti-TB medicines are provided with 
external funds. However, there can be problems of distribution and AIDS patients may 
not find appropriate treatment for the opportunistic infections and conditions affecting 
them. 149  Generally I gathered six main explanations for the stock-outs. First, the 
estimates of the medicines needs by the health facility can be inappropriate. Among other 
reasons, health workers still have to adapt to the recently the ‘Integrated Logistics 
System (ILS)/Indent System’, which has been introduced recently.150 Reportedly, the 
system is overly complex and is anyway based on past use of medicines rather than 
future needs. 151  However, being a ‘pull’ system, it can improve the match between the 
needs of the health facilities and the products actually delivered by the Medical Stores 
Department. Secondly, quite remarkably, the Medical Stores Department often does have 
the medicines in stock at the central store, but it fails to distribute them to the regional 
hubs and thence to the health facilities. 152  Third, the government allocation to the 
                                            
146 I undertook more than 50 relevant interviews about access to medicines, health care, 
and human rights with people relevant for the matter including officials from the 
Tanzanian government (central and local), international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, foreign aid, pharmaceutical industries, pharmaceutical traders, health 
workers etc. See also Annexe A for a list of the interviewees. With regard to the areas, I 
visited the health facilities (public dispensaries, health centres, hospitals and, for the 
private sector, ADDOs) in Sumbawanga (Rukwa region) and Ifakara (Morogoro region). 
See also Chapter 1 section 1.5. 
147 Together with the 2008 “Medicine Price Monitor” [Tanzania MOHSW, Medicine 
Price Monitor, June-July 2008], see also Tanzania MOHSW, “Baseline Survey of the 
Pharmaceutical Sector in Tanzania 2002” [2002]; Tanzania MOHSW “Survey of the 
Medicines Prices in Tanzania” [2004]; and Tanzania MOHSW, “Medicine Price Monitor 
– June-July 2007” [2007]. 
148 Reportedly, often 40-60% of an order is not fulfilled [Interview with Action Medeor, 
Dar es Salaam, 16 July 2009]. 
149 Interview with JSI/SCMS [Dar es Salaam, 15 July 2009]. 
150 The ‘pull’ system started to be gradually introduced around 2004 [Tanzania MOHSW, 
Survey of the Medicines Prices in Tanzania, 2004: 3]. 
151  Under the ILS, the health facilities place their orders with the Medical Stores 
Department according to their needs and their budget allocation. The ILS is a JSI project 
[Interview with USAID/JSI, Dar es Salaam, 17 July 2009]. 





Medical Stores Department is allegedly not sufficient to procure the medicines needed by 
the health facilities.153 Fourth, deficiencies can occur when resources are committed but 
not disbursed by the government.154 Fifth, there can be delays from the suppliers. Sixth, 
there can be wastage for theft (the ‘pilferage’ to the private sector is common) or 
inappropriate use of medicines.155 Reportedly, only 5-40% (according to the area and the 
study) of the fevers treated as malaria, if tested, is in fact caused by malaria.156 With 
regard to affordability, the government applies user fees and cost sharing for medicines. 
The fees are higher in the hospitals, whereas in the dispensaries they are generally lower 
but in fact quite erratic.157 The consulting fee was on average Tsh. 1000 (US$ 0.76). 
Government guidelines recommended the price of medicines to be half of Medical Stores 
Department procurement price, except for artemether-lumefantrine, which enjoys had 
subsidised price (Tsh. 1500 or US$ 1.14 for adults and Tsh. 500 or US$ 0.38 for children 
dosage). The prices of the products dispensed, however, were considerably diverse.158 
Importantly, exemptions from payments are prescribed for mothers, children under five 
years of age, the elderly and patients suffering a series of chronic and epidemic diseases 
including for instance tuberculosis and AIDS [Tanzania MOH, 2003, National Health 
Policy]. Again, the policy is not operated systematically.159 
The private sector offers an alternative avenue for acquiring medicines. 
Pharmacies, private dispensaries, private hospitals, and ‘duka la dawa baridi’ are the 
main retailers. In rural areas, often, the ‘duka la dawa baridi’ are the most viable business 
as they do not require trained medical personnel or a pharmacist [HERA 2006: 5]. 
                                            
153 Chief Pharmacist Muhume stated that the money allocated to medicines can meet 
70% of needs [Interview with Muhume in Dar es Salaam, 12 August 2009]. 
154  Such mismatch has been denounced by health officials but denied by the Chief 
Pharmacist Muhume, who stated that 97% of the funds were utilised in 2008-2009. 
Contra see interviews at Ifakara Health Institute [Ifakara, 5 August 2009] and USAID 
[12 August 2009]. 
155 Interviews [e.g., National Malaria Control Programme, Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2009], 
visits to dispensaries.  
156 Interviews with USAID/JSI [Dar es Salaam, 17 July 2009], National Malaria Control 
Programme [Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2009]. See Reyburn et al [2004]; and Mosha et al on 
the cost implications of improving malaria diagnosis in Tanzania [Mosha et al 2010].  
157 Visits to dispensaries, Sumbawanga municipal area, Ifakara and surroundings. 
158 Visits to dispensaries, Sumbawanga municipal area, Ifakara and surroundings. 
159  Visits to Sumbawanga municipality and Ifakara; interviews. See also Save the 
Children finding that in the region Lindi exemptions were ‘more a favour than right’ 




Sometimes duka la dawa baridi exist where there public dispensaries do not.160 However, 
they are only qualified to sell over-the-counter products (OTCs),161 that which precludes 
the sale, for instance, of the first line anti-malarial artemether-lumefantrine. A new 
government project, instead, aims at training the shopkeepers so that they can sell a few 
‘necessary’ products under prescription. With regard to malaria the rationale is, 
reportedly, that a significant proportion of fevers (up to 70%) are managed in private 
sector [Lynch et al 2006: 20; See also Kachur et al 2006]. These certified shops are called 
‘duka la dawa muhimu’, which is the Swahili for ‘shop of necessary medicines’, and are 
known internationally as ‘accredited drugs dispensing outlets’ (ADDOs). The ADDO 
project, in fact, offers an interesting hook for observing the operation of extra-
governmental actors on access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa (the operation of 
extra-governmental actors is the subject of Chapter 6). Whereas the TFDA is the main 
implementer of the programme, ADDOs are an international public private partnership 
(PPP).162 The initiative has originated from a foreign NGO programme, the Management 
Science for Health (MSH) “Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines” (SEAM). The 
programme is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation “to identify and test 
innovative approaches for improving access to essential medicines in developing 
countries through greater participation of the private sector” [SEAM 2003: 1]. Tanzania 
has been selected together with other six countries for ‘field-testing’ the framework 
“[a]fter discussions and consultations with experts from WHO, the World Bank, and 
developing countries” [MSH, SEAM Programs; SEAM 2000]. Therefore, SEAM’s work 
in Tanzania is motivated by ‘top-down’ considerations. SEAM is currently providing 
technical assistance to the project, together with other foreign NGOs.  
Starting from Ruvuma, the programme is currently run in other five regions: Dar 
es Salaam, Morogoro, Mtwara, and Rukwa (see also the map of Tanzania in Chapter 1 
                                            
160  A recent government proposal envisages one dispensary for every village. The 
dispensaries I visited generally served 5-10 villages. The policy of multiplying the 
dispensaries by five or ten seems quite unrealistic, given the resources constraints.   
161 Duka la dawa baridi means in Swahili ‘shop for cold medicines’. 
162  Public private partnerships are commonly defined as voluntary and collaborative 
relationships between various parties, both state and nonstate, in which all participants 
agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to 
share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies, and benefits [UN Secretary 
General, Enhanced Cooperation between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners, 




section 1.5).163 With regard to funding, the Tanzanian government is the biggest funder. 
Other extra-governmental actors fund ADDOs often as part of their vertical aid 
programmes. ADDOs obtained a grant from the Global Fund for Tuberculosis, AIDS and 
Malaria (hereinafter Global Fund) round 7 as ADDOs were presented in the application 
to the fund as playing a role in controlling malaria by selling antimalarials. 164  An 
application for subsidised artemether-lumefantrine is currently under examination at the 
Affordable Medicines Facility for Malaria, always part of Global Fund.165 With regard to 
bilateral aid, the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) is now subsidising artemether-
lumefantrine in the ADDOs of Ruvuma and Morogoro. The US agency for foreign aid 
(USAID) is sponsoring the roll out of ADDOs in Morogoro for the project “IMCI 
[Integrated Management Childhood Disease] in ADDOs” (a ‘special case’ of ADDOs 
particularly focus to child-disease such as malaria, diarrhoea, acute respiratory tract 
infection).166 The Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development, the Ifakara Health 
Research and Development Centre and the Swiss Tropical Institute are also collaborating 
with ADDOs through the ACCESS programme, which “[a]ims at understanding and 
improving access to prompt and effective treatment” [Swiss Tropical Institute 2005: 3]. 
One of the components of this project are ‘social marketing campaigns’ to “motivate 
people to seek timely and correct malaria treatment in the event of fever episodes, as well 
as improving advice, diagnosis, and treatment in private pharmacies and public health 
facilities” [id.; IFPMA 2007: 38].167 
The empirical experience and the literature suggest that in terms of availability, 
ADDOs offer an important alternative to the public sector which is often out of stock. 
ADDOs expand the range of medicines sold legally as compared to ‘duka la dawa 
                                            
163  See also TFDA website [TFDA website, Accreditation, last accessed 6 February 
2010].  
164 See “The Tanzanian Proposal Form for Round 7” [United Republic of Tanzania, 
Proposal Form – Round 7, 2007: 50]. 
165  The facility, unlike the ordinary Fund’s practice, also provides subsidies for 
artemether-lumefantrine to the for-profit sector. 
166  Interview with TFDA official [Dar es Salaam, July-August 2009]. See also 
USAID/BASICS and USAID/RPM/Plus, “Improving Child Health through the 
Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet Program” [2008]. 
167  See Novartis, website, “Improved access to effective treatment of malaria in 
Tanzania” [last accessed 5 April 2008] and International Federation of Pharmaceutical 




baridi’.168 However, the ‘necessary’ prescription medicines allowed in ADDOs are in fact 
a restricted selection and the outlets are not required to hold them in stock. Furthermore, 
access to medicines in the areas where ‘duka la dawa baridi’ are absent may not be 
improved: ADDOs generally replace ‘duka la dawa baridi’ rather than being set up from 
scratch.169 With regard to quality, ADDOs shopkeepers receive training on how to keep 
and dispense medicines, and are taught to refer patients to other health facilities in 
complicated cases. Sub-standard products are nevertheless found in ADDOs. Granted, 
the problem of sub-standard medicines is widespread in Tanzania. It has occurred that 
dangerous products seized by TFDA during their inspections had in fact received the 
Authority’s clearance at importation, therefore they had been procured by the 
wholesalers and the shops legitimately.170 Also worrying with regard to the rational use 
of medicines is the fact that ADDO shopkeepers often do not check the prescriptions 
when clients ask for a prescription medicine, as they should do. According to some 
health professionals some flexibility is warranted as in fact “antimalarials should not be 
                                            
168 With regard to the literature, the ADDO programme has been re-edited as a case-study 
in global access to medicines policy discussions [Brieger et al 2004; Hetzel et al 2007; 
Patouillard et al 2007; Quick, Nana-Adjoa, Rankin, and Mbwasi, 2005; Rutta et al 2009; 
WHO, Partnerships for Malaria Control: Engaging the Formal and Informal Private 
Sectors, 2006]. Thorough reviews, however, seem to come only from its institutional 
promoter [STI 2005; HERA 2006; MSH, website, SEAM Country Programs; MSH  
2006; SEAM 2003]. The ADDO project is also discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 in light of 
the implementation of the human right to essential medicines. 
169 See also the Tanzania pilot programme for the distribution of subsidised artemether-
lumefantrine in duka la dawa baridi undertaken by the Clinton Foundation (the Clinton 
Foundation obtained a waiver as duka la dawa baridi are not otherwise allowed to sell 
prescription medicines). With regard to availability, the proportion of remote duka la 
dawa baridi stocking subsidised artemether-lumefantrine remained limited: “stocking and 
sales of subsidized ACTs [artemether-lumefantrine] were lower in stores located away 
from town centers and major roads. At the time of the March audit, 38% of these stores 
were stocking subsidized ACTs compared with 80% of stores in more densely populated 
areas” [Clinton Foundation, Tanzania Pilot ACT Subsidy: Report on Findings, 2008: 42].   
  
170  Interview [National Malaria Control Programme, Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2009]. 
According to Kihiyo, Tanzania Consumer Advocacy Society, 50% of the medicines 
marketed in Tanzania are fake. The estimate may be inflated but not totally unrealistic 
considering that some research showed that more than a third of antimalarial drugs sold 
in Africa have failed quality tests [Bate et al 2008]. Substandard Metakelfin, an 
antimalarial has been discovered by TFDA in 2009. The product was totally ineffective 
against malaria and has been withdrawn from the market [TFDA, Taarifa Kwa Kuhusu 





prescription medicines where malaria is endemic”.171  However, fevers are too often 
attributed to malaria and this can be a risk for the health of the individual if other health 
conditions are overlooked – and a waste of antimalarials which can also lead to drug 
resistance, a serious public health concern. 172  Social marketing of artemether-
lumefantrine, as per the ACCESS project, I note, could be a double-edged sword, leading 
to further malaria over-diagnosis. 173  With regard to affordability, ADDOs are more 
expensive than the public sector. Importantly, as opposed to the public sector, ADDOs do 
not implement exemptions for protected categories.174  Indeed, ADDOs are for-profit 
entities, sometimes bearing considerable logistic costs, and facing little competition. 
However prices in ADDOs were generally lower than in pharmacies or other private care 
facilities.175 Thanks to US President’s Malaria Initiative funds, artemether-lumefantrine 
is sold at subsidised price in Morogoro and Ruvuma. In terms of access overall, 
furthermore, some interviewees voiced the concern that pharmaceutical products are 
pilfered from the public sector to the ADDOs.176 Finally, a major problem is how to 
sustain ADDOs financially, considering that the training and accreditation programme 
relies on donor support [HERA 2006].  
 
 
                                            
171 Interview [Dar es Salaam, July 2009]. See also, Goodman et al writing on “Drug Shop 
Regulation and Malaria Treatment in Tanzania – Why do Shops Break the Rules, and 
Does it Matter?” [Goodman et al 2007].  
172 Interviews with USAID/JSI [Dar es Salaam, 17 July 2009] and National Malaria 
Control Programme [Dar es Salaam, 19 July 2009]. See Reyburn et al [2004]; Mosha et 
al [2010] on the cost implications of improving malaria diagnosis in Tanzania. See also 
Gwer et al [2007] on the risks of treating only for malaria as a failure to address other 
life-threatening conditions. The authors therefore suggest that routine use of parenteral 
antibiotics among children with a slide that indicates malaria is warranted because 
invasive bacterial infections are likely to be under-ascertained and are associated with 
increased mortality [Gwer et al 2007]. 
173 Social marketing is still laudable in dispelling harmful beliefs in sub-Saharan Africa 
such as those attributing some diseases’ symptoms to witchcraft. Such beliefs can bring 
to ineffective treatment of serious conditions – and even to acts of violence against the 
sick. Reportedly, conditions with convulsions as leading symptoms are often primarily 
treated with traditional practices but are in fact often linked to malaria [Dillip et al 2009]. 
174 See above. 
175  See also the Tanzania pilot programme for subsided artemether-lumefantrine 
undertaken by the Clinton Foundation, which found that the subsidy was generally 
passed onto the consumers [Clinton Foundation, Tanzania Pilot ACT Subsidy: Report on 
Findings, 2008]. 




2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated the circumstances, problems and contingencies of 
access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, also recounting the case-study on Tanzania. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is affected by a huge burden of disease, more than other regions of 
the world, which invasively impairs the health of its people. The situation is multifarious, 
as there is not a single pathogen ravaging the region. Rather, there are many conditions, 
often interrelated. Also, there are many determinants of health, both environmental and 
humane, which favour such situation. The chapter has further shown that many health 
conditions affecting sub-Saharan Africa are technically preventable and curable. In effect 
access to quality medical treatment can prevent, heal or alleviate the suffering of an 
individual: medicines are one component of treatment, not sufficient on their own, but 
still necessary. Yet many medicines, and even the ‘essential’ ones, are not widely 
accessible in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter has consequently illustrated the 
technicalities and problems relating to the provision, access and financing of medicines 
in the region and, in particular, in Tanzania.  
It was demonstrated that access to medicines is complex, multidimensional, and 
involving different factors and actors, private and public. In effect, those actors have 
power and biopower on access to medicines. Observing in terms of Luhmann’s social 
systems it is remarked that the decisions of these actors are framed by different 
subsystems such as: the economic subsystem, communicating in terms of money e.g. 
with regard to profit, political economy, resources available at the national level; the 
subsystem of science, communicating on truth e.g. about epidemiology or treatment 
options; the subsystem of morality, communicating on good e.g. about health, 
compassion, corporate social responsibility; the subsystem of law, communicating on 
legality e.g. about competition law, intellectual property law; the subsystem of politics, 
communicating on binding power e.g. about quality controls, rational use of medicines, 
price controls, public health measures. The subsystems are often structurally coupled, in 
their effort to respond to environmental contingencies and complexities.  
Can, shall the human rights subsystem overrule the other subsystems? Recalling 
my research question exposed in Chapter 1, “can a human right to medicines be utilised 
to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?”. On the one hand, it 
has been appraised that the universal need for access to medicines is particularly acute in 




the lack of resources is apparently a major impediment for access to medicines, this can 
be improved through regulation, alternative financial arrangements and voluntary actions. 
This chapter has in effect shown the variety of interests and rationalities adopted by the 
actors operating on access to medicines. Such ‘communications’ and ‘programmes’ 
(recalling Luhmann’s terminology) could arguably be harnessed to the framework of the 
human right to medicines. On the other hand, also referring to the situation in Tanzania, 
it has been highlighted how both the needs and the effects of access to medicines are 
contextual, based on the health and financial situations of the individual as well as the 
local health, economic and legal systems. Furthermore, these factors are interrelated in a 
complex, contingent way. Moreover, cognitive limitations (both in the sense of scarcity 
and inadequacy) of objective, comprehensive and conclusive knowledge of health 
systems have been pointed out. For example, quantitative studies need to be 
complemented by qualitative research and empirical work which are essentially 
subjective. These complexities and contingencies can represent challenges to the 
utilisation of the human right to medicines to solve the problem of access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, Chapters 3 and 4 analyse what the international 
human right to medicines prescribes de jure and Chapters 5 and 6 discuss how the duties 
ensuing from this right can be operationalised (that is, given precise content translating it 




CHAPTER 3: THE OBLIGATIONS OF HOME STATES WITH REGARD TO 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO MEDICINES DE JURE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, 
addressing the overall burden of disease, the importance of medicines, the problems and 
contingencies of access to health care and medicines in the region. It showed that, among 
other factors, access to medicines is and can be greatly influenced by public policies. 
Recalling the research question, “can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the 
problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?”, Chapter 3 aims to establish 
whether and what human rights obligations African states bear in relation to the access to 
medicines. It will be shown in particular that the human right to health enshrined in 
several widely-accessed human rights treaties binds ‘home states’ to respect, protect and 
provide – under certain conditions – access to medicines vis-à-vis their populations.177  
Therefore, these treaties may sanction an international human right to medicines as part 
of the human right to health. The legal arguments supporting such statements are 
discussed in this chapter. Other human rights can also be ancillary to a case for access to 
medicines, such as the human right to life in claims concerning vital medicines. 
The scope of this chapter, together with international law, includes domestic law 
as well as ‘soft law’. International and national law intertwine – and this is indeed a 
fundamental premise for the utilisation of the international human right to medicines to 
solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The implementation and 
enforcement of human rights takes place primarily at the national level.178 Furthermore, 
the wordings of international human rights treaties may influence the phrasing of national 
constitutions [Hogerzeil 2006: 308] and other law such as the implementing legislation. 
In domestic courts, international human rights law may influence the interpretation of 
                                            
177 For obligations of ‘home states’ I mean the obligations of states towards the people 
within their jurisdiction. For the use of the term ‘home state’ see e.g. Joseph [2004]. 
178 National courts have primary jurisdiction on the legal enforcement of international 
human rights law, while international adjudication is to be deemed subsidiary [Conforti 




constitutional provisions,179 or even be claimed and awarded replacing the absence of a 
constitutional right. 180  On the other hand, national courts applying national and 
international human rights norms contribute to the development of the international right 
to medicines.181 Cases in national courts can also influence foreign cases when similar 
questions relating to human rights are at issue.182 Furthermore, the enquiry will deal with 
soft law, ie international non-binding law.183 There are four main reasons why the study 
of non-binding law is relevant for the present research in the positive law. First, if 
enshrining ‘paper practice’ and opinio juris, soft law can be an element of customary law. 
Second, soft law and self-regulation can be explicitly referred to by the positive law 
enshrining the human right to medicines. Instruments sanctioning the human right to 
                                            
179 In the Grootboom judgement, for instance, the South Africa’s Constitutional Court 
used international law as tool for interpreting the rights inscribed in the South Africa’s 
Bill of Rights (as also prescribed by art. 39 of the South Africa’s Constitution) [South 
Africa, Constitutional Court, Grootboom, 2000:  para. 26]. 
180 For example in the Viceconte (Argentina) case the Federal Court of Appeals found 
that any individual may bring complaints concerning the right to health because of the 
incorporation into the national constitution of international treaties referring to the right 
[Argentina, Court of Appeals, Viceconte, 1998].  
181  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health, Hunt, and other commentators, for instance, often refer 
to national case law in order to interpret the right to health and essential medicines 
prescribed by international human rights law, both in treaty law and in customary law 
[CESCR 2000; Hestermeyer 2004; Hunt 2006; Yamin 2003]. Similarly Toebes 
researched the domestic implementation of the international right to health also by 
studying the national case law, ie “cases in which the right to health is invoked before a 
national judge or before quasi-judicial bodies, either directly on the basis of international 
treaty provisions or on the basis of national constitutions provisions” [Toebes 1999: 190 
et seq]. 
182 For example, the South Africa’s Constitutional Court has discussed the Indian case 
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal in the Soobramoney 
judgment [South Africa, Constitutional Court, Soobramoney, 1998: paras. 18-20]. See 
also Lord Woolf considering that “[a]cross the globe there is a comparative approach to 
human rights” and noting that a British Bill of Rights “would enable us to play our part 
in the development of human rights jurisprudence internationally” [Woolf 1995: 70]. 
183 I adopt the definition of soft law offered by Boyle and Chinkin according to whom 
soft law, from a law-making perspective, is a description for a variety of non-legally 
binding instruments used in international relations [Boyle and Chinkin 2007: 212]. On 
soft law as a ‘law-making instrument’ see generally Boyle and Chinkin [2007: 211-229]. 
See also, e.g., the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Ruggie, who 
stated that “[s]soft law is ‘soft’ in the sense that it does not by itself create legally binding 
obligations. It derives its normative force through recognition of social expectations by 
States and other key actors… Some soft law instruments may contain elements that 
already impose, or may come to impose, obligations on States under customary 
international law, which would give them binding effect independent of the soft law 




health and medicines, for example, refer to the Alma Ata Declaration, the WHO 
regulations and standards, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General 
Assembly Declarations.184   Binding treaties in effect often also include non-binding 
‘aspirational’ provisions. Those dynamics show the structural coupling of law to other 
subsystems such as the meta-positive ‘subsystem of human rights’ and morality. Third, it 
is always important to discern the binding law from the non-binding law, in order to 
ascertain the legal applicability of the (legal) human right to medicines. Fourth, the 
identification of the instances of the meta-positive ‘human rights subsystem’ is 
instrumental to the discussion which will take place in Chapters 5 and 6, the critical study 
of the (positive) human right to medicines undertaken in these chapters will also analyse 
the meta-positive human right to medicines.  
The method of this chapter, in effect, is legal analysis. The study is nonetheless 
undertaken with a critical attitude, underlining the uncertainty and contingency 
embedded in the law de jure. The strengths, limits and uncertainties of the sources 
utilised in identifying the law (such as treaties, treaty bodies, international non-binding 
pledges, international courts, national courts, publicists and other authors) are taken into 
consideration.185  With regard to the structure, this chapter is divided into two main 
sections. Section 3.2 presents the human right to medicines in international (universal 
and regional) treaty law, as warranted by the human right to health, life or other human 
rights (including the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment; to dignity; to adequate standards of living; to social security; to education; to 
work; to the benefits of scientific progress). Most attention is dedicated to the human 
right to health enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) as 
more precisely related to the human right to medicines. Furthermore, most African 
                                            
184 See e.g., the CESCR comments and the African Commission’s resolution on the 
human right to medicines [CESCR 1990(b), 2000; AC Res. 141 (2008)]. 
185 With particular regard to the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), for 
example, it is noted that the Court’s role in establishing international law is important but 
not definitive. The ICJ’s tasks are to deliver judgment in cases between the parties and to 
express advisory opinions on demand (“at the request of whatever body may be 
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request” [ICJ Statute, art. 65(1)]) [ICJ Statute arts. 34-38; 65-68]. The statements of the 
Court are often considered as “the best formulation of international law in force” [Chetail 
2003: 235-236]. However, the international legal system does not envisage a hierarchy 
between the international courts. Cf. Higgins discussing the relevance of the ICJ in “A 




countries are parties to the ICESCR and all African countries are parties to the ACHPR. 
Section 3.3 attempts to identify the possible status of the human right to medicines in 
international customary law and soft law. A conclusion is finally provided in section 3.4 
reporting on the possibilities and limitations of a human right to medicines to be utilised, 
de jure, to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa with regard to 
the role of home states. The possibilities derive from the fact that instances of 
international human rights law prescribing access to medicines as part of other human 
rights, and in particular the human right to health, are in effect identified and can be 
named as a ‘human right to medicines’. With regard to the limitations it is pointed out, in 
particular, that the law is often uncertain with regard to the prescription of the duties that 
African states shall undertake in order to comply with the human right to medicines. 
 
3.2 The human right to medicines in international human rights treaties 
Section 3.2 examines the human right to medicines in international treaty law. 
The law is complemented by commentaries (including the comments of the related 
treaty-bodies) and judicial cases. Those sources contribute to the interpretation and, 
arguably, to the development of the positive law. Interpretation is necessary as the 
provisions are often unclear or indeterminate.186  I will be cautious in this section to 
select the more faithful interpretations of the treaties, nonetheless exposing the 
uncertainties regarding the positive law which are not settled in the discipline. With 
regard to the possible evolution of the law, the use of a ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutionary’ 
interpretation of human rights provisions has been established in international law, inter 
alia, by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).187  With particular regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in particular Craven has remarked that “the drafters 
                                            
186 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty provisions have to 
be interpreted by respecting the ordinary meaning of their wording, in the light of the 
object and purpose of the document. In order to resolve textual ambiguities, preparatory 
works and the subsequent practice should be utilised [VCLT 1980: arts. 31-32]. 
187 See, e.g., ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] and ECtHR, Tyrer v United Kingdom [1978]. On 




clearly envisaged a continuing process of standard-setting” [Craven 1995: 26].188 The 
development of the law is, to note, often contentious and introduces uncertainty in the 
positive law. 
 
3.2.1. Access to medicines as part of the human right to health 
3.2.1.1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with its two Optional Protocols, is part 
of the international Bill of Rights, a project promoted by the UN.189 With regard to its 
geographical breadth, the Covenant binds 159 states parties from all world regions 
[UNOHCHR 2008(b)], including 43 (out of 53) African states [Odinkalu 2003: 23]. The 
Covenant, in effect, enjoys ascendency in human rights law; it is a source of inspiration 
for legislation [Hogerzeil 2006: 308] and it is cited in domestic tribunals.190 With regard 
to its subject matter, the Covenant enshrines the human right to health which, as 
demonstrated below, comprises a human right to medicines. In analysing what the 
Covenant entails, the pronouncements of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) will receive particular attention as, even if not binding per se, 
                                            
188 Craven cites the example of article 8, paragraph 3, of the ICESCR expressly open to 
the International Labour Organisation standard setting [Craven 1995: 26]. 
189 The United Nations Office of the High Commission of Human Rights (UNOHCHR) 
describes the Bill of Human Rights as a project promoted by the United Nations (UN) in 
observance of the UN Charter purposes of “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion” [UN Charter art. 1(3)]. The idea of promulgating an ‘international 
bill of rights’ was considered by many as basically implicit in the Charter [UNHOCHR, 
Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, 1996]. See section 
3.2.1.3 presenting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and section 
3.3.4 discussing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ie the other two 
components of the international Bill of Rights. 
190  See e.g. the South African Ministry of Health v. TAC case [South African 
Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002, para. 26] and the Argentinean 




they can be considered ‘authoritative interpretations’ of the Covenant [Skogly and 
Gibney 2002: 791].191 Article 12 enshrines the human right to health providing that: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and 
for the healthy development of the child;  
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;  
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases;  
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness. [ICESCR art. 12] 
Regarding the term health, the drafters did not mean simple lack of disease, as 
demonstrated by the drafting history.192 With a view to the second paragraph of the 
article, which lists specific positive duties to be undertaken by the member states, it is 
apparent that the recognition of the human right to health provides for more than a mere 
right/freedom to be healthy. As the CESCR suggests, it provides for a right/entitlement 
as well [CESCR 2000: paras. 4, 8; Toebes 1999: 51-52]. With the possible exception of 
sub-paragraph b), medicines can be needed for all the aspects of health policies 
mentioned in paragraph 2. The CESCR clearly identifies the provision of essential 
medicines as one of the measures to be taken under sub-paragraph d) which, the 
Committee maintains, “includes the provision of equal and timely access to basic 
preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services and… the provision of essential 
                                            
191  A few considerations may justify such authority. The Committee is a body of 
independent experts which was established under ECOSOC Resolution 17 (1985) to 
carry out the monitoring functions assigned to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) in Part IV of the ICESCR [UNOHCHR 2008(d)]. The Committee 
has been active in elaborating General Comments on various ICESCR provisions and on 
how to better implement the Covenant; issuing reporting guidelines for the ICESCR 
Parties, relating to issues and policies on which States have to focus their attention; 
analysing States implementation of the Covenant and expressing ‘concluding 
considerations’ on them [Niada 2006: 149]. The CESCR comments are also considered 
by national courts when addressing human rights issues. The South African 
Constitutional Court has discussed the CESCR General Comment 3 in Grootboom, a 
case relating to the right to housing (although therein the Court rejected the CESCR 
approach demanding on states the immediate satisfaction of core obligations. See Chapter 
5 section 5.4.3.) [South African Constitutional Court, Grootboom, 1999: 11-13]. 





drugs…” [CESCR 2000: para. 17]. Moreover, according to the CESCR, among the 
‘interrelated and essential elements’ contained by the right to essential elements for 
health, there are ‘functioning public health and health-care facilities’ which have to 
‘include… essential drugs’ [id.: para. 12]. The view that the human right to health in the 
ICESCR can imply obligations onto the states parties with regard to medicines is upheld, 
inter alia, by national courts.193 It can arguably be said, therefore, that access to the 
medicines needed for health is a human right under the ICESCR. This view is also 
maintained by the Special Rapporteur on the human right to health [e.g., Hunt 2006: para. 
40] and international lawyers [Hestermeyer 2004: 125; Yamin 2003: 111].  
It is more difficult, however, to establish what conduct states shall undertake to 
realise the human right to medicines. The ICESCR does not enucleate precise 
prescriptions. For example, a direct intervention of states in health care is not required. 
States have to take steps for “[t]he creation of conditions which would assure to all 
medical service and medical attention...” [ICESCR art. 12(2)(d), emph. add.]. In general 
the ICESCR rights are to be realised, vaguely, “by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures” [ICESCR art. 2(1)]. The CESCR 
General Comment on the right to health prescribes conducts to states in a more expansive 
way. The CESCR holds that according to the ICESCR states have tripartite obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfil the human right to health. Some obligations are especially 
pertinent to access to medicines [CESCR 2000: para. 33]: states have duties to respect 
the human right to health by refraining from interfering in the equal access to treatment 
[id.: para. 34]; protect by “controlling the marketing of medical equipment and medicines 
by third parties” [id.: para. 35]; and fulfil by “ensur[ing] the provision of health care, 
including immunization programmes against the major infectious diseases…” [id.: para. 
36]. These CESCR prescriptions too, however, are quite indeterminate, as it will also be 
discussed in Chapter 5. In effect the CESCR ultimately states that “[t]he most appropriate 
feasible measures to implement the human right to health will vary significantly from 
one state to another. Every state has a margin of discretion in assessing which measures 
are most suitable to meet its specific circumstances” [id.: para. 53]. Furthermore, judicial 
                                            
193 In the Viceconte case the Argentinean Federal Court of Appeals also referred to the 
ICESCR in order to appreciate the social right to health and to assert the state obligation 
to manufacture the hemorrhagic fever vaccine as requested by the plaintiffs [Argentina, 




enforceability is not prescribed in mandatory terms by the CESCR.194 The CESCR is 
instead more assertive with regard to the so-called minimum core obligations, as it is 
shown below. 
Another element of uncertainty regards the fact that the ICESCR stipulates that 
the rights recognised in the Covenant have to be realised progressively, to the maximum 
of the available resources:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. [ICESCR art. 2(1)] 
A question originates about how slowly the steps can be undertaken without 
constituting violations of the Covenant. The wording ‘achieving progressively’ may be 
seen as an excuse for delaying the parties’ conduct for the realisation of the rights. 
Noteworthy, concern about the formula had been expressed during the travaux 
préparatoires by some representatives who argued that it introduced uncertainty in the 
liability of states for the realisation of the ICESCR rights.195 The CESCR in its comment 
states that the concept of progressive realisation in fact “imposes an obligation to move 
                                            
194 The CESCR recommends remedies for the violation of the right to health in non-
mandatory terms: “[a]ny person or group victim of a violation of the right to health 
should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and 
international levels. All victims of such violations should be entitled to adequate 
reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or 
guarantees of non-repetition. National ombudsmen, human rights commissions, 
consumer forums, patients’ rights associations or similar institutions should address 
violations of the right to health” [CESCR 2000: para. 59, emph.  add.].  
195 Scepticism was expressed during the travaux by some country representatives such as 
those from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Costa Rica. The former, for instance, 
stated that the word ‘progressively’ would render the “Commission’s work meaningless; 
if it were allowed to remain, it would matter little how the remaining articles read, since 
in any case they would be doomed to [become] a dead letter” [Morozov, Russian 
representative, 1952: 8]. The French representative however noted that the phrase 
‘progressively the full realisation’ replaced the former proposal ‘progressive 
implementation’ “in order to strengthen rather than weaken the objective set before 
future contracting parties” [Cassin, French representative, 1951]. Other representatives 
instead retorted that the word ‘progressively’ emphasised the supposition that progress 
was supposed to be continuous [Sørenson, Danish representative 1951: 20-21] and that it 
was necessary to recognise that “[t]he commitment was conditional and depended upon 
factors outside [state] control such as international cooperation, available resources and 





as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal” [CESCR 1990(b): para. 9]. 
The CESCR phrasing is however still vague. Next, reference to the ‘maximum of 
available resources’ also introduces contingency. As Alston and Quinn maintain, “it is 
clear from the travaux that states parties are presumed to have considerable discretion in 
determining what resources are in fact available for use in economic, social, and cultural 
right-related concerns” [Alston and Quinn 1987: 180]. 196  ICESCR article 12 also 
possibly concedes some delay in the implementation of the human right to health: in 
paragraph 1, the Covenant utilises the term ‘highest attainable standard’ which is 
ambiguous [ICESCR art. 12(1)]. Hestermeyer and Toebes, on the one hand, note that the 
French version of article 12 recites: “meilleur état de santé… qu’elle soit capable 
d’atteindre”. Thus, it would only refer to the biological preconditions of the individual 
[Hestermeyer 2004: 127; Toebes 1999: 45-6]. The CESCR, on the other hand, argues that 
it “takes into account both the individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions 
and state’s available resources” [CESCR 2000: para. 9]. In paragraph 2, article 12 
prescribes certain ‘steps’ that the parties shall undertake, thereby contemplating a gradual 
implementation [ICESCR art. 12(2)]. 
Nonetheless, in the General Comment on the nature of states parties obligations, 
the CESCR maintains that the ICESCR “also imposes various obligations which are of 
immediate effect” [CESCR 1990(b): para. 1]. One of these is the guarantee that relevant 
rights “will be exercised without discrimination” [id.]. The other is the act of taking steps 
[id.: para. 2], which includes legislative measures [id.: para. 4] and the provision of 
judicial remedies [id.: para. 5]. Lastly, the CESCR expresses the view that “a minimum 
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party” [id.: para. 10]. Short of these 
                                            
196 For instance, as mentioned by the Danish representative, “many countries were faced 
with the problem of reconciling defence requirements with those of social services… [so] 
it would be unrealistic to attempt to dictate to states how they should allocate their 
resources in that respect” [Sørenson, Danish representative, 1951: 20]. Nevertheless, the 
Australian representative maintained that states engaging in the Covenant had ‘positive 
and not… evasive purposes’ [Whitlam, Australian representative, 1951: 15]. The 
Lebanese representative also specified that the ‘maximum of available resources’ refer to 
the real resources of a country and not to budgetary appropriations [Azkoul, Lebanese 
representative, 1952: 5]. See Alston and Quinn who provide a thorough commentary of 
the ICESCR provisions relating to state parties obligations utilising the travaux 
préparatoires. Odinkalu notes that the analysis of Alston and Quinn is reflected in the 
CESCR General Comment 3 on the nature of states parties obligations [Odinkalu 2001: 




minimum core obligations the covenant ‘would be largely deprived of its raison d’être’ 
[id.]. Importantly, according to the CESCR, the provision of ‘essential drugs’ is on its 
own a core obligation [CESCR 2000: para. 43(d) and note 5]. This view is upheld by 
Special Rapporteur Hunt, who has also reported to the UN General Assembly about the 
human right to medicines [Hunt 2006: para. 38]. The CESCR however does not identify 
‘essential drugs’. Rather it refers to those drugs “from time to time defined under the 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs” [CESCR 2000: para. 43(d) and note 5]. It 
is also noted that, according to the CESCR, the lack of essential medicines in a country is 
a prima facie violation by states of their minimum core obligation if it affects ‘any 
significant number of individuals’ [CESCR 1990(b): para. 10; 2000: para. 43]. 
In sum, the ICESCR attributes to home states certain duties to respect, protect and 
fulfil access to medicines as part of the human right to health. The CESCR, in addition, 
identifies the provision of ‘essential’ medicines as a core obligation of immediate effect. 
It can therefore be said that access to medicines is a human right as fundamental part of 
the human right to health. It was also noted however that the wording of the human right 
to health is to great extent indeterminate, therefore it is difficult to draw precise 
obligations for African states. In effect, the ICESCR contains no precise prescription 
with regard to the conduct that states shall adopt for the realisation of the right. For 
example, a direct intervention of states in health care is not required. States have to take 
steps towards the ‘creation of conditions’ which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention [ICESCR art. 12(2)(d), emph. add.]. Apparently, some duties are 
conditional on the local circumstances, such as the availability of state resources and the 
characters of the health systems [ICESCR art. 2(1)]. The CESCR, in its general 
comments, prescribes the conduct of states in a more comprehensive way, yet allowing 
for margins of discretion. The operationalisation and implementation of the prescriptions 









3.2.1.2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)  
Several regional covenants sanction a human right to health, such as the European 
Social Charter197 and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.198 With regard to sub-
Saharan Africa, the human right to health is enshrined in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), adopted in 1981, ratified by all 53 members of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now African Union, AU) [Odinkalu 2003: 20]. 199 
Like the ICESCR, the ACHPR is presided by a treaty body, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights [hereinafter African Commission] which can offer guidance 
for the interpretation of the right to essential medicines sanctioned in the Charter’s 
regime.200 There are a series of articles in the Charter dealing with health. Article 16 is 
the most relevant with regard to access to medicines.201 The article provides that  
Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable State of physical 
and mental health. States Parties are obliged to take the necessary measures to 
protect the health of their peoples and to ensure that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick. [ACHPR art. 16] 
                                            
197 In the European Social Charter the 47 Members of the Council of Europe “[w]ith a 
view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health… undertake, 
either directly or in co-operation with public or private organisations, to take appropriate 
measures designed inter alia: to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health to 
prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases” [ESC art. 11].  
198 The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also known as Protocol of San Salvador, sets forth 
a right to health for all individuals [Protocol of San Salvador, art. 10]. The American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man establishes the right to the preservation of 
health through sanitation and social measures (food, clothing, housing and medical care) 
[ADRDM, Article XI]. See, e.g., Langford and Nolan [2006: 97-99]. 
199 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in 1981 and entered 
into force in 1986. The Charter is often called Banjul Charter in order to differentiate it 
from the Charter of the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) [Peter 1990: 9].  
200  The Commission’s mandate is to protect, to interpret, and to promote the rights 
guaranteed under the ACHPR [ACHPR Arts 45(1)(2)(3)]. Under its protective function, 
the African Commission receives biennial reports, it can consider communications and 
complaints by other State parties or NGOs [art. 55], and can formulate recommendations 
[art. 59] for the implementation of the Charter. So far, the African Commission has not 
been officially requested to interpret a Charter provision, however, it has expressed 
authoritative interpretation through the recommendations expressed in the exercise of its 
protective role [Baderin 2007: 144]. See also Chapter 4 section 4.2.2. 
201 For example, article 18 provides that the state “shall take care for the physical health” 
of the family [ACHPR art. 18]. Article 13 sanctions the right to equal access to the public 
service of his or her country [id.: art. 13]. Article 24 provides for a general satisfactory 




The formulation recalls ICESCR article 12 which describes the human right to 
health as the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.202 It is 
also remarked that international instruments can be used by the African Commission in 
order to interpret the Charter [ACHPR: art. 60]. Access to medicines is necessary for the 
realisation of ACHPR article 16 even though the Charter does not make direct reference 
to it. In effect the African Commission has recognised the lack of provision of medicines 
as a violation of the human right to health deciding in a violation complaint. 203 
Furthermore, it has recently issued a resolution on access to medicines which, inter alia, 
“urges states to guarantee the full scope of access to medicines” [AC Res. 141 (2008): 
para. 1], and recognises that “access to needed medicines is a fundamental component of 
the human right to health and that States parties to the African Charter have an obligation 
to provide where appropriate needed medicines, or facilitate access to them” [id.: 
preambular para. 4].204  
With regard to the conduct for the implementation, similarly to the ICESCR 
[ICESCR art. 2(1)], according to the Charter article 1, the parties “shall recognize the 
rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them” [ACHPR art. 1]. The Charter is in 
effect vague, but duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to health can be read 
in the ACHPR provisions. This view has been upheld by the African Commission in its 
communications. 205  The African Commission’s resolution on the human right to 
medicines, furthermore, lists the scope of the actions that states should take in order to 
promote, protect and fulfil the human right to medicines [AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 2]. 
Among the obligations to fulfil, similarly to the CESCR, the Commission demands 
“ensuring availability and affordability to all of essential medicines” [id.: para. 2(3)(a)]. 
The Commission identifies the essential medicines referring to the country’s essential 
                                            
202 For the meaning of ‘health’ in the Charter therefore see section 3.2.1.1 above. For the 
comparability of the ACHPR art. 16 to the ICESCR art. 12 formulations see also Toebes 
[1999: 73]. 
203 In the Zaire case, the Commission found that “[t]he failure of the Government to 
provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of 
medicine… constitutes a violation of Article 16” [AC, Zaire, 1995: para. 47]. See 
Chapter 6 Section 6.4.3.2.  
204  Quite convolutedly the African Commission also recognises that the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health has explained the right to health mandates that State 
promote “the realization of the human right to medicines for all” [AC Res. 141 (2008): 
preambular para. 5]. 




medicines list and the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs, as it will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 section 5.4.1. 
There is no mention in the African Charter to certain concepts found in the 
ICESCR, such as the progressive achievement or the availability of resources [ICESCR 
art. 2(1)]. According to Baderin, scholars are of the view that the economic, social and 
cultural rights must be achieved progressively owing to the lack of resources and the 
poor economic situation confronting African states [Baderin 2007: 141]. 206  Instead, 
Odinkalu maintains that the obligations assumed by state parties “are clearly stated as of 
immediate application” [Odinkalu 2001: 349]. This is because in the Charter, differently 
to the UN Covenants, “[e]conomic, social and cultural rights are placed on the same 
footing as all other rights in the Charter” [id.]. This interpretation, he argued, is 
confirmed by the Commission which for instance, in its third Activity Report, 
acknowledged the difficulty posed by “the present hostile economic circumstances” but 
reminded the state parties that “[o]ur Charter requires that all these rights and more 
should be implemented now… It is a task that must be carried out by every ratifying 
State” [African Commission 1990: 115]. 207  In its resolution on the human right to 
medicines, the African Commission also calls on states to fulfil access to medicines by 
“immediately meeting the minimum core obligations of ensuring availability and 
affordability to all of essential medicines” [AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 2(3)(i), emph. 
add.].208  
Thus, the African Charter de jure sanctions access to medicines as part of the 
human right to health [ACHPR art. 16]. In particular, the African Commission (which is 
however a non-binding treaty-based body) has issued a resolution recognising access to 
medicines as a fundamental component of the human right to health and urging states to 
promote, protect and fulfil access to medicines. Essential medicines shall be immediately 
ensured. Therefore, it can be said that under the ACHPR regime, like under the ICESCR 
regime, access to medicines is a human right, as part of the human right to health.  
 
                                            
206 For instance, Baderin refers to Ankumah [1996: 144]. 
207 See Odinkalu [2001: 350]. 
208 The Commission identifies the core referring to the country’s essential medicines list 






3.2.1.3 The human right to health in other treaties 
Other international treaties enshrine special provisions relating to health which 
can apply to access to medicines. Those treaties however, unlike the ICESCR and the 
ACHPR, regard specific groups/situations such as women and children. 209  Thus, 
arguably, the human right to health, sanctioned in treaty law by a host of widely-accessed 
international covenants, including the principal human rights treaties of the African 
region, upholds a human right to medicines and its corresponding obligations on the part 
of states to respect, protect, and fulfil access to medicines.  
 
3.2.2 Access to medicines as part of the right to life 
Access to life-saving medicines can also be supported in international human 
rights law by the right to life. This right is sanctioned in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), whereby “[e]very human being has the inherent right 
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life” [ICCPR art 6(1)]. Like the ICESCR, the Covenant is part of the Bill of Human 
                                            
209 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified by 48 
African countries [Odinkalu 2003: 23] and 185 parties worldwide [UNTC 2008], 
contains a right to health for children which demands, inter alia, that states take 
appropriate measure to “ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health 
care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care” and “to 
combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, 
through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology” [CRC art. 24(2)(b) 
and (c)]. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, ratified by 37 
African countries [African Union, website, 2004], is also comprehensive in providing for 
the health of the children. Article 14, in effect states that “States Parties… shall take 
measures… to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all 
children with emphasis on the development of primary health care” [ACRWC art. 14, 
14(b)]. Health is recognised in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women [CEDAW art. 12(2)], ratified by 48 African countries 
[Odinkalu 2003: 23] and 185 parties worldwide [UNTC 2008], and the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
ratified by 27 countries [African Union, website, 2010], which requires states parties “to 
provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services to women, especially those in 
rural areas” [Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 




Rights.210 The Covenant has been ratified by 162 states [UNOHCHR 2008(a)], out of 
which 43 are African countries [Odinkalu 2003: 23]. The right to life is also enshrined in 
the ACHPR, whereby “[e]very human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and 
the integrity of his person. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” [ACHPR art. 
4]. The inference of a right to medicines from the right to life is not straightforward. 
Traditionally, the right to life has been interpreted as imposing to states a negative 
obligation to abstain from arbitrarily depriving the life of individuals [Dinstein 1981: 
115]. There are suggestions, however, that the right to life also imposes a responsibility 
for basic survival conditions. The Human Rights Committee, which oversees the ICCPR, 
for instance, in its General Comment 6 on the right to life has stated that:211 
…the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression 
‘inherent right to life’ cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and 
the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this 
connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties 
to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life 
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and 
epidemics. [HRC, General Comment 5, 1994: para. 5] 
The African Commission has also adopted a broader understanding of the right to 
life, stating for instance that it can be violated when “pollution and environmental 
degradation to a level humanly unacceptable has made it living in the Ogoni land a 
nightmare” [AC, Nigeria, 2001: 67]. Some national cases, debating the right to life in the 
national law also support such broader interpretation, such as some decisions in Indian 
and Bangladeshi Supreme Courts212 – where the recognition in the national law of a 
                                            
210 See sub-section 3.2.1.1. 
211 See Chapter 4 section 4.2.3. 
212 In India, in Frances Mullen v. Union Territory of Delhi the Supreme Court held that 
the right to life “includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with 
it, namely, the bare necessities of life, such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter” 
and the right to live with human dignity includes the right to good health [India, Supreme 
Court, Mullen, 1981: 453]. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh considered this decision 
by the Indian Supreme Court in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh & Others. 
Therein it held that the right to life is not limited to the protection of life and limb, but 
also includes, among other rights, the protection of the health and normal life longevity 
of an ordinary human being. Even though the Directive Principle (Article 18 of the 
Constitution) of raising the level of nutrition and improving public health might not be 
directly enforceable, the state may be compelled by the courts to remove any threat to 
public health unless such a threat is justified by law [Bangladesh, Supreme Court, Dr 





positive, justiciable right to health is absent.213 A number of cases relating to access to 
life-saving medication have been awarded in Latin America inter alia referring to the 
right to life.214 Indeed, the right to life can reinforce the case for access to medicines. In 
an analysis of 71 court cases in 12 low and middle income countries in which access to 
essential medicines was claimed with reference to the human right to health, Hogerzeil et 
al indeed note that in 80% of cases, the human right to health was linked to the right to 
life [Hogerzeil et al 2006: 308].215 Some courts however have preferred to distinguish the 
scope of those rights. In Soobramoney the South African Constitutional Court held that 
the human right to health care does not have to be inferred from the right to life because 
section 27 of the Constitution specifically deals with health rights [South Africa, 
Constitutional Court, Soobramoney, 1998: para. 15]. 
 
 
                                            
213 Namely, India’s Constitution is composed of enforceable and non enforceable parts. 
While the Fundamental Rights in part III are enforceable, the Fundamental Duties and 
the Directive Principles of State Policy, in part IV and IVa are non-enforceable 
[Constitution of India, art. 37]. The right to health is sanctioned among the Fundamental 
Duties and the Directive Principles of State Policy [id.: art. 47]. 
214 In Venezuela, in Glenda López y otros c. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales 
(IVSS), the Supreme Court granted an amparo for a group of persons living with HIV 
requesting to ensure regular and consistent supply of antiretrovirals and other drugs 
needed to treat opportunistic diseases, as well as to provide coverage of expenses of all 
necessary medical tests. The Court found that the failure denounced by the petitioners 
was a violation of the right to health and a threat to the right to life, as well as a breach of 
the right to the benefits of scientific and technological progress, and to social security, as 
set forth by the Constitution of Venezuela and international human rights conventions 
[Venezuela, Supreme Court, Glenda López y otros c. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros 
Sociales (IVSS) 2001; Venezuela, Supreme Court, Loreto Tabares y Otros, 2002]. In B. 
E. A. v. Ministerio de Salud, Banco Nacional de Drogas Antineoplásticas, Ley 16.986, a 
successful protection writ action was brought to force the Ministry of Health of 
Argentina to provide a particular anti-cancer drug necessary for the survival of a 63-year-
old woman suffering from colon cancer [Argentina, Supreme Court, B.E.A., 2002; Yamin 
2003: 111]. Other cases on antiretrovirals have been successful in Colombia and Costa 
Rica. As reported by Yamin, the Constitutional Court of Colombia has elaborated an 
extensive jurisprudence on the right to treatment in cases of HIV/AIDS. For instance in 
the Judgment of Fabio Moron Diaz, Magistrado Ponente, the Court held that denial of 
costly antiretroviral treatment prescribed for the plaintiff under social security system 
violated constitutional fundamental right to life [Colombia, Corte Constitucional de 
Colombia 1998 in Yamin 2003: 111]. See also Yamin [2003: 110-111] and Hestermeyer 
[2004: 152]. 
215 Most of the cases identified by Hogerzeil and colleagues were set in Central and Latin 




3.2.3 Access to medicines and other human rights (right not to be subjected to 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment; right to dignity; rights to adequate 
standards of living, to social security, to education and to work; and to the benefits 
of scientific progress)  
Access to treatment, under certain circumstances, can be seen as part of the right 
not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. The right is sanctioned 
in the ICCPR [ICCPR art. 7] and in regional conventions including the ACHPR [ACHPR 
art. 5].216 The intentionality of pain is in fact often seen as a necessary requirement for 
the state offence to amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment [Kilkelly 
1999: 153]. The jurisprudence is however inconsistent. Violations of the right have been 
found in a number of cases relating to the treatment in detention of seriously ill 
individuals. The Human Rights Committee, which oversees the ICCPR,217 for instance 
recognised a violation of the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica, regarding the failure to provide adequate 
medical care to prisoners [HRC, Jamaica, 1996].218 In South Africa, on the same grounds 
the High Court granted parole to a terminally ill cancer patient.219 In Europe such rights 
                                            
216 See also the Report by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, stating that “[t]he right to freedom from cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can arise in a variety of ways in the 
context of HIV/AIDS” [Van Boven 2004: para.51]. 
217 See Chapter 4 section 4.2.3. 
218 In Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica the Human Rights Committee held that the failure 
to provide adequate medical care to prisoners (a violation of the social and economic 
right to health) constituted a violation of the right to freedom from torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and of the right of all persons deprived of 
their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person (provided for by Articles 7 and 10 of the ICCPR, respectively) [HRC, 
Jamaica, 1996]. See also Nolan et al [2007: 19]. 
219 In Stanfield v. Minister of Correctional Services & Others, the High Court of South 
Africa granted parole to a terminally ill cancer patient [South Africa, High Court – Cape 
of Good Hope Provincial Division, Stanfield, 2003]. The court relied on language in 
international human rights law with respect to protection from ‘cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment’, echoing Article 7 of the ICCPR (language which was also repeated 
in the South African Constitution [Constitution of South Africa, art. 12]) [ICCPR art. 7]. 
The decision also relied on language very similar to Article 10 of the Covenant, which 
guarantees that all “persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person” [ICCPR art. 10]. As UNAIDS 
notes, “insofar as South African prisoners living with HIV continue to be unable to 
realize their right to be treated for their illness, many of the arguments made in favour of 




have been debated with regard to deportation of immigrants (especially former detainees), 
where such act would entail the interruption of the care needed and provided in the host 
country even if harm is not intentionally inflicted. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), while recognising the importance of intentionality, has also declared, in D. v. 
United Kingdom that it “must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to address the 
application of [Article 3] in other contexts which might arise” [ECtHR, D. v. United 
Kingdom, 1997: para. 49]. 220  Yet, such flexibility is reserved to ‘very exceptional 
circumstances’ [id.]. More restrictively, the Venezuela Supreme Court has held that the 
Venezuelan government’s conduct did not amount to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment because there was no intention to cause pain or inflict damage on people living 
with HIV or to undermine their dignity.221 In that case however reference was made to 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
                                                                                                                                 
Courting Rights 2006: 125]. Ceteris paribus, this can be applied to other conditions and 
treatments. See UNAIDS, Courting Rights [2006]. 
220 In D. v. United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that 
deporting a man in the late stages of AIDS from the United Kingdom back to his home 
country, where he would face poor general public health conditions and lack of access to 
treatment for AIDS, qualified as ‘inhuman treatment’ [ECtHR, D. v. United Kingdom, 
1997: paras. 53, 54]. Consequently, in Bensaid v. United Kingdom, the Court could 
conclude that article 3 had not been violated because, although in serious medical 
condition, the applicant could get the medical treatment available in Algeria, where he 
was to be returned [ECtHR, Bensaid v. United Kingdom, 2001; Lambert 2005: 40-44; 
2006: 29-30]. (Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) claims that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” [ECHR art. 3].) See also Kalashnikov v. Russia, 
where the ECtHR held that the applicant’s unhealthy conditions of detention amounted to 
degrading treatment as “although the question whether the purpose of the treatment was 
to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any 
such purpose cannot exclude a finding of violation of Article 3” [ECtHR, Kalashnikov v. 
Russia, 2002: paras. 101-102]. ECtHR D. v. United Kingdom influenced the following 
European national jurisprudence on similar cases, such as the UK’s N (FC) v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department. In N (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the House of Lords rejected the appeal of a deportation order filed by a 
Ugandan woman living with HIV, who argued that expelling her to her country, where 
access to HIV medication and medical care was uncertain, was in breach of the European 
Convention [United Kingdom, House of Lords, N (FC) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, 2005; UNAIDS, Courting Rights, 2006: 62-63]. The case went to the 
ECtHR which also held that expulsion would not cause a violation of article 3 of the 
ECHR [ECtHR, N v UK, 2008].  
221 Namely, in the Cruz del Valle case, the applicants brought an amparo action against 
the Ministry of Health and Social Action seeking the supply of prescribed antiretrovirals. 
While rejecting allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
nevertheless, the Court instead found violations of the rights to life, health and the 
benefits of science and technology. Tehrefore, it decided in favour of the applicants 




Punishment which requires explicitly intentionality for a conduct to be qualified as 
torture [Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art. 1].  
The human right to medicines can also be seen as connected to civil and political 
rights. It has been noted, for instance, that the minimal content of social rights represents 
an indispensable protection to enjoy civil and political rights. 222  Importantly, health 
treatment can be seen as claimed as implicating for instance the right to the benefits of 
scientific and technological progress, the right to social security,223 other human rights 
generally,224 or as a condition for a ‘population’s earning capacity’.225 It is commented 
however that, while human rights can be communicated as ‘indivisible’ in principle, in 
fact, the duties they impose on states can clash.226 For instance, the right to benefits of 
scientific progress, sanctioned by art. 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR may conflict with the 
intellectual property right sanctioned by the same article at subparagraph (c) [ICESCR art. 
15(1)]. Furthermore, the fulfilment of the human right to health by the states competes in 
resources with the fulfilment of other (especially economic and social) rights like, for 
example, other components of the ‘right to social security’ or the right to education 
[ICESCR art. 13; ACHPR art. 17]. Overall, the state intervention for the realisation of 
                                            
222 In Azanca Alhelí Meza García the Peruvian Tribunal Constitucional accepted the 
amparo action submitted with Peru’s Health Ministry by an HIV/AIDS-positive person, 
who requested full medical care including permanent supply of drugs and periodical 
testing, as well as CD4 and viral load tests. The Court noted that social rights standards 
are not simply programmatic principles of non-immediate effectiveness, as they have 
been traditionally described to set them apart from immediately effective civil and 
political rights, since their minimal content represents an indispensable protection to 
enjoy civil and political rights. The Court also held that the principle of progressive 
realization of expenses does not rule out setting reasonable timelines or the State’s 
obligation to take concrete and permanent actions aimed at implementing public policies 
[Peru, Tribunal Constitucional, Azanca Alhelí Meza García, 2004; ESCR-Net, website].  
223 In Glenda López y otros c. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (IVSS), 
relating to the provision of antiretrovirals, the Venezuelan Supreme Court found a breach 
of the right to the benefits of scientific and technological progress, and to social security, 
as set forth by the Constitution of Venezuela and international human rights conventions 
[Supreme Court of Venezuela, Glenda López, 2001; ESCR-Net, website].  
224 This view has been adopted in court cases, such as in Laverde v. Capresom by 
Constitutional Court of Colombia [Yamin 2003: 118, footnote 74]. 
225  In Alejandro Moreno Alvarez v. Estado Colombiano, the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia held that the social security institute has obligations to provide essential 
medication and services to avoid the destruction of the population’s earning capacity 
[Yamin 2003: 118, footnote 74]. 
226 On the indivisibility of civil and political rights from economic, social and cultural 




human rights requires the collection of resources from the people and can impose other 
constraints. The impact of the implementation by home states of the human right to 
medicines on other rights, interests, needs and liberties in society will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
In sum, the variety of human rights to which the access to medicines can appeal 
may be reassuring for the claim of access to medicines as a human right and show how 
access to medicines is communicated within the ‘human rights subsystem’. However, as 
opposed to the human right to health, they do not comprehensively sanction for a human 
right to medicines as such. Access to medicines is sometimes instrumental to those rights 
or those rights can be instrumental to access to medicines. These rights can reinforce the 
case for access to medicines, but they do not fit with a right to medicines as 
comprehensive as the human right to health does. Accordingly, for instance, Langford 
and Nolan in their analysis of the jurisprudence of economic, social and cultural rights 
have remarked that the application of the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment “is unlikely to apply to many of the fundamental components 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health or to all aspects of other economic, 
social and cultural rights” [Langford and Nolan 2006: 103]. On a similar line, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, when dealing with the right to treatment in the 
Soobramoney case, decided to refer to the human right to health, as opposed to the right 
to life, because more comprehensively responding to the circumstances of the case 
[South Africa Constitutional Court, Soobramoney, 1998: para. 15]. Furthermore, the 
duties imposed to states by human rights norms can in effect contradict. These conflicts 
will be analysed in Chapter 5, but it can be recalled here that Luhmann specifically 
identified a paradox in the fact that human rights are justified as ‘indisputable’ values, 
that is, ‘fully independent of consequences’ [Luhmann 1997(b): 35; 2008: 19] – while 





                                            





3.3 The human right to medicines in customary international law and soft law 
Section 3.3 discusses the possibility that a human right to medicines be part of 
customary international law and investigates the correspondent obligations for home 
states. International customary law is a valuable legal source for both substantive and 
procedural reasons. Substantively, the obligations relating to the prospective international 
customary right may not correspond to the provisions relating to the right to medicines 
envisaged in the human rights treaties that have been examined in the previous sections 
(which are in any event similar between them but not identical). The right under 
customary law could be more comprehensive. In fact, custom is a fluid source of law.228 
Conversely, the customary right may lack some parts of the complex bundle of rights and 
duties entailed by the treaties. Procedurally, the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) envisages international customary law as a primary source of international 
law, on the par of treaty law [ICJ Statute: art. 38(b)]. All states are accountable for 
violations of general international law under the doctrine of state responsibility including 
ten African states (such as South Africa) and the US, which have not ratified the ICESCR 
[UNOHCHR 2008(b)].229 Furthermore, the investigation of customary law will in effect 
reveal manifestations of the human right to medicines in ‘soft law’, which can be 
relevant for the positive law.230 It will also provide a snapshot of the practice which 
African states undertake to promote access to medicines.   
Section 3.3 first presents the technical difficulties of probing customary law 
(section 3.3.1). Next, some literature is reviewed and some comments expressed on the 
methodology for identifying a customary human right to medicines (section 3.3.2). 
Consequently, pieces of evidence of state practice and opinio juris are researched 
analysing ‘paper practice’ (section 3.3.3), ‘factual practice’ and judicial practice (section 
3.3.4).231 Finally, some conclusions on the issues raised are proposed (3.3.5).  
                                            
228 According to Roberts, international custom is more receptive to changes in the states’ 
wills and beliefs [Roberts 2001: 784]. 
229 Human rights can indeed count as obligations erga omnes, for which all states have a 
legal standing in customary international law. See Chapter 5 section 5.3.1 and Chapter 6 
section 6.4.3.2.  
230 For the relevance of soft law to the present investigation of the positive law see 
section 3.1 above. 





3.3.1 Elements of a customary norm 
The assessment of international customary law involves notorious technical 
difficulties that are exacerbated in the research of norms relating to human rights. The 
ICJ Statute defines international customary norms as the ‘evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’ [ICJ Statute: art. 38(b)]. International customary norms are therefore 
seen as characterised by two elements: state practice and opinio juris ac necessitatis.232 
Identifying those elements is problematic. In brief, to begin with, it is not clear what state 
actions can be acknowledged as evidence of practice. For instance, D’Amato argues that 
only ‘factual’ (what I would call ‘implementing’) acts can count as practice [D’Amato 
1987: 102]. Hereinafter I will refer to these acts as ‘factual practice’. Conversely, 
according to Akehurst, also statements and declarations can count [Akehurst 1974-5]. 
Hereinafter I will refer to this practice as ‘paper practice’.233 Next, it is difficult to mark 
the threshold between acts deviating from a candidate norm, therefore representing 
violations of the emerged norm, and acts that fall within the sovereign will and discretion 
of a state (thereby disproving the consolidation of a prospective norm).234 It is hard to 
identify a customary norm on a subject area already regulated by a treaty, as the state 
actions may be merely complying with the latter legal source. Also, by contracting out 
from the general law on state responsibility, the parties to a treaty may establish a special 
– maybe softer – sanctionary regime, and therefore be more ‘relaxed’ in enucleating 
duties.235  Thus, the recognition of a right in a treaty does not necessarily imply the 
opinio juris ac necessitatis of a duty in general international law. Moreover, it has to be 
established how many states have to comply – and for how long. Brownlie, for instance, 
maintains that practice should be of a certain duration, uniformity, consistency, and 
                                            
232 See, e.g., Cassese [2005: 157].  
233  On the distinction between ‘factual practice’ and ‘paper practice’ see also 
Hestermeyer [2004]. 
234 It has been observed that this test of customary law assumes that custom is founded on 
what states mistakenly believe is custom [Geny 1917: 367]. 
235 As Pauwelyn notes, by concluding a treaty states can contract out of or deviate from 
general international law (except from jus cogens).  For instance, treaty provisions can 
set up a tailor-made enforcement mechanism (thus deviating from the general rule of 
State responsibility) [Pauwelyn 2001: 537]. Accordingly, the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility state that “[t]hese articles do not apply where and to the extent that the 
conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or 
implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules 




generality [Brownlie 2003: 7]. However these requirements are subject to exceptions.236 
Importantly for the present research, there is a view that the requirements of uniformity 
and generality may be eased in some cases for humanitarian outcomes or human rights 
norms. The ICJ has adopted this reasoning in decision favouring a ‘humanitarian’ 
outcome [Chetail 2003: 243].237 Especially with regard to human rights, there is view 
that human rights norms should be identified focussing, in fact, on the opinio juris ac 
necessitatis (hereinafter opinio juris), that is, the animus of the acting state of being in 
compliance with a norm while performing the acts.238 Therefore, the requirements of 
uniformity and generality of state practice may be relaxed.239 In effect, it can be noted, 
the legal subsystem manifests its structural coupling to the human rights and ‘morality’ 
                                            
236 With regard to duration, according to the ICJ in the case North Sea Continental Shelf, 
“it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very 
widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected” [ICJ, North 
Sea Continental Shelf, 1969: para 73]. With regard to the uniformity and consistency of 
the practice, while in the case North Sea Continental Shelf the ICJ held that custom has 
to be ‘extensive and virtually uniform practice’ [ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969: 
para 74], in the Nicaragua case the Court decided that “[i]t is not to be expected that in 
the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect… 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order 
to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct 
of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of 
that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule” [ICJ, Nicaragua, 1986, para. 
186]. 
237  For example, see the ICJ in the Corfu Channel and Nicaragua cases: “[t]he 
obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the 
benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters 
and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the 
minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 
1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well 
recognised principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more 
exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; 
and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States” [ICJ, Corfu Channel Case, 1949: 22]. In the 
Nicaragua case the ICJ held that “[I]f a State lays mines in any waters whatever... and 
fails to give any warning or notification whatsoever, in disregard of the security of 
peaceful shipping, it commits a breach of the principles of humanitarian law underlying 
the specific provisions of Convention No. VIII of 1907” [ICJ, Nicaragua, 1986: 112, 
para. 215]. See also Chetail [2003: 243]. 
238 For the use of the expressions opinio juris as opposed to opinio juris ac necessitatis 
see Cassese [2003: 157-8]. 
239 The expression is borrowed from the ICJ case North Sea Continental Shelf [ICJ, 




subsystems.240 To this end, ‘paper practice’ such as declarations in international fora 
should provide an increasingly important source of law for human rights obligations, as 
they more explicitly enshrine opinio juris as well.241  The missing ‘factual practice’, 
consequently, should be liberally identified as infringement of the norm. 242  This 
methodology has been used, for instance, by international courts in order to identify the 
customs relating to international humanitarian law, 243  the crime of genocide, 244  the 
                                            
240 See Chapter 1 section 1.4.  
241 See Roberts [2001]. The same acts are therefore used as state practice and opinio juris 
[Id.]. Cf. Mendelson, above, maintaining that the same acts cannot serve the two tests at 
the same time [Mendelson 1995: 206] 
242 As Meron observed, “[w]hen it comes to human rights or humanitarian conventions... 
the gap between the norms stated and the actual practice tends to be especially wide” 
[Meron 1987: 363]. This suggests that the traditional notion of custom, which privileges 
inductive research in state practice, is at odds with human rights law analysis. 
Conversely, the inductive focus on state practice should yield to a deductive process that 
begins with general statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice [id.]. 
Cassese contends that the identification of some customary norms such as those opposing 
genocide, slavery, torture and racial discrimination is supported by their ‘inherent 
rational grounds’ [Cassese 2005: 158]. See also Brun [1993]; Chetail [2003]; Lillich 
[1995-96]; Simma and Alston [1988-89]; Roberts [2001]. See Niada [2006: 174] on the 
standing of the right to food in customary international law. 
243 For example the ICJ upholds the approach adopted by the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal stating in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons that “[t]he Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had already found 
in 1945 that the humanitarian rules included in the Regulations annexed to the Hague 
Convention IV of 1907 ‘were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as 
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war’… The extensive codification of 
humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the resultant treaties, as well as the 
fact that the denunciation clauses that existed in the codification instruments have never 
been used, have provided the international community with a corpus of treaty rules the 
great majority of which had already become customary and which reflected the most 
universally recognized humanitarian principles” [ICJ,  Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1995: 257, paras. 80-82; Chetail 2003: 245].  
244 In Preliminary objections Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia the ICJ reiterated its 
opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, maintaining that: “[t]he origins of the Convention show that it was 
the intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime under 
international law’ involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a 
denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, 
and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations... The 
first consequence arising from this conception is that the principles underlying the 
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, 
even without any conventional obligation. A second consequence is the universal 
character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the cooperation required ‘in order 
to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention)” [ICJ, 
Preliminary objections Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, 1996: 616, para. 31; Chetail 




prohibition of the use of force and the discipline of non-intervention in foreign 
relations.245 The application of such method to the identification of a human right to 
medicines in customary law is critically discussed in sections 3.3.2-3.3.5. 
 
3.3.2 The identification of a customary human right to medicines in the scholarly 
literature and proposal of a methodology  
One of the few elaborate attempts to investigate the possible customary status in 
international law of the human right to medicines is undertaken by Hestermeyer in his 
monographic essay “Access to Medication as a Human Right” [Hestermeyer 2004]. His 
method is interesting. Hestermeyer first examines access to medicines as part of the 
human right to health and consequently researches a possible self-standing right to 
medicines. With regard to the human right to medicines as part of the human right to 
health Hestermeyer identifies some ‘paper practice’, such as the inclusion of the human 
right to health in over 60 national constitutions [id.: 167].246 However, he concludes that 
the ‘factual practice’ backing the hypothetical custom is insufficient as not enough case 
law could be found [Hestermeyer 2004: 167-8]. Hestermeyer also emphasises the 
position of the US opposing to the existence of economic, social and cultural rights. In 
effect, other authors as well are sceptical about the existence of an international 
customary norm on the human right to health [Jamar 1994: footnote 37], or express 
prudent reservations [Kinney 2001].247 Nonetheless, Hestermeyer identifies a customary 
                                            
245 The Nicaragua judgment, in 1986, represented a landmark case for the identification 
of a customary norm banning the use of force in foreign relations. While the ICJ 
maintained that “the Court may not disregard the essential role played by general 
practice” [ICJ, Nicaragua, 1986: para. 184], it provided no evidence or discussion of 
such practice, relying instead on the reaffirmation by states of article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter [id.: paras. 183-190]. Therefore, it relied on opinio juris or/and paper practice.  
246 According to the UNOHCHR and WHO the right to health or the right to health care 
is recognized in at least 115 constitutions [UNOHCHR and WHO 2008: 10]. At least six 
other constitutions set out duties in relation to health, such as the duty on the State to 
develop health services or to allocate a specific budget to them [id.]. See also Kinney and 
Clark [2004] and Hogerzeil [2006: 371].  
247 Kinney discusses the scenario of a custom and its consequences for the US.  Kinney 
in effect suggests that constitutional cases such as the 1977 Maher v. Roe, wherein the 
Supreme Court stated that “the Constitution imposes no obligations on the states to 
pay… any of the medical expenses of indigents” may one day be outdated [US Supreme 
Court, 1977: 464; Kinney 2001: 1465]. The current health sector reform can be a step in 





international norm regarding the provision of access to medicines to groups, for 
emergencies, namely in pandemics and ‘subject to progressive realization’ [Hestermeyer 
2004: 176]. He draws this conclusion from the work of states, including the US, for the 
universal treatment of HIV/AIDS, as evidenced from the participation to the WHO 
access initiative ‘3 by 5’ [id.: 172]. However, Hestermeyer’s position may not be 
consistent: Hestermeyer admits the conduct of states as a viable practice for a right to 
medicines in pandemics, even though results are not achieved and court cases are not 
presented.248 Instead, for proof of the human right to medicines as part of the human right 
to health and life he requires legal cases about the recognition of the right [Hestermeyer 
2004: 167-8]. Anyway, the international customary norm relating to pandemics identified 
by Hestermeyer does not actually regard a human right; arguably it concerns a right to be 
rescued in particular situations, in relation to the rule of rescue for urgent care.249  
Consequently, I venture in a new investigation utilising an original method in 
order to ascertain the existence of a human right to medicines in international customary 
law. I note that human rights can be attributed different legal standings in the legal 
subsystem, for instance they can be claims to freedoms or to entitlements, and be 
corresponded by obligations of different nature – such as the duties of respect, protection 
and fulfilment – which can be borne by different actors.250 This does not only mean that I 
advance the possibility that parts of the human right to health are legally binding in 
customary law.251  In fact, it is also suggested that the test to be used in order to verify 
customary human rights should depend on the nature of the obligation investigated. In 
other words, the types of state practice and opinio juris to be sought shall also differ. The 
thesis presented by adopting this method is that the acts required as a proof of practice 
for demonstrating the recognition of a right/freedom may be ‘paper practice’, whereas 
actions and policies for implementation will be needed in order to prove the character of 
a customary entitlement. Therefore, I also dissociate from Hestermeyer who, in 
                                            
248 As Hestermeyer himself admits “[d]espite the favourable practice the access situation 
remains bleak: only 1 percent of the people who need AIDS medication in Southern 
Africa actually have access to it” [Hestermeyer 2004: 172]. 
249 The rule of rescue is a principle of medical ethics. It is set into law, for instance, in the 
South African Constitution, which states that “[n]o one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment” [South Africa’s Constitution, art 27(3)]. The rule of rescue will be 
dealt with in Chapter 5 section 5.4.3 on the implementation of the right to health. See 
also McKie and Richardson [2003]. 
250 See also the CESCR in General Comment 14 [CESCR 2000: para. 13]. 
251 See Skogly maintaining that human rights obligations in customary law have negative 




investigating the human right to medicines as part of the rights to health and life, reduced 
the enquiry of state ‘factual practice’ to an enquiry of the recognition of the human right 
to medicines in legal cases. As argued below, my contentions are supported by the 
analysis of the texts constituting ‘paper practice’, considerations of 
expediency/sensibility, the rulings of international courts, and state practice. 
 
3.3.3 Investigating the practice of the presumed customary norm: ‘paper practice’ 
and its limitations 
My investigation starts with the analysis of the ‘paper practice’, also observing if 
it is accompanied by ‘factual practice’ – such correspondence can warrant the existence 
of a customary norm prescribing negative as well as positive duties. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stands out, as it has been often reported to be part 
of international customary law as such, even though some international law literature 
only sees it as opinio juris.252 The UDHR is actually a UN General Assembly resolution, 
which had been approved unanimously in 1948 by the then members of the UN. 
Therefore it was not originally meant to be legally binding.253 It is interesting to see what 
implications follow from the Declaration’s provisions on a right to health. Article 25 of 
the UDHR states that: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
                                            
252 See Buerghental [1988]; Dimitrijevic [2006]; Hannum [1995-96]; Riedel [1991]; Sohn 
[1982]. See also the US Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law (Comments), 
according to which “[a]ll the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration and 
protected by the principal International Covenants are internationally recognized human 
rights” [Third Restatement (Comments) 1987: para. 702 (o.)]. A number of countries 
have reached a similar conclusion. For example, a statement made on behalf of the five 
Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden indicated that: 
“[t]he Declaration is generally recognized as having already become a part of universal 
international law. Therefore, the implementation of the principles of the Declaration is 
the responsibility of all Member States of the United Nations” [International Centre for 
Human Rights and Democratic Development, Technical Annex, 1999]. Similar 
statements have been made by the governments of Austria, Chile, Mexico and Azerbaijan 
[id.].  
253  The Declaration is a resolution by the General Assembly. It was approved 
unanimously, with eight abstentions (the Soviet Bloc, Saudi Arabia and the Union of 




unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. [UDHR art. 25] 
The human right to health is thus combined to other social issues, as part of the 
right to an adequate standard of living [UDHR art. 25]. There is no definition of health 
and an initial text reference to the WHO Constitution had not been finally accepted 
[Toebes 1999: 40]. According to Toebes, it is possible to read a right to medical care and 
sickness benefits, although ‘only with some difficulty’ [id.]. The question is, to which 
obligations are states committing. Article 22, which deals with the realisation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, may provide some guidance, stating that  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality. [UDHR art. 22] 
From a textual point of view, article 22 of the UDHR resembles article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR,254 even though it appears to be less committing. For instance, the realisation of 
the rights is not characterised as ‘full’; the national effort and or the international 
cooperation are not to be based on the maximum of the available resources but ‘in 
accordance’ to them; the rights to be realised to everyone are those ‘indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality’; the parties do not undertake to take 
steps, so there is no route demanded – arguably the article may merely refer to an equal 
share of the resources among the members of society. The Declaration provides 
nonetheless for an entitlement to realisation of those rights [UDHR art. 22]. However, the 
wording in the UDHR is vaguer than that in treaties such as the ICESCR or the ACHPR 
and does not have a treaty-based body which can authoritatively interpret its 
provisions.255 Remarkably, it is often noted that the ICESCR was meant to specify with 
measures of implementation the obligations set as principles in the Declaration 
[UNOHCHR 1996]. 
The substance of the UDHR is elusive and we turn to the ‘paper practice’ of 
declarations more specifically regarding the problem of access to medicines. The 
Declaration of Alma Ata, which is also referred to by the CESCR in its general comment 
on the human right to health [CESCR 2000: para. 43], for instance, reads that “health… 
                                            
254 See section 3.2.1.1. 




is a fundamental human right” [Declaration of Alma Ata 1978: para. I] and “[p]rimary 
health care… includes at least… [inter alia] provision of essential drugs” [id.: para. VII 
(3)].256  The states convened also agreed that “[g]overnments have a responsibility for the 
health of their people which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and 
social measures” [id.: para. V]. Thus the Declaration does refer to human rights and state 
action. However, it should be noted that the Declaration has been accepted in the specific 
context of primary health care. 257  Furthermore, it is noted that the Declarations is 
founded on a series of ‘communications’, including the human right to health.258 With 
regard to the practice of the declaration, it is difficult to maintain that the target of 
“attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will 
permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life” has been respected [id.]. 
In effect, primary health care have not been universally realised in an effective way.259  
                                            
256 The Declaration was endorsed in 1978 by all 134 WHO members who participated to 
the international conference on primary health care held by WHO and UNICEF [WHO, 
Primary Health Care Comes Full Circle, 2008]. It has been reaffirmed, for instance, in 
1998 by the WHO Health Assembly with resolution 7 (1998) [WHA Res. 7 (1998); 
Banerji 2003]. WHO has just celebrated the Declaration’s 30 years, also focusing its 
2008 World Health Report on “Primary Health Care – Now More Than Ever” [WHO, 
World Health Report 2008]. 
257 The notion of primary health care is analysed in Chapter 5 section 5.4.1. 
258  For example, “the attainment of the highest possible level of health is a most 
important world-wide social goal” [Declaration of Alma Ata 1978: para. I] and “[a] main 
social target of governments, international organizations and the whole world community 
in the coming decades should be the attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 
2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically 
productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this target as part of 
development in the spirit of social justice” [Id.: para. V]. 
259 The concept of primary health care has received attention in health-systems policy-
making but often has not delivered the promised outcomes [Beaglehole and Bonita 
2004]. According to Hong, Director General of the WHO, though, primary health care 
has not really been adopted in the third world countries. Primary health care has in fact 
been betrayed by ‘selective’ primary health care, ie reduced to ‘selective cost effective 
interventions’, as proposed by wealthy donors and institutions (such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation) [Hong 2004: 29]. Cf. India’s report to the CESCR: “India is a signatory to 
the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 with the commitment to the goal of ‘Health for All’ by 
2000 A.D. The National Health Policy 1983 was evolved in this background as a blue 
print for combined action by the government and voluntary agencies stressing the 
preventive health care and the need of establishing comprehensive primary health care 
services to reach the people in the remotest areas. It called for a decentralized system of 
health care and people’s participation viewing health and human development as vital 
components of overall integrated socio-economic progress” [CESCR, India, 




The General Assembly of the UN has also pronounced on the issue of access to 
medicines in Resolution 179 (2003), which enjoyed near universal acceptance with the 
unique opposition of the US.260 In the resolution, the UN members have recognised that 
“access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria is one fundamental element for achieving progressively the full realization of the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health” [UN GA Res. 179 (2003): para. 1] and calls upon states to pursue policies 
which would promote: availability, accessibility and quality of pharmaceutical products 
or medical technologies used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria or the most common opportunistic infections [id.: para. 6]. Therefore, the 
Resolution is centred in the context of pandemics. The Resolution is also founded on 
groundings other than human rights, such as stability and security [id.: preambular para. 
20] and on other pledges to combat AIDS and other epidemics [UN GA Res. 179 (2003)]. 
In effect, no targets or goals have been set with the resolution.  
Elements of the human right to medicines are recognised, for instance, by African 
states in a number of recent non-binding declarations.261 In the Brazzaville Commitment 
on Scaling Up Towards Universal Access to HIV and AIDS prevention, treatment, care 
and support in Africa by 2010, the parties convened, which included African states, 
explicitly stated that “[b]asic medicines and other basic commodities are a human right 
and should be available and accessible to all who need it in Africa” [Brazzaville 
Commitment, 2006, para. 4(m), emph. add.].262 This statement is however again linked to 
occasions, namely ‘emergencies’, not providing for access to medicines. Other pledges to 
provide treatment do not make explicit mention to a right to health and medicines, 
nevertheless they can invoke the ‘respect’ of human rights [Abuja Declaration 2001: para. 
24; Brazzaville Commitment 2006]. These pledges are generally solicited by specific 
diseases and emergencies, namely AIDS and/or malaria and/or tuberculosis [Abuja 
Declaration 2000; OAU Abuja Declaration 2001; AU Abuja Call 2006; Brazzaville 
Commitment 2006]. Some of these commitments have set targets which, however, have 
                                            
260 See Hestermeyer [2004: 173]. The position of the US with regard to the human rights 
to health and medicines is discussed in the text below. 
261 See also Commit for Africa, website, Health, last accessed May 2010. 
262 The meeting had been convened by the AU and saw the participation of “ministers, 
deputy ministers, parliamentarians, high-level officials from governments and regional 
bodies, civil society activists and people living with HIV, faith-based organizations, 




not been fulfilled in practice [Abuja Declaration 2000, para 3(i); Abuja Declaration 2001: 
para. 26]. 
It is argued through this analysis that the UDHR and other ‘paper practice’ cannot 
provide the proof of practice needed for establishing the protection or fulfilment of the 
human right to health and to medicines. For those duties, the value of ‘paper practice’ is 
still ‘meta-positive’. ‘Paper practice’ can instead sanction the duty to respect the right. 
With specific regard to the UDHR, it is therefore contended that parts of the provisions 
are binding as international customary law. Incidentally, noteworthy, the arguments 
supporting the customary status of the UDHR generally rely on other ‘paper practice’.263 
My argument is supported by the analysis of the texts constituting ‘paper practice’, by 
considerations of expediency/sensibility, by the rulings of international courts, and by 
state practice. First, the account above underlines the textual limits of the ‘paper practice’ 
analysed. For instance, texts such as the UDHR are generally vague on the duties 
required for the implementation. Next the texts often use the conditional rather than 
indicative mode. Overall, since the commitments are not worded to be legally binding, it 
is questioned whether they can be read as they were in fact incumbent. Consequently, 
their significance as opinio juris of international law is also to be reconsidered. 
Furthermore, where access to medicines is mentioned, it is not always seen as a human 
right but as an instrument for combating pandemics, or upholding economic and social 
development, peace and security. Such commitments to access to medicines may still 
contribute to the inductive recognition of a customary international human right to access 
to medicines if certain substantive elements are present even though, arguendo, they are 
                                            
263 The arguments supporting the customary status of the UDHR, indeed, generally rely 
on other ‘paper practice’. This means that the practice is mainly constituted by the re-
affirmation of the Declaration, for instance in international treaties or declarations and in 
national constitutions. The UDHR has been invoked by governments (even those who 
initially objected to it) against other governments, or reaffirmed in international 
declarations such as that granting independence to colonial territories, and that opposing 
racial discrimination. Other declarations of human rights, such as the 1969 Teheran 
Declaration, or the Millennium Declaration have also upheld the rights it sanctioned 
[Sohn 1982: 16; Millennium Declaration, para. 25]. See also Buergenthal [1988]. Riedel 
also notes that the UDHR “has been incorporated in many constitutions of newly-
independent States, and has served as an aspiration model for the European Convention 
on Human Rights, as well as for other Human Rights documents” [Riedel 1991: 69]. 
Hannum, arguing that the UDHR have force of international law, refers to the virtual 
universal acceptance of the declaration, also reiterated by national courts [Hannum 1995-




not (yet) framed as communications of the meta-positive ‘human rights subsystem’.264 
Second, expediency/sensibility suggests that it may be unwarranted to allege the 
existence of a consistent international practice of providing medicines by founding on 
declarations or court cases as Hestermeyer has done. Instead, it seems viable to assert an 
international customary human right in its simplest degree which would require, for 
instance, universal respect and non-discrimination of the human right to health – and 
thereby to medicines on the part of states.  
Third, with regard to the ruling of international courts, it is noted that even when 
the courts have utilised ‘paper practice’ to identify custom, generally they have drawn 
principles265 and have prohibited commissions – or modalities of commission – rather 
than censuring omissions.266 Fourth, it is argued that my approach to the identification of 
international custom permits to comprehend better the articulated practices of some states 
with regard to economic and social rights. States not parties to the human rights treaties 
analysed in part. 3.2 of this chapter often express the most complex positions. 
Incidentally, the practice of states which are not parties to treaties sanctioning certain 
norms is interesting in order to identify the existence of the customary norm.267 The US, 
for instance, are sometimes seen as negating the human right to health because they 
oppose the entitlement to universal health care,268 do not commit to international treaties 
                                            
264 The Abuja Call 2006, for example, sanctions human rights requirements such as non-
discrimination, and attention to the vulnerable and marginalised, without expressly 
referring to a human right to essential medicines [AU, Abuja Call, 2006: 4]. 
265 The ICJ, for instance, has referred to the UDHR provisions as principles rather than 
norms. In a 1980 case, the ICJ stated that: “[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their 
freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well 
as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” [ICJ, Unites States v. Iran, 1980: para. 91]. To note, arguably, by referring to 
‘principles’, the legal subsystem structurally couples to the subsystems of human rights 
and/or morality, utilising the communications of these subsystems in order to code 
circumstances (its environment) as legal or illegal.  
266 The duty to enforce the Genocide Convention may configure as an exception to this 
theory [ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Genocide Convention, 1951]. See Section 3.3.2 above. 
267 Looking at practice dehors of treaty is an interesting starting point. However, some 
arguments caution against relying uniquely on such strategy. D’Amato notes the 
paradoxical result that the more participation a treaty has gained, the more difficult it is 
to find practice outside of it, and thus the more difficult it is to establish a customary 
norm on the subject regulated [D’Amato 1987: 129]. See also Hestermeyer [2004: 163].  
268 The governmental view was mirrored by the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe, where 
the Court stated that “the Constitution imposes no obligations on the states to pay… any 




sanctioning economic, social and cultural rights, and express sceptical views on the 
human right to health in other international documents [Hestermeyer 2004: 173; Alston 
1990]. Hestermeyer mentions the US dissent to UN General Assembly resolution 179 
(2003) (seen above) as prove of the US “track record of objection to economic, social 
and cultural rights and access to medication” [Hestermeyer 2004: 173]. Remarkably, 
however, the US have rejected the resolution’s reference to the human right to health 
specifying that  
[w]e do not support an entitlement approach; we do not believe that this right 
should be interpreted as a legally enforceable entitlement, requiring the 
establishment of judicial or administrative remedies at the national or 
international levels to adjudicate such presumed rights [United States, Digest of 
United States Practice in International Law 2003, 2003: chapter 6, sec. 26, emph. 
add.]. 
Thus, it can be argued that what the US oppose is an entitlement to health care 
(and thence medicines) rather than the mere respect of this right.269 Indeed, the US, in the 
Third Restatement of international law, conceives the rights sanctioned by the UDHR 
and the ‘principal international covenants’ as ‘internationally recognised human 
rights’.270 We have to be cautious in distinguishing between the ‘recognition’ of meta-
                                                                                                                                 
2001: 1465]. However, the current health sector reform can be seen as a change in the 
stance of the US with regard to entitlements to health care. On the reform see, e.g., The 
Economist, “Signed, Sealed, Delivered” [2010]. See below. 
269 It has to be acknowledged, however, that some pieces of US practice seem to reject 
the notion of a right to health in international customary law as such. Hestermeyer refers 
to the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in Flores et al. v. Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation in order to disprove the right to health. Here the Court also denied the status 
of customary norms of the right to health as well as of the right to life (which instead 
Hestermeyer recognises as part of international customary law [Hestermeyer 2004: 167-
8]), “as prescribed in the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the UDHR”, as “insufficiently 
definite to constitute rules of customary international law” [US, Flores, 2003: para. 70]. 
It could be noted that the appraisal of customary law by the Court is shaped by 
jurisdiction/competence considerations under the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) which 
was applied in the case [id: para. 129], and that the courts of the Second Circuit hold a 
particularly restrictive view of customary international law as composed only of those 
rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, “out of a sense of legal obligation and 
mutual concern” [id.: para. 38]. Compare instead with the US position in the Third 
Restatement with regard to obligations erga omnes: “[v]iolations of the rules stated in 
this section are violations of obligations to all other states and any state may invoke the 
ordinary remedies available to a state when its rights under customary law are violated” 
[Third Restatement (Comments) 1987: para. 702 reproduced in Henkin et al 1999: 349-
355, para (o)]. On the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) see also Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.2. 
270 See the US Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law (Comments), according 




positive human rights and the obligations to respect human rights in international law, 
although in this case the term recognition may well imply understanding of an obligation 
to respect. In sum, most states commit to respect the human right to health and thereby 
the ‘human right to medicines’. The next section explores the practice undertaken by 
home states for the realisation of those rights.  
 
3.3.4 Investigating the practice of the presumed customary norm: ‘factual practice’ 
The next paragraphs try to assess states’ ‘factual’ practice in relation to the 
protection, fulfilment and judicial remedies for the hypothetical customary human right 
to medicines. There are two main difficulties associated to this endeavour. One concerns 
the theoretical identification of the practice to look at. The other difficulty concerns the 
empirical appraisal of this practice. The task is taxing and cannot find here the space that 
it deserves. A sketchy draw is nonetheless attempted, that may launch further research on 
the matter. I first present the conduct of states with regard to the protection and fulfilment 
of access to medicines. In order to assess the fulfilment I also analyse the results in terms 
of access to medicines. The practice of judiciability is examined subsequently. Special 
attention is accorded to the practice in sub-Saharan Africa, also considering the 
possibility of a regional custom on a right to medicines.271  
With regard to the theoretical identification of the relevant practice, a question 
shall be posed about the object of the analysis of the practice, whether such object are 
specific obligations of some kind of conduct, or just an obligation for states to engage in 
any conduct conducive to the realisation of the right to essential medicines.272 The first 
view, which would suggest the use of a closed list of indicators for implementation, is 
unwarranted considering the diversity of economic, social and political conditions across 
                                                                                                                                 
principal International Covenants are internationally recognized human rights” [Third 
Restatement (Comments) 1987: para. 702 (o.)]. 
271 The identification of a regional custom shall reportedly satisfy special requirements. 
Cassese, referring to ICJ Asylum case (Columbia v. Peru), notes that the Court demanded 
that 1) the custom was tacitly accepted by all parties (so, akin to tacit agreement as per 
Anzilotti) and 2) the burden of proof be posited on the claiming party (as opposed to the 
traditional assumption that jura novit curia) [ICJ, Asylum, 1950: 276] [Cassese 2005: 
164]. See also Brownlie [2003: 12].  
272 This difficulty could be avoided, it is noted, if the ‘paper practice’ found in section 
3.3.4 had been followed by factual practice. In that case, the ‘factual practice’ would 




countries. 273  States, in effect, enjoy a ‘margin of discretion’ in implementing the 
obligations flowing from human rights law.274 Form the empirical point of view, it is 
difficult, qualitatively, to identify when actions are undertaken by states with the opinio 
juris of a human right to medicines and when, instead, following other ‘communications’ 
and ‘programmes’: there is a problem of ‘redundancy’ as the same practice can be 
undertaken for a variety of reasons. Quantitatively, the practice should be general and 
uniform. These cautions notwithstanding, an indicative idea may be provided utilising 
some of the parameters measured by the WHO’s surveys on the ‘World Medicines 
Situation’ and other global institutions. A discussion of the merits of these actions is 
reserved to Chapter 5. According to WHO, most states have regulatory authorities and 
formal requirements on the safety of medicines [WHO, The World Medicines Situation, 
2004: 93], even though regulatory gaps are common, for instance with regard to the 
quality and safety of medicines distributed in the informal sector [id.: 103]. 275  The 
number of states adopting national medicines policies has grown from 5 in 1985 to 108 
in 1999 [id.: 53].276 WHO remarks that this growth has mostly taken place in low-income 
countries. 277  However, WHO notes that two-thirds of the states adopting national 
medicines policies have failed to establish implementation plans [id.]. The majority of 
countries have adopted a national essential medicines list (EML). WHO calculates that, 
in 2003, 72% of reporting countries (82 out of 114) had a (EML) updated within the last 
five years [WHO Medicines strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 117]. Nearly all developing 
countries – 95% – have a published EML, 86% have updated it in the past five years [UN, 
Delivering on the Global Partnerships for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 
2008: 36]. With regard to price regulation, WHO reports that almost 40% of respondent 
countries (53/135) implement no price regulation policy at all [WHO, World Medicines 
Situation 2004, 2004: 66]. While low and middle-income countries regulate prices more 
                                            
273 See also Chapter 5. 
274 See also CESCR [2000: para. 53]. 
275 WHO has assessed that 50%-90% of samples of antimalarial drugs failed quality 
control tests and more than half of antiretrovirals assessed did not meet international 
standards [WHO, WHO Medicines strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 5]. 
276 According to WHO, national medicines policies are meant to deal with: selection of 
essential medicines, affordability, financing options, supply systems, regulation and 
quality assurance, rational use, research, human resources, monitoring and evaluation 
[WHO, How to Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy, 2001: 7]. 
277 “Among low-income countries, 90% of responding countries had official national 
medicines policy documents in 1999 compared with 66% for middle-income countries 
and only 22% for high-income countries”. The last available data are from 1999 [WHO, 




often – above half of low and middle-income countries (54/104) do regulate prices [id.: 
72] – WHO laments that only 10% of them uses all of the identified regulatory 
approaches and combinations surveyed to control domestic prices. 278  Thus, WHO 
concludes that in both purchasing practices and in domestic price regulation measures 
many low and middle-income countries appear to be missing opportunities to ensure that 
medicine prices are affordable [id.] – even though this policy may impair availability.279  
Until 2010 the US have been the only wealthy, industrialized nation that would 
not ensure that all citizens have social insurance coverage [Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies 2004; The Economist, “Signed, Sealed, Delivered”, 2010] but in 
developing countries the prevalence is inverted. Protection by social insurance coverage 
in Africa, for instance, covers less than 8% of the population [WHO and WTO 
Secretariats 2001: 7]. With specific regard to medicines, overall, 68% of the countries 
reporting to WHO have public health insurance covering the cost of medicines (79 out of 
117 countries) [WHO Medicines strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 65]. Moreover, WHO 
reckons that in 2003, out of 105 countries reporting, 32 (30%) had adopted ‘TRIPS 
Agreement flexibilities’ to protect public health into the national legislation [WHO 
Medicines strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 33]. According to WHO the adoption of TRIPS 
flexibilities is a benchmark of the attention to medicines by a country. A discussion of 
intellectual property, TRIPS, flexibilities and TRIPS-plus will take place in Chapter 5. 
Next, it can be acknowledged that the number of countries promoting research and 
development of new active substances in 2003 was 21 out of 114 countries reporting 
(18%) [id.: 37]. Finally, an element of state conduct of recognising the human right to 
medicines can be seen in the diffused practice of states of collaborating with non-state 
and foreign institutions working in access to medicines. The cooperation with UN 
agencies (such as WHO, UNAIDS) may confer an international sanction to those states 
actions with respect to access to medicines.  
In sum, some action is been taken worldwide with regard to access to medicines. 
However, some discrepancies in the conduct of states stand out, such as the low 
provision of social insurance covering medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. The optimal 
pieces of state conduct, furthermore, depend on the characters of the country at issue. So 
far, thus, evidence of an obligation to protect and provide essential medicines could not 
                                            
278 In high-income countries, the proportion is double, amounting to 22% [WHO, World 
Medicines Situation 2004, 2004: 72] 




be found. The achievement of results is consequently looked at in order to identify the 
alleged customary entitlement to access to medicines. It is reasonable to set as 
benchmark that at least a core list of essential medicines should be immediately provided. 
The national surveys on the access to medicines collected by WHO may provide a rough 
estimate. Those surveys assess the access to 20 medicines deemed essential by the WHO 
[World Medicines Situation 2004: 61]. The following tables visualise the world situation 
relating to access to medicines from the 1999 Drug Survey.  
 
 
Number of countries in different WHO world regions with different levels of 
regular access to a core list of essential medicines, 1999 data. Source: WHO, World 
Medicines Situation 2004 [2004: 62] 
 
Number of people in different income groups without access to medicines, 1999 
data. Source: WHO, World Medicines Situation 2004 [2004: 63] 
It is apparent that access to essential medicines varies greatly between the world 
geographical regions and between the country income groups. While in Europe the 
majority of countries have population with an access to essential medicines greater than 




results.280 The largest part of the world population lacking access to medicines is in 
Africa and India. However, the number of people with access to essential medicines has 
increased over time. WHO has estimated that access has jumped from 2.1 billion in 1977 
to 3.8 billion in 1997 [WHO, Equitable Access to Essential Medicines: A Framework for 
Collective Action, 2004: 1]. WHO nevertheless notes that access is still ‘inequitable’, as 
30% of the world’s population lacks regular access to essential medicines, and in the 
poorest parts of Africa and Asia the figure rises to over 50% [id.].281 Importantly, those 
are the regions where the highest incidence of remediable mortality and morbidity are 
reported.282 Furthermore, in 15% of the countries reporting to WHO (15/103) more than 
50% of the population does not have access to medicines [WHO, WHO Medicines 
Strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 59]. Moreover, these surveys regard a handful of essential 
medicines, far from fulfilling all vital medical needs. 283  Indeed, national essential 
medicines lists generally contain between 200 and 400 medicines [WHO and HAI 2008: 
34]. In the private sector, often, several thousands of medicines are available [id.]. 
Another caveat regards the fact that the data collected on the results – ie, the effective 
status of the realisation of the human right to medicines –  have to be adjusted for the 
causes of changes, which can be out of the retain of state action. In fact, the results 
obtained with regard to access to medicines can be due to many factors other than state 
policies relating to access to medicines. Eventually, conduct and results complement 
each other in the assessment of the state obligations with respect to the fulfilment of a 
human right to medicines. In conclusion, from the account provided above, a general and 
uniform practice sanctioning the protection and fulfilment of access to essential 
medicines could not be identified. 
Lastly, it is enquired about the judiciability and enforceability of a human right to 
medicines as a (national or international) human right. These issues are dealt with more 
extensively in Chapter 5 section 5.4.5. Here it is noted that some states, like the US, 
explicitly reject the character of entitlement of a right to health, and do not accept its 
judicial – domestic and international – judicial enforceability. Even the UK, where the 
                                            
280 The percentage of population with regular access to a core of essential medicines in 
1999 is found at WHO, World Medicines Situation [2004: 136]. On the practice of the 
US see also Section 3.3.4. 
281  The number of countries providing HIV/AIDS-related medicines free at primary 
public health facilities was 60 out of 104 countries reporting (58%) [WHO Medicines 
Strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 41]. 
282 See Chapter 2 on sub-Saharan Africa. 




National Health Service (NHS) provides universal provision of health care,284 expresses 
scepticism towards the enforceability of the provisions enshrined in the ICESCR, which 
it has ratified.285 States in sub-Saharan Africa are particularly reluctant to provide judicial 
remedies for the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. Mushayavanhu 
notes that, for instance in Southern Africa (ie, among the 14 SADC countries),286 nine 
states have enshrined a right to health in their constitutions. Out of them, five states have 
characterised it as a judiciable right, while the other four incorporate the right as part of 
the principles of state policy.287 Further, within the four states where the constitutions 
guarantee a judiciable right to health, no case-law exist to demonstrate the application of 
these provisions in practice [Mushayavanhu 2007: 140]. In fact, the only state in the 
Southern Africa region where the human right to health and to medical treatment has 
been subject to judicial procedures is South Africa. Here, the Constitutional Court 
decided in favour of the provision of Nevirapine in public health facilities [South Africa, 
Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC].288 In sum, judicial enforcement of the 
human right to medicines is not an obligation under customary law on its own.  
Finally, it is also noted that the hypothetically customary human right to 
medicines does not generally enjoy consistent international enforcement by international 
courts other than treaty-based supervisory bodies. 289  The lack of legal action for 
international law, especially with regard to human rights, however, does not necessarily 
constitute acquiescence [Roberts 2001: 777]. Chapter 6 will deal with the international 
                                            
284 See NHS, website, About NHS, 2008 and NHS, website, NHS Core Principles, 2008.  
285 For example, as a response to the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), has stated in 2003 that: “[t]he Government considers that the greater part of the 
provisions of the ICESCR are Statements of principle and objectives which do not lend 
themselves to specific incorporation into legislation or to justiciable processes” [Rommel 
2003: para. 23; cited in UK Joint Committee on Human Rights 2004: para. 52].  
286 The 14 parties to the SADC Protocol: Angola, Botswana, The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, The United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe [SADC Protocol 
on Health].  
287 The five states which have characterised the human right to health as a judiciable right 
are Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique and South Africa. 
The four states which incorporate the right as part of the principles of state policy are 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland [Mushayavanhu 2007]. 
288 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.5. 
289 See, e.g., Toebes on the implementation of the right to health at the UN level [Toebes 
1999: 170-182]. See Chapter 6 section 6.4.3 on the international enforcement of the 




adjudication of states regarding their international responsibility with respect to the 
international human right to health.  
 
3.3.5 The performance of the customary right to essential medicines with respect to 
the goals sought  
However tentative, the contentions presented above can attempt to answer the 
questions posed at the beginning of section 3.3 relating to the existence of an 
international customary human right to medicines, its corresponding state obligations, 
and the ensuing international state responsibility under general international law for cases 
of violations. According to the original methodology utilised, the state practice and 
opinio juris required as evidence of a customary norm depend on the type of obligations 
sought – namely, if obligations to respect, protect or fulfil the human right to medicines. 
‘Paper practice’ can support the duty to respect the human right to medicines in 
customary law but not other duties. It is concluded from the investigation that all states, 
including those states not bound by treaty law to recognise the human right to medicines 
as part of the human right to health, are bound to respect the human right to medicines as 
part of the customary human right to health. Customary obligations of protection, 
fulfilment and adjudication of the human right to medicines in domestic courts could not 
be found. A regional customary right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa has also been 
discounted. Furthermore, section 3.3 has demonstrated that the soft law enshrined in 
international non-binding pledges is more generous, envisaging for example health, 
health care and medicines for all. However, these pledges are framed in the ‘human 
rights subsystem’ as well as in other subsystems such as politics, morality, economics. 
Furthermore, the practice of access to medicines was also founded on other 
‘communications’ and ‘programmes’, for example as a political commitment as well as 








3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated that the situation of access to medicines in sub-
Saharan African countries is addressed by several instances of international human rights 
law which may sanction a human right to medicines. In treaty law, a human right to 
medicines is mainly found in the human right to health, enshrined in widely accessed 
agreements such as the ICESCR (which binds 43 African states) and the ACHPR (which 
binds all African states) [ICESCR art. 12; ACHPR art. 16]. States bound to these treaties 
bear obligations to respect, protect and fulfil access to medicines. Next, it has been 
ascertained that many human rights such as the right to life and freedom from torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment can enrich a case for access to medicines, even if 
falling short of the comprehensive prescriptions provided by the human right to health. It 
has been underlined however that the international law on the human right to medicines 
presents notable contingencies. For example, the obligations contained in the human 
rights treaties are often vague and indeterminate, not indicating clear legal/illegal 
prescriptions. Treaty-bodies, international and national adjudication as well as 
authoritative commentaries have been utilised to interpret and elaborate such obligations 
(also by virtue of the principle of evolutionary interpretation of human rights treaties). 
However, these sources are not binding per se and can add uncertainty to the positive law. 
In addition, with particular reference to the CESCR and the ACHPR, it was noted that 
these sources are often expressing their statements in conditional terms. Furthermore, the 
CESCR and the ACHPR have importantly maintained that access to essential medicines 
shall be provided immediately by African states. Yet, they have not identified ‘essential’ 
medicines, and have instead referred to the non-binding and open-ended definitions of 
WHO and individual states. Moreover, it has been noted that treaties generally accord 
margins of discretion to the action of states. Also, it has been mentioned that while many 
human rights can support access to medicines, these rights may not be ‘indivisible and 
interdependent’, as often contended by the human right subsystem. In fact, ‘indisputable’ 
human rights (recalling Luhmann’s critique) compete for their realisation by the state.  
Next it has been argued that customary international law sanctions the universal 
respect of the human right to medicines. Again, this right is fundamental part of the 
customary human right to health. There are notable difficulties in ascertaining customary 
duties to protect and fulfil the human right to medicines. To note, the international lawyer 




policies for access to medicines can vary given the local contingencies. Overall, uniform 
and general practice of protection and fulfilment of the human right to medicines could 
not be established. Furthermore, the results of home states’ action for access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa are indeed poor. The judiciability of the human right to 
medicines is, overall, not developed. Such conclusions have been drawn through an 
original research, as the identification of customary law on the human right to medicines 
has not been investigated thoroughly in the literature. Next, the analysis of the ‘paper 
practice’, the ‘factual practice’ and the ‘soft law’ have illustrated that the soft law is more 
generous, envisaging for example health, health care and medicines for all. This meta-
positive law can be seen as communicated by the ‘human rights subsystem’, which can 
conceive a more comprehensive intervention of home states with regard to the realisation 
of the human right to medicines. It should be pointed out however that the soft law was 
also framed in other subsystems such as politics, morality, economics. Furthermore, the 
practice of access to medicines was founded on other ‘communications’ and 
‘programmes’ as well, for example other political commitments, policies and actions in 
society not invoking human rights. This thesis in effect investigates whether the 
positivisation of the meta-positive human right to medicines provides a better alternative 
with respect to those other communications. The possible impact, de facto, in sub-
Saharan Africa, of the operationalisation and implementation of the human right to 
medicines with regard to the obligations of African home states will be critically 




 CHAPTER 4: THE OBLIGATIONS OF ‘EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS’ 
WITH REGARD TO THE HUMAN RIGHT TO MEDICINES DE JURE 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 aims at establishing whether and how ‘extra-governmental entities’, 
that is, foreign states and non-state actors, are subject to international obligations in 
relation to a human right to medicines. For ‘foreign states’ I refer to those states (African 
and non-African) whose actions have consequences on the enjoyment of the human right 
to medicines in another state.290 ‘Non-state actors’ encompass, as proposed by Ssenyonjo: 
international organisations, international financial institutions, non-governmental 
organisations, multinational companies, professional bodies, civil society and groups 
[Ssenyonjo 2008: 727].291 These actors can exercise a strong influence on access to 
medicines, as anticipated in Chapter 2, and as it will be further discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6. The legal position of foreign states and non-state actors with regard to the human 
right to medicines is particularly difficult, and they are therefore dedicated a separate 
chapter.   
As a preliminary issue I shall address the matter that the very capacity of non-
state actors to be responsible and liable for human rights and international law 
obligations is contentious in the legal doctrine. I identify two major theoretical problems. 
Firstly, as some scholars contend, typically only states are legal subjects of international 
law. 292  This theory however overlooks the fact that non-state actors are sometimes 
conferred rights or duties under international law, and is not universally accepted by the 
literature.293 Thus I will generally adopt the hypothesis that in principle international 
                                            
290 For the use of the term ‘foreign state’ see e.g. Scullion and Gerstein [2007].  
291 Cf. Alston’s critique to the term ‘non-state actors’. As a negative term, its notion and 
contents are not exactly agreed [Alston 2005: 3]. 
292 See Ssenyonjo [2008: 725]. See for instance Brownlie arguing that corporations do 
not, in principle, have international legal personality [Brownlie 2003: 65]. 
293  For example, individuals are directly liable in international law for international 
crimes [Cassese 2003: 23]. See also Alston [2005], Clapham and Rubio [2002], 
Duruigbo [2008], Joseph [2003] and Higgins [1995] attributing rights and duties to non-
state actors. Higgins takes a decisive stance arguing that “[t]he whole notion of subjects 
and objects has no credible reality and… no functional purpose” thus it would be better 
to speak of ‘participants’ who make claims [Higgins 1995: 49-50]. See also the 




legal personality derives from – rather than gives origin to – the attribution of rights and 
duties [De Schutter 2006: 33-34].294 Nevertheless, in the investigation of customary law I 
will also consider the case of applying international customary duties onto the non-state 
actors which have international legal personality, as suggested by some literature [Skogly 
2001; Ssenyonjo 2008]. Secondly, it is asked if non-state actors can have duties with 
regard to human rights. This issue recalls the classic problem of the horizontal effect of 
constitutional, human rights provision on third (non-state) parties. As Barak aptly puts it, 
human rights provisions are ‘textually’ dedicated to states [Barak 2001]. Weissbrodt 
indeed rejects the notion that non-state actors can ‘violate’ human rights and suggest that 
“they should be criticized for ‘abusing’ the rights of individuals” [Weissbrodt 1998: 195 
in Clapham and Rubio 2002: 3]. Yet, it is a fact that human rights, and the human right to 
health is no exception, are used in some courts to decide about private law cases and are 
referred to in policies regarding non-state actors.295 The liability of non-state actors for 
violations of the human right to medicines will be critically researched. It is stressed here 
that, with a few exceptions, an international law literature on this topic is virtually non-
existent.296  This chapter therefore pioneers a field of international law, pointing out 
theoretical gaps in the discipline. 
The scope of this chapter is legal analysis of the obligations of ‘extra-
governmental actors’ under international law with regard to the human right to medicines 
de jure. With regard to the method, as in Chapter 3,297 I study treaties and custom, but 
also domestic law and cases as well as soft law and the self-regulation of non-state 
                                                                                                                                 
rights may accrue directly from international obligations to any person or entity other 
than a state [ILC Draft Articles 2001: 33(2)].  
294 See also Jägers: “[w]here entities have not been granted legal personality by treaty 
provisions or by explicit recognition by other parties, the best way to ascertain whether 
an entity does or does not have legal personality is to find out if in fact possesses any 
rights or duties under international law” [Jägers 1999: 264].  
295 For instance, the Italian Constitutional Court held that the right to health applies in 
both public law and private relations, imposing on individuals the duty to refrain from 
injuring or endangering by their behaviour the health of another person [Toebes 1999: 
210].   
296  But see Yamin on the obligations of other actors towards the human right to 
medicines [2003: 138-143]; Joseph on the responsibility of transnational corporations 
[2004] and of pharmaceutical corporations for access to medicines [2003]; Skogly on the 
responsibilities for human rights of foreign states for transboundary damages [2006] and 
the responsibilities of international the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank [2001]. 




actors. 298  The enquiry in this chapter is, again, undertaken with a critical attitude, 
underlining the uncertainty and contingency embedded in the law de jure. The strengths, 
limits and uncertainties of the sources utilised in ascertaining the law (such as treaties, 
treaty bodies, international non-binding pledges, international courts, national courts, 
publicists and other authors) are taken in consideration.299  
Following the structure of Chapter 3, treaty law is explored in the first part of 
Chapter 4 (section 4.2) while customary, soft law and self-regulation are assessed in the 
second part (section 4.3). Where possible, the obligations are studied as obligations to 
respect, protect, fulfil and enforce the human right to medicines. A conclusion is finally 
provided identifying the duties of extra-governmental actors under international law and 
contrasting these limited positive duties to the expansive communications of the meta-
positive human right (section 4.4). 
 
4.2 International human rights treaties  
Section 4.2 looks at the obligations of foreign states and non-state actors towards 
the human right to medicines sanctioned by the most important human rights treaties. For 
every treaty I focus on the obligations of foreign states to respect, protect, fulfil and 
enforce the right. I subsequently look for the obligations directly imposed on non-state 
actors. The law is complemented by commentaries and comments of the treaty-bodies as 
those sources contribute to the interpretation and, arguably, to the development of the 





                                            
298 For self-regulation I mean the regulation of an institution issued and enforced by the 
institution itself. For the importance of soft law see Chapter 3 section 3.1.  
299 See also Chapter 3 section 3.1.  




4.2.1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)  
The ICESCR binds 159 states parties from all world regions [UNOHCHR 
2008(b)].301 ICESCR article 12 does not set a territorial scope for the obligation of state 
parties to realise the human right to health. Indeed, unlike other human rights treaties 
such as the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not contain territorial or jurisdictional limitation in 
its chapeau articles.302 However, it is generally accepted that article 12, as other ICESCR 
obligations to realise the human rights therein sanctioned, are directed to home states. In 
effect, in several places the wording of the treaty does distinguish the action of home and 
foreign countries, for instance obliging states “to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant” [ICESCR art. 2(1)].303 I have consequently searched whether and what legal 
obligations are borne by the state parties with regard to the enjoyment of the human right 
to health – and thereby medicines – abroad. It follows from the object, purpose and 
preamble of the treaty that foreign states shall respect the human right to medicines in 
other countries.304 The CESCR, specifically commenting on the human right to health, 
has indeed identified incumbent duties to respect and protect (prevent violations of) the 
human right to health abroad [CESCR 2000: art. 39].  
                                            
301 In particular, the ICESCR binds 43 (out of 53) African states [Odinkalu 2003: 23]. 
The US, notably, are not parties to the Covenant [UNOHCHR 2008(b)]. 
302 Note that the identification of jurisdiction is problematic as it does not necessarily 
correspond to the state territory. This issue has been raised for instance by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The scope of application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is limited to the parties’ jurisdiction 
[ECHR art.1]. Nonetheless in Loizidou v. Turkey, the ECtHR held that “responsibility of 
Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether 
performed within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own 
territory” [ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, 1995: para. 65].  
303 See also Dennis and Stewart affirming that the ICESCR rights are to be realised by 
the homes states. They note that the ICESCR recommends the realisation of the rights 
through legislative measures, that which defines the limits of state action within legal 
jurisdiction [ICESCR art 2(1); ICCPR art 2(1)]. See also Skogly [2002: 790]. 
304 The purpose of the treaty, as expressed in the preamble, suggests an extra-territorial 
concern. In the preamble the parties consider “the obligation of States under the Charter 
of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and freedoms…” [ICESCR preambular para. 4]. In international treaties, the preambles 
are not binding, but they offer a basis for interpreting the provisions therein, providing 




More uncertain is the attribution of duties to fulfil. The ICESCR recognises the 
role of international cooperation and assistance in a number of articles and preambular 
paragraphs [ICESCR art. 2(1), 11(1), 23; preambular para. 4].305 The wording of those 
provisions however does not clearly prescribe legal obligations. Moreover, the travaux 
préparatoires indicate that dim is the responsibility of a state to fulfil the access to 
medicines in other countries. 306  Other provisions in the Covenant, in addition, 
recommend a caution with regard to the entity of the assistance to be provided abroad.307 
The CESCR does indeed maintain that foreign states should take action to facilitate 
access to health facilities, goods and services in other countries [CESCR 2000: para. 39]. 
The action is also conditioned on the availability of resources [id.]. Nonetheless, in its 
comment on the nature of states parties’ obligations, the CESCR maintains that foreign 
states have an obligation to cooperation [CESCR 1990(b): para. 14]. The obligation is 
vague and refers to a variety of other international commitments, namely the ICESCR 
itself, the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right to 
Development [UN GA Res. 128 (1986)], and the ‘well-established principles of 
international law’ [id.]. With regard to the enforcement by foreign states of the human 
right to health and other ICESCR obligations, the ICESCR engages the parties to report 
to the ECOSOC, which has subsequently appointed the CESCR to the task [ICESCR arts. 
16-22; ECOSOC resolution 17 (1985)]. The CESCR examines countries’ reports,  but has 
                                            
305  The ICESCR sanctions the agreement of states “to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant” [ICESCR art. 2(1)]. In article 11, on the improvement of living 
conditions, states recognise “the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent” [id.: art. 11(1)]. With article 23, the states parties “agree that 
international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
includes such methods as… the furnishing of technical assistance” [id.: art. 23]. In the 
preamble the parties take into consideration “the obligation of States under the Charter of 
the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms” [id.: preambular para. 4]. In the preamble the parties also recognise that “the 
inherent dignity and… the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” [id.: preambular 
para. 1]. 
306 As Alston and Quinn noted, “the only formal suggestion on the existence of a binding 
obligation came from the Chilean representative who observed ‘that international 
assistance to under-developed countries had in a sense become mandatory as a result of 
commitments assumed by States in the United Nations’” [Diaz Casanueva 1962: para 10; 
Alston and Quinn 1987: 189]. 
307 See also article 24 stating that “[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted 
as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their 




no power to redress situations and does not hear intra-state complaints and complaints 
from individuals or groups.308 An optional protocol to the ICESCR has been adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in December 2008 to consider individual and group 
communications, but is not yet operational for want of ratifications [ICESCR-OP art. 1; 
UN GA Res. 117 (2008)].309 The protocol also provides for the possibility of ‘interim 
measures’ and establishes an inquiry procedure for the CESCR [ICESCR-OP art. 5, 11].  
No direct obligation originates from the ICESCR onto non-state actors. With 
regard to international organisations the treaty provides for a voluntary mechanism for 
the reporting of UN specialised agencies about “the progress made in achieving the 
observance of the provisions of the present Covenant falling within the scope of their 
activities” [ICESCR art. 18]. The CESCR furthermore maintains that UN agencies, 
regional development banks and the WTO should cooperate effectively in relation to the 
implementation of the human right to health and ascribes to them roles and 
recommendations rather than duties [CESCR 2000: para. 64-5]. With regard to other 
entities, in the preamble the ICESCR parties realise that the individual has responsibility 
for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the Covenant [preambular 
para. 5]. Preambles are not binding but a duty to respect can be read into article 5 stating 
that “[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…” [ICESCR art. 5(1)]. 
However, it has been remarked that this provision is meant to prevent states or third 
parties from relying on a ICESCR right as a pretext for activities implying the destruction 
of the ICESCR rights [Sepúlveda 2003: 305].310 Others conclude that article 5 offers 
mere guidelines for the behaviour of both individuals and states as opposed to imposing 
any direct accountability to non-state actors [Daes 1990: para. 2; Ssenyonjo 2008: 738]. 
Indeed, analysing the preparatory works, and in particular the decisions of the 
                                            
308 See CESCR Revised General Guidelines [1991] and ECOSOC Resolution 17 (1985). 
309 The protocol has been opened for signatures in March 2009 and will enter into force 
three months after the date of deposit with the UN-Secretary General of the tenth 
instrument of ratification or accession [Raja 2008]. As of May 2010 the Protocol has 32 
signatories and yet no parties [United Nations Treaty Collection, website, 2010(a)]. 
310  Indeed the provision emphasises the importance of the ‘aim’ of a given activity 
[ICESCR art. 5(1)]. Sepúlveda also argues that ICESCR article 5(1) is ancillary to other 
provisions by analogy to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HRC deciding 
respectively on similar articles of the ECHR and the ICCPR [ECHR art. 17; ICCPR art. 




Commission on Human Rights, Alston and Quinn affirm that the ICESCR is not 
designed to govern private relations [Alston and Quinn 1987: 196]. Nevertheless, it can 
govern non-state actors indirectly through state regulation, by attributing to states the 
responsibility to protect the human rights in question.311 
 
4.2.2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
The ACHPR has been ratified by all 53 members of the Organisation of African 
Unity (now African Union) [Odinkalu 2003: 20]. With regard to the obligations of 
foreign states, similarly to the ICESCR, the ACHPR does not identify a territorial 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as the ICESCR, the ACHPR does refer to distinctions between 
the conducts of home states and foreign countries.312 Again, the purpose of the treaty and 
the preamble present a cross-border concern which suggests duties to respect the ACHPR 
rights abroad. For example the preamble reads: “fundamental human rights stem from the 
attributes of human beings which justifies their national and international protection” 
[ACHPR: preambular para. 5]. The Charter is in fact very vague on the duty of 
international protection. With regard to international fulfilment, the ACHPR provides that 
the free disposal of wealth and natural resources which is sanctioned in the Charter “shall 
be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic 
cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of 
international law” [ACHPR: 21(1)(3)]. The obligation is indefinite, vaguely referring to 
an external source, that is, general international law.313  African unity and solidarity 
seems to take pre-eminence for ACHPR members [art. 21(4)]. Yet this provision is 
                                            
311 See also the CESCR attributing to those non-state actors roles and responsibilities but 
holding states as ultimately accountable: “[w]hile only States are parties to the Covenant 
and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society – 
individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as 
well as the private business sector – have responsibilities regarding the realization of the 
right to health. State parties should therefore provide an environment which facilitates 
the discharge of these responsibilities” [CESCR 2000: para. 42]. 
312 Moreover, the same reasoning that Dennis and Stewart utilised for the ICESCR with 
regard to the fact that the ICESCR recommends the realisation of the rights through 
legislative measures (that which defines the limits of state action within legal 
jurisdiction) can be applied to the ACHPR which also recommends the adoption of 
legislative or other measures [ACHPR: art 1]. See supra section 4.2.1. 





arguably dedicated to the joint management of common resources rather than the sharing 
of resources over which they may have exclusive jurisdiction [id.; Ouguergouz 2003: 
283]. The African Commission’s resolution on the human right to medicines does not 
provide for international cooperation except with regard to research and development for 
neglected diseases [AC Res. 141 (2008)]. The ACHPR regime provides for enforcement 
mechanisms stronger than those currently implemented under the ICESCR regime. The 
African Commission, in addition to analysing states’ reports, examines violation 
complaints and case-based reporting, also hearing individual and group cases [ACHPR: 
art. 30, 55-59, 62; Odinkalu 2001: 351]. The African Commission also has special 
investigative powers with respect to emergency situations [ACHPR art. 59; Odinkalu 
2001: 352]. However, the Commission has no power of sanction or police and does not 
grant redress for individuals. Furthermore, in 2006 the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has become operational. The Court, as opposed to the Commission, is set 
to deliver binding judgments and to provide remedies [ACtHR Protocol art. 30]. The 
Court however does not have enforcement power on its own [Lyons 2006]. 
With regard to non-state actors, the ACHPR does not address international 
organisations but it dedicates one of its two chapters of the substantive law to the duties 
of individuals (which can include private business activities as well). For instance, the 
Charter sanctions that “[e]very individual shall have duties towards his family and 
society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the international 
community” [ACHPR art. 27(1)]. As Brems notes, the provision does not have self-
standing meaning, as it introduces the subsequent articles on the duties of the individuals 
[Brems 2001: 114].314 Relevant for the case of access to medicines, the charter affirms 
that the individual has duties “[t]o serve his national community by placing his physical 
and intellectual abilities at its service” [ACHPR art. 29(2)]. Reportedly, however, this 
provision was mainly conceived to address the problem of ‘brain drain’.315 It has to be 
remarked that the wording of the provisions on individual duties are very vague. The 
legal function of those duties is indeed uncertain, thence arguably impossible to enforce 
                                            
314 See also the preamble, wherein the parties agree to the Charter “[c]onsidering that the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of 
everyone; Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the 
right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from 
economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that 
the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights ia a guarantee for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights” [ACHPR: preambular para. 6]. 




as such [Brems 2001: 112]. In effect some commentators interpret the autonomous 
individual duties in the ACHPR as non-binding, ethical obligations [Ahanhanzo 1984: 
526], a ‘code of good conduct’, not capable of effective implementation [D’Sa 1985: 77]. 
Furthermore, at the international level, as underlined by Brems, the defendants before the 
African Commission are states [Brems 2001: 113]. In that sense, the Charter imposes an 
obligation of due diligence, as the state must prevent the violation by individuals of their 
duties in its legal order and it must “inculcate these duties as well as their underlying 
principles and ideals in its citizens” [id.].316  
 
4.2.3 Other treaties supporting the human right to medicines  
Section 4.2.3 examines the obligations flowing on foreign states and non-state 
actors from other relevant treaties sanctioning the human right to health and medicines. 
Particular attention is given to obligations of foreign states to protect, cooperate, fulfil 
and enforce, which have demonstrated to be uncertain under the ICESCR and the 
ACHPR. As seen in Chapter 3 section 3.2.1.3, the human right to medicines is supported 
by the human right to health sanctioned by human rights treaties relating to certain 
groups, namely, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Optional 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on Women’s Rights 
(Optional Protocol to the ACHPR on Women), the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Among those treaties, only the CRC 
demands international cooperation, although falling short of prescribing specific 
obligations in regard [CRC art. 4, 23, 24(4) preambular para. 13].317 All those treaties 
establish monitoring mechanisms for enforcement, but most of them do not envisage 
binding enforcement procedures and some do not receive individual or group complaints 
                                            
316 The African Commission has indeed condemned states for failing to perform due 
diligence. For example in the SERAC v. Nigeria communications the African 
Commission held that “the Nigerian Government has given the green light to private 
actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the 
Ogonis” [AC, Nigeria, 2001: para. 54] and this fell afoul of the provisions of the Charter 
[id.: para. 58]. 




[ACRWC: arts 42-45; CEDAW: art. 18]. 318  With regard to the CEDAW, for those 
countries which have ratified the CEDAW Optional Protocol, the treaty monitoring 
Committee also receives complaints from individuals or groups victims of violations of 
the CEDAW [Langford and Nolan 2006: 198]. 319  Furthermore, unresolved disputes 
between states are referred to the International Court of Justice [CEDAW: art. 29(1)]. 
The Optional Protocol to the ACHPR on Women is subject to the same procedure as the 
ACHPR [Musa 2007]. The CERD provides for individual petitions to the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, although the consent of the state in question is 
required [id. art. 14(1)]. Some of those treaties attribute roles and responsibilities on non-
state actors, yet without imposing direct duties [ACRWC: preambular para. 7; CRC art. 
45(a)]. 
The ICCPR has been ratified by 162 states, including the US (which are not 
parties to most of the treaties mentioned in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 above) [UNOHCHR 
2008(a)], out of which 43 are African countries [Odinkalu 2003: 23]. As seen in Chapter 
3, the ICCPR sanctions some rights ancillary to the human right to medicines, such as the 
right to life and the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment 
[ICCPR art. 6(1); 7]. With regard to obligations of foreign states, in the ICCPR preamble 
the parties consider “the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms” [ICCPR 
prembular para. 5]. However, beside the preamble, the binding articles of the treaty 
impose obligations with respect to the individuals within a state’s territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction [ICCPR 2(1)]. With regard to enforcement the Covenant is overseen by 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which monitors the treaty implementation and 
hears inter-state complaints. Furthermore, according to the First Optional Protocol, the 
HRC can examine individual complaints.320 With regard to the behaviour of non-state 
actors, the ICCPR enshrines the ICESCR common provision preventing states, groups 
and individuals from undermining the rights and freedoms recognised in the ICCPR 
                                            
318 On the CRC see Archard [2004: 59] and Detrick [1999: 41]. On the ACRWC see 
Olowu [2002: 131]. 
319 The CEDAW Optional Protocol Convention has been ratified by 99 States, as of May 
2010 [United Nations Treaty Collection, 2010(b)]. 
320 The protocol has 111 parties, as of 5 March 2008 [UNOHCHR 2008c], of which 31 
African countries [Odinkalu 2003: 23]. See Lanford and Nolan on the procedure to 




[ICCPR art. 5(1); ICESCR art. 5(1)].321 Furthermore, in the preamble the parties realise 
that the individual also has responsibility for the promotion and observance of the 
Covenant rights [ICCPR preambular para. 6]. While a specific liability of non-state 
actors seems not to be envisaged, just as like for the ICESCR, states have to protect their 
populations against violations by other parties [Hestermeyer 2004: 153]. 
Finally, the UN Charter should be looked at, as it is often referred to by human 
rights treaties and the literature to make a case for international cooperation and 
assistance on human rights. 322  In effect the UN Charter enjoys pre-eminence in 
international law among the UN members [UN Charter art. 103].323 Other human rights 
treaties such as the ICESCR also refer to the UN Charter [ICESCR preambular para. 4]. 
It has to be noted however that the human right to health and medicines are not explicitly 
identified in the Charter. Still, the Charter mentions ‘standards of living’, ‘international 
health problems’ and ‘human rights’ as goals that the UN shall promote [UN Charter art. 
55(a), (b) and (c)]. Although an international human right to health was not commonly 
recognised at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, the Charter’s human rights 
provision should arguably be read through ‘dynamic’ or ‘evolutionary’ interpretations.324 
The UDHR has been seen as an authoritative declaration of the UN Charter’s provisions, 
but this argument is controversial.325 In effect, the UDHR was not designed as a legally 
                                            
321 See above section 4.2.1. 
322 For example, as seen in supra section 4.2.1, the UN Charter is referred to by the 
CESCR General Comment on international technical assistance measures [1990(a): para. 
14]. 
323 The Charter is currently ratified by 192 states [UN Treaty Collection, website, Charter 
of the United Nations, 2009]. 
324 On the dynamic or evolutionary interpretation of treaties see Chapter 3 section 3.2. 
325 According to Sohn, the Declaration spells out the meaning of the phrase ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’ enshrined in article 56 of the Charter [Sohn 1982: 17]. 
At first glance, this may entail that “the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including… medical care and 
necessary social services…” is made an obligation under the UN Charter [UDHR art. 25; 
UN Charter arts. 55-6, 103]. Hestermeyer is sceptical on this point, noting that the UN 
General Assembly is not endowed with such declaratory power. Indeed a Belgian 
proposal to incorporate it was explicitly rejected [Hestermeyer 2004: 157]. Cassese also 
notes that, by introducing the proviso of article 2(7) about domestic jurisdiction, the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945 weakened the original proposals made at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference in 1944 regarding the powers of the UN General Assembly in the field 
of human rights. The powers were already ‘boiled down’ to making recommendations 
and conducting studies [Cassese 2005: 379]. However, this does not mean that the 
attitude of (and powers conferred to) the UN and the Generally Assembly with respect to 




binding document. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 section 3.3.3 and section 4.3 in this chapter 
argue that some of its provisions with regard to the human right to medicines are in part 
customary law. Therefore, obligations can be derived from the Declaration, through the 
evolution of customary law, and the respect of the human right to health is supposedly 
one of those. 326  Furthermore, the UN includes specialised agencies which directly 
recognise the human right to health. The WHO, namely, enshrines the human right to 
health in its Constitution [WHO Constitution: preambular para. 2]. The WHO 
Constitution can be seen as practice related to the UN and contribute to the interpretation 
of UN provisions.327 Thus it can be assumed that the human right to health is among the 
human rights considered by the UN Charter. It is consequently asked what international 
rules, if any, follow from this recognition, binding foreign states and non-state actors.    
With regard to the duties of foreign states, in the Charter UN members pledge “to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization” [UN Charter art. 56] 
for the achievement of “higher standards of living… and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation” [id.: art. 55(a), 
(b)]. From a literal point of view, the legal value of these provisions is not clear. As 
Skogly remarks, “whether the wording in articles 55 and 56 represents a legal obligation 
upon states to cooperate in the international community to attain the goals of the United 
Nations has been disputed” [Skogly 2002: 786].328 Cassese, analysing the drafting history 
reminds us that such provisions are not meant to be definitively compelling. With regard 
to article 56, a proposal for broadening the scope to “member States’ joint and separate 
action for the promotion of economic and social co-operation” had been explicitly 
rejected by the US during the drafting of the Charter. Further, article 2(7) on the 
domestic jurisdiction was also adopted as a safeguard from undue interference from the 
UN [Cassese 2005: 379]. Thus while the UN should promote the human right to health as 
                                            
326 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.3 and infra section 4.3. 
327 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the context to of a treaty is 
constituted inter alia by “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” [VCLT art 31(3)(b)]. 
328 Even more nuanced is article 1 sanctioning as one of the purposes of the UN “[t]o 
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 




a human right, through article 55 the Charter does not impose clear obligations on the 
members to fulfil the human right to health abroad. 
With regard to international enforcement, the UN ultimately remits to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as its judicial organ [ICJ statute art. 1; UN Charter art. 
92]. The ICJ is set to produce binding judgments on disputes between states to be 
decided in accordance with international law, which sanctions the human right to 
medicines in various instances (as demonstrated in Chapter 3) [ICJ Statute arts. 36-38]. 
However, the Court has no enforcement power and jurisdiction to the Court is optional – 
unless the parties opt to be subject to compulsory jurisdiction [id.: art. 36]. States can 
also undertake by agreement to have certain disputes decided by the Court.329 Finally, 
with regard to non-state actors, the UN Charter does not address the duties of individuals. 
International organisations are not mentioned as such, but the Charter does contain 
provisions relating to particular ‘specialised agencies’, which should be brought into 
agreement with the UN [UN Charter arts. 57 and 63]. However the agencies, for instance 
the IMF and World Bank, enjoy autonomy and do not refer to human rights in their 
founding agreements [Agreement between UN and the IMF art 1(2); Agreement between 
UN and the IBRD].330   
Thus, all the treaties examined in section 4.2 bind foreign states to respect the 
human right to medicines as part of the human right to health or, with regard to vital 
medicines, the human right to life. Duties relating to the other types of obligations vary 
among the treaties reviewed. The ICESCR, according to the CESCR, demands 
international protection. Most treaties demand international cooperation for the 
realisation of human rights abroad. However, those obligations are quite indeterminate. It 
is not clear, for example, what foreign states have to do in order to satisfy their obligation 
to cooperate: the obligation does not imply the full realisation of the right in other 
countries. The mechanisms for international enforcement vary. The treaties generally 
establish monitoring bodies which oversee the treaties’ implementation but do not 
normally issue binding decisions. The decisions of the African Court of Human Rights 
and the International Court of Justice are instead binding. No enforcement mechanism is 
however provided to enact the rulings and the ICJ does not have compulsory jurisdiction 
                                            
329 For example, disputes not resolved by the CEDAW Committee are to be referred to 
the ICJ [CEDAW: art. 29(1)]. See supra section 4.2.3. 




by default.331 None of those treaties gives to the treaty-based bodies power of sanction or 
police. Procedures to redress the complaints of individuals are not envisaged by several 
treaties, included the ICESCR regime (the Optional Protocol redresses this shortcoming 
but is not in force as of yet). Reparations for individual situations are not prescribed by 
the treaties analysed.332 Besides the treaty bodies, nevertheless, states can recur to state 
responsibility for breaches of obligations erga omnes. This means that all states parties to 
human rights treaties can hold another party responsible for breaches, even if those 
breaches do not directly injure the claiming party [Cassese 2005: 262].333 Moreover, 
according to Cassese, the responsibility for erga omnes obligations in human rights treaty 
law is extended to minor or sporadic breaches of obligations, not merely to gross and 
serious breaches as provided for in customary international law [id.: 276]. Next, most 
treaties sanctioning access to medicines as a human right attribute to international 
organisations, individuals and other non-state actors roles and responsibilities with 
regard to the human rights they enshrine. However these provisions are vague and do not 
prescribe obligations directly on the non-state actors: states have the duty and 









                                            
331 The jurisdiction of the African Court of Human Rights is instead compulsory except 
for cases presented by NGOs and individuals [ACtHR Protocol 34(6)]. 
332 Other regional systems such as the European Court of Human rights do provide 
monetary compensation [ECHR art. 41]. But cf. Nowak arguing that even such ‘just 
satisfaction’ system is inadequate and it does not even cover legal expenses [Nowak 
2007: 257]. 
333 Cassese underlines that human rights treaties are not synallagmatic therefore they do 




4.3 Custom, soft law, self-regulation  
Section 4.3 searches whether and what duties international customary law, soft 
law and self-regulation prescribe onto extra-governmental actors in relation to the human 
right to medicines. Section 4.3.1 discusses the obligations of foreign states, while 4.3.2 
discusses the obligations of international organisations (section 4.3.2.1), non-
governmental organisations (4.3.2.2), and other private parties, with particular regard to 
pharmaceutical companies (4.3.2.3). This endeavour is overwhelming, especially 
considering that the international law literature on the obligations of extra-governmental 
actors towards the human right to medicines in customary law is minimal.334  
 
4.3.1 Foreign states  
Chapter 3, in section 3.3, profusely dealt with the identification of a human right 
to medicines in international customary law and the duties thereby originated on the 
home states. Section 4.3.1 looks at the duties of respect, protection, fulfilment and 
enforcement possibly borne under this law by foreign states. The methodology applied is, 
ceteris paribus, the one elaborated in Chapter 3. To begin with opinio juris and ‘paper 
practice’, often occurring as soft law, are analysed also observing if they are 
accompanied by ‘factual practice’ – such correspondence could warrant the existence of 
a customary norm prescribing negative as well as positive duties. For duties of protection, 
fulfilment and enforcement instances of ‘factual practice’ are specifically researched.  
I start the investigation of the obligations of foreign states under customary 
international law with respect to the human right to medicines by considering the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Parts of the Declaration are indeed 
seen as customary law as such. It was argued in Chapter 3 that the duty of home states to 
respect the human right to medicines sanctioned by the Declaration is also a duty in 
customary law [UDHR art. 25].335  With regard to international action for the rights 
named therein, the Declaration provides that:  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
                                            
334 See Yamin on the duties concerning the human right to medicines borne by ‘other 
actors’ [2003: 138-143].  




accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality. [UDHR art. 22] 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. [UDHR art. 28]  
Thus the Declaration recognises the importance of international cooperation. 
However, it does not identify precise duties. Skogly in effect states that those provisions 
cannot be read as firm obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights abroad 
[Skogly 2006: 123]. Next, ‘paper practice’ demonstrating the concern of states for the 
universal realisation of the human right to medicines can be found in the widespread 
access to human rights treaties sanctioning the human right to health.336 Yet, even these 
texts were not conclusive on duties of international protection, cooperation and 
enforcement. The UN General Assembly resolution enshrining the ‘Millennium 
Declaration’ is arguably a high-mark point in the activity of the Assembly concerning 
international cooperation. The Millennium Declaration presents the commitment by the 
UN members to, inter alia, ‘freeing the entire human race from want’, realising the right 
to development and ‘civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all’ [UN GA 
Res. 2 (2000), paras. 11, 25]. The human right to medicines, the human right to health or 
health itself are not mentioned in the document, but the members resolve “[t]o help 
Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other 
infectious diseases” [id.:  para. 28]. This is in fact undertaken in order to “support the 
consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting 
peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the 
mainstream of the world economy” [id.: para. 27]. Nevertheless, health is the object of 
three Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), subsequently developed as indicators of 
the fulfilment of the Declaration.337 One of the MDGs, in effect, precisely concerns the 
                                            
336 For some considerations on the relationship between treaties and custom see, e.g, 
Meron [1987], Boyle and Chinkin [2007: 234-238]. 
337 The MDGs more directly affecting health are the reduction of child mortality (MDG 
4), the improvement of maternal health (MDG 5), and the combat of HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria (MDG 6) [United Nations, Millennium Goals, 2010; United 
Nations, About the Millennium Development Goals Indicators, 2010]. The MDGs have 
been elaborated in targets and indicators to track the commitment made to development 




provision of access to medicines. 338  However, the MDGs are not being fulfilled as 
scheduled in the practice [UN, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, 2010].  
Some ‘paper practice’ explicitly refers to the human right to health or medicines, 
as also seen in Chapter 3 section 3.3.3, and sanctions international cooperation, but again 
does not set targets for cooperation and may point to access to medicines for selected 
conditions. The Alma Ata Declaration reaffirms the human right to health [Alma Ata 
Declaration: para. I].339 In the Alma Ata Declaration states maintained that they should 
cooperate for the operation of primary health care, which also comprehends access to 
certain medicines throughout the world.340 The reasons for cooperation are in effect 
diverse.341 Furthermore it is noted that primary health care does not exhaust the need for 
medicines.342 The 2003 UN General Assembly Resolution 179 (2003) recognises that 
access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria is a fundamental element for the realisation of the human right to health [UN GA 
Res. 179 (2003): para. 1].343 The resolution calls upon “the international community, in 
particular the developed countries, to continue to assist developing countries in the fight 
against [such pandemics] through financial and technical support as well as through the 
training of personnel” [id.: paras. 10(a), 15]. However, resolution 179 (2003) adopts a 
                                            
338 Target 46 of Goal 8 (developing a global partnership for development) reads that 
states have to, “[i]n cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries” [United Nations, Millennium Goals, 
2010; United Nations, website, About the Millennium Development Goals Indicators, 
2010]. 
339 The Declaration was endorsed in 1978 by all the 134 WHO members who participated 
to the international conference on primary health care held by WHO and UNICEF 
[World Health Organization, Primary Health Care Comes Full Circle, 2008]. See Chapter 
3 section 3.3.3. 
340  Primary health care necessitates of access to certain medicines, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3 section 3.3.3. See also Chapter 5 section 5.4.1. 
341 The Declaration refers to the role of international organisations and the whole world 
community as “[a] main social target of governments, international organizations and the 
whole world community in the coming decades should be the attainment by all peoples 
of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially 
and economically productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this target as 
part of development in the spirit of social justice” [Id.: para. V]. Moreover the 
Declaration states that: “[a]ll countries should cooperate in a spirit of partnership and 
service to ensure primary health care for all people since the attainment of health by 
people in any one country directly concerns and benefits every other country” [Alma Ata 
Declaration: para. IX].  
342 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.3 and Chapter 5 sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
343 It is recalled that UN General Assembly resolution 179 (2003) enjoyed near universal 




vertical approach to public health problems, focussed on specific diseases. To note, both 
the Alma Ata Declaration and the UN General Assembly resolution 179 (2003) refer for 
their justification on the human right to health and/or medicines as well as on other 
‘communications’.344 Furthermore, access to medicines is indirectly recognised in other 
fields of states’ international relations, such as the international regulation of intellectual 
property. The concern for ‘public health’ has been recognised, for instance, in the WTO 
through the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [Doha 
Declaration 2001 paras. 1, 4-5] and the 2003 Decision on the implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [TRIPS 
Decision 2003]. However, the realisation of the human right to health arguably requires 
more than public health.345  
In sum, states pledge to recognise human rights internationally, and to cooperate 
for the human right to health and access to medicines. Therefore, a duty to respect the 
human right to medicines abroad can be established for foreign states. However, I 
contend that hypothetical customary duties to protect, fulfil and enforce cannot rest on 
‘paper practice’ but have to be corresponded by ‘factual practice’. Analogously, Skogly 
has maintained with regard to the UDHR that “[i]t may be possible to argue that Article 
22 (and Article 28) do not constitute a firm international law obligation to fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights, but there may be an obligation to respect and protect 
economic, social and cultural rights beyond national borders” [Skogly 2006: 123]. The 
identification of the ‘factual practice’ is however challenging. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
there are difficulties in establishing, theoretically, which conduct to look and in finding, 
practically, sufficient uniform and general practice. 346  With regard to international 
protection, ie the protection of states against the behaviour of third parties affecting 
access to medicines across national borders, some practice can be identified in the 
participation to the WHO, which has a preeminent role in international public health 
regulation. Most international normative activity, including that arranged by the WHO, is 
however non-binding and even binding regulations are not accompanied by a sanctionary 
regime.347 Apart from the action within international organisations, however, states do 
                                            
344 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.3. 
345 See Chapter 5 sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
346 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.4. 
347 See generally Burci and Vignes [2004] and Minelli [2003]. WHO can adopt binding 
agreements and conventions [WHO Constitution arts. 19-20], issue recommendations 




not uniformly undertake to protect access to medicines in other countries from actions 
originated by third parties on which they have control.348 Some countries control the 
quality of the medicines exported. For instance medicines exported from the US, 
including donations, have to be registered with the FDA.349 The trade in sub-standard and 
counterfeit medicines is however rife, transnational policing is not consistent and 
international responsibility is not generally claimed for this [WHO, Combating 
Counterfeit Drugs: 2005]. 
With regard to fulfilment, a proliferation of initiatives for improving the access to 
medicines is undertaken by foreign states as bilateral donors or part of multilateral 
agencies [Leach et al 2005: 41-57]. WHO, for instance, is increasingly engaged in 
operational functions such as the management of the ‘3 by 5’ programme (for the 
provision of antiretrovirals)350 and the coordination of global health partnerships for 
access to medicines [The Economist, 1.3 by 5, 2006; Ruger and Yach 2005: 1100; WHO, 
Engaging for Health, 2006: iii]. WHO’s budget on essential medicines is also rising.351 
                                                                                                                                 
List (EDL) [id.: art. 23; Burci and Vignes 2004: 141]. The International Health 
Regulation are a rare example of binding regulations but the procedure for the settlement 
of disputes is not particularly developed: “[i]n the event of a dispute between WHO and 
one or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of these 
Regulations, the matter shall be submitted to the Health Assembly” [WHO, International 
Health Regulation, 2005: art. 56]. Furthermore, the Regulations aim at the prevention of 
international spread of diseases, thus states ultimately participate by virtue of self-interest 
rather than out of concern for other states public health situations. 
348 See also infra on the poor practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction for the violations of 
the human right to medicines.  
349 Such requirement may however be problematic for access to medicines, as it will be 
analysed in Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.1. 
350 The ‘3 by 5’ programme was launched by WHO and UNAIDS in 2003 to serve as 
catalyst for other funding sources. It addresses a variety of issues such as training of 
health workers, development of health systems, improving infrastructure and developing 
standards. WHO provides technical support, technical assistance and seeds money. See, 
e.g., The Economist, “1.3 by 5” [2006]. 
351  Reportedly the budget for WHO’s work in essential medicines is rising and has 
amounted to US$ 71.7 million in 2006 (states are the major founders followed by private 
charities, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and international organisations, 
such as UNITAID) [WHO, Essential Medicines Annual Report 2006, 2006: 22]. The 
scope of WHO’s action related to access to medicines has generally expanded. In 1992 
WHO started to act as leader of global health initiatives [Brown et al 17]. Among these, 
mention can be made to the Roll Back Malaria, the Accelerating Access Initiative, the 
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Alliance to Eliminate 
Leprosy, The Global Program to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis, the Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative [WHO Programmes and Projects, 2010; IFPMA 2009]. See also 




Furthermore, states donate through funds engaged in access to medicines such as Global 
Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.352 Moreover, states intervene in health abroad 
through foreign aid [CMH Working Group 6, 2002: 17]. As a result, external funding 
amounts to 15% of total health expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa [WHO, World Health 
Statistics 2006, my elaboration].353 However, the conduct of states is not general and 
uniform. Furthermore, it is noted that the quality and effectiveness of the external 
intervention is also important in order to fulfil the human right to medicines. Foreign 
assistance can for example be a distortion of local resources and can be volatile. In effect, 
with regard to results, access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa is still shortcoming. 
Often the agencies miss the very targets they fixed.354 Furthermore, the identification of 
the fulfilment of the human right to medicines is complex, as it will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. For example, it can be asked if the aid for time-limited projects and 
health ‘emergencies’ responds to the fulfilment of the human right to medicines.  
Finally, with regard to international enforcement, I am not aware of foreign states 
invoking another state’s international responsibility for the human right to medicines.355 
Also, I could not find cases of foreign states acting for the infringement of such human 
right as a violation of an obligation erga omnes.356  In sum, while foreign states bear a 
                                            
352  To date (May 2010), states have paid more than US$ 15 billions to the Fund 
[GFATM, website, 2010, Pledges and Contributions].  
353 See also Commit for Africa, website Health, last accessed 2010. 
354 To make just one example, the WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative to treat three million people 
with HIV drugs by end 2005 has decidedly missed its target, as only 1.6 million are now 
on antiretroviral treatment in developing countries. The case is explored in further detail 
in Chapter 6 section 6.4.1. 
355 State responsibility is part of customary law, although the definition of some of its 
aspects is still controversial. The UN International Law Commission has been working 
on the codification – and arguably progressive development – of state responsibility for 
almost six decades. As of yet, the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts are being considered by the General Assembly [UN GA 
Res. 35 (2004)]. See also International Law Commission, website [2006]. 
356 It seems established that any state holds a legal interest to intervene against gross and 
large-scale violations of internationally recognized human rights, which therefore violate 
obligations erga omnes, even if the violations occur abroad [Cassese 2005: 393-4]. See 
also the US Third Restatement, stating that a foreign state commits violations of 
obligations erga omnes when it engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognised human rights [Third Restatement (Comments) 1987: para. 702 
(o.)]. In those cases the foreign states can use diplomatic or economic retortions, peaceful 
countermeasures or recur to international adjudication, for instance through the ICJ 
[Cassese 2005: 394]. Cf. Henkin, maintaining that the foreign state could in fact have a 
duty to call the violator to account [Henkin 2003: 395]. On the international enforcement 




duty to respect the human right to medicines abroad, a general and uniform ‘factual 
practice’ of duties to protect, fulfil and enforce the human right to medicines could not be 
identified to be certainly incumbent on foreign states.357 Nevertheless, states undertake 
actions for the protection and fulfilment of access to medicines abroad (even though 
those actions are not necessarily framed as contributions to the realisation of human 
rights) and profusely pledge to cooperate for human rights, the human right to 
health/medicines or access to treatment abroad. 
 
4.3.2 Non-state actors  
Section 4.3.2 explores the customary law, the soft law and self-regulation of non-
state actors – in particular international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical 
companies – with regard to the human right to medicines. The sub-sections first research 
whether and what duties originate directly onto those non-state actors from customary 
international law with regard to the human right to medicines – that means, as opposed to 
the obligations that are imposed on them by states. Direct duties imply that non-state 
actors are directly legally accountable for the related violations of customary 
international law. The identification of human rights customary norms for non-state 
actors, it is pointed out, incurs in notable paradoxes. International custom is in fact 
classically established through the practice of states accompanied by opinio juris. What 
sense does it make to look at state practice, indeed, to identify customary duties binding 
non-state actors? Certain non-state actors can be seen as having legal personality under 
international law and therefore being bound by international customary law and the 
general principles of law (as argued in Chapter 3 section 3.3 the respect of the human 
right to health is a duty under international customary law). However customary law, like 
treaty law, is ‘textually’ dedicated to states, and can be applied to the conduct of non-
state actors only in a very general way.358 Secondly, the sub-sections investigate whether 
and what duties are attributed by soft law and self-regulation to international 
                                            
357 See also Skogly concluding on the human rights obligations of foreign states under 
customary law that “[i]n terms of transnational obligations based on customary 
international law, it would be fair to assume that the content of the obligation would be 
of a negative nature – states should refrain from actions in their international or 
transnational operations that will fail to respect the human rights of people in other 
states” [Skogly 2002: 788].  
358 This is the classic problem of the horizontal effect of constitutional, human rights 




organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical organisations with regard to the human right to 
medicines. It will be noticed that such types of commitments often envisage expansive 
roles and responsibilities for these non-state actors.  
 
4.3.2.1 International governmental organisations  
Skogly maintains that the international organisations which have international 
legal personality are bound by customary international law and the general principles of 
law. 359  Therefore, they are bound to respect the human rights which are part of 
customary international law [Skogly 2001: 87].360 Accordingly, customary international 
law would impose to international organisations obligations to respect the human right to 
health – if we accept that the human right to health is part of customary law.361 The duty 
is however vague, and can only be applied if watered down to make it compatible to the 
characters of international organisations. Customary norms, in effect, are ‘textually’ 
dedicated to states, their powers and characters.  
International soft law and the self-regulation (or mandates) of international 
organisations themselves often sanction a role with regard to international human rights 
and access to health care which is more extensive than that provided in the positive law.  
In effect, states often urge in their international declarations the support for health care 
and access to medicines from some international organisations [Alma Ata: X; Abuja 
                                            
359 Skogly demonstrates the de facto legal personality of these institutions assessing their 
powers and operations and referring to the ICJ which in its advisory opinion WHO and 
Egypt declared that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law and, as 
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which 
they are parties” [ICJ, WHO and Egypt, 1980: para. 37; Skogly 2001: 76-91]. For the 
capacity of international organisations to hold autonomy and legal personality see also 
the ICJ Reparation case, whereby the Court advised that the UN had the personality to 
bring an international claim in respect of injury to its personnel, on the lines of 
diplomatic protection, and in respect of injuries to the UN caused by the injury to its 
agents. Even though the UN Charter does not contain explicit provisions on the legal 
personality of the organisation, the ICJ could draw from other articles of the document 
stating the mandate of the UN [ICJ, Reparation, 1949: 179; Brownlie 2003: 648-650]. 
See generally Amerasinghe [2005: 80-81]. For the capacity of international organisations 
to be subject to customary and international law see e.g. Joseph [2003: 437]. 
360 According to Skogly, “the nature of obligations in regards to customary international 
law will often have a negative character” [Skogly 2001: 87, emph. orig.]. 




Declaration: para. 18, 27]. Furthermore, it is looked at self-regulation and mandates of a 
sample of global international organisations which have great impact on access to 
medicines, namely the WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO.362 
WHO’s Constitution does recognise the human right to health, as seen in above section 
4.2.3. The UNICEF’s Mission Statement claims that, inter alia, the organisation is 
mandated by the UN General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children’s rights 
and to help meet their basic needs [UNICEF’s mission statement 2004: para. 1]. 
Children’s rights are sourced from the Convention on the Rights of the Child [id.: para. 2; 
CRC]. The IMF and the World Bank are also UN agencies but they enjoy autonomy from 
the organisation and do not refer to human rights in their founding agreements [UN 
Charter arts. 57 and 63; Agreement between UN and the IMF art 1(2); Agreement 
between UN and the IBRD].363 Traditionally, the IMF and World Bank claim that human 
rights are a political issue within a country’s domestic affairs.364 However, the World 
Bank has more recently declared seeking to “ensure that human rights are fully respected 
in connection with the projects it supports” and trying to “reflect the principles enshrined 
in the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] into all of [the Bank’s] work” [World 
Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank, 1998: 2]. The IMF 
remains more laodicean with regard to human rights. With regard to the IMF work on 
                                            
362 I look at these organisations considering also that the CESCR in its comment on the 
right to health especially mentions that UN agencies, regional development banks and the 
WTO should cooperate effectively in relation to the implementation of the right to health 
[CESCR 2000: para. 64]. Thus these organisations have been identified to have an 
impact on health.  
363  Cf. Ssenyonjo arguing that Article 103 of the Charter links the two institutions’ 
Articles of Agreement to the Charter [Ssenyonjo 2008: 741]. Furthermore, “human rights 
issues are implicitly part of the development mandate of the World Bank and central to 
the success of the poverty alleviation programmes of the Bank and the IMF” [Ssenyonjo 
2008: 741]. Such reasoning is sensible but gives little guidance on the legal responsibility 
of these institutions. See Shrijver identifying a difference between the IBRD (World 
Bank) and the IMF, the former not being controlled by the UN. Shrijver argues that the 
relationship agreement between the UN and the IBRD states that the UN recognises that 
the action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is a matter to be determined by the 
independent exercise of the Bank’s own judgment in accordance with the Bank’s Articles 
of Agreement [Agreement between UN and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1947: art IV para 2]. Such provision is not present in the Agreement 
between the UN and the IMF, thus a contrario one could argue that in the case of the 
IMF the United Nations is free to intervene [Shrijver 2001: 8]. Cf. Feyter who contrasts 
the agreements between the UN and the IMF or the World Bank on the one hand and the 
agreement between the UN and the WHO on the other hand, whereby the WHO agrees to 
enter consultation with the UN with respect to recommendations [Agreement between 
the United Nations and the World Health Organisation, 1948: art. IV; Feyter 2001: 77]. 




Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, for instance, Pereira Leite from the IMF External 
Relations Department declares that “[w]hile human rights advocates should be given 
every opportunity to participate in the PRSP consultations, they should not expect the 
IMF to impose human rights conditions on its assistance to member countries. The IMF 
simply does not have the expertise required to make judgments in this area” [Pereira 
Leite 2001]. The Agreement Establishing the WTO does not mention human rights or 
health but in the preamble the parties recognise “that their relations in the field of trade 
and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living…” [Agreement Establishing the WTO, preambular para. 1] and that special 
attention is to be dedicated to developing countries [Id., para. 2].365 
 
4.3.2.2 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
Some authors maintain that NGOs366 bear duties under international customary 
law arguing deductively that NGOs perform a public role and core customary human 
rights obligations are to be binding on every entity that has the capacity to bear such 
obligations [Clapham 2006; Hobe 2004; Rossi 2008: 13-15].367 This type of argument is 
slightly tautological and does not solve the question of the ‘textual’ applicability of 
customary international human rights norms on non-state actors. It is not clear, in other 
words, when NGOs violate the respect of the human right to health and medicines. In 
effect, I could not find any judicial practice of holding NGOs legally responsible for 
violating the customary human right to health or medicines. Nevertheless I note that 
NGOs are attributed roles with regard to human rights and access to health care under 
international soft law and their own self-regulation. For example, the UN General 
Assembly has issued in 1999 the “Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” [UN GA Res. 144 (1999)]. The 
                                            
365 More specifically “there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development” 
[Agreement Establishing the WTO, preambular para. 2] 
366 An NGO is here understood as a private nonprofit organisation. Cf. Lehr-Lehnardt 
[2005: 3-4]. 
367 Rossi maintains nonetheless that NGOs do not have personality in international law, 
as they have been excluded from work of International Law Commission on the 




declaration states that NGOs have roles and responsibilities “in contributing, as 
appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other human rights instruments can be fully realized” [id.: art. 18(3)]. No legal duty 
is in fact directly established and it is not clear what NGOs should do for ‘promoting’ 
human rights. Incidentally, a suggestion by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan that UN members drew up a code of conduct to ensure that NGOs commit 
themselves to the aims of the UN Charter and act in a manner that reflects the 
intergovernmental character of the UN had not been yielded as of yet [UN Secretary 
General, 354 (2004): para. 34; Rossi 2008: 22]. 368  
For their part, NGOs produce instances of self-regulation regarding their position 
with respect to human rights. In 2005 some international NGOs, including some 
organisations having influence on access to medicines worldwide, drew up the 
“International Non-Governmental Organizations Accountability Charter” [INGO 
Accountability Charter, 2003].369 The NGOs identify themselves as “independent non-
profit organisations that work globally to advance human rights” [INGO Accountability 
Charter, 2003: Who We Are, para. 1]. Human rights are mentioned in the Charter only as 
objective in “seek[ing] to advance international and national laws that promote human 
rights… and other public goods” [id.: Principles, para. 1]. Therefore, NGOs are not seen 
as accountable for the respect of human rights.370 Other standards and codes of conduct 
have been agreed, but the human right to health is not directly addressed.371 Individually, 
NGOs may express more direct views on human rights and the human right to health. 
                                            
368 Some instance of scrutiny of NGOs working on international economic and social 
issues is offered by the ECOSOC which regulates the NGOs consultative status in the 
institution. Pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, implementing Article 71 of the 
UN Charter, NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC must conform to the principles 
governing the establishment and nature of their consultative arrangements and have to 
report to the ECOSOC [ECOSOC Res. 31 (1996) para. 55]. Interestingly, among those 
organisations to be accorded special consultative status are those which “because of their 
interest in the field of human rights should pursue the goals of promotion and protection 
of human rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action” [id.: para. 25]. Other international organisations also established consultative 
arrangements [Rossi 2008: 22]. 
369 The signatories include Action Aid International, Amnesty International, International 
Save the Children Alliance, Oxfam International, Plan International, Survival 
International [INGO, website, Accountability Charter, 2009]. 
370 Nevertheless, the parties pledge not to discriminate [id.: Principles, para. 5]. 




Among NGOs active on access to medicines, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) “sets out 
to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health and to restore and ensure respect 
for the human beings and their fundamental human rights” [MSF, website, About MSF, 
2005].372  Management Science for Health (MSH), instead, does not mention human 
rights among its vision [MSH, website, About Us, 2009]. Oxfam asserts that “[g]ood 
health care is a fundamental right, not a luxury” [Oxfam, website, 2009, Oxfam in Action 
– Health]. However, no commitment is made by the organisation itself to comply with 
human rights.  
 
4.3.2.3 The private, business, trans-national corporations (TNCs) 
This section investigates whether and what obligations customary international 
law imposes directly onto some private parties, with a focus on pharmaceutical 
companies. From the point of view of legal capacity, section 4.1 demonstrated that 
individuals and corporations can be bound by international customary norms. In 
particular, it is noted that these non-state actors can be directly liable for international 
human rights customary norms. An example of adjudication of this liability is offered by 
the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which provides to US courts jurisdiction on torts 
committed in violation of international law abroad.373 Under ATCA, US courts have in 
effect held corporations responsible for certain violations of human rights.374 However, 
they have rejected jurisdiction on the human right to health which was not recognised as 
part of customary law.375 In effect, I could not find adjudication or literature relating to 
                                            
372 The MSF Charter does not mention human rights or the right to health [MSF, 2006, 
MSF’s Charter]. 
373 Enacted in 1789, the Alien Tort Claims Act more specifically gives federal courts in 
the United States jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States” [28 U.S. Code § 1350]. 
It permits suits against individual private actors, non-governmental groups such as 
corporations and unincorporated associations including paramilitary groups which violate 
international law binding the US [Stephens 2000: 280, 284-5]. The norm violated must 
be ‘universal, obligatory and definable’ [Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987) in Stephens 2000: 281].   
374 This judicial jurisdiction has not been cause of protest from foreign states relating to 
the subject matter. Protest on the subject matter jurisdiction could have been urged by the 
fact that the ATCA sanctions extra-territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, there seem to be 
acquiescence by the international community that non-state actors such as corporations 
can be liable for violations of human rights under customary law. 




the duty of companies to respect the human right to health in customary law. Some 
literature in fact expresses scepticism on the idea of holding corporations accountable for 
violations of human rights under customary law. For example Skogly states that this 
(referring to transnational corporations) would be ‘difficult’ and the “instances of human 
rights problems where it would be possible to grant responsibility to these companies 
would be very limited” [Skogly 1999: 251]. 
Nevertheless soft-law, often under the aegis of the UN, attributes roles, 
responsibilities and duties to business corporations with regard to human rights, 
including the human right to medicines as part of the human right to health. Some 
documents can be listed here: the 2000 UN Global Compact [UN Global Compact], the 
2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights [Norms on the Responsibilities of Business], the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy [ILO Tripartite Declaration]. Those 
instruments are not binding and can be quite liberal in their affirmations, for example, the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Business recite inter alia that:  
[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure 
the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized 
in international as well as national law. [Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Business, art. 1]  
To note, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Ruggie, has 
remarked, the ‘textual’ problem of applying to non-state actors norms which are designed 
for states. Ruggie has indeed criticised the ‘exaggerated legal claims and conceptual 
ambiguities’ of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Business which, in his view, had 
taken “existing State-based human rights instruments and simply [asserted] that many of 
their provisions now are binding on corporations as well” [Special Representative Ruggie, 
2006: para. 59].376 This has “little authoritative base in international law – hard, soft or 
                                            
376  In the preamble the Norms on the Responsibilities of Business identify the 
responsibilities and norms to be respected as including “the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights… the ‘Health for All in the Twenty-First Century’ 
policy of the World Health Organization… the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 




otherwise” [id.]. Particular mention, furthermore, is due to the Human Rights Guidelines 
for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to Medicines, compiled by the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the human right to health [Hunt 2007(a): para. i]. The 
guidelines are an interesting effort to obviate the indeterminacy of the responsibilities of 
corporations with respect to the human right to medicines, and will be recalled in Chapter 
6. However, it has to be noted that the UN General Assembly has not taken action as of 
yet to endorse the document [id.].377  
Moreover, it is remarked that many pharmaceutical companies themselves 
commit to human rights. Some pharmaceutical companies have participated to the UN 
Global Compact, the 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Business and the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration. The Special Representative Ruggie, who has conducted a 
systematic study also administrating questionnaires to the Fortune Global 500, has 
concluded that most companies are interested in human rights.378 I have consequently 
reviewed the statements of several pharmaceutical companies influent on access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa.379 Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) declares to comply with 
the Global Compact. It does not mention a human right to health or medicines, but in its 
policy paper on HIV/AIDS the company “shares the view that access to medicines saving 
human lives cannot be limited to those who can afford them” and a multi-sectoral 
response by different parties is required, also including the effort of pharmaceutical 
companies [BI 2009(a)]. Cipla’s website does not mention human rights, access to 
medicines or corporate social responsibility. GlaxoSmithKlein (GSK) is signatory to the 
Global Compact and proclaims to uphold the UDHR, the OECD Guidelines and the ILO 
core labour standards. The firm recognizes that businesses also have responsibilities with 
regard to human rights and it claims to “work hard to uphold human rights within our 
sphere of influence…As a marketer of medicines, we strive to make them as widely 
                                            
377  For an account of the draft guidelines for pharmaceutical companies see Joseph 
[2005: 10]. 
378 More precisely, most companies referenced international instruments in formulating 
their policies. Most worked with external stakeholders on the human rights policies. Most 
had reporting systems to monitor human rights performances [Ruggie 2007]. 
379 The selection, presented in alphabetical order, is based on a combination of factors. 
Shelys is the most important pharmaceutical company in Tanzania. Cipla and Ranbaxy 
are chosen because they trade extensively generic products to Africa. The others are 
among the 20 biggest pharmaceutical companies for sale and revenue, vastly exporting to 
sub-Saharan Africa. GSK and BI have also been involved in the notorious case TAC v. 
GSK, BI and others at the South Africa Competition Commission [Tau et al 2002]. See 




available as possible while running our business in a sustainable way” [GSK 2009]. 
Merck & Co. is committed to respecting human rights as defined in the UDHR and its 
subsequent changes, the ICESCR, ICCPR, the OECD Guidelines and the ILO core 
labour standards [Merck & Co. 2009]. Merck & Co. also undertakes to produce reporting 
according to external guidelines and measurements frameworks which include the Global 
Reporting Initiative Guidelines, the Millennium Development Goals and the Access to 
Medicines Index [Merck & Co. 2008: iii ]. Novartis claims to respect and support human 
rights, as also enshrined in the UDHR, and is signatory to the Global Compact [Novartis 
2003; website, Human Rights, 2009]. Pfizer does not mention human rights, but declares 
its commitment to access to medicines and presents its awards in philanthropic activities 
[Pfizer 2007]. Ranbaxy does not refer to human rights but claims to be engaged in 
corporate social responsibility activities, including access to medicines and primary 
health care. I could not find any reference to human rights or ‘access to medicines’ at the 
website of Shelys, the most important pharmaceutical company in Tanzania [Shelys, 
website, Vision and Values, last accessed 7 December 2009]. 
In sum, international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies may be 
liable for the violation of the respect of the human right to medicines – as part of the 
human right to health – under customary law, but such provision would be extremely 
vague and is controversial in the doctrine of international law. The soft law reviewed in 
section 4.3.2, often promoted through the UN, is instead readier to attribute onto these 
non-state actors (non-binding) duties to respect and/or support the realisation of human 
rights, the human right to health/medicines, and access to medicines. Furthermore, some 
international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies commit in their self-
regulation and mandates to human rights in general, the human right to health and/or 









4.4 Conclusion  
Chapter 4 has shown that foreign states and non-state actors are subject to certain 
obligations under international law relating to the human right to medicines. The treaty 
law analysed in section 4.2 generally obligates foreign states to respect and cooperate for 
the human right to medicines (as part of the human right to health) in other countries. 
The ICESCR, according to the CESCR, binds states to protect the human right to 
medicines internationally. There is no specific obligation to realise the right through 
fulfilment; foreign cooperation and assistance are vague concepts. To note, these treaty 
provisions are mandatory in nature, but their substance if often uncertain. A duty to 
enforce the human right to medicines abroad could not be found. A legitimate interest in 
the realisation of the human right to medicines by other states parties to the treaties is 
nonetheless sanctioned. Treaty-based bodies have been established in order to monitor 
the conduct of the parties with regard to the human rights sanctioned by the treaties. 
However, most treaty-based bodies do not exercise a judicial function proper. Procedures 
to redress the complaints of individuals are not envisaged by several treaties, included the 
ICESCR regime (the Optional Protocol redresses this shortcoming but is not in force as 
of yet). Reparations for individual situations are not envisaged by the treaties analysed.380 
Furthermore, not all the bodies receive inter-state complaints.381 Even those who receive 
such complaints rarely have the power to issue actionable interim measures,382 and have 
no policing capacity.383 Regardless, states can recur to state responsibility for breaches of 
obligations erga omnes. Under international customary law, it has been argued, foreign 
states have to respect access to medicines in other countries.  
Furthermore, some treaties enshrining the human right to health and medicines 
attribute duties to non-state actors. Individuals, groups or international organisations are 
often demanded respect of human rights and recognised responsibilities with regard to 
the realisation of these rights but clear obligations are absent. Moreover, these parties 
were found not to be directly liable, as the duties are instead ultimately binding on the 
                                            
380 Other regional systems such as the European Court of Human rights do provide 
monetary compensation [ECHR art. 41]. But cf. Nowak arguing that even such ‘just 
satisfaction’ system is inadequate and it does not even cover legal expenses [Nowak 
2007: 257]. 
381 The CESCR, for instance, does not. See section 4.2.1. 
382 For instance, within the ICESCR regime, interim measures are not provided in the 
Covenant but have been included in the (not yet operational) Optional Protocol (see 
above Section 4.2.1). 




states parties to the treaties.384 The identification of duties from customary international 
law has proved to be extremely tentative, as I could not overcome the paradox of whose 
practice, whose opinio juris should be searched when seeking the inter-national custom 
binding non-state actors. I have confined the scope of my enquiry to verify whether 
international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies were bound by the 
international customary human right to health and medicines which (arguably) binds 
states. I have concluded that a case can be presented to hold those actors accountable 
under international customary law for the respect of the human right to medicines in their 
operations. However, such duty is extremely vague, also considering that it is deduced 
from (a vague) obligation ‘textually’ formulated for states.  
Thus custom has revealed to be a weak instrument for the positivisation of the 
human right to medicines with regard to extra-governmental actors. In contrast certain 
instances of soft law, state practice and non-state actors’ self-regulation, overall, show an 
attitude readier to frame the roles and responsibilities of extra-governmental actors, also 
with respect to access to medicines, as human rights duties. Such duties however are not 
meant to be legally binding. Rather, they can be regarded as aspirations, communications 
framed in the ‘human rights subsystem’. In this ‘utopian’ subsystem, arguendo, all actors 
have a role in the realisation of human rights. Given the resources needed to fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights, and who has the power to master them, the ‘human 
rights subsystem’ is inclined to bind and rely on extra-governmental actors as well as 
home states. However, the legal subsystem struggles to frame such communications as 
legal/illegal.385 So “can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of 
access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?” This chapter has demonstrated some 
potentials and limitations of the international human right to medicines to bind extra-
governmental actors. Chapter 6 will critically analyse the operationalisation, 
implementation and enforcement of the right regarding those actors de facto.  
                                            
384 See also, e.g., Special Representative Ruggie [2007: paras. 33-44]. 
385  For example, it is recalled that the provisions relating to non-state actors and 
individuals generally have no direct applicability. As seen in section 4.2 individuals are 
contemplated in treaties but those prescriptions may be seen, borrowing Brems’ words 
with regard to the ACHPR, to “inculcate these duties as well as their underlying 




CHAPTER 5: THE OBLIGATIONS OF HOME STATES WITH REGARD TO 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO MEDICINES DE FACTO 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 showed that home states exert considerable influence on access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 demonstrated that all African states bear 
obligations under international human rights law relating to access to medicines. Access 
to medicines is part of the human right to health enshrined in widely-accessed 
international human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), binding 43 African states, and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which binds all African states [Odinkalu 2003: 
20]. Access to medicines is also supported by other human rights such as the right to life 
and the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
International custom, arguably, endorses the respect of the human right to medicines. 
This chapter contributes to answering the research questions of this thesis, “can a human 
right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”, by providing a critical analysis and a normative discussion of the possible 
utilisation, de facto, of this right to guide and redress the conduct of African home states.  
With regard to the scope, the enquiry critically analyses the indications which 
international human rights law gives for the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of the human right to medicines by home states. 386  According to the 
formulations of the human right to medicines binding African countries, home states are 
obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to medicines. It will be shown that 
the operationalisation of the human right to medicines however encounters several 
paradoxes. From a legal perspective, as noted in Chapter 3, states enjoy ‘margins of 
discretion’ with regard to the realisation of human rights.387 In effect, not all state actions 
diminishing access to medicines violate the respect of the human right to medicines. Not 
                                            
386 Operationalisation is here defined as the attribution of precise content to a concept, in 
this case the human right to medicines, through the identification of good practices and 
policies. This expression has been used by the UN Human Rights Council [Human Right 
Council, Res. 29 (2007): para. 2(c)]. On the operationalisation of political ‘steering’ 
programmes see Luhmann [1997: 51]. 




all shortcomings in protection and fulfilment of access to medicines violate this right. 
Moreover, human rights can be contradictory. The human right to medicines has both an 
individual and a collective dimension which can in effect clash. From an ethical and 
normative perspective it is underlined that while human rights are deemed to be founded 
on indisputable norms, ‘fully independent of consequences’ [Luhmann 1997(b): 35; 2008: 
19], the decisions relating to the regulation and policies of access to medicines are 
characterised by delicate ethical predicaments concerning the effects on health as well as 
other rights, interests, needs and liberties in society. Those choices in effect entail 
conspicuous power and biopower. Furthermore, the practical limits of the steering of law 
and politics in addressing problems in society shall be considered.388  
According to its broad scope, this chapter utilises a multidimensional, 
interdisciplinary methodology. To begin with, it deals with the legal analysis of the 
human right to medicines and health utilising: the ICESCR and the ACHPR, as they set 
up the most comprehensive regimes of international human rights obligations on access 
to medicines; the comments and decisions of treaty bodies, focussing on the CESCR (the 
ICESCR treaty body), the African Commission (the ACHPR treaty body); the decisions 
of international and national courts; the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
human right to health, academics and other authoritative sources. Next, the normative 
analysis expands considering the ethics, economics, politics and science involved in the 
realisation of access to medicines. Socio-legal studies, mainly drawing from Luhmann 
and Foucault, are also utilised. Furthermore, the investigation employs an empirical study 
regarding access to medicines, with particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania 
where I undertook field work.  
This chapter is constituted by three parts which follow the tripartite distinction of 
home states duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to health and 
medicines. 389  Attention is dedicated to the most problematic aspects of regulation, 
                                            
388 As mentioned in Chapter 1 section 1.4, with regard to the steering of law, “law does 
not necessarily solve the original conflicts but only those that it can construct on its own 
terms” [Luhmann 2004: 169]. The steering of the political subsystem incurs in three 
major limits, namely: 1) the unexpected and/or undesired side-effects 2) the so-called 
‘deficits of execution’ and 3) the so-called ‘self-fulfilling’ or ‘self-defeating prophecies’ 
(obtain the opposite of what sought) [Luhmann 1997: 44]. 
389 The distinction is enshrined by the ICESCR and ACHPR provisions on the right to 
health and has been adopted, among others, by the CESCR, the African Commission, and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health [CESCR 2000: paras. 33-36; AC Res. 




policies and actions having an effect on access to medicines. Section 5.2 examines the 
duties of respect, namely the injunction of no harm and non-discrimination. Particular 
focus is given to the impact on access to medicines of the protection of intellectual 
property rights and to the problematic identification of duties of de facto and substantive 
non-discrimination. Section 5.3 examines the duty to protect and is divided between the 
duty to ensure the respect by third parties and the regulation of the promotion of access to 
medicines involving third parties. This part expands on price controls and the possible 
abuses of competition by pharmaceutical companies such as ‘excessive pricing’. Section 
5.4 examines the contingencies of the fulfilment of the human right to medicines, 
analysing the problems in medical ethics of prioritising health-care interventions and 
access to medicines. This part also studies the judicial enforcement of the human right to 
medicines. Finally, a conclusion is provided reflecting on the uncertainties of a human 
right to medicines in regulating and redressing the conduct of home states in relation to 
access to medicines.  
 
5.2 Respect  
 
Neither the ICESCR nor the ACHPR explicitly use the expression ‘respect’ when 
prescribing the duties of home states towards the human right to health. The obligation of 
respect is instead explicitly identified by the CESCR and the African Commission, with 
direct regard to the human right to medicines [CESCR 2000: para. 34; AC Res. 141 
(2008): para. 2(1)].390 Two overarching concepts may be derived from these prescriptions 
and will be examined in turn. The first is that states shall not directly impede access to 
medicines (section 4.2.1). The second is that states shall not exercise discrimination in 




                                                                                                                                 
types of duties befalling on the State parties with regard to access to medicines 
[Hestermeyer 2004 132-138; Yamin 2003: 127-138]. See also Chapter 3 section 3.2.1. 
390 While the African Commission defines the first set of duties in relation to access to 
medicines as ‘promotion’, substantively it refers to negative actions of respect by 




5.2.1 No harm  
With regard to the prescriptions of no impediment of access to medicines, 
violations are most evident when the state actively undermines access to medicines, for 
example by interfering with the provision of humanitarian aid in internal conflicts [AC 
Res. 141 (2008): para. 2(1)(c)].391 The adoption of tariffs and taxes on pharmaceutical 
products can reduce the economic affordability of medicines [Hunt 2006: para. 49] yet 
they can be instrumental to the development of a nascent national pharmaceutical 
industry aimed at improving access to medicines.392 Notably, certain interventions of 
states in the regulation and provision of medicines can diminish access to certain 
medicines, for example the selection of the treatments available in public health 
facilities.393 These types of state interventions are further investigated later in this chapter 
with regard to the protection and fulfilment of the human right to medicines.394  
Furthermore, states can influence the enjoyment of access to medicines by 
protecting intellectual property rights and in particular patents on medicines. The African 
Commission in its resolution on access to medicines maintains that states shall stimulate 
intellectual property, but adopt the ‘TRIPS flexibilities’ [AC Res. 141 (2008): paras. 
                                            
391 See, e.g., the communication The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria at the African Commission. The African 
Commission found that the government of Nigeria had directly participated in the 
contamination of air, water and soil, thereby harming the health of the Ogoni population. 
The government had also refused to permit scientists and environmental organisations from 
entering Ogoniland to undertake studies regarding hazardous operations and materials 
relating to oil production [AC, Nigeria, 2001: para. 50 and Findings].  
392 It has been reported for example that the average tariff in Tanzania, Burkina Faso and 
other countries is above 30% [Bale 2001: 10]. See also Ocay and Laing [2005].  
393 In Ministry of Health v. TAC, for instance, the South African Constitutional Court 
held that the State’s policy not to make nevirapine available was unreasonable and, inter 
alia, “[t]he State has failed to meet its obligation ‘to desist from preventing or impairing’ 
the right of access to health care” [South Africa, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002: para. 
3.21.1]. The plaintiff, the NGO Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), asked the South 
African Constitutional Court to allow the provision of nevirapine to all HIV-positive 
pregnant women (the provision of nevirapine, an antiretroviral drug, reduces the woman-
to-foetus HIV transmission) at hospitals and clinics other than the research and training 
hospitals, as it was instead decided by the state [South Africa, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 
paras. 57-58]. The case is discussed in infra section 5.4.3. See also Langford and Nolan 
arguing that the restrictions on the provision of certain medicines by medical 
practitioners can amount to failure to respect the right to health [Langford and Nolan 
2006: 28]. 
394 For the registration of medicines see Section 5.3.1; for the selection of essential 
medicines lists (EMLs) and the selection of the treatments accessible in public health 




2(2)(d), 2(1)(e)]. Setting aside for the moment the Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPS), its ‘flexibilities’ (e.g. compulsory licensing, parallel trading) and 
other international agreements, the relationship between the protection of intellectual 
property and access to medicines is generally problematic.395  Patents are a form of 
intellectual property rights that are typically attributed to original, innovative inventions 
adapt to commercial use.396 The holder of a patent is granted a time-limited monopoly on 
the commercialisation of her product. Therefore, she can set the product’s price without 
the pressure of competition, unless she grants a licence. This can curtail the affordability 
of medicines for states and individuals. It has been estimated indeed that most patented 
medicines are sold at 20-100 times their marginal costs [Mossialos and Dukes 2001: 6-
7].397 However, reportedly, all countries in Africa except Angola and Eritrea currently 
offer patent protection on pharmaceuticals [Grace 2003: 53; CIPR: 46, 27; Thorpe 2002]. 
Nevertheless, intellectual property protection may be morally justified and 
advantageous for access to medicines. The literature on intellectual property usually 
identifies three competing rationales for the protection of intellectual ‘property’: the 
labour, personality and utilitarian arguments [Fisher 2001; May 2000]. The first two seek 
to identify natural rights originating from the relationship between the inventor and the 
invention. The ICESCR recognises such values and sanctions the human right to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary 
or artistic production [ICESCR article 15(c)]. Nonetheless, personality and utilitarian 
                                            
395 The TRIPS and its flexibilities will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 6 section 
6.2.1 regarding the foreign and ‘non-state’ dimension of access to medicines. 
396 See, e.g., TRIPS article 27 [TRIPS art. 27, note 5].  
397 According to the microeconomic tenet, in regimes of perfect competition prices tend 
to correspond to the marginal cost of production. Firms have a stimulus to enter 
competitive markets and compete on the price until the market price allows for some 
profit. See, e.g., Katz and Rosen [1997]. Yet, the pharmaceutical sector is naturally not 
perfectly competitive for the barriers to entry such as the continuous, dynamic 
innovation, the high fixed and sunk costs. See Chapter 2 section 2.3.2. Nonetheless, there 
are great differences between the prices of on-patent and generic products. For example, 
in India, where the originator company has sold a 500 mg dose of ciprofloxacin for 
US$ 4.40, the Indian company Cipla is able to make and sell an identical product 
profitably for US$ 0.12, a 36-fold difference in price. In Thailand, Fluconazole, costs 
US$ 14.00 per treatment day in branded form whereas a generic Thai version of the same 
drug is available at a price corresponding to US$ 0.75 per treatment day [Mossialos and 
Dukes 2001: 6-7]. The minimum cost of a first-line antiretroviral triple-combination 
(stavudine, lamivudine, nevirapine) generally amounts to US$ 132 per patient per year if 
sold by Cipla, an  Indian generic manufacturer, whereas up until 2000 the originator was 




justifications are not always applicable to the current industrial organisation of 
pharmaceutical research and innovation [May 2000: 15, 97]. The third principle is 
founded on a utilitarian account of right utilised in certain economic theory. 398 
Mainstream microeconomic theory hypothesises that knowledge is a sort of public good 
as it enjoys to some extent non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability (non-
appropriability) [Drahos and Braithwaite 2002: 216; Maskus and Reichman 2004]. The 
non-exclusive character entails that incentives may lack for the good to be produced at a 
societal optimal level. 399  Utilitarian considerations consequently prompt a public 
authority to create and protect property rights for the creations of the intellect, such as 
patents. Thence knowledge is appropriated and traded in the market, that which is 
supposed to deliver the maximum efficiency to society.  
Utilitarian arguments however do not indicate a precise policy on patents. In fact, 
utilitarian economists also note that the curtailment of the enjoyment of the good that 
would naturally not be scarce (non-rivalrous) is a loss of society welfare.400 According to 
Stiglitz, a balance needs to be found between dynamic and static efficiency [Stiglitz 1991: 
6 in Roffe et al: 67]. Furthermore, it shall be noticed that some uses of the patent systems 
can undermine innovation.401 Nevertheless, the research-based pharmaceutical sector is 
                                            
398 According to Bentham’s rule of utility, “the good is whatever brings the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number of people” [Bentham 2009/1780]. 
399 This means, society as a whole would be willing to pay for this level of knowledge 
production, if it was given the choice. 
400 The utilisation of a non-rivalrous good by one does not undermine the utilisation by 
another. Note: a piece of knowledge can be rivalrous when it produces advantages for she 
who holds that piece of knowledge (for example in the case of information asymmetries). 
In that case knowledge is rivalrous as wider availability of the knowledge would cause 
such advantage to evaporate. Cf. May’s rebuttal to such contention [May 2003]. 
401 If overly strong, patent systems can hinder dynamic and static efficiency as well as 
dynamic and static competition [Stiglitz 1991: 6 in Roffe et al: 67]. Patenting on 
intermediate technology can be detrimental to innovation in knowledge-based industries 
– and the pharmaceutical is certainly such – wherein “the process of innovation may be 
cumulative, and iterative, drawing on a range of prior inventions invented independently, 
and feeding into further independent research processes by others” [CIPR 2002: 112]. 
Examples of vicious use of patents are ‘preemptive patenting’, ‘sleeping patents’ 
[Pugatch 2004: 27; Gilbert and Newbery 1982: 514-26], ‘patent suppression’ [Landes 
and Posner 2003: 320-4], patent racing [CIPR 2002: 126; Trebilcock and Howse 2005: 
399]. Similar concerns have also been expressed by the people working in the 




adamant about patents.402 Economists specialised on the pharmaceutical sector emphasise 
that the pharmaceutical industry heavily depends on the patent system [Scherer 2001] as 
the costs of developing a new drug are high and the costs of developing processes for 
copying a new drug are low [Grabowski 2002; Sykes 2002: 16]. It is also reckoned that 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors are overall the sectors spending the most in 
research and development [Willman 2007]. Moreover, indirectly, patent protection can 
foster development through transfer of technology, foreign direct investment and 
economic growth. Again, some cautions are expressed with regard to the transfer of 
technology and economic growth.403 As Pugatch argues, the information disclosed by 
(foreign) innovators applying for patents in patents offices could in fact be obtained from 
other (foreign) patent offices. Furthermore, know-how is not transferred with the 
information disclosed in a patent [Pugatch 2004: 57]. With regard to economic growth, 
the effect depends on many circumstantial variables in a country. The economic literature 
on the influence of patent protection on economic growth and other economic variables 
is uncertain, failing to identify a clear trend. Qualitative considerations suggest that the 
outcome depends on the level and type of technology, education, culture, interest, 
entrepreneurship in the country.404  
In addition, the effects of patent protection on the access to existing medicines 
depend on environmental contingencies such as the resources of individuals and health 
systems to buy medicines. As seen in Chapter 2, medicines are provided within complex 
health systems.405 Determinant is, for example, the type of financing and distribution of 
medicines: as out-of-pocket expenditures for instance make the African poor particularly 
sensitive to the medicines’ prices.406 Furthermore, the impact of intellectual property 
rights depends on the actual utilisation of the rights by pharmaceutical companies 
deciding whether to apply for patent protection of innovative products (which does not 
occur systematically in sub-Saharan Africa); whether to grant licenses; and whether to 
                                            
402 For instance, patetnts are strongly lobbied for, internationally, by the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) [Gerhardsen 
2006; IFPMA, website, About US] 
403  With regard to foreign investment Pugatch, who overall opposes the global 
intellectual property regime, concludes that “although no clear-cut conclusion is currently 
available, it is still plausible that a stronger IPR environment may indeed have a positive 
effect on the overall decision of foreign firms to invest and to utilize their technologies in 
developing countries...” [Pugatch 2004: 64]. 
404 See Maskus and Reichman [2004: 289]. 
405 See Chapter 2 section 2.3.2. 




enforce patent rights. Foreign states can also influence the implementation and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in African countries. On the other hand, 
especially considering the finances of African countries, foreign states can contribute to 
access to medicines in poorer African countries through aid and cooperation, funding the 
purchase of patented medicines. Chapter 6 will investigate whether and how the human 
right to medicines regulates the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies and foreign 
states with regard to intellectual property in sub-Saharan Africa.407  
Therefore, contingencies distort the causality between patent regulation and 
access to patentable medicines, which is not linear. In sum, it is not clear what type of 
intellectual property protection African states can implement without undermining access 
to medicines. The case of Tanzania, which I have enquired during my field work in July-
August 2009, illustrates how the effects of intellectual property protection can be 
contingent. The Tanzanian government, the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) 
and WHO officials report that the country has not experienced ‘public health’ problems 
with patents on pharmaceutical products. 408  Tanzania’s patent law does cover 
pharmaceutical products.409 However, the originator pharmaceutical companies have not 
patented, for instance, the first-line antiretrovirals and the first line antimalarial (the ALu 
‘Coartem’). An interviewee at TFDA indeed declared that 99% of the medicines used in 
Tanzania are generic products [Interview, TFDA, Dar es Salaam, August 2009]. The 
situation of Tanzania may nonetheless become more precarious with the adoption of 
TRIPS obligations by some of its exporters, such as China and India, as it will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. On the other hand, the level of development of the Tanzanian 
pharmaceutical sector does not invite patent protection because, overall, it does not 
innovate.410  
Therefore, a ‘fundamentalist’ approach to patents is questionable, in that it 
overlooks other rights, interests, needs and liberties in society. As Luhmann remarked 
with regard to the indisputability of norms, values in effect do clash [Luhmann 2008: 28, 
                                            
407 See Chapter 6 section 6.2.1. 
408 Interviews with the Chief Pharmacist at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 
TFDA and WHO [Dar es Salaam, July-August 2009]. 
409 Tanzania grants patents for both processes and products, without expressly excluding 
pharmaceutical products, since the Tanzania’s Patents Act of 1987 [Tanzania’s Patents 
Act, 1987: Art 7(1)]. 





29]. Intellectual property protection can provide dynamic efficiency through innovation 
and investment in the pharmaceutical sector. Thus, in considering access to medicines 
African states also have to encourage research, also considering the need of treatment for 
the so-called ‘neglected’ disease – endogenous conditions that are not effectively 
researched [WHO, Diseases of Poverty and the 10/90 Gap, 2004; UNAIDS 2002: 105]. 
Furthermore, intellectual property can be beneficial for reasons which do not fall within 
the calculation of access to medicines such as the recognition of reward for the inventive 
effort or economic growth of the country. The African Commission seems to recognise 
the positive aspect of patents and therefore condones the action of African states in 




The second set of state obligations originating from the duty to respect the human 
right to medicines relates to the prohibition of discrimination. The ICESCR prohibits 
discrimination on so-called internationally prohibited grounds which include “race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status” [ICESCR art. 2(2)]. The ACHPR provides a similar list, 
with the addition of the categories of ethnic groups and the replacement of property with 
fortune [ACHPR art. 2]. According to the CESCR the duty of non-discrimination is also 
a ‘core obligation’, that states should realise immediately, in relation to the human right 
to health [CESCR 2000: 30, 43(a), 50]. Violations of non-discrimination in access to 
health care have been found by the African Commission in the context of political 
detainees. 411  However, the obligation of non-discrimination, which is rooted in the 
                                            
411 Discrimination on internationally prohibited grounds in matters of access to health has 
been identified with regard to health by the African Commission in the Mauritania and in 
Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria cases relating to non-discrimination of 
‘political’ detainees [AC, Mauritania, 2000; AC, Nigeria, 1998]. Indeed, with regard to 
the equal access to health services, the CESCR explicitly mentions prisoners and 
detainees [CESCR 2000: para. 34]. The non-discrimination of detainees outside the 
context of prohibited grounds, however, raises its own questions about the extent to 
which medicines that are not accessible to the whole population shall be provided in 
prisons by the state – while the prisoner depends entirely for her health care on her 
custodian. UNAIDS for instance analyses some cases of access to antiretrovirals in 




principle of equality, is sometimes seen as incomplete without duties of substantive non-
discrimination. Unlike formal discrimination, which requires all situations to be treated 
equally, substantive non-discrimination prescribes that like situations are treated alike 
and different situations are treated differently.412 Reading the ICESCR, it seems that at 
least the child deserves particular attention [ICESCR art 12(2)(a)].413 Many international 
treaties for example deal specifically with categories such as women and children, as 
seen in Chapter 3 section 3.2.1.3. The African Commission has identified an obligation 
to respect substantive non-discrimination for instance with regard to the treatment of 
mental illness.414 According to the CESCR, states also have to “ensur[e] that… health 
care staff are trained to recognize and respond to the specific needs of vulnerable or 
marginalized groups” [CESCR 2000: para. 37(ii)].415 The CESCR is however silent on 
the identity of the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginalised’ people. The Special Rapporteur 
instead identifies ‘vulnerable individuals’ and ‘disadvantaged groups’ as including 
“women and girls, ethnic minority and indigenous populations, people living in poverty, 
people living with HIV/AIDS, internally displaced people, the elderly, people with 
disabilities, prisoners and others” [Hunt 2006: para. 52]. The Special Rapporteur insists 
that “a State is obliged to establish a national medicine supply system that includes 
programmes specifically tailored to reach the vulnerable and disadvantaged” [Hunt 2006: 
para. 54].  
                                                                                                                                 
prisoners living with HIV are unable to realise their right to be treated for their illness 
[id.: 125]. 
412 Substantive non-discrimination may entail affirmative action facilitating the exercise 
of rights for some groups. See Yamin [2003: 124] specifically on the right to medication 
(also discussing affirmative action). See also the WTO case EC – Generalised System of 
Preferences wherein the WTO Appellate Body held that different treatment can be 
accorded to different situations in international trade without impinging the non-
discrimination clause of the GATT Agreement [WTO, EC – Generalised System of 
Preferences, 2002: para. 172].  
413 The article lists as one of the steps necessary to the realisation of the right to health 
“[t]he provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child” [ICESCR art. 12(2)(a)]. 
414 For instance, in Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia the African Commission remarked 
that mental health patients should be accorded special treatment to enable them to attain 
and sustain their optimum level of independence and performance [AC, The Gambia, 
2003: para. 81]. This would be consistent with the ACHPR art 18(4). The Commission 
also refers to the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and 
Improvement of Mental Health Care [id.]. 
415 Furthermore, those groups are entitled to priority provision of international medical 




Those remarks are appealing in principle. For example women need special 
attention for their sexual and reproductive health (see also Chapter 2 section 2.2.2) and 
are often the carers of those who are sick [Oxfam, website, Access to Medicines]. It is 
not clear however what these indications really entail. Furthermore, typically, the 
creation of categories excludes those who do not fit into those categories. We shall see in 
section 5.4 that the prioritisation of health-care resources poses momentous dilemmas for 
example as the principles of equity, medical need and aggregate welfare clash between 
each other. Indeed, Luhmann calls for a critical approach with regard to the 
operationalisation of the right to equality. He notes that this right is exercised with 
respect to each subsystem in isolation, therefore it is inherently paradoxical, as it does not 
consider the person as a whole or the context [Luhmann 2004: 135]. As Luhmann stated, 
“[e]quality means: that no other principles of inclusion are accepted from those that the 
function systems [ie subsystems] themselves determine” [Luhmann 1997(b): 1075 in 
Moeller 2008: 137]. The efforts of the legal subsystem to operationalise substantive non-
discrimination, in effect, are also subject to this paradox.  
For example I found that the great geographical disparities in access to medicines 
throughout African states are not necessarily addressed through the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination.416 Are such disparities not discrimination?417 Generally, 
rural areas tend to be less served by effective state health care facilities, which instead 
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. In terms of geographical availability of medicines, 
people living in rural areas often need to utilise private pharmacies or shops [WHO, 
World Medicines Situation 2004, 2004: 47].418 This situation influences the affordability 
of medicines, considering that the private sector tends to be more expensive [id.] and that 
75% of African poor live in rural areas [IFAD 2001: 1].419 Furthermore there can be 
disparities among regions. Indeed, territorial differences in health services can be due to 
overt, intentional discrimination, in so far as the reason for disparities in public 
interventions relating to medicines is motivated by the favour of the policy makers for 
the kith and kin or out of clientelar relations that often affect the African public sphere.420 
                                            
416 See, e.g., with regard to antiretrovirals in Uganda, Whyte et al [2004].  
417 See also Daniels on morally relevant discrimination [Daniels 1982].  
418  See Chapter 2 sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
419 Also recall that few African countries adopt reimbursement schemes on the purchase 
of pharmaceuticals. See Chapter 2 section 2.3.3. 
420 For an account of African political economy, and in particular about the phenomenon 




Those bonds can also lead to unintentional discrimination. According to Yamin’s reading 
of the CESCR, “geographic areas may closely overlap with religious, racial or ethnic 
identities and discrimination need not be intentional under international law, but merely 
needs to have the effect of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of rights” [Yamin 2003: 
125]. However, discrimination based on identities does not explain all territorial 
differences in health-care provision. Individuals can always travel but it is undeniable 
that disparities in health services exist according to the location – and certainly this 
occurs worldwide.  
To note, policies attempting to obviate those problems sometimes incur in what 
Luhmann called ‘self-defeating prophecies’, one of the practical limits of political 
steering [Luhmann 1997: 44]. The Tanzanian Accredited Drug-Dispensing Outlets 
(ADDOs) programme was meant to increase access to quality medicines in remote areas 
where access to medicines is poorer.421  However, it could be seen as de facto and 
substantively discriminatory, privileging the areas where it is implemented. Started in 
2003, the programme was supposed to be extended to the whole country by 2011, but 
just five regions have been covered until now (June 2010). As I had the chance to see, the 
pilot is managed as a quasi-parallel system for access to medicines in the private sector in 
the regions where it is implemented rather than as a provisory arrangement.422 Notably, 
however, the selection of the pilot regions had not been precisely based on health needs. 
Among other factors influencing the decision about where the ADDOs would be set up, 
there were the demands of foreign aid agencies to establish the project in the regions 
where they were already active.423 Arguably, nevertheless, there is a trade-off between 
the quality and reach of policies. Furthermore it can be considered that the resources used 
on ADDOs are to great extent additional – rather than fungible – to the Tanzanian 
resources, as they are obtained from extra-governmental actors for this project.424 
 
 
                                            
421 See Chapter 2 section 2.4 and Chapter 5 section 5.2.2. 
422 For example, the Clinton Foundation and the US President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) 
for runs pilot programmes subsidising Coartem in the ADDOs located in selected areas 
[Clinton Foundation 2008; interviews, Dar es Salaam, July-August 2009]. See Chapter 2 
section 2.4. 
423 Interviews with TFDA [Dar es Salaam, July-August 2010]. 






The CESCR and the African Commission name some activities that states shall 
undertake in order to protect the human right to health in relation to access to medicines 
[CESCR 2000: 35; AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 2(2)]. Section 4.3.1 investigates the role of 
states in ensuring respect by third parties while section 4.3.2 analyse the regulation of 
third parties’ behaviour to secure the promotion of access to medicines.  
 
5.3.1 Ensure respect by other actors 
States shall act against active, violent impairment of access to medicines or 
discrimination.425 Also considering the difficulties in the identification of substantive and 
or de facto non-discrimination seen in section 5.2.2, it is not straightforward to establish 
if private initiatives, extraordinary programmes, public-private partnerships for the 
provision of access to medicines perform prohibited discrimination, for instance by 
charging certain categories higher prices for health insurance, selecting the territory 
where they operate, providing good care for a limited catchment area (as in the case of 
ADDOs seen above), or focussing on a single disease, neglecting other health needs. For 
example, states may prohibit private health insurance schemes which charge with higher 
prices unappetising categories such as the elderly, the chronically ill or the disabled 
[CESCR 2000: para. 35]. In this case, the discrimination operated by the insurer is not 
intentioned to harm any group – it is instead intentioned to maximise the profit through 
market skimming – therefore it arguably represents de facto discrimination.426 It has to 
be noted moreover that in effect this state intervention has drawbacks in terms of access 
                                            
425 See Ssenyonjo on the obligation of states to protect against violation of economic, 
social and cultural rights committed by non-state actors. For instance, reading the 
IACtHR case Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Ssenyonjo notes that the “responsibility 
of the state is engaged when there is failure to prevent violations by NSAs where the 
possibility of such violation is reasonably foreseeable” [Ssenyonjo 2008: 731]. See 
Chapters 4 and 6 for the direct responsibility of non-state actors. 
426 On the problems of operationalising the prohibition of de facto discrimination see 
section 5.2.2 above with regard to home states’ duties and Chapter 6 section 6.2.2 with 




to medicines overall, as it increases the costs for insurance companies and consequently 
the prices of insurance.427  
Furthermore, states may protect the human right to medicines by controlling the 
quality of the medicines marketed in their jurisdiction. Quality control entails different 
activities such as control of manufacturing practices, registration of safe products and 
control of the products circulating in the market against counterfeits. The trade of 
counterfeit medicines, for example, is rife in Africa and demands rigorous, expensive 
policing efforts.428 The registration of new medicines (ie the approval of a new medicine 
in the market on the basis of safety, quality and efficacy) is particularly problematic. 
Medicines regulation implies gate-keeping of health risk and therefore entails 
conspicuous biopower. States however have to take regulatory decisions under 
uncertainty or even ‘ignorance’, as the safety and efficacy of certain products may not be 
conclusively established in science and medicines [Paterson 2010].429 In effect, it is not 
possible to determine a priori, for example with clinical trials, all the consequences of a 
medicine’s intake. Reportedly, worldwide the regulatory requirements are becoming 
                                            
427 States could instead opt to insure by themselves the neglected categories. 
428 According to WHO, “[m]any countries in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America 
have areas where more than 30% of the medicines on sale can be counterfeit” [WHO, 
Counterfeit Drugs Kill, 2008: 3]. Furthermore, a WHO survey of the quality of 
antimalarials in seven African countries revealed that between 20% and 90% of the 
products failed quality testing (ie, they were ‘substandard’) [WHO, World Health 
Organization Steps Up Action Against Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines, 2003]. 
See also Bate et al [2008]. Substandard Metakelfin, an antimalarial has been discovered 
in Tanzania by TFDA in 2009. The product was totally ineffective against malaria and 
has been withdrawn from the market [TFDA, Taarifa Kwa Kuhusu Kuwepo Kwa Dawa 
Bandia Za Vidonge Za Metakelfin Katika Soko La Dawa Hapa Nchini, 2009]. 
Substandard medicines are dangerous for the individual who takes them as they can be 
diluted with poisonous materials or anyway be ineffective against the condition she 
suffers. They are also dangerous in terms of public health, as they can contain a reduced 
dosage of active ingredient which would stimulate the resistance of the antigen treated. 
429 Paterson in particular analyses the possibility of judicial review of the state policies 
and regulations which implement the precautionary principle. Utilising the framework of 
systems theory Paterson concludes that judicial review in this field is warranted, if judges 
reflexively comprehend the problem of environmental ignorance – that is, the 
impossibility to assign probabilities to different choices [Paterson 2010]. On the 
importance of ignorance as a strategic resource within regulatory and bureaucratic 
organizations see Luhmann [1998] and McGoey providing an empirical application of 




more demanding.430 However, such trend has been subject to critique as delays in the 
registration of pharmaceuticals mean retarded availability of the products431 and costs for 
the pharmaceutical firms. 432  Some have indeed argued that in poorer countries the 
balance should be all the more tilted in favour of new medicines, because of the greater 
burden of disease and the lower level of medical resources available [Jack 2007].433 In 
effect, the registration of continuously new medicines poses a particular challenge to 
African regulatory authorities which often lack scientific and technical means for 
assessing the most advanced formulations. 434  Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has 
specifically reported on the slowness of such procedures for access to antiretrovirals in 
                                            
430 OECD reckons that over the period from 1960s to 1990s the number of clinical trials 
per drug application raised from 30 to 60, and the number of patients in trials doubled 
[OECD 2001: 39]. 
431 A literature has developed arguing that the approach of regulatory agencies such as 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is too skewed against risk – and therefore 
potential benefit. Referring to the FDA, The Economist proposes that “[f]aster approval 
of new drugs in humans should be matched by more rigorous post-launch testing and 
surveillance… The starting point is that the FDA and its counterparts across the world 
need to move from a risk-obsessed, ‘one size fits all’ approach to a more flexible system 
that considers the risks and benefits of new therapies. Rather than asking drugs to 
undergo many years of costly trials in the vain pursuit of medicines that are safe for all in 
all circumstances, regulators should allow speedier conditional approvals” especially 
considering targeted therapies based on genomics [The Economist, From Bench to 
Bedside, 2007]. See also Sauer and Sauer [2005]. See also Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.1. 
432 Abraham reports that a manufacturer can lose on average over US$1 million for each 
day’s delay in gaining marketing approval from the FDA [Abraham 2002: 1498]. 
433 Jack reports that “[o]ne problem for such developers is that the regulators’ assessment 
of the relative balance of risks and benefits of a new medicine or vaccine in the 
developed world is not the same as for their counterparts in poorer countries, because of 
the greater burden of disease and the lower level of medical resources available. For 
example, when Wyeth’s RotaShield vaccine for rotavirus – a gastric infection that causes 
thousands of hospitalisations each year but very few deaths in the US – was linked to an 
extremely rare but serious side-effect in 1999, the company withdrew it from the market. 
But in the developing world, where rotavirus causes up to 500,000 deaths a year and 
access to hospital care is less easy, the benefits have since been judged to outweigh the 
risks. That is one reason why GlaxoSmithKline sought regulatory approval first for its 
rival Rotarix vaccine in Mexico, in 2004” [Jack, Two Faces to Speedy Medicine 
Approval, 2007]. 
434 In Tanzania, for the registration of new products TFDA first checks the ‘negative 
literature’, ie if the components of a product are known to be dangerous. Consequently 
TFDA studies the dossiers provided by the pharmaceutical company which reports on the 
trial conducted. Admittedly, this information is biased, even though the clinical trials are 
checked by government authorities. TFDA consequently commits to monitor the product 
once launched in the market through ‘pharmacovigilance’ [Interviews at TFDA July-




these countries.435 It has to be noted however that delays in the registration can occur due 
to acts external to state action. Namely, pharmaceutical corporations may decide not to 
register new products in a country.436 In sum, in order to protect the human right to 
medicines, the home states are expected to take binding decisions, but such exercise of 
power and biopower imposes problematic moral choices and can be practically 
challenging. The human right to medicines does not give precise prescriptions about the 
response of states to such contingencies. 
 
5.3.2 Regulate promotion of access to medicines by third parties  
The CESCR and the African Commission pinpoint some activities that states 
shall undertake to regulate third parties’ behaviour to secure the promotion of access to 
medicines. Regulation on these matters is problematic in terms of power and biopower. 
For example, states can control the prices of medicines [AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 
2(2)(iii)] and intervene on the territorial distribution of pharmaceutical outlets. Price 
controls can be implemented in the context of public purchasing and/or can be levied at 
the pharmacy retail level [Grace 2003]. Price controls at the producer level present a 
series of problems.437 To begin with, the ‘fair’ price has to be determined, and this is 
contentious. Pharmaceutical products are not exchanged in classically competitive 
markets, and may deliver exceptional profits. It can therefore be suggested that those 
                                            
435 See Chapter 6 sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.3 on the international action for the regulation 
and registration of medicines. 
436 Pharmaceutical companies for example can decide not to register new products in a 
country giving the lack of interest for a country’s market, or can utilise this strategy in 
retaliation against a government’s hostile policy (e.g. price controls or lack of protection 
of intellectual property). See Chapter 6 section 6.2.1.2. Lack of registration is unfortunate 
especially if generic equivalents are not available in the country. If the products are 
deemed to be safe, however, governments can issue special authorisations for 
importation. For instance, MSF had to request special authorisation for Merck’s 
efavirenz, GSK’s abacavir, Abbott’s lopinavir/ritonavir, Cipla’s 
lamivudine/stavudine/nevirapine and Gilead’s renofovir in Cambodia, Uganda, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Laos, Ethiopia and other countries [MSF, Untangling the Web of 
Price Reduction, 2005: 7]. The effect to access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa of 
delayed registration of antiretroviral generics in the US is presented in Chapter 6 section 
6.2.1.1. 
437 See generally Tetteh reporting that African countries do not generally undertake price 




profits should be capped.438 However, the pharmaceutical sector is also particularly risky 
and capital-intensive [Burns 2005] so the high returns on a product provide an incentive 
to research and develop new products [Grace 2003]. Different criteria can be adopted for 
the identification of the ‘fair’ price, although they all present problematic aspects.439 
Moreover, the price would have to be accepted by the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
holds a special bargaining position not only if the product in question is patented, but 
also if competition in the product’s therapeutic class is poor.440 Indeed, there is no perfect 
generic competition in the pharmaceutical sector, and the pharmaceutical market is 
generally consolidated [Buse and Walt 2002:51; Chaudhuri 2005: 13; The Economist, 
Prescription for Change, 2005; Klimek & Peters 1995: 74; Levy 1999:196; OECD 2001: 
33].441 As a result, pharmaceutical corporations often have market power to retaliate to 
unfavourable state policies, for instance, by divesting, withdrawing from or not entering 
a market.442  
                                            
438 As Evans and Padilla note, the competitive price is not the marginal cost in markets 
where competition is dynamic, significant economies of scale and/or scope, high fixed 
costs and low incremental costs [Evans and Padilla 2005]. See Chapter 2 section 2.3.2.  
439 Rietveld and Haaijer-Ruskamp identify the following options – and their relative 
drawbacks. ‘Cost plus calculations’ would be desirable considering that it is precisely the 
uncompetitive excessive price (as opposed to the price in competitive markets which 
theoretically corresponds to the marginal cost) that price controls ought to regulate. Yet it 
presents problems of: information on the real costs incurred by the manufacturer; 
allocating overhead and research costs to the single product; and attributing costs 
between parent firm and subsidiaries. Generally the methodology curtails incentives to 
efficiency. ‘Profit ceilings’ seek to control the profitability of a company as a whole 
rather than margins of individual products. It is again prone to difficulties with respect of 
the accounting of multinationals. This method is used for instance in the UK, through the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, where there are domestically based producers. 
By ‘comparative pricing schemes’ (or external reference pricing), prices are set referring 
to the prices in other countries. African countries should have to consider applying a 
reduction given their financial situation. ‘Price negotiation models’ work better for 
generics and when the purchaser bargaining power is considerable. ‘Pharmaco-economic 
evaluations’ are interesting in identifying the clinical effectiveness of a medicine as 
compared to other treatments and thence establishing the willingness to pay for it. 
Problems rest in the uncertainty of the science underpinning such estimates and in the 
propensity to vested pressures from the pharmaceutical sector onto the politicians 
[Rietveld and Haaijer-Ruskamp 2002: 31-35]. See also OECD [2001]. 
440 Viz. the so-called ‘rule-of-fives’: lowest prices are achieved in the market when at 
least five therapeutic alternatives are available from five competing producers [WHO and 
WTO Secretariats 2001: 16]. 
441 See also Chapter 2 section 2.3.2. 
442 Lanjouw reports that in lower-income countries extensive price controls lowers the 
probability that new pharmaceutical products reach consumers quickly. Moderate price 




Prices may also be controlled at the distribution level, that is, at wholesaler and 
pharmacy retailing level, which can add conspicuous mark-ups [Madden et al 2003; 
Levison and Laing 2003].443 Special caution shall be taken in fixing prices not to erode 
the economic viability of retailers which incur high operating costs and low sale volumes 
especially in marginal areas [OECD 2001: 50]. Regulation can guarantee revenues 
planning the number of pharmacies which a certain population should attend and setting 
minimum distances between shops [id.]. However, such approach does not make more 
appetising the African poorest and sparsely populated regions.444 In sum, price controls 
can be another self-defeating policy tool: by eroding profits, they may also erode the 
incentive to provide medicines in the least appealing African markets. 445  In effect, 
African countries do not generally undertake price controls [Tetteh 2008]. 
States can protect the enjoyment of the human right to medicines through the 
regulation of intellectual property and competition law [AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 
2(2)(v)]. Some problems regarding the operationalisation of intellectual property law 
have been analysed in section 5.2.1 above. The scope of competition law is broad, 
spanning the regulation of horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, abuse of 
dominance, intellectual property and mergers [Whish 2005]. Competition law is usually 
framed on the promotion of consumer welfare and economic efficiency. 446  This 
regulatory tool could however be informed and utilised for the human right to medicines. 
Competition policy instruments, for example, can proscribe excessive pricing (an abuse 
of market power). Yet, this concept is problematic to operationalise and enforce. An 
                                                                                                                                 
given these countries’ less efficient regulatory procedures which slow price negotiations 
[Lanjouw 2005]. See also Chapter 2 section 2.3.2. 
443 Reportedly hidden costs, which include entry procedures, taxes, and allowable mark-
ups increase the price of medicines by 70% on average in selected countries [Levison and 
Laing 2003].  
444 It has been noted that delivery costs are much higher in sub-Saharan Africa because of 
the low population density [Foster 1987]. OECD suggests using tendering for scattered 
areas while having price controls and free market where competition is possible [OECD 
2001: 50]. However, this strategy if applied in sub-Saharan Africa would exacerbate the 
problems of affordability in rural areas. An alternative to product-oriented retail price 
setting are patient-oriented systems (based on capitation systems or fixed fees per 
prescriptions), applicable where medicines are covered by health insurance [id.], which is 
not common in sub-Saharan Africa. See Chapter 2 section 2.2.3. 
445 Reportedly Africa accounts for 1.2% of global pharmacy market (and the figure is 
even smaller for sales of patented medicines) [Friedman et al 2003: 341-343]. 
446 See also the Tanzanian Fair Competition Act and the South Africa, Competition Act 
[Tanzania, Fair Competition Act 2003: art. 3; South Africa, Competition Act, as 




important case which has been presented at the Competition Commission in South Africa, 
TAC v. GSK, BI and others, shows such complexities. The case mainly regarded an 
allegation of excessive prices of some on-patent antiretrovirals. 447  Interestingly, the 
complaint explicitly referred to human rights and to the human right to health care. In a 
nutshell, the complainants proposed an algorithm for determining the reasonableness of 
the relation between a price charged for a good and the economic value of that good. The 
complainants suggested that attention shall be paid to the price of the good in a 
competitive market, including some allowances for research and development costs and 
profit, to the particular detriment to the consumers, and to the “the adverse impact of the 
high prices on constitutionally protected and internationally recognised rights”, namely, 
the rights to life, dignity and access to health care services [Tau et al 2002: para. 60]. The 
Commission consequently found that the respondents violated prohibitions against 
excessive pricing.448 The episode has been concluded with a settlement agreement for the 
licensing of the patented products in question [South Africa Competition Commission 
2003]. It has to be noted, though, that TAC’s reasoning if applied generally may 
annihilate the incentive of research-based pharmaceutical companies which arguably 
endure on the super-profits made from few blockbuster medicines.449 We have seen few 
paragraphs above that the identification of a ‘fair’ price is in fact problematic. 
 
 
                                            
447 The South African Competition Act prohibits a firm in a dominant position to charge 
excessive prices to the detriment of the consumer [South Africa, Competition Act, as 
amended in 2001, sec. 8(a)]. 
448 The Commission also found that the respondent refused access to essential facilities 
and exclusionary acts that have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains [South Africa Competition Commission 
2003(b)]. 
449 See Napp’s appeal to the UK Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, arguing that 
pricing should be assessed with portfolio-based approach where prices and profitability 
for a range of different products are jointly assessed. The Appeal Tribunal did not yield 
such appeal [United Kingdom Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, 
Pharmaceutical Holdings v Director-General of Fair Trading, 2002: paras. 357, 361; 
Evans and Padilla 2005: 107]. See generally, on the problems of finding a fair price, 






Section 5.4 examines the obligation of African states to fulfil a human right to 
medicines. According to the CESCR and the African Commission states shall ‘promote’, 
‘facilitate’ and ‘provide’ access to medicines [CESCR 2000: para. 33; AC Res. 141 
(2008): para. 2(3)]. Certain actions for the promotion and facilitation of access to 
medicines have been reviewed in the sections above, for example regarding the 
regulation of intellectual property, the promotion of research and development, the 
regulation of the quality of medicines, the provision of medical insurance by the private 
sector and the regulation of competition in the pharmaceutical sector.450 This section 
focuses on the ‘provision’ by states of access to medicines. In particular, access to 
‘essential’ medicines is deemed by the CESCR, the African Commission and the Special 
Rapporteur to be a fundamental obligation of result that states shall satisfy immediately 
[CESCR 1990(b): para. 10; CESCR 2000: 43, 47; AC Res. 141 (2008): 2(3)(a); Hunt 
2006: para. 38]. Apparently, no resources shall be spared, as this injunction is not 
conditional on the available resources. Therefore, this obligation could be applied 
directly to the situation of access to medicines in sub-Saharan African countries where 
access to medicines is shortcoming. However, it has to be considered that the budget of 
African countries is limited. 451  This raises the question: to what extent shall more 
resources be collected and distributed for ‘essential’ medicines? To what extent shall 
other rights, interests, needs and liberties be overridden? Within the CESCR framework 
itself, for example, there are other core needs “of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education” [CESCR 1990(b): para. 10]. Whereas those questions are pertinent, in the 
following sections I confine the enquiry to what is meant for provision of ‘essential 
medicines’ – thereby also asking whether access to medicines has the ‘legitimacy’ to be 
an overriding (‘indispensable’) minimum core obligation. Section 5.4.1 illustrates the 
problem of identifying ‘essential’ medicines and, more generally, priorities among 
health-care interventions. This section mainly refers to the ICESCR and the ACHPR 
regimes. Section 5.4.2 elaborates on the doubts raised within the human rights 
framework presenting the ethical problems of setting priorities in health interventions. 
The contributions from other disciplines such as the philosophy of distributive justice and 
                                            
450 See above sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.  




medical ethics are analysed. Section 5.4.3 finally deals with the enforcement of the 
fulfilment of the human right to medicines.  
 
5.4.1 The identification of ‘essential’ medicines and health interventions prioritising 
according to the ICESCR and ACHPR regimes 
Access to ‘essential’ medicines is deemed by the CESCR, the African 
Commission and the Special Rapporteur on the right to health to be a fundamental 
obligation of result that states shall satisfy immediately [CESCR 1990(b): para. 10; 
CESCR 2000: 43, 47; AC Res. 141 (2008): 2(3)(a); Hunt 2006: para. 38].452 According 
to the Special Rapporteur, nonetheless, the right to health encompasses ‘non-essential’ 
medicines as well [Hunt 2006: para. 38]. In effect, ‘essential’ medicines are typically a 
selection of prioritised medicines. The CESCR does not directly identify what essential 
medicines are, but it refers to the medicines “from time to time defined under the WHO 
Action Programme on Essential Drugs”, a document which corresponds to the WHO 
Model List of Essential Drugs [CESCR 2000: para. 43(d) and note 5]. The African 
Commission identifies essential medicines referring to the country’s essential medicines 
list and the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs AC Res. 141 (2008): 2(3)(a)]. 
In effect, the sources referred to by the CESCR and the African Commission are open-
ended. As the WHO itself maintains, the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines is 
purely indicative and does not relate to the health problems of individual countries 
[WHO, The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines, 2003: 55]. WHO’s list is indeed 
meant to guide the development of national and institutional essential medicine lists 
                                            
452 The Special Rapporteur makes clear that “the right to health encompasses access to 
non-essential and essential medicines. While a State is required to progressively realise 
access to non-essential medicines, it has a core obligation of immediate effect to make 
essential medicines available and accessible throughout its jurisdiction” [Hunt 2006: 




(EMLs). 453  Fundamentally, WHO recommends states to identify essential medicines 
as:454 
[…] those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population. They are 
selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on efficacy and 
safety, and comparative cost effectiveness... exactly which medicines are 
regarded as essential remains a national responsibility. [WHO, The Selection and 
Use of Essential Medicines, 2003: 54] 
Once identified at the national level, essential medicines are to be set in a national 
essential medicines list [WHO, How to Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy, 
2001: 7]. Most African states do compile EMLs.455 The lists generally contain between 
200 and 400 medicines and can serve as a guide for medicine supply in the public sector, 
medicine benefits within reimbursement schemes, medicine donations, local production 
and be linked to national clinical guidelines used for training and supervision [WHO and 
HAI 2008: 28, 34]. The aim of the lists is to concentrate resources and rationalise the use 
of medicines in a country, ie a use of ‘fewer drugs more effectively’ [id.: 28]. Moreover, 
generally the governments decide centrally which essential medicines are to be made 
available at the different levels of care (primary, secondary, tertiary level). 
The very selection of essential medicines, therefore, exerts power and biopower, 
as it has considerable impact on access to medicines. Essential medicines are not simply 
the most cost-effective within their therapeutic class; they also represent a selection of 
                                            
453 The UN Special Rapporteur sees WHO’s List as a default mechanism, maintaining 
that “[i]f a State declines to prepare its own national essential medicines list, the WHO 
model list will apply, subject to any obvious contextual revisions” [Hunt  2006: para. 57]. 
Hunt refers to the CESCR comment for backing this statement [Id.: footnote 42; CESCR 
2000: paras. 12(1) and 43(4)]. 
454 The comment refers to the Action Programme on Essential Drugs in the WHO Model 
List of Essential Drugs, revised December 1999, allegedly published in WHO Drug 
Information Vol. 13, No. 4, 1999 [CESCR 2000: endnote 5]. In WHO Drug Information 
I could not find the “Action Programme”, nor a definition of essential medicines/drugs (a 
document named “WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs Collaboration between 
NGOs, Ministries of Health and WHO in Drug Distribution and Supply, 1999”, does not 
mention essential drug lists). I consequently refer here to the 2003 Technical Report 
Series 920, “The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines” [WHO, The Selection and 
Use of Essential Medicines, 2003]. Leach and colleagues as well, for the Millennium 
Task Force, utilise the definition proposed in “The Selection and Use of Essential 
Medicines” (they actually refer the definition to the “2004 World Medicines Strategy”, 
but I could not find the definition in that document) [Leach et al 2005: 151]. 
455 Nearly all developing countries – 95% – have a published EML, 86% updated in the 
past five years [UN, Delivering on the Global Partnerships for Achieving the Millennium 




the health problems to be tackled. For instance, WHO has for long excluded treatment for 
HIV/AIDS from the lists, as vocally lamented by civil society groups [Laing 2004: 
1725].456 Antiretrovirals to treat HIV are not present in the EMLs of some of the African 
countries hardest hit by the AIDS pandemic, such as South Africa [South African 
Standard Treatment Guidelines and Essential Drugs List for Primary Health Care 
2003].457 Love also notes that on-patent medicines tend not to be included in the WHO 
EDL.458 Love submits that this is a distortion as many patented medicines currently not 
on the EDL would be included, were they available at generic prices. For instance the 
most recent list includes no patented anti-cancer drugs, and the core list includes no anti-
cancer drugs at all [Love 2006]. Therefore, Love asks the WHO to include in the EDL 
the somewhat paradoxical category of medicines “essential ‘if available at generic 
prices’” [id]. In sum, ‘essential’ medicines are not to be confused with ‘vital’ medicines. 
The question is how to identify what WHO’s definition indicated as the ‘priority health 
needs of the populations’. For example, do those needs correspond to the most common 
conditions? To the most severe? To what a population itself identifies as priority? To the 
needs of the vulnerable and the marginalised?  
The framework of the human right to health in effect does not give a precise 
answer about priorities in health care. To begin with, with regard to the object of the 
intervention, it sometimes refers to public health, prevention and primary health care, 
while other times it refers to a medical approach, curative, also supporting secondary and 
tertiary care.459 Tomasevski for example remarks that “in defining the obligations of 
States that correspond to the human right to health, priority is accorded [by international 
human rights law such as that originating from the ICESCR] to public health measures” 
[Tomasevski 1995: 125, emph. orig.]. Public health is a discipline that has been defined 
as the “collective action for sustained population-wide health improvement” [Beaglehole 
                                            
456 Some antiretrovirals, however, have been introduced in the most recent versions of 
the WHO EML, relaxing the requirements of cost-effectiveness [Laing 2004: 1725]. 
457 South Africa’s government, notwithstanding the absence of antiretrovirals from its 
essential medicines list, has started to provide testing and treatment free in public 
hospitals – yet the take-ups remain low [Chopra et al 2006: Hadley 2008]. 
458 Love recalls that only 14 (12 on the core list and two on the complimentary list) of the 
total 312 medicines on the [2005] EDL are under a US patent [Love 2006]. Reportedly, 
less than 5% of medicines of the WHO’s essential drugs list are subject to patent 
protection [Ghafele 2008: 16]. See supra section 5.2.1. 
459 Roughly, primary care is the first point of consultation, secondary care is specialist 




and Bonita 2004: 174].460 The very concept of the human right to health has been traced 
in the early public health measures [Toebes 1999: 8-14; Hestermeyer 1994: 111]. Three 
out of four steps sanctioned by the ICESCR can in effect be seen under the perspective of 
public health, namely, the concern for child and maternal health, for environmental and 
industrial hygiene, and for epidemic, pandemic, occupational and other diseases 
[ICESCR art.12(2)(a), (b) and (c)]. Furthermore, within medical interventions, the 
CESCR states that essential primary health care is a minimum core obligation that shall 
be realised immediately [CESCR 2000: para. 19, 43, note omitted]. Primary health care 
is often identified as a typical ‘public health’ policy [World Bank, Public Health and 
World Bank Operations, 2002: 5]. Primary health care however is a particular modality 
of health assistance to be implemented in the context of health systems. 461  Its 
                                            
460  This definition is normative, as the authors advocate the reduction of health 
inequalities, the importance of sustainability, and the fit of policies in the supportive 
systems [Beaglehole and Bonita 2004: 174]. The American Public Health Association 
has synthesized the many definitions and perspectives on public health and identified six 
basic principles of contemporary public health theory and practice (APHA): a) emphasis 
on collective responsibility for health and the prime role of the state in protecting and 
promoting the public’s health; b) focus on whole populations; c) emphasis on prevention, 
especially the population strategy for primary prevention; d) concern for the underlying 
socioeconomic determinants of health and disease, as well as the more proximal risk 
factors; e) multi-disciplinary basis which incorporates quantitative and qualitative 
methods as appropriate; and f) partnership with the populations served [World Bank, 
Public Health and World Bank Operations, 2002: 5]. 
461 Again, primary health care is not a clear concept, as also recognised by the CESCR 
[CESCR 2000: endnote 9]. Primary health care was originally meant to provide a route 
for the achievement of affordable universal coverage. However, it is arguably a health 
programme, to be implemented within health systems. As WHO contends in its World 
Health Report 2000, the implementation of primary health care has been problematic, 
also because its meaning is in fact ambiguous. The Alma-Ata declaration defines it as 
“essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable 
methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the 
community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and country 
can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance 
and self-determination. It forms an integral part both of the country’s health system, of 
which it is the central function and main focus, and of the overall social and economic 
development of the community. It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family 
and community with the national health system bringing health care as close as possible 
to where people live and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health 
care process” [Alma-Ata Declaration, para. VI]. In effect, the term ‘primary’ “quickly 
acquired a variety of connotations, some of them technical (referring to the first contact 
with the health system, or the first level of care, or simple treatments that could be 
delivered by relatively untrained providers, or interventions acting on primary causes of 
disease) and some political (depending on multisectoral action or community 
involvement)” [WHO, World Health Report 2000: 13]. The Southern African 




implementation, especially in developing countries, is not devoid of drawbacks [WHO, 
World Health Report 2000: 15]. Thus, the CESCR seems to hold a penchant for public 
health. Attention to curative approaches is nonetheless sanctioned by the ICESCR. 
Indeed the steps referred by the ICESCR for the members to follow include the “[t]he 
creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in 
the event of sickness” [ICESCR art 12(2)(d)]. The wording is hesitant, but the same 
article also binds members to take steps for the treatment of different kinds of diseases 
[id. art 12(2)(c)]. Even more decisively, the ACHPR asks members to take measure “to 
ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick” [ACHPR art. 16(2)].  
Indeed, besides the problem of the object of such right – public health or medical 
care measures – lays the problem of the subject of such right, namely, if it is the 
individual, the population or groups. Tomasevski for instance remarks that international 
human rights law envisages two sets of norms relating to health. On the one hand, the 
human right to health creates entitlements for individuals and corresponding obligations 
for governments. On the other hand, the protection of public health constitutes legitimate 
grounds for limiting human rights [Tomasevski 1995: 125]. Thus, with regard to the 
latter aspect of the norm, public health often demands to limit human rights such as the 
right to privacy, autonomy, or even the human right to health of the individual, in favour 
of the collective interest [Beaglehole and Bonita 2004: 264-266; D’Oronzio 2001].462 
With regard to the former aspect of the norm, conversely, the ICESCR and the ACHPR 
respectively refer to the highest or best attainable standard of health, which seems to 
imply a personalised approach to health needs referring to the biological preconditions of 
the individual [ICESCR art. 12 para 1; ACHPR art. 16].463 Toebes, indeed, argues that 
the human right to health is uncompromisingly private, therefore pertains to individuals 
or groups rather than the public. Thus it should not be a tool for states to take public 
health measures. 464  The CESCR, instead, does not identify a conflict between the 
                                                                                                                                 
health care based on appropriate, acceptable methods and technology, made universally 
accessible through community participation” [SADC Protocol on Health art. 1]. 
462  For instance, vaccinations may be imposed that could have side effects. O’Neill 
remarks that while (the new) medical ethics is centred on autonomy, it has “relatively 
little to say about public health, where interventions are often (and sometimes 
necessarily) compulsory” [O’Neill 2002: 36].  
463  See Chapter 3. 
464 Toebes also adds that perhaps [sic] the limitation clauses in civil and political rights 




individual and the collective dimension stating that both dimensions are recognised by 
the human right to health: 
[r]egardless of whether groups as such can seek remedies as distinct holders of 
rights, States parties are bound by both the collective and individual dimensions 
of article 12. Collective rights are critical in the field of health; modern public 
health policy relies heavily on prevention and promotion which are approaches 
directed primarily to groups. [CESCR 2000: para. 59 footnote 30]. 
Moreover, the CESCR identifies certain groups as deserving particular attention, 
and others as requiring less attention.465 In particular, with regard to vulnerable and 
marginalised groups the Committee maintains, inter alia, that the ‘vulnerable members 
of society’ must be protected ‘even in times of severe resources constraints’, by the 
adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes [CESCR 1990(b): para. 12]. The 
African Commission and the UN Special Rapporteur on the human right to health also 
recommend special attention to the vulnerable and marginalised, even though falling 
short of demanding affirmative action. 466  Furthermore, the CESCR states that 
“investments should not disproportionately favour expensive curative health services 
which are often accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of the population, rather 
than primary and preventive health care benefiting a far larger part of the population” 
[CESCR 2000: para. 19, note omitted].  
In conclusion, the ICESCR and the ACHPR regimes do not prescribe with 
precision the operationalisation of the fulfilment of the minimum core obligation to 
provide essential medicines. They do not establish clearly what ‘essential’ medicines are 
and do not set consistent instructions for the utilisation of resources for realising the 
human right to health. Such contingency should not be taken lightly. From a legal point 
of view it is paradoxical that human, subjective, rights may be concerned with and 
applied through collectivities (populations and groups).467 From a normative point of 
view, as it is discussed in the following section, the biopolitics of priority-setting in 
health care is a sensitive matter rife with moral predicaments. 
 
                                            
465 See also above section 5.2.2 on non-discrimination. 
466 See also above section 5.2.2 on non-discrimination. 





5.4.2 The prioritisation of health interventions: aggregate status of a population, 
individual need and equity  
This section examines the ethical problems of biopolitical choices concerning 
which health interventions are to be prioritised and provided. It points out the decisions 
that have to be taken when choosing between the types of measures that will be 
administered and the recipients that will be served.468 Indeed, three main principles/goals 
can be identified as informing choices of health interventions prioritisation: the health 
improvement of the aggregate status of a population, the response to individual needs, 
and the promotion of equity.469 A focus on the aggregate health status of a population 
entails that greatest attention should be dedicated to the health conditions which are most 
prevalent and most threatening for a population. The benefits to a population can be 
measured in terms of reduction of the national ‘burden of disease’, for instance measured 
through aggregate disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) or quality-adjusted life-years 
(QALYs). 470   Resources are then to be allocated on the basis of cost-effectiveness 
analysis, in order to discover the highest health impact per resource spent [Hammer and 
Berman 1995: 31].471 This is the principle that WHO and the World Bank recommend for 
African and developing countries to adopt in health interventions prioritisations [CMH 
2001; World Bank, World Development Report, 1993; WHO, The World Health Report, 
1993; WHO, Tough Choices, 2006]. African countries, such as Tanzania, assess and 
consider the burden of disease and use it in articulating their policies [Tanzania’s MOH, 
Burden of Disease, The Morogoro District, 2001]. The criterion is also adopted in order 
                                            
468 The section therefore focuses on the macro (e.g., national) level. Cost containment 
decisions are usually implemented in health care both at the macro (national) and at the 
micro (individual) level [Kapiriri and Norheim 2004: 172; Laurie and Mason 2006: 414, 
428]. 
469 This account draws liberally from Hammer and Berman, who identify three goals and 
principles of public health policy in developing countries: improving aggregate health 
status, relieving equity/poverty, and improving individual welfare [Hammer and Berman 
1995]. 
470 DALYs are defined as “a measure of the future stream of healthy life (years expected 
to be lived in full health) lost as a result of the incidence of specific diseases and 
injuries”, ie a sum of “both premature mortality (years of life lost because of premature 
mortality or YLL) and disability (years  of healthy life lost as a result of disability or 
YLD, weighted by the severity of the disability)” [World Bank, The Global Burden of 
Disease and Risk Factors 2006: 3]. QALYs, ie quality-adjusted life years, are the inverse 
form of DALYs [id.: 48]. See also Chapter 2 section 2.2.1.  




to address the benefits of health interventions on development and economic growth, that 
is, the economic subsystem.472   
Besides the technical difficulties of estimating DALYs or QALYs, such approach 
is prone to some criticism from an ethical point of view. For example, the emphasis on 
the aggregate health status of a population brought to the extremes suggests the 
concentration of public health interventions in densely populated regions, where 
economies of scale are probable and more ‘benefit’ is to be reaped given the greater 
number of individuals served at one time [Hammer and Berman 1995: 36]. Also, it may 
induce to exclude the elderly from health care, as their life expectancy is shorter and 
thence their life has lower value.473 The emphasis on disease reduction as the only goal of 
health services, finally, ignores concerns of equity [Lilani Kumaranayake and Damian 
Walker 2002: 153]. In effect, the choice of burden of disease as the representation of 
population health needs derives most of its appeal from a prudential – as opposed to 
moral – stance. Sheaff argues that under a prudent course of action the individual, who is 
uncertain of what types of ill health might befall him, assumes that the relative size of 
different care groups indicates the relative probability that he will need that kind of care 
in future [Sheaff 1996: 176]. From this, ‘population health needs’ would be construed. 
However, the needs of the care groups composed by those exposed to particular risks, or 
whose risks cannot affect the ‘living’ others (such as genetic diseases) have to be 
elaborated from an impartial or objective standpoint, ie through an ethical approach, lest 
being neglected [id.: 169]. Sheaff also notes that “the assumptions built into cost-benefit 
analysis in general, and QALY analysis in particular, are simply false in respect of non-
additive characteristics such as health and of entities such as populations” [id.: 170]. It is 
pointed out however that the elaboration of an ‘ethical approach’ is by no means 
straightforward. 
In alternative to the ‘aggregate status of the population’, decisions for the 
prioritisation of medical interventions at the population level may be informed on 
                                            
472 Thus, the cost-effectiveness of the provision of certain medicines with respect to other 
interventions may be based on the benefits for the economy or national wealth. Yamin 
reports that such were the concerns considered in the Costa Rican Alvarez case where the 
use of national resources was discussed [Yamin 2003: 136; Costa Rica Constitutional 
Court, Alvarez, 1997]. 




considerations relating to ‘individual need’ or ‘equity’ [Hammer and Berman 1995].474 
These principles are more attentive to the individual. However, they are difficult to 
operationalise and implement. Philosophical perspectives of distributive justice have 
explored these issues. To begin with, the ambit of distribution has to be identified. Health 
can be seen as instrumental to other moral concerns (welfare, needs) or as a separate 
moral good, that thereby should be accorded a distributive route on its own [Hurley 2007: 
318]. Dworkin argues that health care has to undergo resources prioritisation together 
with any other good [Dworkin 1993] while Daniels argues that health is special and 
cannot be factored into a resource-based theory of justice along with other resources 
[Daniels 1985]. For the sake of simplicity we confine to analyse the distribution of health 
resources – thereby overlooking the opportunity cost of the use of those resources for 
other aims in society.475 The object of distribution has yet to be identified. The focus on 
welfare encounters some paradoxes, as the generation of welfare is subjective. With 
regard to health welfare (or ‘well-being’), a disabled or a sick may be happy yet 
‘unhealthy’,476 while people with so-called ‘expansive tastes’ may be miserable unless 
they get sophisticated treats [Hurley 2007: 315]. Alternatively, the object to consider can 
be ‘medical need’, or individual need, which occurs “when an individual has an illness or 
disability for which there is an effective and acceptable treatment” [Laurie and Mason 
2006: 428].477  As opposed to well-being considerations, this criterion is purportedly 
objective. Medical ethics generally prescribes to follow medical needs, at the micro level 
[Laurie and Mason 2006: 428]. At the macro policy level, however, researchers and 
professionals are not agreed whether non-medical needs should also be heeded [Kapiriri 
and Norheim 2004: 173]. Brauman, from MSF, eloquently contrasts the paradigm of 
health-care prioritising based on medical needs of the individual as opposed to the 
paradigm of public health. Brauman criticises the public health model for being too 
‘rationalistic’ as it considers, in health decision-making, non-medical issues and long-
                                            
474  Hammer and Berman in fact refer to ‘individual welfare’ rather than ‘individual 
need’, but the latter terminology is preferred in light of the following discussion 
(‘individual need’ in fact encompasses both considerations of welfare and strict medical 
need) [Hammer and Berman 1995]. 
475 See also the introduction to section 5.4. 
476 This occurrence is often referred to in heath debates as ‘adaptability’. As Hurley 
presents it: “[p]eople who actually live with health conditions tend to regard them as less 
bad than do members of the public, of their own families, or of the health care 
professions. While at first a disability may reduce someone’s welfare dramatically, over 
time someone’s attitudes to his disability may adapt” [Hurley 2007: 311, note omitted]. 




term medical outcomes. Moreover, the public health model presupposes the questionable 
exactitude and validity of epidemiological predictions. 478  Instead, he supports the 
‘humanitarian’ model asserting as “primary obligation… to give direct medical treatment 
to people who require medical attention” [Brauman 2004].479 However, it is noted that 
the health needs of a population can be infinite, and require operationalisation and 
ranking [Laurie and Mason 2006: 428].480 DALYs and QALYs can also be utilised to 
estimate the benefits of a health intervention to individuals.  
Further questions arise on the algorithm to follow if an equitable distribution of 
the chosen object of distribution – welfare, well-being or ‘medical health’ – is sought.481 
Utilitarians would efficiently maximise the amount of the object (utility) to be 
redistributed in society. In distributing welfare/well-being, they would not waste 
resources with the expensive tastes types, in distributing health care they would not heed 
to ‘worried wells’ or the expensive chronically ill. Egalitarians would distribute the 
object evenly. In the maximin version, yet, they would sanction inequality if it benefits 
the worse-offs.482 Egalitarian theory can lead to paradoxical results as, if the welfare or 
the well-being are the objects to equalise, egalitarianism may require to satisfy the 
‘spoiled’. If health is the good do redistribute, egalitarian policies would dissolve 
resources in ‘bottomless pits’ and reduce society to poverty, if given the chance [Daniels 
1985: 44]. While utilitarians generally have scarce consideration for equity, the 
egalitarian theory – especially in the maximin version – is factually problematic to 
implement. Building on a criticism of the egalitarian maximin criterion, Daniels has 
conceived an influential theory based on the equality of opportunity [Daniels 1985: 
44].483 According to the philosopher, illness and disease are deviations from “the natural 
functional organization of a typical member of a species” [1985(a); 1985(b)]. As he sees 
                                            
478  In fact, collecting epidemiological data can be extremely impracticable in some 
circumstances. See Chapter 2.  
479 Brauman is a doctor at MSF. In this article, he refers, in particular, to humanitarian 
work in health care [Brauman 2004].  
480 See also Bosanquet [2001]. 
481 Again, there are different meanings that the term equity can take with regard to health 
and health care [Hammer and Berman 1995: 34]. 
482 The maximin principle derives from Rawls’ ‘Difference Principle’ of justice which 
requires that the basic social and economic institutions of society be arranged so as to 
maximize the expectations of the worst-off representative group. According to Rawls, 
“the justice of a society can be seen in how it treats its least fortunate members” [Brock 
2002]. 
483 For the influence of Daniels in the field see e.g. the essays collected in “Medicine and 




it, the moral importance of meeting health-care needs is the moral objective impact on 
opportunity rather than the more subjective impact on happiness [Daniels 2002: 8]. So, 
needs should be met before other benefits, even if this leads to less welfare overall 
[Daniels 1980; 1985; Hope et al 2002: 146].  
In fact, Daniels’ theory is not easily practicable. Notwithstanding the best efforts 
to differentiate from maximin’s shortcomings, his reasoning too would lead to a 
‘bottomless pit’ for resources. Daniels has responded to such objection conceding that 
“the particular rights and entitlements of individuals to have certain needs met are 
specified only as a result of a fair deliberative process aimed at meeting population health 
needs fairly” [Daniels 2008]. Eventually, Daniels’ theory is not conclusive; rather it 
refers to a public deliberative process. Besides, Daniels’ construct expounds what I 
believe to be the typical vulnerability of the egalitarian reasoning: what is the point of 
opportunity after all, if not happiness? Sen, probably, provides a better approach to the 
problem of the good in his critique of the monolithic utilitarian accounts of either 
resources or welfare concepts of well-being (happiness). Sen sees functionings and 
capabilities/freedoms as both valuable goods to pursue, at the individual and societal 
levels and as end in themselves [Sen 1999]. Furthermore, Daniels’ view may sanction 
eugenic considerations, identifying an ideal-type human being and possibly stigmatising 
those who are ‘different’, falling short of such description yet adapt to their conditions. It 
is also noted that Daniels’ argument fits with what Foucault identifies as ‘normalisation’, 
as opposed to ‘normation’ and therefore can be politically transposed to the pursuit of 
‘security’.484 Daniels’ approach, moreover, lets down those who have already had their 
opportunities (or, as said in health debates, their ‘innings’), such as the retired and the 
elderly or those whose normal state cannot be restored [Hurley 2007: 323, 326-7]. 
Those theoretical problems are well illustrated in a paper by Hope and colleagues 
specifically addressing the question whether a new health intervention (such as the 
provision of a new medicine) should be introduced. The authors propose to compare the 
                                            
484 While according to ‘normation’ “there is an originally prescriptive character of the 
norm and the determination and the identification of the normal and the abnormal 
becomes possible in relation to this posited norm” [Foucault 2007: 57], according to 
‘normalisation’ different immanent normalities are observed within the population as a 
whole and a norm is fixed on the basis of these normalities: “[t]he norm is an interplay of 
differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it” [id.: 
63]. See Chapter 1 section 1.4. See Newell calling for an inclusion in bioethics of the 
lived experiences of those who identify themselves as disabled, too often, instead 




cost of the QALY saved by the intervention with a ‘guide cost’, fixed nationally [Hope et 
al 2002]. If the cost is higher, they suggest assessing whether there are grounds for 
justifying paying more, and how much more.485 Interestingly, they identify six grounds 
for exception, with undertones of ethical and human rights questions. First, they wonder 
whether treatments for the young should have a different priority from treatment for the 
old, as it would result using DALYs.486 Rawls, for instance, argued in favour of such 
priority using the veil of ignorance [Rawls 1972]. Second, they ask whether the 
identifiable patients should be favoured over non-identifiable patients. According to the 
rule of rescue,487 the identifiable patients have precedence on the ‘statistical people’, that 
which is counter QALY reasoning and prevention policies. Third, the authors 
acknowledge that QALY calculations deliver lesser importance to palliative care than 
that attributed by otherwise shared sensitivity. Fourth, particular attention may be 
morally required also to those who are particularly badly-off with regard to their health 
or, fifth, those for whom no alternative treatment is available, while QALYs forsake such 
concerns. Sixth, ‘double jeopardy’ has to be dealt with whenever other conditions subsist 
which otherwise impair the quality of life or that make treatment more difficult. Hope et 
al conclude that since each theory for allocation of health resources (welfare, needs and 
lottery theories) faces difficulties, it is more important to concentrate on the procedure 
[Hope et al 2002: 144].488  
In sum, ethical reasoning points out the ethical problems encountered by the main 
principles of prioritisation and distribution of resources for health. No principle could be 
                                            
485 Admittedly, Hope and colleagues draw from Daniels, utilising the needs theory which 
“suggest[s] that needs should be met before other benefits even if this leads to less 
welfare overall” [Hope et al 2002: 146; 1980; 1985]. 
486 DALYs explicitly give different values for life at different ages – valuing young 
adulthood more than either old age or childhood. 
487 See McKie and Richardson [2003] for an interesting examination of the rule of rescue. 
488 So does also Daniels who has recently advocated to vet public agencies and private 
health plans making limit-setting decisions and hold them ‘accountable for 
reasonableness’, in order to solve the problems of legitimacy and fairness they face. 
Daniels also sets four conditions for procedure, namely: publicity, relevance, appeals and 
enforcement [Daniels 2002: 16; Daniels and Sabin 1997].  
In fact, for example, WHO’s model lists of essential drugs have been  long criticised by 
“incomplete and non-transparent reasoning”, feeding allegations of politicisation and 
concealment, as Richard Laing, a WHO Expert Committee on National Drug Policies, 
has recognised on the Lancet. The selection of the products was in effect done on a 
consensus basis. A more transparent procedure, revolving around considerations of 
public-health relevance, efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness, has been introduced in 





found to be conclusively ‘moral’ and ‘just’. Most principles, furthermore, were also 
impossible to realise considering the limited availability of resources. In light of those 
considerations, some comment can be made with regard to the positions of the ICESCR 
and ACHPR regimes relating to priority-setting for the fulfilment of access to medicines. 
As seen in above section 5.4.1, the ICESCR and ACHPR regimes have shown to be 
vague and open to contradictions, especially when equality and individual dignity are 
seen in contrast. The CESCR seems to interpret the ICESCR with an inclination to equity, 
as in the egalitarian ‘maximin’ position. Views such as that “investments should not 
disproportionately favour expensive curative health services which are often accessible 
only to a small, privileged fraction of the population, rather than primary and preventive 
health care benefiting a far larger part of the population” reveal the concern for equity 
and non-medical considerations in the prioritisation of health interventions [CESCR 2000: 
para 19, note omitted]. Furthermore, the focus on public health and primary health care 
suggests a preference for the aggregate status of a population. The penchant for public 
health and the population or group interests, however, spurs some questions about the 
value of the human right to health as a subjective right. It may be decided for example 
that the human right to health care and medicines does not apply for those who suffer 
from rare or expensive conditions or belong to the ‘small, privileged fraction of the 
population’ [CESCR 2000: para 19]. Little is said by the CESCR about the gravity of the 
condition or suffering endured.489 Remarkably, instances of the public health framework 
are at variance with the principles of medical, individual need. In sum, there is legal and 
moral uncertainty about the identification of entitlements to medicines. Furthermore, 
philosophical perspectives question why health should be prioritised separately from 
other moral goods. Thus not only the ‘essential’ medicines object of a minimum core 
obligation have not been defined conclusively; more generally, the operationalisation of 
priorities-setting required for the implementation of an ‘indisputable’ human right to 
medicines have revealed to be rife with problems of ‘ethics’ and ‘justice’. The next 
section will address, consequently the problems of enforcement of the fulfilment of the 
human right to medicines.  
                                            
489 It may be suggested that a better (in moral terms) interpretation could reprove health-
care interventions intended to favour a ‘privileged’ part of the population, but would not 
oppose interventions that as a consequence favour ‘privileged’ parts of the population. 
Thus, conditions which affect a higher proportion of the rich (such as cardiovascular 
diseases) shall not be discarded as such, and conditions which affect the marginalised, 






This section presents the enforcement of the human right to medicines through 
judicial remedies. Judicial remedies are not demanded by either the ICESCR or the 
ACHPR. However, the CESCR demands, among the obligations to fulfil the human right 
to health, that judicial or other appropriate remedies for addressing violations of the right 
should be provided [CESCR 2000: 33; 59]. Some court adjudication has been analysed in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 relating to the respect and protection of access to medicines. This 
section looks at the role of courts with regard to the obligation to fulfil/provide access to 
medicines. In particular, it is enquired whether and how the individual in sub-Saharan 
Africa can utilise the human right to medicines in domestic courts to obtain the 
medicines she needs. Inevitably, the contingencies emerged in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 
resurface in this section. Namely, uncertainties concern what is the object of the right – 
e.g. public health measures, primary health care, individual treatment – and who is the 
subject of the right – e.g., the population, groups or individuals. This section studies how 
the judiciary can address those contingencies.  
In effect, there is little jurisprudence in sub-Saharan Africa on the human right to 
medicines – as well as health care – as already seen in Chapter 3 section 3.3.5. The 
Ministry of Health v. TAC case at the South Africa’s Constitutional Court is probably the 
only domestic court case dealing with the provision of medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
[Hogerzeil 2006].490 The case concerned the provision of nevirapine to pregnant women 
so that they could prevent the transmission of AIDS to their foetus. Nevirapine was 
offered to the government by the manufacturing companies free of charge for five years, 
but the government announced it would introduce the medicine only in certain pilot 
sites.  The NGO Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) consequently launched a 
constitutional challenge, alleging a violation of the right to access health care.491 In this 
case, the Court asserted its competence (subject-matter jurisdiction) on the realisation of 
the human right to health, which is a constitutional right [South Africa, Constitutional 
Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002: paras. 5, 25; South African Constitution arts. 
                                            
490  See also Hogerzeil and colleagues [Hogerzeil et al 2006: 305]. International 
adjudication is explored in Chapter 6 section 6.4.3.2. 
491 For a background of the case see ESCR-Net, website, Minister of Health v Treatment 




27(1), 28(1)]. The Court refused to recognise individual entitlements, maintaining that 
the rights involved did not generally create an individual entitlement to any specific 
resources [id.: para. 32, 37].492 Noteworthy, the Court did not endorse the view of the 
CESCR and the African Commission in relation to the obligations of states to 
immediately realise a minimum core of the human right to health and medicines, ruling 
instead that it is not possible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ service 
immediately [id.: para. 35].493 The Court also stated that courts are not institutionally 
equipped to determine what the minimum-core standards should be [id.: para. 37]. 
Nonetheless, the identification of a core service was in fact acknowledged by the Court 
to be “possibly… relevant to reasonableness under section 26(2)”, as previously 
recognised in Grootboom [id.: para. 34]. In effect, the TAC case succeeded because the 
government’s action was deemed by the Court to be ‘unreasonable’:  
[…] the policy of confining Nevirapine to research and training sites fails to 
address the needs of mothers and their newborn children who do not have access 
to these sites. It fails to distinguish between the evaluation of programmes for 
reducing mother-to-child transmission and the need to provide access to health 
care services required by those who do not have access to the sites [id.: para. 67].  
Notably, I remark, while professing a limited role in public health policy 
decisions, the Court took a position with regard to technical and medical issues. For 
instance, it decided not to consider the problem of resistance to antiretrovirals or toxicity 
that the intake of nevirapine can generate.494 With regard to the enforcement of the 
decision, the Court issued a mandatory – rather than declaratory – order [Bilchitz 2007: 
                                            
492 In particular, the Court held that “[i]t is essential that there be a concerted national 
effort to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The government has committed itself to such 
an effort. We have held that its policy fails to meet constitutional standards because it 
excludes those who could reasonably be included where such treatment is medically 
indicated to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV. That does not mean that 
everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment, although the ideal, as Dr 
Ntsaluba says, is to achieve that goal. Every effort must, however, be made to do so as 
soon as reasonably possible. The increases in the budget to which we have referred will 
facilitate this” [South African, Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002: 
para. 125]. 
493 It is recalled that South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR [UNOHCHR 2008(b)]. It 
has however signed the Covenant [id.] and the Court does refer to the treaty in its ruling 
[South Africa, Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002: paras. 26-33].  
494 On the toxicity and resistance generated Nevirapine see the medical research of Arrive 
et al [2007]; Connor et al [1994]; Guay et al [1999]; Jourdain et al [2004]; Mofenson and 
McIntyre [2000]. Cf. South Africa, Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC 




155].495 ESCR-Net remarks that indeed nevirapine may have saved thousands of lives 
[id.]. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that enforcement had been inefficiently 
managed both by the Court and by the executive. Indeed, the uptake of the programme 
has been slow, and the Court did not exercise supervision [Bilchitz 2007: 165]. The civil 
society had to exercise pressure for a follow-up, including a contempt of court action 
against one provincial authority [ESCR-Net, website, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2009]. 
Furthermore, the Court had not ordered breast-milk substitutes to complement 
effectiveness of preventing mother-to-child transmission programme [id.].  
In effect, the Ministry of Health v. TAC case is exemplary to identify the 
contingencies and paradoxes of decisions relating to the adjudication of a subjective 
human right to medicines. Allegedly, no individual entitlement has been recognised by 
the Court. Indeed Fitzpatrick and Slye note that the South African Constitutional Court 
has permitted the individual enforcement of specific socio-economic rights only in two, 
narrowly defined circumstances [Fitzpatrick and Slye 2003]. The first case is 
Soobramoney, where the claim was however not based on access to health care but on 
emergency medical treatment [South Africa, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 1998; 
Fitzpatrick and Slye 2003: 678].496 The second case is Grootboom, where the Court 
accorded provision of shelter to homeless children [South Africa, Government v. 
Grootboom, 2000; Fitzpatrick and Slye 2003: 678]. However, the Court in Grootboom 
did not recognise a direct obligation of the state with respect to children who do not have 
shelter, but just with respect to the group, I remark, of those who had no parents or 
family members to care for them [id.].  
The human right to health in Ministry of Health v. TAC was indeed purportedly 
awarded on the grounds of ‘reasonableness’. Normatively it could be argued that the 
criterion of ‘reasonableness’ – also referred to as ‘rationality’ – is too arbitrary and/or 
                                            
495  Cf. the Grootboom case, where the Court issued a declaratory order. Most 
municipalities put in place ‘Grootboom allocation’ in their budgets to address those in 
most desperate need. Still, there was no consequent successful policies and 
implementation in Western Cape for the applicant community [Bilchitz 2007: 151; 
ESCR-Net, website, Government of the Republic of South Africa. & Ors v Grootboom & 
Ors 2000]. Further action was taken to enforce the remedy against the local government 
[id.].  
496  As per art. 27(3) of the South African Constitution: “[n]o one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment” [South Africa’s Constitution, art 27(3)]. The claim was 





narrows the scope of courts in awarding human rights through judicial review.497 Bilchitz 
for instance suggests that courts should look at overall budgets and focus on a minimum-
core approach rather than on reasonableness [Bilchitz 2007: 233]. Indeed, Bilchitz 
favours an expanded role of the courts seeing human rights protection as the justification 
of judicial review. The problem is, however, how can courts award human rights – and 
take decisions on the appropriate operationalisation of human rights at all – amid the 
contingencies revealed above in this chapter. If a minimum-core approach were to be 
yielded, how could it be identified? Why is the minimum core more incumbent than any 
other intervention for health? What would the minimum core award? The notion of a 
minimum core in effect seems to be more related to an indicator of the state activity for 
the realisation of the human right to health of its ‘population’ rather than to the basic 
health needs – and individual right – of a person. Indeed it is recalled that, according to 
the CESCR, the lack of essential medicines in a country is a violation by states of their 
minimum core obligation if it affects ‘any significant number of individuals’ [CESCR 
1990(b): para. 10; 2000: para. 43, emph. add.].498 In the Ministry of Health v. TAC case 
the Court has, arguably, in fact granted an entitlement to a minimum core of the right to 
pregnant women.499 However, nevirapine is not a perfectly self-standing cure – and can 
even be toxic for the individual. Thus the ‘health’ of the mother and the child may not be 
the result of the vindication of a minimum-core obligation in relation to the human right 
to health. In alternative, what could be comprised – or excluded – in an individual 
                                            
497 See, e.g., Hogerzeil [2006] and Langford and Nolan [2006]. In the UK, for instance, 
judicial review traditionally relates to issues of illegality (unlawfulness), irrationality 
(unreasonableness) and procedural impropriety (unfairness) [Lord Diplock quoted in 
Horne and Berman 2006: 18]. Courts can decide about the compliance of the act of a 
public authority with human rights obligations in administrative law review. On the 
judicial review on health care in the UK see also Syrett [2000] and Tur [2002].  
498 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.1.1. 
499 Cf. Bilchitiz arguing that in Grootboom the administrative law review would not have 
been sufficient to determine unreasonableness, as the problem was not unreasonable 
exclusion but inadequate provision, ie, the urgent need of shelter [Bilchitz 2007: 168]. 
Therefore, the issue was not discrimination, regarding who should be entitled to a benefit 
(scope), as per the ‘equality approach’, but an issue of what individuals are entitled to 
(content) [Bilchitz 2007: 167]. Bilchitz in effect maintains that “[c]ases that fall to be 
determined in accordance with the socio-economic rights of the Constitution … are not 
essentially comparative: rather, they relate to defining the nature of the entitlements 
contained in these provisions and the corresponding obligations of the State. They are 
concerned primarily with what the State is required to do to realize the entitlements in 
question rather than with who is the beneficiary of the entitlements” [id.: 168]. Cf. contra 




entitlement to health care and medicines in South Africa as part of the human right to 
health?  
Furthermore, the case has revealed the practical limitations of judicial decisions, 
as the enforcement of the ruling by the executive has been shortcoming. The separation 
of powers conceals indeed the structural coupling of the legal and political subsystems 
and the evident conflict of interest of the executive in not enforcing certain sentences.500 
Noteworthy, discrepancies between decisions and enforcement have reportedly tainted 
most other cases relating to access to medicines in relation to human rights worldwide. 
Cases celebrated in Latin America for the award of expansion of benefits, for instance by 
Hogerzeil and colleagues, such as Venezuela’s Cruz del Valle Bermúdez and Argentina’s 
Viceconte case, have in fact been disappointing in terms of enforcement [Hogerzeil et al 
2006].501 We will see in Chapter 6 section 6.4.3 that the effects of the decisions by treaty-
bodies on the provision of medicines and health care are also doubtful.  
 
 
                                            
500 It is recalled that Luhmann describes the structural coupling of law and politics as 
follows: “[i]n order for law to be enforced it needs politics, and without the prospect of 
enforcement there is no stability to norms that are credible to (or which are expected by) 
everybody. Conversely, politics use law to diversify access to politically concentrated 
power” [Luhmann 2004: 162]. 
501 With regard to the Venezuela’ Cruz del Valle Bermúdez, Torres reports that “[t]he 
reality that the Venezuelan government ignores the Court’s ruling in the Bermudez case 
with impunity only contributes to the widespread perception that the right to health is 
symbolic rather than vital to the life of the nation” [Torres 2002: 114; Venezuela, 
Supreme Court, Cruz del Valle, 1999]. With regard to the Argentinean Viceconte case, a 
discrepancy in the outcome can be noted. ESCR-Net for instance reports that the Court of 
Appeals has been remarkably active, monitoring compliance of the measures ordered 
within the framework of the decision, as well as controlling the management and 
execution of the budget allocations aimed at producing the vaccine. Production is 
currently in progress: the vaccine has already been tested in animals and is now being 
tested in humans [ESCR-Net, Viceconte, 2008]. However, Singh reported that “[a]s a 
result of this case the Argentine government developed a social plan to deliver basic 
medicines to those in need within 5 years of the ruling” [Singh et al 2007: 521. The case 
was decided in 1998 [Argentina, Viceconte, 1998]. See also Verma: “five years after the 
Viceconte case, a vaccine for haemorrhagic fever has not been produced despite close 
judicial supervisions” [Verma 2005: 2]. In effect, “[i]n spite of Argentina’s strong 
positive decision on the right health case, Viceconte in 1998, implementation has not 
taken place. It was noted that the part of the problem in this instance was a lack of 




5.5 Conclusion  
Chapter 3 demonstrated that important instances of the international human right 
to health oblige African states to respect, protect and fulfil a human right to medicines. 
Chapter 5 has consequently explored the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of the duties held by African states in relation to this human right. The 
utilisation of the human right to medicines to guide and redress the policies of home 
states influencing access to medicines, however, has appeared to be difficult. To begin 
with, often, the international human right to health does not set definite legal/illegal 
prescriptions with regard to the conduct or the results that states shall be liable for with 
respect to access to medicines. The right to health also admits margins of discretion. Or, 
for example, where the right to health accords an entitlement to essential medicines, it 
does not identify what ‘essential’ medicines are. From a normative point of view, 
furthermore, it was showed that the human right to medicines does not seem to solve the 
ethical predicaments involved in the design of policies for access to medicines which 
imply morally-sensitive biopolitical decisions concerning life as well as conflicts 
between other rights, needs, interests and liberties in society. 
In summary this chapter has illustrated that, with regard to the duty to respect, 
problems are posed for instance by the selection of essential medicines for the national 
essential medicine lists (EMLs), the regulation of intellectual property and the 
operationalisation of substantive non-discrimination. In particular, the protection of 
patents can reduce the affordability of new medicines but can also promote 
pharmaceutical research and development, and be morally warranted by recognising the 
inventor’s efforts or fostering the economy. The prohibition of non-discrimination is 
problematic as formal non-discrimination does not solve the problem of inequality, while 
substantive non-discrimination is difficult to operationalise and implement. In relation to 
the duty to protect, problems are posed by the control of quality and safety, which may 
trade off wide and immediate access to medicines. Competition law presents problems of 
contingency for instance with regard to the assessment of ‘excessive prices’. The duty to 
protect is problematic to operationalise especially when it interferes with the role of the 
private in the distribution of medicines, for instance when dealing with health insurance 
and price controls. Finally, difficulties have been found in the operationalisation of the 
human right to medicines with regard to the fulfilment of the right in sub-Saharan Africa. 




identification of health-care priorities is controversial. Priorities are often subjective; 
different moral principles and values ultimately conflict.502 A fundamental dilemma is 
ascertained in public health debates between attention to the aggregate health status of a 
population and to the individual health needs. With regard to adjudication, much 
uncertainty was revealed over the use of legal remedies to redress the lack of fulfilment 
of the human right to medicines. Given the resources constraints, courts are hesitant 
about recognising individual entitlements to medicines, even essential ones. When states 
are held to be in violation of access to medicines, furthermore, the judicial remedies have 
not necessarily been effective for the claimants’ health needs. The objects of the awards 
are sometimes limited with respect to the health problems at stake. Moreover, the 
sentences may not be effectively enforced by the executive. The uncertainty of the 
enforcement of the right de facto generates contingency in the legal subsystem de jure as 
its legal/illegal communications are not in fact enforceable in courts with certainty. 
Interestingly, as mentioned above, judicial remedies are not demanded by the ICESCR 
and the ACHPR.  
So “can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?”. This chapter has shown the difficulties for the 
individual in sub-Saharan Africa to obtain redress for her situation utilising the human 
right to medicines. The reasons are not only to be attributed to judicial ‘inactivism’, but 
to a series of paradoxes which have been identified in this chapter. First and foremost, a 
subjective human right to medicines (or health care, health) faces the paradox of referring 
to an objective right, pertaining to collectivities, the ‘population’ or groups. Indeed the 
law showed some contradiction. Certain formulations by the ICESCR, the CESCR and 
the African Commission for example operationalised the human right to health and 
medicines as concerned with the aggregate health status of a population or with some 
groups and health problems. This indication clashes with the principle that everyone has 
equal importance and dignity.503 More specifically, the focus on the aggregate population 
conflicts with the formulation of the human right to health according to which everyone 
is entitled to the maximum attainable standard of health [ICESCR art. 12(1); ACHPR art. 
                                            
502 See also Evans J.H [2006] on the limits of public bioethics as technocracy. 
503 See, e.g., ICESCR preambular paragraphs 1 and 3 [ICESCR preambular paras. 1, 3] 
and ACHPR article 2: “Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any 
kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other 




16]. Next, through structural coupling, powers are accorded to states in order to realise 
the human right to medicines. However, the human right to medicines, as demonstrated, 
cannot frame a political programme for access to medicines. Indeed, the ‘human rights 
subsystem’ rests on the notion of indisputable values of humanity/inhumanity which is in 
fact, often, a simplification. Such simplification can be positivised in the legal subsystem, 
which is also coupled to the political subsystem, only through indeterminacy. Thus, not 
all actions diminishing access to medicines violate the respect of the human right to 
medicines. Not all shortcomings in protection and fulfilment of access to medicines 
violate this right. States are conceded certain margins of discretion. In effect, the choices 
made by the state in its function of ‘fostering’ life in the name of law and human rights 
are sensitive and may not respond to medical needs, be practically limited in their 
steering and undermine other legitimate interests, rights and needs in society.  
The next chapter will analyse the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of the obligations held by ‘extra-governmental’ actors with respect to the 
human right to medicines. Indeed, this chapter pointed out that the shortcomings of the 
application of the human right to medicines vis-à-vis African home states is also 
generated by the actions of agents other than the state. We shall see how these actors can 
contribute to the realisation of the human right to medicines in Africa, also addressing 
violations of access to medicines by, inter alia, African home states. Again, the 
contingencies and possible instances of biopower that the human right to medicines can 




CHAPTER 6: THE OBLIGATIONS OF ‘EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS’ 
WITH REGARD TO THE HUMAN RIGHT TO MEDICINES DE FACTO 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapters 2, 4 and 5 illustrated that the realisation of the human right to medicines 
by home states also depends on the conducts of extra-governmental actors (foreign states 
and non-state actors). It was demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4 that, in effect, the 
international human right to medicines attributes duties onto these actors. The duties are 
attributed both indirectly, as home states have to protect the enjoyment of the human 
right to medicines against third parties (Chapter 3), and directly (Chapter 4). Chapter 6 
contributes to answering the research question of this thesis, “can a human right to 
medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”, by analysing and normatively evaluating the possible utilisation of this right 
with regard to the duties of extra-governmental actors.  
The primary scope of this chapter is the critical analysis of the indications which 
human rights law gives for the operationalisation, implementation and enforcement of the 
human right to medicines with regard to the roles of extra-governmental actors. Among 
non-state actors special focus will be given to international organisations, NGOs and 
pharmaceutical companies, as they are most influent on access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. Part of the research will, moreover, enquire in what the legal subsystem 
does not prescribe but ‘expects’ about extra-governmental actors. It is noted, for example, 
that the international human right to health, like other international human rights 
(especially economic, social and cultural rights) rests on the idea that extra-governmental 
actors have a subsidiary role in the fulfilment of the human right to health [e.g. ICESCR 
art. 2(1), 12(1); ACHPR preambular para. 3]. For example the CESCR has maintained, 
when stating the minimum core obligations that home states shall immediately realise:   
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes to emphasize that it is 
particularly incumbent on States parties and other actors in a position to assist, to 
provide ‘international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical’ which enable developing countries to fulfil their core and other 
obligations indicated in paragraphs 43 and 44 above. [CESCR 2000: para. 45 
emph. add.] 
International cooperation and assistance by foreign states and other actors in a 




on home states. Yet it is not an enforceable prescription: the law is structurally coupled to 
other social subsystems, including the subsystem of meta-positive human rights (it is 
recalled that structural couplings occur when subsystem need events to occur within their 
environment that they cannot achieve through their own operations [Luhmann 2004: 
382]). Soft law and self-regulation, which can be seen as communications of the ‘human 
rights subsystem’, are indeed more prolific with regard to the (non-binding) duties of 
extra-governmental actors, as illustrated in Chapter 4. Thus the positive human rights law 
also builds on those meta-positive prescriptions. It will be asked whether and how extra-
governmental actors can in effect respect and contribute to protect and fulfil the human 
right to medicines. This enquiry is pertinent in order to assess the utilisation of the human 
right to medicines, overall, to the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Generally, it will be shown that the operationalisation of the human right to 
medicines with regard to extra-governmental actors encounters several paradoxes. Some 
are analogous to those identified for the duties of home states. For example, not all 
actions committed by extra-governmental actors reducing access to medicines can be 
considered to violate the respect of the human right to medicines. Not all shortcomings in 
protection and fulfilment of access to medicines violate this right. Granted, access to 
medicines is complex, and this often makes problematic establishing the relevant nexus 
of causality for violations. Normatively, the actions of extra-governmental actors for 
access to medicines can touch upon indisputable values pertaining health as well as other 
rights, interests, needs and liberties in society. As a result, the action of extra-
governmental actors, even if framed as in furtherance of human rights, may exert 
unwarranted power and biopower. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, it is 
recalled that the theory of autopoiesis in the social systems cautions that political action 
is generally prone to the limits of steering [Luhmann 1997: 44]. Organisations, more 
generally, are also autopoietic social systems which handle themes according to the 
actions of that system [Luhmann 1995: 196-197].  
According to its broad scope, this chapter utilises a multidimensional and 
interdisciplinary methodology. To begin with, it deals with the legal analysis of the 
human right to medicines and health under: the ICESCR and the ACHPR, as they are the 
most comprehensive regimes of human rights obligations on access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa; the comments and decisions of treaty bodies, focussing on the CESCR 




decisions of international and national courts; the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the human right to health, academics and other authoritative sources. Soft law and self-
regulation of extra-governmental actors will also be studied, as mentioned above. The 
enquiry nevertheless expands on an interdisciplinary study, which spans the ethics, 
economics, politics and science involved in the realisation of access to medicines. Socio-
legal studies, mainly drawing from Luhmann and Foucault, as well as my empirical work 
in sub-Saharan Africa (especially, in Tanzania) will be utilised.  
With regard to the structure, this chapter is constituted by three main parts which 
follow the tripartite distinction of duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to 
health and medicines. Such tripartite classification is not adopted in human rights law 
and literature as systematically for extra-governmental actors as it is for home states.504 
However, it provides an immediate comparison with the duties of home states and 
permits a systematic analysis of the possibilities, problems and limits of the human right 
to medicines framework. Attention is dedicated to the most problematic aspects of 
regulation, policies and actions having an effect on access to medicine. With regard to 
the respect of the human right to medicines by extra-governmental actors in sub-Saharan 
countries, section 6.2 focuses on the design and utilisation of the international intellectual 
property regime; the policies of international financial institutions; and the predicaments 
of the operationalisation of the principle of non-discrimination. With regard to the 
protection of the human right to medicines from third parties violations in other countries, 
section 6.3 reviews the harmonisation of standards and regulations pertaining the safety 
and efficacy of pharmaceuticals. Section 6.4 analyses the role of extra-governmental 
actors in the fulfilment of the human right to medicines. Such investigation is particularly 
important considering the limited resources of African home states for the fulfilment of 
the human right to medicines. Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 therefore analyse the problem of 
prioritisation and selection of the interventions of external aid for access to medicines, 
also presenting the debate in international public health between vertical and horizontal 
                                            
504 With regard to the duties of home states, the distinction is enshrined by the ICESCR 
and ACHPR provisions on the right to health and has been adopted, among others, by the 
CESCR, the African Commission, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health 
[CESCR 2000: paras. 33-36; AC Res. 141 (2008); Hunt 2006: paras. 59-60]. See also 
Chapter 3 section 3.2.1. The CESCR explicitly adopts the tripartite classification for the 




approaches.505 Section 6.4.3 investigates the difficulties of the enforcement of the human 
right to medicines studying in particular the problematic evaluation of the fulfilment of 
the right, for instance through the utilisation of indicators of performance. Section 6.5 
concludes the chapter commenting on the role and problems of the international human 
rights law in prescribing duties onto extra-governmental actors for the solution of the 
problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
6.2 Respect  
The analysis of the operationalisation and implementation of the duties of extra-
governmental actors to respect the human right to medicines is divided into two sections 
respectively dealing with duties not to harm (section 6.2.1) and not to discriminate 
(section 6.2.2). Each section considers separately foreign states and non-state actors. It is 
pointed out that failure to respect the human right to medicines can originate from 
activities undertaken by extra-governmental actors meant to protect and fulfil access to 
medicines.  
 
6.2.1 No harm  
6.2.1.1 Foreign states and international organisations 
Chapter 4 showed that foreign states have a duty to respect the human right to 
medicines. The duty originates from both treaty and customary international law.506 This 
section explores how such duty can be operationalised. Apparently states shall avoid 
exerting a direct impediment to access to medicines in another country. In discussing the 
duty to respect the human right to medicines enshrined in the ICESCR, the CESCR for 
instance remarks that states shall refrain from embargoing medical equipment [CESCR 
2000: para. 41]. Ascertaining whether sanctions violate the respect of the human right to 
medicines can be problematic, considering that sanctions not directly aimed at medicines 
                                            
505 In the public health literature, horizontal programmes regard the health-care system at 
once, for instance through primary health care, while vertical programmes focus on one 
health problem at time. See Chapter 1 section 1.4. 
506 The CESCR, for example, unequivocally states that the respect of the right to health 
in other countries derives from the right to health enshrined in article 12 of the ICESCR 




can also undermine access to medicines.507 Fluctuations or withdrawal of health care and 
other foreign aid programmes also impinges on peoples’ access to health care.508 Lack of 
respect can be the outcome of foreign states’ policies to protect the human right to 
medicines in sub-Saharan African countries. For example, delays in the registration of 
pharmaceutical products for exportation or donation can damage access to medicines in 
African countries.509  
Foreign states can also influence access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
through international agreements and international organisations dealing with for 
example intellectual property rights, international health regulation or international 
finance. According to the CESCR, states are required to “ensure that the human right to 
health is given due attention in international agreements… States parties have an 
obligation to ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take due 
account of the human right to health” [CESCR 2000: 39]. With regard to agreements 
prescribing the protection of intellectual property, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
human right to health, Hunt, has more specifically stated that “no rich state should 
encourage a developing country to accept intellectual property standards that do not take 
into account the safeguards and flexibilities included under the TRIPS Agreement” [Hunt 
2006: para. 64]. As seen in Chapter 5 section 5.2.1 the patentability of pharmaceutical 
products in a country requires very sensitive and delicate decisions. It is therefore 
investigated here if foreign states violate the respect of the human right to medicines 
abroad by contracting with African states on intellectual property. 
                                            
507 General public international law accepts the use of countermeasures for redressing 
another state’s violation of international law obligations. Countermeasures can be 
otherwise unlawful actions but cannot, inter alia, “affect… obligations for the protection 
of fundamental human rights” [ILC 2001: art 50]. Yet it is controversial to establish what 
counts as an infringement of fundamental human rights. See Cassese [2005: 312-3]. 
508 Foreign aid for health care can also be used as an instrument of foreign policy. For 
instance, in February 2007 the Italian government interrupted many cooperation projects 
in Eritrea in the context of souring bilateral relations with the African country. One of 
these projects, I learnt, was the Italian Cooperation/Red Cross health centre and training 
centre of Gash Barka, a remote region in Eritrea [Forti 2007]. I visited the project in 2004 
and was enchanted by the contribution to health the centre made, with the full approval 
of the regional government. The literature on the political use of foreign aid is huge, see 
e.g. Adelman et al [1995]; Boone [1996]; Boulding [1981]; Easterly [2001, 2006]; 
Middleton and O’Keefe [1998]; Rugumamu (on Tanzania) [1997]; Streeten [1972].  
509  See e.g. The Economist, “From Bench to Bedside” [2007], Health Gap [2005], 
interviews [July-August 2009, Dar es Salaam]. Section 6.3 discusses in more detail the 





It is noted that there is a moral rationale for regulating intellectual property 
protection at the international level. Free riding intellectual property may damage the 
originators, depriving them of the return on their efforts. This occurs especially in certain 
cases of parallel trading. 510  If parallel trading is not permitted, the reward of the 
innovator and the consequent incentive to innovation are not undermined. A problem of 
‘fairness’, yet, could be perceived among consumers in different countries, as products 
are more expensive where intellectual property is recognised, where most of the 
innovation happens and also the concomitant social costs are borne.511 Thus, a worldwide 
regime of intellectual property protection would address such free-riding, promoting 
more innovation on a global scale and permitting national patent regimes of innovator 
countries to be laxer (for instance, on shorter terms).512 Consequently, static access to 
medicines in the originator countries would be fostered and research for conditions 
affecting African countries may be stimulated as well.513 Nonetheless, the consequences 
of the recognition of patents on medicines domestically can be considered too serious, 
especially in developing countries, for justifying anything short of the prohibition of re-
exporting medicines into the innovator’s country through parallel trading.514 
Most African countries, however, are bound by international obligations with 
respect to the protection of intellectual property on pharmaceutical products. While sub-
Saharan African countries are not involved, until the moment of writing, in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) contracting on 
                                            
510 I am particularly referring to the parallel trading which occurs when a generic good is 
produced and marketed in a country without recognising intellectual property rights and 
then exported to the country where the original good is marketed (and likely protected by 
intellectual property rights). The imported good competes on an uneven playing field as 
it has been produced without incurring in the research and development costs. 
511 For instance, the cost of education. 
512 See Maskus and Reichman discussing global public goods and the optimal global 
jurisdiction   [Maskus and Reichman 2004: 285]. See also International Task Force on 
Global Public Goods [2006: 13, 68]. 
513 See Pascale and Velasquez, for WHO [Pascale and Velasquez 1999]. Some studies 
however show that pharmaceutical research remains mainly directed to the conditions of 
the people of developed countries. See Global Forum for Health Research [2000]. Cf. 
WHO’s “Diseases of Poverty and the 10/90 Gap” [2004: 3, 4] contending that neglected 
diseases constitute a small fraction of low income countries total disease burden and that 
there are only three diseases that are genuinely ‘neglected’: African trypanosomiasis, 
Chagas disease and leishmaniasis. Cf. UNAIDS on AIDS vaccines, objecting that the 
research for an AIDS vaccine is limited to the genetic subtype B, rather than A or C 
prevalent in developing countries [UNAIDS 2002: 105].  
514 See also WHO’s position [WHO 1999, Globalisation and access to drugs: 41; Van 




intellectual property, all major sub-Saharan countries except Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia 
and Sudan are parties to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and thereby the Trade 
Related Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS) [WTO, website, Understanding the 
WTO, 2009].515 Under the TRIPS, inter alia, the parties are legally bound to adopt a 
minimum twenty-year patent protection on all products and processes, including 
therefore medicines [TRIPS art. 27 and 33]. The WTO offers a binding dispute 
settlement mechanism for enforcing WTO law between members [Lowenfeld 2003]. 
Therefore, it can be argued that African states have been deprived of a notable portion of 
their discretion in setting their domestic regime of intellectual property. However, the 
TRIPS regime also provides for some flexibility. Apart from the fact that procurers can 
use parallel importation (of cheaper patented medicines)516 and developing countries 
have been granted extensions in the deadlines for adopting patents on pharmaceutical 
products, some provisions are now available permitting countries to obtain generic 
versions of patentable products without the consent of the patent-holder.517 In particular, 
a moratorium is in place sanctioning the freedom for states to issue compulsory licences 
(on domestic production and/or importation of generic medicines). The African 
Commission, the WHO and other authors recommend African countries to adopt and 
utilise such ‘flexibilities’ [AC, Res. 141 (2008): para. 8(1)(d); Baker 2004; Correa 2000, 
2002; Lewis-Lettington and Munyi 2004; Lewis-Lettington and Banda 2004; Mercurio 
2004; WHO 1999, Globalisation and access to drugs: 41].518 But are these flexibilities 
appropriate? 
In fact, the flexibilities are rarely adopted and used by African countries.519 Thus, 
it is questioned whether these arrangements are effectively helpful. African countries 
may not need to use those provisions because pharmaceutical industries do not patent 
                                            
515  The organisation has established a multilateral regime of intellectual property 
protection entered into force in 1995. The organisation is currently composed by 153 
members (last figures available from WTO website, Understanding the WTO: The 
Organization. Members and Observers, 2008, last accessed 10 February 2009)  
516 Parallel importation (after exhaustion of rights in the exporting country) is sanctioned 
in TRIPS article 6 [TRIPS art. 6]. See Ferreira [2002: 1145-1146]. 
517 The extension of a deadline for amending legislation is not particularly useful for sub-
Saharan Africa considering that, substantively, almost all African countries provide for 
patents on pharmaceutical products. Only Angola and Eritrea do not currently observe 
patent protection on pharmaceuticals [Grace 2003: 53; CIPR: 46, 27; Thorpe 2002]. See 
also Chapter 5 section 5.2.1. 
518 For WHO’s position see also Pascale and Velasquez [1999] and Van Thiel [2003]. 
519 Reportedly, most SADC countries have intellectual property laws that do not comply 




their products in their jurisdictions. 520  Compulsory licenses may in fact become 
necessary for sub-Saharan Africa countries which commonly import pharmaceutical 
products from other countries,521 such as India and China, where intellectual property 
protection on medicines is being gradually recognised for new products.522 Or, again, 
flexibilities can be superfluous because African states negotiate the procurement prices of 
medicines and/or set the retailing prices. Such option, however, is effective if the state 
has bargaining power vis-à-vis the supplier, but African countries often represent small 
markets.523 It is also often noted that less than 5% of medicines of the WHO’s essential 
drugs list are subject to patent protection [Ghafele 2008: 16]. However, the list includes 
medicines, generally, on the basis of cost-effectiveness, and on-patent medicines can be 
more costly therefore not suitable for the list.524 Remarkably, compulsory licences give a 
power to the state – which thereby increases its exposure to lacking respect of the human 
right to medicines. In effect, African governments may refrain from issuing the licences 
if that entails providing the medicine in question.525 Alternatively, it can be argued that 
the TRIPS flexibility for compulsory licences is too cumbersome a procedure. Indeed, 
the provision of TriAvir by Canada Apotex Inc. for Rwanda is the only case to date in 
full compliance with the TRIPS regime procedure, also notifying the Council for TRIPS 
[WTO Doc. IP/N/10/CAN/1, 2007]. 526  Furthermore, it is noted that the effects of 
intellectual property law are influenced by the conducts of pharmaceutical companies and 
foreign states which the law does not steer. The role of pharmaceutical companies is 
                                            
520 See Attaran and Gillespie-White arguing that antiretrovirals are seldom patented in 
African countries even if patent protection is available by law [Attaran and Gillespie-
White 2001]. The significance and accuracy of the study has been vivaciously rebutted 
by MSF [MSF, Doha Derailed, 2003: 6]. 
521 To give an idea, in 1994 the World Bank reported that more than 90% of medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa are imported [WB 1994: 67].  
522 Generally, products marketed before the implementation of TRIPS are instead not 
patentable in China and India. For more details see Grace [2005]. 
523 Reportedly Africa accounts for 1.2% of global pharmacy market (and the figure is 
even smaller for sales of patented medicines) [Friedman et al 2003: 341-343]. See also 
Chapter 5 section 5.3.2. 
524  See also Chapter 5 section 5.4.1 on the selection of medicines for the essential 
medicines lists. 
525 In effect, as Love notes, compulsory licenses have followed foreign donors’ initiatives 
to finance pharmaceutical products [Love 2007: 16]. See also Attaran and Granville 
[2004: 178] and Block [2001]. 
526 Love recounts that compulsory licenses have otherwise been used successfully in 
Ghana, Guinea, Eritrea, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. While the 
author conclude that compulsory licensing in Africa is now fairly common, even though 
often not widely publicised [Love 2007: 16], on the basis of similar evidence other 




discussed in infra section 6.2.1.2. With regard to foreign states, African states can be 
reticent for example about recurring to compulsory licenses to avoid external political 
pressures by other states that may support their industries exerting pressure on patent 
protection [Oh 2006: 31].527 In effect, the consequences of the TRIPS on African states 
also depend on the actual enforcement of intellectual property law by pharmaceutical 
companies and foreign states.528  
In order to appreciate the problems of operationalisation of the respect of the 
human right to medicines with regard to patent protection on medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa I investigated the situation in Tanzania during my field work (July-August 2009). 
It is recalled – as also seen in Chapter 5 section 5.2.1 – that the Tanzanian government, 
the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) and WHO officials report that the 
country has not experienced ‘public health’ problems with patents on pharmaceutical 
products as of yet. Tanzania’s patent law does cover pharmaceutical products but 
according to my interviews about 99% of the medicines used in Tanzania is not under 
patent.529 Nevertheless, the Tanzanian government has allegedly undertaken a three-fold 
                                            
527 Support to a similar view can be found considering the experience of Thailand in 
issuing compulsory licenses. The reaction from Abbott has not been particularly 
philosophical. The American pharmaceutical firm indeed retaliated by withdrawing some 
of its products from the Thai market. The American Trade Representative stood behind 
Abbott’s behaviour [CPTech, website, Thailand, last accessed May 2010].  
528 Within the WTO/TRIPS framework, for instance, the US has initiated a case against 
Brazil alleging that the adoption by the latter country of local working requirements 
clause was incompatible with TRIPS [WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, 2000]. Unilaterally, outside the WTO Agreement, US Trade Act Section 301 
obligates the US Trade Representative (USTR) to assess whether standards of intellectual 
property protection in other countries are consistent with the US preferred level of 
protection [Oxfam, Patents Versus Patients, 2006: 14]. If the country does not comply 
with US standards it can be placed on the ‘priority watch list’, thence it may face 
unilateral trade sanctions [Oxfam, Patents Versus Patients, 2006: 14]. In effect, for the 
African countries eligible to benefit from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
for developing countries, which include most African countries, the USTR’s reports can 
lead to sanctions or withdrawal of concessions. (See Trade Act of 1974 [US, Trade Act 
of 1974, Subchapter V, Sec. 2462, para. C(5)] as amended by the ‘GSP Renewal Act of 
1996’, which also requires the President to ‘take into account the extent to which such 
country is providing adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights’ [US, 
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Subtitle J,  section 502 para c (5)].) The 
threats are in fact rarely concretised, but it can be recalled that the USTR strongly 
sustained the PMA v. South Africa case, until civil society obtained its withdrawal from 
the dispute [South Africa, PMA v. South Africa, 2001; Klug 2008: 222-3].  
529 The originator pharmaceutical companies have not patented, for instance, the first-line 
antiretrovirals and the first line antimalarial (the artemether-lumefantrine ‘Coartem’) 




strategy on intellectual property and access to medicines.530 First, Tanzania is working on 
the adoption of flexibilities to its patent law, which are not sanctioned in the 1987 
Tanzania’s Patents Act currently in force.531 Secondly, the government is favouring local 
production of pharmaceuticals, for instance reserving in public tenders a 15% price 
advantage to local industries. Third, the government aims to comply with the Abuja 
Declaration and WHO Plan of Action by raising the national budget for health to 15%. 
According to WHO, the general government expenditure on health as percentage of total 
government expenditure in 2005 was 12.6% [WHOSIS, last accessed October 2009].  
Some remarks nevertheless suggest that the situation of Tanzania with respect to 
global intellectual property protection is not unproblematic. The first element of the 
strategy will importantly enable compulsory licenses. 532  It has to be seen how the 
mechanism of compulsory licenses, issued by the importer and the exporter countries ad 
hoc by way of exception, will respond to possible systematic needs of patented medicines. 
Currently, reportedly, 70-85% of the medicines utilised in Tanzania are imported.533 
With the second element of the strategy the need of generic versions of new products 
could be tapped without using importations. In effect, the assembling of formulations of 
sophisticated patentable drugs, such as antiretrovirals, may not be technically prohibiting. 
However, the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) have to be imported as they are 
                                            
530 Interview with TFDA [Dar es Salaam, 17 August 2009]. TFDA is selected as the 
‘focus institution on intellectual property in Tanzania’ [id.]. 
531 Tanzania grants patents for both processes and products, without expressly excluding 
pharmaceutical products, since the Tanzania’s Patents Act of 1987 [Tanzania’s Patents 
Act, 1987: Art 7(1)]. Such legislation presents harsh provisions on compulsory licenses, 
parallel importation, and other exceptions to patent rights. For instance, an early working 
exception is not prescribed [Losse et al 8-14]. (Article 13 however authorizes the 
exclusion from patentability of ‘certain kinds of products, or processes’ for a maximum 
period of ten years [Tanzania’s Patents Act, 1987: article 13].) Modifications can include 
the possibility of compulsory licenses, parallel importation, government use, Bolar 
exception, exemption in scope, patentability, and the exclusion of patents from 
pharmaceutical until 2016, as permitted according to the Doha Declaration [Doha 
Declaration 2001: para. 7; Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002: para. 1]. 
532 With a worldwide tightening of intellectual property protection, parallel importation 
loses some of its attractiveness. 
533  According to an interviewee at the Medical Stores Department, 80-85% of the 
medicines procured by the department (the national procurer of pharmaceutical products) 
are imported [Interview, MSD, Dar es Salaam, July 2009]. According to an interviewee 
at the TFDA, 70% of medicines circulating in Tanzania are imported [Interview, TFDA, 




more technologically demanding and benefiting from huge economies of scale.534 Finally, 
the trials required for the launch of new products are expensive.535 The third strategy 
incurs in the reality that, by increasing from general government expenditure on health as 
percentage of total government expenditure 12.6% to 15%, the per capita government 
expenditure on health would shift from US$ 23 to US$ 27.4 [WHOSIS, website, 2005, 
my elaboration]. Notably, general expenditures on health already comprise external aid 
[WHO, website, WHOSIS – National Health Accounts, last accessed 10 November 
2009]. By comparison, in France it is US$ 2646, in Italy US$ 1894, in the United 
Kingdom US$ 2261, in the United States of America it is US$ 2862 [WHOSIS: 2005, 
last accessed 30 October 2009]. It is spurious comparing the financial resources available 
for African least-developed countries with those available in developed countries.536  
In sum it is not clear whether foreign states violate the human right to medicines 
by binding sub-Saharan African states – and the countries habitually exporting generics 
to them – to the TRIPS. On the one hand, the protection of intellectual property can be 
warranted under the human right to medicines and other ethical considerations. It can 
also be argued that African states were generally granting patentability of medicines 
before the TRIPS came into existence and that the emerging countries exporting generic 
medicines to Africa would have adopted patent protection anyway, following 
technological development.537 On the other hand, the ‘flexibilities included under the 
                                            
534 Trade in pharmaceuticals occurs because the pharmaceutical sector typically benefits 
from economies of scale at the international level and because the infrastructure in 
African countries can be challenging especially for technology-intensive products. 
Interviewees from pharmaceutical companies in Tanzania highlighted the problems of 
production in the country. The poor status of infrastructure and higher level education in 
Tanzania makes drugs production more expensive than in Asian countries from where 
most medicines are imported [Interviews with Shelys (the biggest manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical products in Tanzania), Salama (importer for generics) and others, Dar es 
Salaam, August 2009]. 
535 For some products, especially for antiretrovirals, WHO requires bioequivalence trials 
which cost about US$ 100,000 [Interviews with Shelys (the biggest manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical products in Tanzania), Salama (importer for generics) and others, Dar es 
Salaam, August 2009]. 
536 In effect, the medicine budget in Tanzania for year 2003/04 was US$ 28.5million, ie 
US$ 0.75 per capita [The United Republic of Tanzania, Survey of the Medicines Prices 
in Tanzania: 2004: 3, my elaboration]. 
537  See Mushayavanhu noting that at the time of the entry into force of the TRIPS 
agreement only three African countries excluded the patentability of pharmaceutical 
products [Mushayavanhu 2007: 150]. Many countries in effect have inherited intellectual 





TRIPS’, to borrow Hunt’s expression, may not be sufficient for avoiding patents and 
getting access to cheap generic medicines [Hunt 2006: para. 64]. The effect of the TRIPS, 
moreover, does not follow linear and immanent causality; rather, it is much contingent, 
depending on the health systems of the sub-Saharan countries and on how the intellectual 
property rights are utilised by foreign states and pharmaceutical companies. Foreign 
states can influence the implementation and enforcement of intellectual property in 
African countries. Decisive is also the promptness of foreign states to issue compulsory 
licenses for exporting generic products to African countries, as they are under no 
compulsion from the TRIPS to do that. Foreign states can also contribute to purchasing 
patented medicines in poorer African countries through aid and cooperation. The practice 
by pharmaceutical companies will be studied in following section 6.2.1.2. 
 Always with regard to the actions of states in international organisations, some 
WHO programmes meant to protect access to safe medicines worldwide are sometimes 
too inefficient and therefore a barrier to access to medicines.538 The activity of WHO in 
recommending lists of ‘essential drugs’ can also be problematic. In particular, the WHO 
Essential Drug List which, following cost-effectiveness considerations, identifies 
medicine that states shall keep available in public health facilities, has been criticised 
until recently for having excluded treatment for HIV/AIDS [Laing 2004: 1725].539 Other 
instances of international selection and prioritisation of health interventions in sub-
Saharan Africa are further analysed in section 6.4.1 below. 
Lastly, this section deals with the impact on access to medicines that foreign 
states have by influencing the public policies and social welfare systems of African states 
in the context of development aid, development finance and debt reduction. This 
influence occurs through bilateral cooperation or by participating to international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
and regional development banks. African countries are particularly prone to the 
intervention of those agencies given the scarce availability of public finances and their 
high levels of public debt.540 It has been contended however that the intervention of 
                                            
538 See infra section 6.3. 
539 Some antiretrovirals have been introduced in the most recent versions of the WHO 
EML, relaxing the requirements of cost-effectiveness [Laing 2004: 1725]. See, e.g., 
WHO, WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 16th List [2009]. See also Chapter 5 
section 5.4.1. 
540 Under the World Bank classification of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 33 




international financial institutions, for instance when encouraging liberalisation and 
privatisation of hitherto public enterprises, has had a negative effect on economic, social 
and cultural rights in several states.541 It is argued here that it is not straightforward to 
identify liability for such policies under the framework of the human right to medicines. 
In its comment on the human right to health the CESCR demands explicitly that parties 
to these institutions “should pay greater attention to the protection of the human right to 
health in influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and international measures 
of [international financial institutions and regional development banks]” [CESCR 2000: 
39]. In a previous comment on technical assistance and cooperation the CESCR did 
however recognise that, considering the amount of debt of some countries, adjustment 
programmes may be unavoidable and that these can involve austerity – yet basic 
economic, social and cultural rights must be protected even in those circumstances 
[CESCR 1990(b): para. 9]. In effect, it can be difficult to assess the level of a ‘basic’ 
right to medicines, or what ‘austerity’ really means. As seen in Chapter 5, the 
operationalisation of the concept of ‘essential’ medicines and the prioritisation of health-
care needs is not certain.542 In addition, the nexus of causality has to be established. It 
can be asked how direct the consequences of the policies shall be. Policies with no focus 
on access to medicines can have negative effect on access to medicines. The temporal 
horizon for the assessment shall also be set out. Policies which interfere with access to 
medicines today may mean more access at another time or by other subjects. Furthermore, 
availability, affordability and quality can in effect be traded off. For example, price 
controls can increment availability to detriment of affordability whereas user fees and 
cost sharing for medicines can decrease the affordability but increase the availability.  
The recommendation of the imposition of user fees for health services by the 
World Bank and the IMF, which had also been supported by WHO and UNICEF,543 in 
particular, has raised considerable criticism against those institutions.544 It has to be 
                                            
541 See Ssenyonjo [2008: 740]. 
542 See section 5.4.1. 
543  UNICEF and WHO have also supported rolling funds for sub-Saharan African 
countries with the 1987 Bamako initiative [Paganini and Jarrett 1993]. 
544 The lending institutions insisted on user fees for health services during the 1980s as 
part of the structural adjustment programmes [Mamdani B. 2007: 139]. Later on, the 
World Bank adopted a more flexible approach. In 2004, the World Bank claimed a ‘no 
blanket policy on user fees’, in effect recommending that fees be evaluated within each 
policy context [World Bank, World Development Report 2004, 2004]. Indeed the foreign 




asked if user fees and cost sharing on medicines are totally inappropriate. Fees are not 
only relevant for revenue collection. User fees are ‘output-based payments’ that foster 
quality of care, responsiveness to users and efficiency because the health facility gains if 
services are delivered [Mamdani B. 2007]. Fees also stem overconsumption of health-
care services and moral hazard by the public. The case of Tanzania is quite representative. 
With the 1967 Arusha Declaration, the Tanzanian Government became the major 
provider and financier of health services, putting emphasis on the free provision of 
primary health-care services. Health services were expanded to rural areas. However, 
Tanzania was not self-sufficient in its social policies.545 In 1994 user fees (cost sharing 
and drug capitalization) were introduced with a view of “generat[ing] additional 
resources to compliment government budgetary allocations” [The United Republic of 
Tanzania, Baseline Survey of the Pharmaceutical Sector in Tanzania 2002, 2002]. The 
reported user fee income proportion for the district health budget was on average 10.5% 
[Laterveer et al 2004: v]. In Tanzania, user fees are used at the local level that which 
safeguards decentralisation and local accountability. Fees collection offers incentive 
against waste and irrational use of medicines which are otherwise rife in Tanzania 
[Yudkin 1999; Tanzania MoHSW/UNICEF 1987]. Exemptions from payments are 
prescribed for mothers, children under five years of age, the elderly and patients suffering 
a series of chronic and epidemic diseases including for instance tuberculosis and AIDS 
[Tanzania MOH, 2003, National Health Policy]. The implementation of the fee system 
has, however, been quite distinct from the policy announced by the government. The 
                                                                                                                                 
officially opposes the utilisation of user fees as condition for loans by the IMF and the 
World Bank. The 2000 US Foreign Aid Bill prohibits the US government from 
supporting future programmes of international financial institutions or the IMF that 
include the introduction of fees as a loan condition. In particular: “[t]he Secretary of the 
Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international 
financial institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial 
Institutions Act) and the International Monetary Fund to oppose any loan of these 
institutions that would require user fees or service charges on poor people for primary 
education or primary healthcare, including prevention and treatment efforts for 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and infant, child, and maternal well-being, in 
connection with the institutions’ lending programs” [US Public Law 106-429, Section 
596]. See also CHER [2002: 3]. 
545 Since the 1960s Tanzania utilised massive amounts of aid and accumulated massive 
amounts of debt. Attempts to restructure the economy indeed took place before the 
intervention of the international financial institutions. However, the health-care system of 
Tanzania collapsed during the 1980s and medicines in particular became overall 
unavailable. With regard to medicines, for instance Havnevik et al report that in 1988 
most hospitals in the country reported to be practically empty of drugs [Havnevik et al 




international NGO Save the Children for instance studied the access to primary health 
care in the Lindi region and reported that exemptions were accorded more as a favour 
than as a right. The use of exemptions for the poorest households, pregnant women and 
children under-five was overall low [Save the Children 2005: 21-22]. My personal 
observation of the dispensaries in the Sumbawanga municipal area and Ulanga (July 
2009) is that the fees for cost sharing of medicines were indeed variable.  
In sum, the policy undertaken by international financial institutions of demanding 
user fees for health services are not permitted or prohibited outright according to the 
human right to medicines. The CESCR pronounces on this matter but its comments are 
tentative and vague. The analysis provided in this section has shown that user fees can 
reduce the affordability of health care for the individual but also have benefits as they 
collect revenues for health systems and avoid overconsumption of health-care assistance. 
In effect, the outcomes of such policies much depend on the context and on how they are 
implemented.  
 
6.2.1.2 Pharmaceutical companies and intellectual property rights 
Chapter 3 showed that the international human right to medicines imposes duties 
on states to protect access to medicines from noxious actions by third parties. Chapter 4 
illustrated that soft law and self-regulation do directly assign duties and responsibilities 
on non-state actors to respect – more or less explicitly – a human right to medicines. 
Section 6.2.1.2 focuses on the problem of whether and when pharmaceutical companies 
fail to respect the human right to medicines by holding patents on their pharmaceutical 
products in sub-Saharan Africa. The policies of pharmaceutical companies can have 
decisive influence on the effects of intellectual property rights on access to medicines. 
Pharmaceutical companies decide whether to apply for patent protection of innovative 
products;546   whether to grant licenses; and whether to enforce patent rights. For a 
notorious example in Africa, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South 
Africa took action against the provision of parallel importation and compulsory licenses 
                                            
546 See Attaran and Gillespie-White arguing that antiretrovirals are seldom patented in 
African countries even if patent protection is available by law [Attaran and Gillespie-
White 2001]. The significance and accuracy of the study has been vivaciously rebutted 




in the South Africa’s Patent Act [South Africa, PMA v. South Africa, 2001].547 The 
pharmaceutical companies can also put pressure on the governments of developed 
countries about the implementation and enforcement of intellectual property abroad.548 In 
fact, major pharmaceutical companies are now pledging to embrace ‘friendly’ patent 
policies. However, such actions are generally not systematic, concentrating on some 
geographic regions and a selection of products on a case-by-case basis.549 After all, it can 
                                            
547 For an account of the case see Klug [2005], Pugatch [2004: 216-17] and CpTech 
[website, Court Case Between 39 Pharmaceutical Firms and The South African 
Government]. 
548 See Drahos and Braithwaite [2002]; May [2000]; Oxfam, Patents Versus Patients 
[2006: 14]; Sell [2003]; Pfizer, 2007 Corporate Responsibility Report [2007: 92]; and 
Pugatch [2004]. 
549 I have reviewed the policies of a sample of pharmaceutical companies. The selection, 
presented in alphabetical order, is based on a combination of factors. The companies are 
among the 20 biggest pharmaceutical companies for sale and revenue, vastly exporting to 
sub-Saharan Africa. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim have also been 
involved in the notorious case TAC v. GSK, BI and others at the South Africa 
Competition Commission [Tau et al 2002]. The same selection has been examined, 
ceteris paribus, in Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.3. Boehringer Ingelheim is renouncing patents 
on Viramune® (nevirapine) and Aptivus® (tipranavir) for HIV/AIDS. With regard to 
Viramune® (nevirapine), “[i]n the past Boehringer Ingelheim granted Voluntary 
Licenses to several companies in Africa enabling them to produce generic nevirapine for 
low income countries as per World Bank classification. In order to further improve and 
facilitate access to nevirapine, Boehringer Ingelheim will not enforce its patents and 
offers interested manufactures listed on the WHO prequalification list non-assert 
declarations allowing them to supply nevirapine-containing medicines for Eligible 
Countries. These Eligible Countries are defined as all low income countries according to 
the World Bank classification of economies, all countries classified as Least Developed 
Country (LDC) according to the United Nations and all African states which are not 
classified as low income of LDC like South Africa, Botswana” [Boehringer Ingelheim, 
2009(b): 2]. With regard to Aptivus® (tipranavir), “[a] policy in equivalent terms shall 
apply to Aptivus®. At the moment, wherever there is a medical need with patients who 
are highly treatment experienced with virus resistance to multiple protease inhibitors, the 
product is available for those patients in form of a Compassionate Use Programme” [id.]. 
GlaxoSmithKline has identified as part of its responsibilities in access to medicines 
“[b]eing more flexible on intellectual property” [GSK, website, 2009(b)]. Since 2009 
GlaxoSmithKline launched a LDC (Least-Developing Countries) Neglected Tropical 
Disease patent pool and has implemented price reductions on patented products in Least-
Developing Countries. The commitment is that “all GSK patented products in these 
countries will now cost less than 25 per cent of their price in the referenced developed 
countries… GSK reduced prices for seven patented brands (110 individual product lines 
and formulations) by an average of 45 per cent” [id.]. Other firms like Novartis also 
proclaim attention to providing access to patented medicines to developing countries. 
Novartis acknowledges that “the price of patented, life-saving medication plays an 
important role in the attainment of treatment for poor people from developing countries” 
and the firm pleads to contribute to solving this problem “for example by issuing 




be commented, pharmaceutical companies are concerned with the economic return of 
access to medicines policies:550 showcase approaches are instrumental to the reputation 
of pharmaceutical companies and therefore more convenient than comprehensive 
undertakings. From an ethical point of view, nonetheless, it is not clear whether 
pharmaceutical companies shall relinquish patents in sub-Saharan Africa altogether. 
Questions can be raised about which countries should be permitted not to respect 
intellectual property rights on medicines, and for which parts of the population and 
sectors (public, private not-for-profit and/or private for-profit). The issue is complicated 
considering the other factors influencing access to medicines apart from the protection of 
intellectual property. As seen in Chapter 2, the capacity of health systems to deliver 
medicines depends on a combination of supply and demand elements. 551  Such 
complexity weakens the causation nexus between patents on pharmaceutical products 
                                                                                                                                 
developing countries at cost price…” [Novartis, website, The Right to Health and Access 
to Treatment, last accessed 2 November 2009]. Some companies are instead less keen. 
Pfizer, for instance, does not seem to adopt flexibilities for its patents policy in 
developing countries. Indeed, in its “Corporate Responsibility Report”, Pfizer only 
stresses that “[w]e believe that strong patent laws, when balanced with reasonable times 
of exclusive marketing rights, lead to more medicines and, ultimately, less disease. There 
is a view that patent rights limit access to medicines because they prohibit the 
unauthorized manufacture and sale of a patented medicine. We disagree that patents are a 
primary cause of limited access to medicines” [Pfizer, 2007 Corporate Responsibility 
Report, 2007: 90]. 
550 The pharmaceutical sector is increasingly compelled to help access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa because this policy ‘makes business sense’. Shareholder groups for 
instance note that friendly policies boost the favours of the procurers and consumers of 
emerging countries’ markets, employees’ satisfaction and recruiting, and overall the 
companies’ reputation. See, e.g., the Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group [2004: 1] and 
the Ethical Investment Research Services [EIRIS 2005: 7].  In effect, the PMA v. South 
Africa case was dropped before a verdict was issued by the South African High Court 
because of the pressure from the civil society [Pugatch 2004: 216-217; South Africa, 
PMA v. South Africa, 2001].  
551 It can be recalled for example that some pharmaceutical products remain out of reach 
of African health systems even in their generic formulations. As a journalist from the 
Wall Street Journal reports, quite scornfully, regarding the initiative of a generic 
pharmaceutical company to obtain from the South African government a compulsory 
license: “[t]he South African government has been tossed a hot potato by Indian drug 
maker Cipla, which asked Wednesday for legal permission to supply the country with 
low-cost generic copies of patented AIDS medicines… Officials privately say they are 
worried that should Cipla win its bid to supply the country with cheap AIDS drugs, the 
government will not have the budget to buy them or distribute them. ‘We are in real 
danger that Cipla could open the door on the AIDS drugs barrier in this country and we 
will not be able to walk through,’ said one health-ministry official” [Block 2001]. Also 
see Attaran reporting that “[t]he government of Zimbabwe, which also accounted that it 
would break patents in order to provide HIV/AIDS medicines... never bought the 




and access to medicines in Africa, thereby diminishing the responsibility of the patenting 
pharmaceutical companies. Such remark applies all the more to the lack of access to 
medicines for the poorest who may not afford generic formulations anyway. 
 
6.2.2 Non-discrimination  
6.2.2.1 Foreign states 
The ICESCR obligation to respect the human right to health, and thence the 
human right to medicines, contains the prohibition of discrimination [CESCR 2000: 34, 
50]. In its basic formula, the prohibition relates to discrimination founded on race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.552 Foreign states can exercise discrimination for instance when offering 
international aid for providing or facilitating access to medicines. With regard to 
international agencies, in particular, the CESCR maintains that “the international 
agencies should scrupulously avoid involvement in projects which… promote or 
reinforce discrimination against individuals or groups contrary to the provisions of the 
Covenant” [CESCR 1990(a): para. 6]. Furthermore, the CESCR advances the principle of 
substantive non-discrimination when stating – but falling short of prescribing – that: 
“[p]riority in the provision of international medical aid, distribution and management of 
resources, such as… food and medical supplies… should be given to the most vulnerable 
or marginalized groups of the population” [CESCR 2000: 40, emph. add.]. Substantive 
equality – e.g. the favour for the vulnerable and the marginalised – is however also 
problematic to operationalise, as seen in Chapter 5 section 5.2.2.  
For example, people living with AIDS are identified by the Special Rapporteur as 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginalised’.553 Still, the numerous foreign aid programmes which 
focus on HIV/AIDS may raise doubts with respect of those who are not supported by 
                                            
552 From ICESCR art. 22 [ICESCR art. 22]. The ACHPR provides for a similar list, 
adding the categories of ethnic group and replacing property with fortune [ACHPR, art. 
2]. See Chapter 5 section 5.2.2. 
553  As seen in Chapter 5 section 5.2.2 the CESCR is silent on the identity of the 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginalised’ people. The Special Rapporteur instead, when 
investigating home states duties, does identify ‘vulnerable individuals’ and 
‘disadvantaged groups’ as including “women and girls, ethnic minority and indigenous 
populations, people living in poverty, people living with HIV/AIDS, internally displaced 




them. Nguyen for instance studies the impact of the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in Ivory Coast. Nguyen notes that triage is both used to decide 
who gets treatment and to “exclude[e] others either because they are HIV-negative or not 
considered ‘vulnerable’”, such as children orphaned by the war rather than AIDS 
[Gerrets and Rottenburg 2008: 70]. Nguyen interestingly elaborates identifying the 
phenomenon of ‘therapeutic citizenship’ whereby “the only meaningful form of 
citizenship comes from belonging to a program such as US President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief which not only offers treatment, but also identity papers, nutritional 
support, and schooling for one’s family” [id.]. The favour for the vulnerable and the 
marginalised, thus, can be disputed under the very principle of non-discrimination. 
However, the concentration of resources can be required to deliver quality care to people. 
In effect quality assistance does not only entail medical care but also food supplements, 
financial support and other implements. Arguably, such considerations are sanctioned by 
the moral principles of individual need or individual welfare.554  
Central coordination at the national level could address the ‘unequal’ impact of 
vertical foreign aid programmes, provided that it succeeds in being implemented in an 
‘egalitarian’ way. Some developing countries now collect foreign aid in ‘basket funds’. 
In Tanzania a basket fund and other coordination mechanisms have been established for 
some diseases.555 The US however does not participate to the fund arguing that it prefers 
acting instead as a distinct safety net. The USAID officials I interviewed (Dar es Salaam, 
August 2009) in effect report that USAID had to play as ‘fallback’ in several occasions, 







                                            
554 Those problems are further explored in section 6.4.1 relating to the fulfilment of the 
human right to medicines by foreign states. See also Chapter 5 section 5.4.2. 




6.2.2.2 Non-state actors 
International law does not hold NGOs, international funds and public-private 
partnerships accountable for violations of non-discrimination directly. States however 
have to protect against discrimination on prohibited grounds by third parties. 556 
Furthermore, those entities can self-regulate on non-discrimination.557 It is more difficult 
to operationalise the de facto component of formal non-discrimination, for instance with 
regard to the selection of a region/country where the entity would operate. NGOs in 
particular usually act out of ‘vocation’ in certain parts of the world and they can hardly 
be expected to dedicate their efforts equally worldwide. The actualisation of substantive 
non-discrimination poses further hurdles. As mentioned in section 6.2.2.1 above with 
regard to international organisations and NGOs the CESCR states (but does not prescribe) 
that “[p]riority in the provision of international medical aid, distribution and management 
of resources, such as… medical supplies… should be given to the most vulnerable or 
marginalized groups of the population” [CESCR 2000: para. 65 emph. add.].558  
The Global Fund on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria can be used to illustrate the 
problems of non-discrimination with regard to the conduct of non-state actors for the 
facilitation of access to medicines. 559  The Global Fund was launched in 2001 as a 
financing mechanism for country-level efforts to combat AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
Admittedly, the Global Fund collects and distributes vast financial resources for tackling 
“three of the world’s most devastating diseases and to channel the money to areas of 
greatest need” [GFATM, website, Fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, last 
accessed 9 November 2009].560  Thus, it is apparent that the fund only focuses on the 
                                            
556 See Chapter 3, Chapter 4 section 4.3.2 and Chapter 5. 
557 As seen in Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.2 for instance, international NGOs with the “INGO 
Accountability Charter” pledge not to discriminate [INGO Accountability Charter, 2003: 
Principles, para. 5]. 
558 Alternatively, the CESCR’s paragraph could be interpreted as indicating the priority 
for the vulnerable and marginalised only in ‘times of emergency’, considering the first 
part of the paragraph which refers to those circumstances. However, noting the analogy 
with paragraph 40 of the same document, I understand that the CESCR meant to 
recommend a more general priority to the vulnerable and marginalised [CESCR 2000: 
para. 40]. 
559  The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is an independent entity, 
governed by a board of directors that includes representatives from donors, the UN, civil 
society, and the private sector [Leach et al 2005: 44-5]. To note, however, 98% of the 
funds are pledged by governments [Feachem and Sabot 2006]. 
560 “Since its creation in 2002, the Global Fund has become the main source of finance 




conditions of certain patients. From the point of view of substantive non-discrimination it 
could be argued that the Global Fund does address the needs of the ‘marginalised’ or the 
‘vulnerable’ if these are identified as the AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis patients, and 
that it intervenes where the need is the greatest. However, overall, the worse-offs in 
health or income are not necessarily those who receive the Global Fund’s attention. The 
Global Fund states that “[i]n making its funding decisions, the Fund will support 
proposals which… Give due priority to the most affected countries and communities, and 
to those countries most at risk” [GFATM, Framework Document, 2002: Section 
III(H)(9)], and finances proposals originated by governments as well as civil society 
organisations.561 In fact, as Sabot and Feachem (former Executive Director of the fund) 
themselves note, there is tension between the empowerment of local groups to determine 
the disease-control priorities and strategies in their countries on the one side and the need 
to ensure that those priorities and strategies are the most effective use of resources on the 
other side [Feachem and Sabot 2006]. Furthermore, the fund dispenses money according 
to the performance of the recipients. Consequently, it is less likely that poor health 
systems will facilitate outcomes attractive enough for the fund’s board.562 Even if the 
fund adopts procedures equally open to all countries for selecting the recipients of their 
recipients, the outcome may be still differ depending on the ability of the applicants to 
formulate and manage the proposals.  
In sum, section 6.2.2 has shown that the prohibition of non-discrimination is 
particularly problematic to operationalise. It seems established that the enjoyment of the 
human right to medicines shall not be affected by intentional discrimination under the 
internationally prohibited grounds. Such prohibition, however, refers to – but does not 
deal with – the paradox of equality in the ‘human rights subsystem’, as also discussed in 
                                                                                                                                 
15.6 billion for more than 572 programs in 140 countries” [Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, website, About the Global Fund, last accessed 9 November 
2009].  
561 Also, “[t]he Fund will balance its resources by giving due priority to areas with the 
greatest burden of disease, while strengthening efforts in areas with growing epidemics” 
[GFATM, Framework Document, 2002: Section IV (A)]. 
562 Thus, the fund can actually increase rather than decrease the inequality of the health 
status of the worse-offs. As Bluestone et al put it, “[t]he temptation for JPPIs [joint 
public-private initiatives] is to target countries or parts of countries where health systems 
are already strong and can deliver quick results” [Bluestone et al 2002: 17]. About GAVI 
see also Starling et al [2002]. The Global Fund indeed recognises those limitations, and 
calls on other donors to contribute to systematic, long-term development of fundamental 





Chapter 5 section 5.2.2. The principle of special attention to the vulnerable and the 
marginalised tries to obviate such paradox. However, this attempt of prohibiting 
substantive discrimination is not positivised by the legal subsystem and, as demonstrated, 
is of difficult application. It can be argued, more simply, that some de facto and 
substantive discrimination are unavoidable in extra-governmental interventions for the 
fulfilment of access to medicines. From a legal point of view, in effect, I am not aware of 
cases awarded against extra-governmental actors on the grounds of de facto and 
substantive non-discrimination. From an ethical point of view, it is noted, de facto and 
substantive non-discrimination are germane to the moral principles of equality and equity 
in the distribution of health-care resources. The importance and limitations of these 
principles are studied in the ethical analysis of the biopolitical choices concerning access 
to medicines, which has been presented in Chapter 5 with regard to the policies of home 
states and is further explored in section 6.4 with regard to extra-governmental actors.563 
 
6.3 Protect  
The CESCR describes the obligation to protect the human right to health 
internationally as follows: “[t]o comply with their international obligations in relation to 
article 12, States parties have to… prevent third parties from violating the right in other 
countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political 
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international 
law” [CESCR 2000: para. 39]. As seen in Chapter 4 section 4.1 the identification de jure 
of violations of the right with regard to access to medicines by non-state actors is 
problematic. I hypothesise here that, for example, foreign states may be required to 
regulate pharmaceutical companies on the quality and safety of medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Such initiative could be seen as an ideal response to the problems of sub-Saharan 
African regulatory authorities in registering and controlling, especially, new and 
sophisticated pharmaceutical products. 564  However, it should not be overlooked that 
                                            
563 Those principles, together with the other principles are analysed in Chapter 5 section 
5.4.2.   




these initiatives are also subject to cognitive limitations in the subsystem of science, 
‘deficits of execution’, and exert important biopower.565  
There are different problems related to the use of foreign standards or the 
international harmonisation for the regulation of the safety, quality and efficacy of 
pharmaceutical products. To begin with, there may be country or population-specific 
issues that need to be taken into account, such as those concerning the ‘metabolic 
pathway’ of the product [Hill and Johnson 2004: 14]. Next, clinical practice varies from 
country to country. Thus, what may be a reasonable indication for a product based on the 
data in one country may not fit with the style of clinical practice in another [id.]. The 
balance between, on the one side, the penchant in public health for prescribing regulation 
mandatory for all and, on the other side, the autonomy of professionals and patients to 
choose what product to use may not be universal. Furthermore, safety standards vary 
across countries which are supposed to weigh the balance of risks and benefits according 
to their health needs, for instance considering different burdens of disease and level of 
medical resources available [Jack 2007].566 Moreover, issues of safety and efficacy are 
not definitely settled in the science.567 In effect, it is not possible to determine a priori 
with clinical trials all the consequences of a medicine’s intake. Continuous empirical 
observation of the medium and long term – drugs surveillance and post-marketing 
monitoring are also needed. Thus, adverse reaction reporting has to be as widespread as 
possible. In effect, international networks are rather usefully undertaken in which drug 
regulatory authorities can exchange information between themselves or with 
international bodies such as the WHO.568 Problematic has been instead the attempt of the 
WHO to exercise global regulation through the WHO Pre-Qualification Programme 
regarding pharmaceutical products for AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The programme 
has been responsible for serious inefficiencies.569 This is unfortunate considering that the 
                                            
565  Deficits of implementation are one of the practical limits of the steering of the 
political subsystem [Luhmann 1997: 44]. 
566 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.1. 
567 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.1. 
568 WHO manages several programmes for sharing information on the safety, quality and 
efficacy of medicines. See WHO, How to Develop and Implement a National Drug 
Policy [2001: 57]. 
569  The Prequalification Programme for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis 
pharmaceutical products has been criticised by Dr Gillies, president of MSF’s 
International Council, as becoming “a barrier to, rather than a tool for, expanding access 




approval of medicines to be distributed in African countries, both by African regulatory 
authorities and by foreign donors, considerably relies on the programme.570 It is also 
noted that exporting countries may take responsibility for controlling the safety and 
quality of the medicines exported. However, delays in the registration of pharmaceutical 
products for exportation or donation can damage access to medicines in African 
countries.571  
 
6.4 Fulfil  
The role of extra-governmental actors in fulfilling the human right to medicines is 
of particular relevance considering the limited financial and technical resources of 
African countries for realising access to medicines.572 For certain projects and diseases, 
especially those related to AIDS, external funds cover the greatest part of expenses in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In Tanzania, for example, the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) provides second-line, alternative first-line and children treatment 
for AIDS. Other states are involved in bilateral cooperation on access to medicines.573 
The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria provides funding for all for first-
line antiretrovirals. The Global Fund also provides all funding for the procurement of 
artemisin-based combination therapy (ACT) in the public sector. Many international 
NGOs contribute to access to health care and medicines in Tanzania. For example the 
Clinton Foundation, among other things, participates to AIDS and malaria programmes 
[Clinton Foundation 2008; Haonga 2007; Kwitema 2007; Hutton 2004]. Faith-based 
organisations provide 40% of health care [Tanzania, Survey of the Medicines Prices in 
Tanzania, 2004]. International pharmaceutical corporations are participating to 
partnerships for several health problems in Tanzania. 574  Novartis for example sells 
                                                                                                                                 
also Lancet, The important World of Drug Prequalification [2004]; Health Gap [2005]. 
See also supra section 6.2.1.1. 
570 Interviews at TFDA [July-August 2009, Dar es Salaam].  
571 The US Food and Drug Authority (FDA), for example, has been criticised for such 
delays. See e.g. The Economist, From Bench to Bedside [2007], Health Gap [2005], 
interviews [July-August 2009, Dar es Salaam].  
572 See Chapters 2 and 5. 
573 The Danish (DANIDA), Finnish (FINNIDA), Norwegian (NORAD) and Swedish 
(SIDA) international development agencies have all collaborated on access to health-care 
and medicines in Tanzania. See e.g. Havnevik et al [1998]. 
574  For example, Boerhinger-Ingelheim, Abbott, Merck & co., Pfizer collaborate on 




Coartem, the artemisin-based combination therapy selected by the Tanzanian state for 
distribution in the public sector, for a non-profit price to the country. Thus, the possibility 
of exercise of biopower ‘to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ by extra-
governmental actors in access to medicines is apparent. Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 analyse 
the operationalisation and implementation of the contributions of, respectively, foreign 
states and non-state actors to the fulfilment of access to medicines. In particular, it 
investigates for whom, for what and how much extra-governmental should intervene in 
access to medicines. Section 6.4.3 deals with the enforcement of the human right to 
medicines with regard to extra-governmental actors. 
 
6.4.1 Foreign states  
There are no obligations of foreign states to immediately realise the provision of 
‘essential drugs’, one of the core domestic obligations of the states parties to the ICESCR 
[CESCR 2000: para. 43(d)]. Nonetheless, the CESCR does identify duties of facilitation 
and cooperation for the realisation of ICESCR rights abroad, also referring to other 
international commitments, namely the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly 
Declaration on the Right to Development [UN GA Res. 128 (1986)] and the ‘well-
established principles of international law’ [CESCR 1990(b): para. 14].575 The CESCR 
operationalises such prescriptions for health indicating that foreign interventions should 
give priority to the vulnerable and marginalised groups of the population [CESCR 2000: 
para. 40]. In addition, drawing from the Alma Ata Declaration, the CESCR advances 
another parameter, namely, the difference in health status of people within and between 
countries [id.: para. 38]. The amount of aid to be distributed, according to the CESCR, 
should depend on the availability of resources of the donor country [CESCR 2000: para. 
                                                                                                                                 
collaborate on tropical diseases; Novo Nordisk, Sanofi-Aventis collaborate on chronic 
diseases [IFPMA, website, Health Partnerships: Developing World – 2009, Tanzania, 
2010]. Novartis also delivered nearly 250,000 tuberculosis treatments to Tanzania 
between 2005 and 2008. With a 2009 Memorandum of Understanding, Novartis 
committed to extend the donation, delivering another 250,000 treatments over the 3-4 
years. This donation is worth about US$ 6 million and aimed to treat an estimated 60,000 
patients per year [Novartis, website, Novartis Extends Tuberculosis Drug Donation to 
Tanzania, 2009]. 
575 In the General Comment on the right to health, the CESCR refers to UN Charter art. 
56, ICESCR arts. 12, 2(1), 22 and 23 and the Alma Ata Declaration to maintain that 
“[s]tates parties should recognize the essential role of international cooperation and 
comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full 




39]. Nonetheless, in cases of emergency, each state “should contribute to this task to the 
maximum of its capacities” [id.: para. 40].576 The Special Rapporteur on the human right 
to health also reported on the duties of international assistance and cooperation with 
similar position to those of the CESCR.577  
In practice, foreign states traditionally provide aid for health abroad as part of 
their foreign policies. Furthermore, they are increasingly rationalising their interventions 
within programmes and plans in the name of development – which often also refer to 
human rights. In the following paragraphs I analyse these latter type of undertakings. It 
will be shown that the biopolitical decisions concerning help for health abroad entail 
momentous practical and moral problems. It will therefore be asked whether these 
interventions in effect fit with the fulfilment of the human right to health and medicines, 
and if such fit can be a normative model. As an example, I analyse the WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) report “Macroeconomics and 
Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development” [CMH 2001]. The report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health gives recommendations for the utilisation 
of resources domestically in developing countries and for the disbursement of aid by 
extra-governmental actors. The report is very specific, quantifying the amount of 
resources that states ‘should’ donate for health in developing countries at US$ 22 billion 
per year by 2007 and US$ 31 billion per year by 2015 [CMH 2001: 11]. Importantly for 
our discussion the report is influential with regard to access to medicines. The report, for 
instance, is referred to by the “WHO Medicines Strategy 2004-2007” [WHO, WHO 
Medicines Strategy 2004-2007, 2004: 13, 58, 60, 62].578 It is recalled that the CESCR 
sanctions the authority of WHO’s normative activity, recommending states to use 
                                            
576 For emergencies the CESCR names “disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in 
times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons” 
[CESCR 2000: para. 40]. Again, the CESCR refers to normative sources other than the 
ICESCR. In particular, the CESCR refers here to the UN Charter, relevant resolutions of 
the UNGA and of the World Health Assembly [id.]. 
577 Like the CESCR, Hunt recommends the collaboration of developed states calibrated 
to the available resources and encourages priority for the disadvantaged groups [Hunt 
2005: para. 64]. Hunt furthermore refers directly to the international aid for access to 
medicines envisioning that developed states should, inter alia, “help developing 
countries establish… health systems that include reliable medicine supply systems 
delivering quality affordable medicines for all…” [Hunt 2006: para. 64].  
578 The report is also having operational consequence as, for instance, approximately 40 
countries (14 in sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania) have undertaken national 
follow-up to the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health’s recommendations 




WHO’s works to formulate and implement strategies to realise the human right to 
health.579 To note, the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health recognises health as 
human right, thereby it subscribes to the ‘human rights subsystem’ [CMH 2001: 21]. 
However, it also uses the communications of economics (incidentally, the Commission 
has been chaired from 2000 to 2001 by economist Sachs, who subsequently became the 
head of the UN Millennium Project). In fact, the report can be questioned as simplifying 
in its rationalisations a variety of complex issues, including economics, medicine and the 
moral concern for poverty and health care.  
The ‘investment for development’ is purportedly aimed at favouring the poor. 
This should occur both directly, by relieving the poor from morbidity – although the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health recognises that the interventions it 
identifies also affect the better-offs580 – and indirectly, through the economic benefits of 
a stimulated country’s economy [id.: 23]. In particular, by 2010, around eight million 
lives per year would be saved “mainly in the low-income countries” through the aid 
provided by foreign states [id.: 11]. This amount equals to 330 million disability-adjusted 
life-years (DALYs) [id.: 12]. 581  Consequently, attributing the economic benefit of 
US$ 563 to one DALY they calculate that “the direct economic benefit of saving 330 
million DALYs would be [US]$186 billion per year, and plausibly several times that” 
[CMH 2001: 12]. Speaking the language of the economic subsystem, with regard to the 
stimulus to the country economy, the use made by the commission of DALYs to grasp 
the economic benefits is disputed.582  Furthermore, in order to reduce the burden of 
                                            
579 The CESCR attributes special relevance for the realisation of the right to health to the 
development of health programmes by WHO [CESCR 2000: paras. 1, 63].  
580 Sic, CMH [2001: 42]. 
581 On the definition of DALYs see Chapter 2 section 2.2.1 and Chapter 5 section 5.4.2. 
582 The economic benefit of a health intervention cannot be really grasped by the DALYs 
saved. Attaran and Granville for instance argue that the proposed interventions should be 
evaluated on the long-run health and macroeconomic benefits [Attaran and Granville 
2004: 182]. Accordingly, for example, they recommend treatment for (adults suffering 
from) malaria even though “the immune system cost nothing and saves life 99.8 per cent 
of time” because it saves the overall cost of malaria which includes the individual’s out-
of-pocket expenses and long-term disability, the worker’s in lost wages, the enterprise’s 
lost output and the state’s lost income [Attaran and Granville 2004: 181]. Attaran and 
Granville also work on the assumption that “improving the delivery of essential 
medicines and producing good health is part of the more general agenda of development 
policy” [Attaran and Granville 2004: 189]. See also Kumaranayake and Walker [2002] 
and Brock and Wikler [2006] for a critique of the calculation of DALYs undertaken in 




disease, the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health promotes disease-oriented 
vertical health programmes on identifiable targets. 583  The commission assumes that 
vertical programmes are more efficient.584 Lele et al, who are nonetheless critical towards 
vertical approaches, have indeed noted that “[t]he long history of management of vertical 
programmes resulted in the development of strong skills, extensive networks, and the 
basic infrastructure necessary for efficient and effective implementation of program 
activities” [Lele et al 2005: 21].585 The efficiency of vertical approaches, however, is the 
object of a prolonged debate among public health specialists. In practical terms, 
considering the environment’s contingencies, it has been remarked that the integration of 
health interventions consents economies of scale in improving systems for a number of 
communicable diseases rather than attempting to strengthen systems disease by disease. 
Furthermore, integration also avoids the transaction costs of dealing with each disease – 
and vertical programme – separately [Lele et al 2005]. 586  Always from a practical 
perspective, Kumaranayake and Walker point out that factors determining effectiveness 
vary from context to context, and such global approaches ignore context. Moreover, 
shifting resources is not costless, while these approaches ignore very critical investment 
on basic infrastructure of a health system, which may vary [Kumaranayake and Walker 
2002].  
Certainly, vertical programmes raise the profile of a specific problem or solution 
[Buse 2006]. Reportedly, the WHO/UNAIDS ‘3 by 5’ initiative sanctioned a change in 
thinking about how to tackle the global AIDS epidemic according to which not only 
prevention but also treatment are important [The Economist, 1.3 by 5, 2006]. The 
                                                                                                                                 
utilisation of lives saved as the only input for the DALYs saved seems to be erroneous as 
it neglects all the morbidity (short of mortality) saved. 
583 In the public health literature, horizontal programmes regard the health-care system at 
once, for instance through primary health care, while vertical programmes are disease-
oriented. 
584 One of the principles inspiring the report is that of spending more efficiently. Indeed, 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health take part in the debate among global 
health experts on how development assistance for health should be used more effectively. 
For the debate over the most efficient uses of development assistance for health see e.g. 
Ravishankar [2009: 2113]. Also, there is an assumption that donor funds will flow if it is 
demonstrated that they will be used efficiently [CMH 2001: 97; Brundtland 2001].  
585 Lele et al write for the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, undertaking 
a study on “Health System Capacities in Developing Countries and Global Health 
Initiatives on Communicable Diseases” [International Task Force on Global Public 
Goods, Terms of Reference, 2002]. 





programme in effect fell short of its goal but it has been argued that “there is little doubt 
that, without the initiative, the number of people on treatment would not have tripled in 
just 2 years, or increased eight-fold in Africa” [Schwartlander et al 2006].587 However, 
vertical programmes can ‘displace’ other health interventions.588 In effect, in recent years, 
HIV/AIDS has received most of the attention from the international community while the 
volume of general health-system support that are not linked to specific programmes or 
diseases have remained low [Ravishanker et al 2009: 2118].589 For the US, for instance, 
in 2003 HIV/AIDS constituted nearly half of all US health funding while health sector 
development funding had ‘virtually vanished’.590 In Tanzania, the funding from the US 
and the Global Fund are strongly skewed in favour of AIDS.591 Notably, the fact that 
                                            
587  UNAIDS and WHO worked as catalysers of funding aimed to distribute 
antiretrovirals to three million people by 2005. In fact, only 1.3 million HIV positive 
patients obtained the antiretrovirals [The Economist, 1.3 by 5, 2006]. See the scathing 
critique pronounced by Bate and Mooney: “[t]he ‘3 by 5’ initiative cut corners on drug 
quality exposing thousands of patients to drugs of unknown quality (all over Africa); it 
over-strained poor countries’ fragile health systems, potentially undermining small-scale 
but successful treatment programs (notably Sierra Leone and Lesotho); failed to maintain 
dialogue or even consult with some countries that disagreed with its targets and methods 
(notably South Africa); furthermore, it failed to promote good clinical practice, so it is 
unknown how many patients are failing treatment (all over Africa)” [Bate and Mooney 
2006]. 
588 The resources displaced can be financial as well as human, technical etc. For instance, 
it has been reported that the best medical talents are diverted to ‘trendy’ causes and away 
from basic medicine such as against diarrhoea and respiratory infections – the chief 
killers of children [The Economist, More Money than Sense, 2007]. See also Lele [2005], 
Walt and Buse [2006], Brown et al [2006]. 
589 This notwithstanding the arguments made by donors emphasising the importance of 
funds providing general health support [Ravishanker et al 2009: 2118]. See generally 
Ravishanker et al for an account of global health development assistance for health from 
1990 to 2007 [Ravishanker et al 2009].   
590  Jeremy Shiffman [Presentation at annual meeting of American Public Health 
Association, November 7th, 2006]. A similar remark has been expressed by USAID 
officials in Tanzania  [Interviews, US Embassy, Dar es Salaam, August 2009].  
591 The 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Tanzania reveals that roughly US$ 
280 ml have been requested for AIDS, while US$ 52 for malaria, US$ 8 for maternal and 
child health, US$ 3.7 for tuberculosis [United States of America, 2010, FY 2010 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 2010]. A senior USAID 
official in Tanzania also hinted at a 67% increase in US funds for AIDS from 2008 to 
2009 [Interviews, 2009, US Embassy, Dar es Salaam]. Analogously, the maximum grants 
approved by the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the other major donor 
for medicines in Tanzania, are also skewed in favour of HIV/AIDS projects, considering 
that they are divided as follows: for HIV, US$ 507,536,271; for HIV/tuberculosis, US$ 
83,466,904; for malaria, US$ 275,300,919 (plus US$ 76,050,523 pending request from 
round 9); for tuberculosis, US$ 16,498,948 [GFATM website, Tanzania and the Global 




more international resources are flowing to the AIDS cause does not necessarily entail 
that at the domestic level less resources are dedicated to other health problems. The 
international resources, indeed, can be merely additional rather than fungible. In the case 
of global health initiatives for AIDS in Tanzania however Hutton, in a thought-through 
review of the “Global Health Initiatives in HIV/AIDS in Tanzania”, maintains that “it is 
becoming clear that funds for HIV/AIDS will not contribute significantly to general 
capacity development, and therefore will not benefit control of other diseases. It is likely 
that other major killer diseases will not be addressed sufficiently, leading to gross 
inefficiencies in resource allocation” [Hutton 2004: 15-16]. Hutton specifically points out 
that “the HIV/AIDS Public Expenditure Review (November 2003) already showed that 
donor projects do not all address government priorities” [id.]. Furthermore Hutton reports 
that the annual budget of Tanzania (including external support) for the AIDS Care & 
Treatment Plan dwarfed the entire Health Sector budget including external support – in 
2004 the former stood at US$ 100 million while the second amounted to US$ 200 million.  
The contentions of the Commission’s report are in effect questionable when 
arguments regarding medicine and the moral concern for health are taken into 
consideration. Separating patients in vertical programmes according to the specific 
disease they suffer is problematic considering their very health. Patients often suffer from 
a combination of health conditions at the same time which can afflict them with 
impairing synergies.592 Also, the health problems need not be medical strictly speaking. 
For example malnutrition has devastating effects on health.593 The World Bank as well 
recognises the importance of horizontal programmes, primary health care and continuity 
as opposed to vertical, ‘cut and run’ projects [World Bank 1994: 51]. Therefore 
immunisation, maternal and child care must be integrated in health facilities providing 
steady and ongoing care [id.]. Unger et al also remark that “the number of diseases 
requiring clinical intervention makes it impossible to consider vertical programmes as the 
gold standard template for disease control organisation” [Unger et al 2006: 3]. Unger et 
al even contend that the favour of international aid for policies of health-care 
                                                                                                                                 
Global Fund (56%) is devoted to fighting AIDS, whereas tuberculosis, the disease with 
the smallest financing gap, has the smallest share (17%) [Feacham and Sabot 2006]. The 
role of the Global Fund in the fulfilment of access to medicines is analysed infra in 
section 6.4.2. 
592 Interviews with physicians, Tanzania and Kenya, July-August 2009. 
593 Iinterviews at KEMRI-Wellcome Trust, Kilifi District Hospital [August 2009, Kilifi, 




fragmentation and privatisation strained first line public health care delivery [Unger et al 
2006: 4]. 594  Admittedly, furthermore, the costing estimates of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health do not include “some key categories that will need to be 
part of any operational health system, such as trauma and emergency care…; tertiary 
hospitals; and family planning…beyond the first year after birth” because they are not 
cost-effective [CMH 2001: 55-56].595  
From the perspective of the ethics of distribution of health care, issues of equality 
arise country-wide and worldwide for the patients who have not been selected to obtain 
assistance from the international vertical programmes.596 For instance Daniels noted with 
regard to the ‘3 by 5’ programme that out of the six million people who would potentially 
enjoy the benefits of the programme only three millions would have been chosen 
[Daniels 2005].597 These issues also arise for the population who does not suffer from the 
condition addressed by the vertical programme. Furthermore, it is noted that the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health proclaimed to pursue the equity principle, 
prioritising the poor, also by relieving them from morbidity. However this principle is 
challenged by the medical principle of need which demands to look solely at health 
needs.598 Moreover, in fact, the Commission founds its calculations on the improvement 
of the aggregate health status of a population. Noteworthy, burden of disease and cost-
effectiveness calculations correspond to a prudential, rather than moral, approach.599  
It is asked what indications originate from the report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health specifically for the action by extra-governmental actors on 
access to medicines. With particular regard to pharmaceutical products it has been noted 
                                            
594  This occurred through “pressure exerted by disease control managers, by 
multiplication of disease-specific divisions in (inter) national administrations, by ill-
defined priority-setting and increasing opportunity cost, unrealistic costing, inadequate 
budgets, and financial overruns, failure to make clear the line of command; tension 
between health care professionals over income disparity, treatment discrepancy and 
opportunity costs and problems with sustainability…” [Unger et al 2006: 4]. 
595 Indeed, with regard to the essential health system envisaged, it is “a rather minimal 
health system, one that can attend to the major communicable diseases and maternal and 
perinatal conditions that account for a significant proportion of the avoidable deaths in 
the low-income countries” [CMH 2001: 55]. 
596 For a discussion of the principles of health interventions prioritisation see Chapter 5 
section 5.4.1. 
597  Daniels specifically argues that the criteria for rationing where not discussed, 
therefore the decision was not a ‘just decision’ [Daniels 2004]. 
598 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.2. 




that, if they are to follow vertical programmes, the parallel delivery of medicines may 
lead to duplications (e.g., in transport costs), distortions (as staff is depleted from other 
functions, and demotivated if it sees higher pays in other sectors), disruptions (as health 
workers are taken from other jobs, re-training), and distractions (for example the 
uncoordinated reporting requirements) [Travis et al, 2004: 902]. In Tanzania, vertical 
programmes for essential drugs distribution have been attempted by donors in the past 
but have not been sustainable [Kanji 1992: 671]. Prioritisation is also needed within the 
disease focus in order to select the modality of intervention.600 In our case, it can be 
asked how much should be spent on pharmaceutical products as opposed to, say, non-
pharmacological prevention. The cost of saving from AIDS one DALY by different 
interventions, for instance, has been estimated as: US$ 8 via blood safety, US$ 13 via 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) control, US$ 18 via voluntary counselling and 
testing (VCT), US$ 19 via preventing mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT), and 
finally US$ 3502 via HAART [Marseille et al 2002]. Moreover, as Hutton remarks for 
Tanzania, the “large differences between the cost-effectiveness of prevention and 
treatment are further heightened by the different population sizes that can be affected by 
prevention and treatment activities, at 88% and 1% of the population, respectively” 
[Hutton 2004: 18]. In light of the ethical considerations seen in the paragraphs above and 
in Chapter 5, however, arguments of cost-effectiveness are not conclusive against 
treatment. In particular it is recalled that medical need rather than DALYs can be used to 
decide the adoption of a certain health intervention. Or, it can be argued that triage 
should be based on the identifiable patient rather than on the ‘statistical people’.601 
In sum, at this stage we can try to answer the questions posed at the beginning of 
this section, whether the rationalisation of foreign aid for health in developing countries 
proposed by the WHO Commission for Macroeconomics and Health fits with the 
fulfilment of the human right to medicines, and if such fit can be a normative model. The 
report of the Commission, it can be argued, by and large fits with some instances of the 
human right to medicines. For example, the report prioritises the poor, also by relieving 
them from morbidity. This is possibly in line with the recommendations of the CESCR 
and Special Rapporteur on the vulnerable and marginalised [CESCR 2000: para. 40; 
Hunt 2005: para. 64]. Or, it focuses on certain conditions, again arguably affecting 
                                            
600 In effect, the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health’s ‘primary targets’ are 
indeed numerous.  




vulnerable and marginalised groups [id.]. The report also focuses on a “minimal health 
system, one that can attend to the major communicable diseases and maternal and 
perinatal conditions that account for a significant proportion of the avoidable deaths in 
the low-income countries” [CMH 2001: 55]. This idea is arguably akin to the satisfaction 
of minimum core obligations of the right to health [CESCR 1990(b): para. 10; 2000: para. 
43]. Yet, it is recalled that the human right to health also sanctions other injunctions, 
including the prescription that everyone is entitled to the maximum attainable standard of 
health [ICESCR art. 12(1); ACHPR art. 16]. Therefore, the international human right to 
medicines prescribes international cooperation; however, it is not clear how cooperation 
should be implemented. The indications from the human right to medicines are often 
paradoxical, contradictory and not framed as legal/illegal prescriptions. Thus, the 
interventions of foreign states in pursuit of the ‘indisputable’ access to health care and 
medicines entail considerable power and biopower to ‘foster life or disallow it to the 
point of death’, influencing the health as well as other rights, interests, needs and liberties 
in sub-Saharan Africa [Foucault 1976: 138]. 
In effect, it is reckoned from a normative point of view, the algorithm proposed 
by the WHO Commission for Macroeconomics and Health proposes undue 
simplifications of the complexities and contingencies of medicine, ethics as well as 
economics and development. Overall, I express caution with regard to the elaboration of 
special principles and programmes for the prioritisation of health interventions in 
developing countries. In fact, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 section 5.4.2, the 
prioritisation of health interventions poses sensitive, knotty, practical and ethical 
dilemmas which do not seem to be solved by the programmes undertaken by foreign 
states. Furthermore, they are affected by the limits of steering. I am therefore critical 
about similar international attempts to setting priorities in developing countries,602 such 
as the 1993 World Development Report [World Bank, World Development Report 1993], 
the WHO’s World Health Report 1999 [WHO, The World Health Report, 1999], which 
also recommend cost-effectiveness analysis in investment for development, and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with their philosophy of target-setting and 
vertical programmes. With specific regard to the Millennium Development Goals I share 
                                            
602  Cf. the Commission’s 2005 report “Tough Choices” which stresses the fact that 
“[t]here is no ‘one way’ to approach the planning and advocacy needed for scale-up. 
Preservation of a ‘bottom-up’ approach translates into very different priorities, 




the appraisal of Horton, who aptly pointed out that: “…what is missing from these Goals 
– e.g., any mention of chronic illnesses, such as heart disease, cancer, and stroke – has 
damaged the overall credibility of the MDG programme” [Horton, 2006: 1793].  
 
6.4.2 Non-state actors  
International human rights law does not prescribe obligations to fulfil the human 
right to medicines directly onto non-state actors. States can nonetheless regulate the 
promotion and fulfilment of access to medicines by non-state actors.603 Furthermore, soft 
law and self-regulation may demand to non-state actors to help realising the human right 
to medicines. Trends of global health financing illustrate an increasing role of the 
voluntary contribution of non-state actors in global health initiatives.604  This section 
looks at the activities for the fulfilment of access to medicines undertaken by: public-
private partnerships such as the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or 
partnerships for bulk purchasing; NGOs; and pharmaceutical companies.  
The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is the largest health-related 
global public-private partnership [Leach et al 2005: 44-5], among those collecting and 
disbursing more resources for access to medicines;605 indeed its achievements for AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria are tremendous.606 However, with a view to the fulfilment of a 
                                            
603 Also, states can be acting in cooperation with non-state actors. On the casus specialis 
of conduct of non-state actors imputable to states and influencing the right to health see 
Clapham and Rubio [2002]. See the UK Human Rights Joint Committee’s report “Any of 
our business? Human Rights and the UK private sector” on the application of the UK 
Human Rights Act 1998 to businesses performing public functions 
[Human Rights Joint Committee 2009: Section 6, Protect]. 
604 For example Ravishankar et al report that the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), two 
public-private partnerships, have attracted a growing share of funds and the role of NGOs 
in terms of spending funds from the public and private sectors has expanded massively in 
low-income and middle-income countries [Ravishankar 2009: 2121-22]. On the 
charitable contributions of the private see also CMH [2001: 95], Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health Working Group 6 [2002]; Claeson and Wagstaff [2004]; 
Friedman et al [2003]. 
605 According to Kazatchkine, executive director of the Global Fund, in 2007 the fund 
sponsored some two-thirds of all tuberculosis treatment worldwide, 45% of malaria 
treatment and nearly 30% of programmes against AIDS [AFP 2007]. 
606 Reportedly, as of 30 November 2009, the Global Fund has performed outstanding 
achievements for AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. For AIDS: 2.5 million people were 




human right to medicines and to ethics some points should be raised. As seen in section 
6.2.2.2 above, it is not necessarily the worse-offs in health or income who receive the 
Global Fund’s attention. Next, these results only concern three diseases, constituting a 
discrepancy with other conditions.607 The effects of the fund, furthermore, vary according 
to the context. The Global Fund’s interventions can also displace national priorities and 
are in effect volatile, deployed on time-limited projects. Leach et al for instance remark 
that the fund imposes short-term horizons that can be counterproductive: “[e]ven if actual 
allocations are yearly and subject to regular review and evaluation, sustainability is 
enhanced when resource commitments are known and driven by health needs” [Leach et 
al 2005: 57].608 In the practice, furthermore, the fund’s model has shown ‘deficits of 
execution’ with regard to slow disbursement of the sums committed, low oversight, 
transparency, accountability and efficacy of the projects.609 In Tanzania, the Global Fund 
                                                                                                                                 
conducted; 4.5 million orphans were provided with medical services, education and 
community care; 790,000 HIV-positive pregnant women have received HIV prevention 
from mother to child transmission (PMTCT) treatment. For tuberculosis: 6 million 
additional cases of infectious tuberculosis were detected and treated; 48% of the 2009 
estimated international targets for detection of tuberculosis cases and treatment using 
DOTS were contributed by Global Fund supported programs. For malaria: 104 million 
bed nets were distributed to protect families from transmission; 108 million malaria drug 
treatments were delivered [Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Website, 
Fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, last accessed 3 December 2009]. On the 
Global Fund see also supra section 6.2.2.2. 
607 AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria funds can be additional to African health system 
resources. But they can also distort the countries’ political priorities. See also supra 
section 6.4.2. 
608 The same criticism can be applied to GAVI [Leach et al 2005: 57]. The Global Fund, 
again, recognises those limits acknowledging that “the Global Fund cannot achieve 
sustainable results on its own” [Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
Partners in Impact – Results Report 2007, 2007, para. 18].  
609 See, for instance, Lancet’s Editorial “A Call for Transparency at the Global Fund” 
[2006] and previous articles in the Lancet, e.g., Attaran et al, “WHO, the Global Fund, 
and medical malpractice in malaria treatment” [2003], Nantulya and Lidén “Response to 
Accusations of Medical Malpractice by WHO and the Global Fund” [2004], Kokwaro et 
al, “WHO, the Global Fund, and Medical Malpractice in Malaria Treatment” [2004]. See 




is not exempt from complaints of lack of accountability 610  and displacement of 
resources.611  
Other international institutions facilitate access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa by undertaking procurement of medicines via international bulk purchasing. 
Current initiatives in this field are for example the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI) for vaccines, the Global Drug Facility for generic medicines to 
treat tuberculosis, the Green Light Committee for multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, the 
UN Population Fund for contraceptives [Grace 2003]. Again, some practical and ethical 
considerations run against a universal extension of such initiatives. In general, 
aggregated procurement is a cumbersome procedure that needs regularity in demand and 
distribution of the product lest running into shortages or oversupply of the good [Bate 
2007]. Importantly, the monopsony of aggregate procurement may stifle competition 
[Grace 2003]. Public-private partnerships are also engaged in research and development 
for diseases affecting sub-Saharan Africa. Such institutions however may not replace 
patents as an incentive to pharmaceutical innovation. Patent pools or prizes for certain 
inventions suffer two major shortcomings: first, in order to be economically manageable, 
they are set for specific goals and diseases. Therefore, they select between conditions. 
Next, they are not likely to provide incentive for ‘incremental’ innovation, ie the 
improvement of existing products.612  
NGOs cover different roles in access to medicines spanning the provision of 
health care in sub-Saharan Africa, procurement of medicines as non-profit wholesale 
suppliers, negotiation of discounted medicines with pharmaceutical companies, research 
on the supply chain, research and development of pharmaceutical products and 
                                            
610 On the lack of accountability and control see the Global Fund’s “Audit Report on 
Global Fund Grants to Tanzania” [Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
2009]. The criticisms are confirmed in my interviews with participants to the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) [Interviews, USAID, Dar es Salaam, July-August 
2009]. 
611  Most health policies at the national level in Tanzania tend to emphasise their 
contribution to the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in order to attract the 
Global Fund’s resources. For example, a senior official at the National Tuberculosis and 
Leprosy Program (a department of the Tanzanian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) 
admitted that some national health programmes had been reconfigured in order to include 
schemes on ‘AIDS and TB’, as such libel increases the chances of getting funds from the 
Global Fund [Interviews, Dar es Salaam, July 2009]. 
612 See, e.g., Lyles [2006]. See generally the comprehensive report by WHO’ Expert 





advocacy.613 In Tanzania, 40% of health care is provided by faith-based organisations 
[Tanzania, Survey of the Medicines Prices in Tanzania, 2004]. The quality of care 
offered by those institutions is generally better than that provided by the public sector. 
Some concerns about the equity of such arrangements are raised considering that the cost 
sharing they collect is generally higher than that requested by the public service [id.]. 
NGOs indeed can provide a big contribution to access to medicines. However, typically 
NGOs act according to their vocation and mandate, focussing on a region or a cause, 
rather than out of a systematic plan for the fulfilment of the human right to medicines.614 
Furthermore, NGOs can undertake research projects on access to medicines in sub-
Saharan African countries. Those programmes raise further questions about their impact 
on the certainty and stability of a health system. Publications and advocacy by NGOs can 
be very interesting, as NGOs can be independent from governments and based in the 
field. However, often NGOs generalise and simplify themes according to their goals.615 
As Chapter 4 showed, many prescriptions concerning the fulfilment of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa are being formulated on the role of the pharmaceutical 
industry by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human right to health, other international 
soft law and the industry itself.616 The question here is what should these actors do, and 
how should they do it, in order to fulfil the human right to medicines. The UN Special 
Rapporteur Hunt, in the “Draft Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies 
in relation to Access to Medicines” identifies recommendations for the formulation and 
implementation of access to medicines initiatives by pharmaceutical companies [Hunt 
2007(a)].617 Namely, the company should: 
                                            
613  See, e.g., Leach et al [2005]. NGOs are here understood, broadly, as non-profit 
companies. See Chapter 5 section 5.3.2.3 for the definition of NGO. 
614 Operational NGOs in particular can offer selective care, avoiding certain medical 
practices out of moral or religious objection. 
615 See also Dar [2004]. See Luhmann’s critical remarks on organisations: organisations 
are identified as a type of autopoietic social systems which handle themes according to 
the actions of that system (they also self-describe themselves as ‘action system[s]’) 
[Luhmann 1995: 196-197]. Thus, “[o]rganizations are not goal-realizing but goal-seeking 
systems. They are constantly involved in interpreting (observing) their own operations 
and seek goals, or even new goals, that make what happens or has happened 
understandable and determinable” [Luhmann 1998: 105]. Cf. Knudsen contending that 
organisations structurally couple to different subsystems to deal with contingency 
[Knudsen 2007: 114]. 
616 See Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.3. 
617 The Guidelines do not identify a duty of providing medicines as such but in the 




(i) give particular attention to disadvantaged individuals and communities, such 
as those living in poverty; 
(ii) give particular attention to gender-related issues; 
(iii) give particular attention to the needs of children; 
(iv) give particular attention to the very poorest in all markets; 
(v) be transparent; 
(vi) encourage and facilitate the participation of all stakeholders, including 
disadvantaged individuals and communities.  
The criteria seem favouring the poor and marginalised, in line with other 
prescriptions of the Special Rapporteur on the realisation of the human right to medicines, 
but are quite broad and indicative, as they cannot be all pursued at the same time. 618  
I have consequently analysed the practice of implementation that pharmaceutical 
companies generally undertake in order to facilitate and provide access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 619  Mainly, those actions are tiered pricing and donations for 
                                                                                                                                 
impact – positive and negative – of pharmaceutical companies on the ability of 
governments to realise the right to the highest attainable standard of health for 
individuals within their jurisdictions” [Hunt 2007(a): preambular para. E].  
618 On the attention for the poor and marginalised in the work of the Special Rapporteur 
see e.g. Hunt [2005: para. 64; 2006: para. 52]. 
619 I have reviewed the same companies whose self-regulation I have analysed in Chapter 
4 section 4.3.2.3 (more initiatives relating to the collaboration of pharmaceutical 
companies for access to medicines can be found at the IFPMA data base on health 
partnerships online [IFPMA, website, Health Partnerships: Developing World – 2009, 
2010]). Boehringer Ingelheim participates to the Global Compact and donates 
Viramune® (nevirapine) to ‘the countries most in need’ [Boehringer Ingelheim, website, 
Viramune Donation Programme, last accessed 7 December 2009]. The Viramune® 
Donation Programme has provided the non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor 
Viramune® (nevirapine) to target the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
(pMTCT) of the HIV-1 virus during birth in the countries most in need. By 2008, this 
programme extended to 169 schemes in 59 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe [Boehringer Ingelheim, website, Viramune Donation Programme, 
2009(c)]. I could not find such type of commitments at Cipla’s website. 
GlaxoSmithKline commits to work to address global health care challenges through 
action in four areas: preferential pricing, research and development, partnerships and 
health-care services [GSK(c), website, Our Approach and Contribution, 2009]. In 
practice GlaxoSmithKline for example has announced that “[o]n 1 April 2009 we 
implemented price reductions on our patented products in the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). Our commitment is that all GSK patented products in these countries will now 
cost less than 25 per cent of their price in the referenced developed countries. We 
reduced prices for seven patented brands (110 individual product lines and formulations) 
by an average of 45 per cent. In some countries prices were not reduced immediately due 
to regulatory processes such as needing to obtain government authorisation, however the 
price reduction process was initiated. We also cut prices in some non-LDC markets in 
East Africa and Francophone West Africa to reduce the risk that products would be 
diverted from the LDCs and sold in these wealthier countries, thereby reducing their 




developing countries (or other countries ‘in need’). It is asked whether those actions do 
in effect contribute to the fulfilment of the human right to medicines. With regard to 
differential pricing, a problem resides in the fact that price reductions by pharmaceutical 
companies are often individually-negotiated on a case-by-case basis.620 As a consequence, 
those policies can be volatile and unreliable as there may not be guarantees that price 
offers will continue and the range of products on offer may not be predictable [Bluestone 
et al 2002: 12]. Also, one-off price reductions can “discourage long-term health planning 
in developing countries” [id.].621 An alternative can be globally regulated tiered pricing 
system, but this can be problematic to design and implement in principle and in 
practice. 622  Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies generally oppose such forceful 
interventions in the market.623 
                                                                                                                                 
“[w]orking with WHO to help eliminate leprosy by offering free treatment to patients 
worldwide; supplying our antimalarial drug Coartem without profit through multilateral 
institutions and public-private partnerships [such as the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in Tanzania]; [developing medicines and vaccines to combat 
diseases in the developing world]; Providing discounts and assistance programs to low-
income patients in the developed world” [Novartis, website, Patients, 2009]. With 
specific regard to pricing, Novartis is also committed to ‘access-to-medicines programs’ 
[Novartis, website, Drug Pricing, 2009]. Pfizer recognises  ‘threefold’ responsibilities to 
improve access to medicines, which include research and development to benefit patients 
in developing countries, support to the development of health-care systems and, for the 
distribution of existing medicines, tiered pricing and donations [Pfizer, website, Access 
to Medicines, 2009]. Ranbaxy has policies on corporate social responsibility which 
include research on anti-malarials and other medicines for developing countries’ 
diseases, and the distribution of cheap antiretrovirals and anti-infectives for opportunistic 
infections [Ranbaxy, website, Anti malaria project, 2009; Ranbaxy website, Anti 
HIV/AIDS].  
620 See footnote 620 above. 
621  See also MSF reporting on the technical difficulties of utilising, for example, 
antiretrovirals under differential price schemes from Abbot and Roche [MSF, Untangling 
the Web of Price Reduction, 2005: 7]. 
622 For example, the Accelerating Access Initiative aims to negotiate antiretrovirals prices 
according to each targeted country’s socioeconomic condition. The initiative was 
launched in 2000 and includes UN agencies and several pharmaceutical companies. 
However, the roll-out of the initiative has been slow and hindered by individual countries 
having to negotiate prices and conditions [Schwartländer et al 2006]. The originator 
companies participate voluntarily and reportedly have often been shy in making their 
price offers for certain countries. In 2003, for example, originator companies made price 
offers only to least-developed countries or to sub-Saharan countries [Hellerstein 2003]. 
Only three offers were publicised for medium-income countries. See generally Grace 
[2003]. See also Act up Paris [2002]; MSF, Reports and Publications [2002]; Mossialos 
and Dukes [2001] and WHO and WTO Secretariats [2001].  
623 Bluestone et al report from interviews with the industry that companies oppose such 




With regard to the donations of medicines there is little doubt that they constitute 
“a valuable tool in specific circumstances, such as when the disease dynamics require 
only one-off treatment or vaccinations” [PSG 2004: 15]. However, as Bluestone et al 
critically point out, donations can also distort the national procurement systems 
[Bluestone et al 2002: 17]. Moreover, “donations on the scale needed to address the 
health crisis are not a commercially sustainable, long-term solution” [id: 13]. Donations 
in effect also serve marketing purposes for the donating company, which can penetrate a 
market or win the loyalty of the national procurer. Those practices can be detrimental to 
the patients of African countries in so far as they have the effect of crowding out the 
products of other pharmaceutical companies.624 Finally, it has to be mentioned that even 
partnerships in research activities for developing countries’ diseases625 raise issues of 
independence and conflicts of interests.626  
In sum, the ‘human rights subsystem’ formulates meta-positive communications 
about the roles and responsibilities of non-state actors to fulfil the human right to 
                                                                                                                                 
et al 2002: 13]. Yet, those features can be avoided with appropriate regulation. See, e.g., 
Bluestone et al [2002: 12]; WHO and WTO Secretariats [2001]. Pfizer nonetheless 
remarks that “[e]ven discounted medicines will often remain unaffordable for patients in 
poor countries…” [Pfizer, website, Access to Medicines, 2009]. For this reason Pfizer 
has claimed to prefer donating medicines in the context of partnership programmes [id.]. 
Novartis, while claiming that for some products it does participate to differential price 
schemes, also states that generally pharmaceutical companies should be free to set prices 
for their products [Novartis, website, Drug Pricing, 2009]. Certainly pharmaceutical 
companies have a vested interest in ad hoc negotiations which can serve as bargaining 
chips to entrench their market power in a country.  
624 Novartis for instance is well established in Tanzania, where it contributes to fund the 
prestigious Ifakara research centre, donates tuberculosis drugs, and sells Coartem 
(artemether-lumefantrine, the first-line malaria therapy) at cost. It will be interesting to 
see whether Coartem will be designed as the national artemisin-based combination 
therapy in the next request for support to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, even though a cheapest Indian generic equivalent (Lumerax, produced by Ipca 
Laboratories Ltd.) is now registered in Tanzania.  
625 Actions of pharmaceutical companies other than donations and tiered pricing which 
can be framed as ‘fulfilling’ the human right to medicines include research and 
development of new products; charitable actions other than medicines donations. See 
footnote 620 above. 
626 In the case of Novartis in Tanzania, for instance, research outcomes from the Ifakara 
Health Institute, partially funded by the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable 
Development, include studies on the efficacy of artemether-lumefantrine that led to the 
change of first-line treatment of malaria from sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine to 
artemether-lumefantrine, and thence Coartem, the Novartis proprietary-branded 
artemether-lumefantrine [Mugittu et al 2005]. Other studies include social marketing to 
raise awareness of malaria and encourage its treatment with artemether-lumefantrine 




medicines. However such communications avoid the conflicts between ‘indisputable 
values’ and the contingencies of the environment. Certainly, the actions of these non-
state actors can be agile, responsive to local needs and effective. Indeed the amount of 
help provided by these actors to increasing access to medicines and the welfare of – 
selected – groups of individuals is tremendous. However, such initiatives can be dubious 
in terms of equity, non-discrimination, effectiveness, predictability, coordination with 
health systems overall and reliability. Thus, the actions of non-state actors relating to the 
realisation of access to medicines can be problematic, wielding power and biopower to 
foster or disallow life. Such powers are exacerbated by the fact that non-state actors (like 
foreign states) are generally poorly accountable to the subjects of their influence in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
6.4.3 Enforcement  
Section 6.4.3 analyses some critical issues concerning the enforcement of the 
duties of extra-governmental actors and the role of foreign states in enforcing a human 
right to medicines. In particular, this section reviews: the enforcement of transboundary 
violations of the human right to medicines committed by a foreign a state (section 
6.4.3.1); the enforcement by foreign states of violations of the human right to medicines 
committed by the home African states in their jurisdictions (section 6.4.3.2); and the 
enforcement of violations of the human right to medicines committed by non-state actors 
(section 6.4.3.3). Particular attention is dedicated to the enforcement of the fulfilment of 
the human right to medicines, bearing in mind the research question “can a human right 
to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”.  
 
6.4.3.1 Transboundary violations of the human right to medicines 
States can be held internationally responsible for the transboundary violations of 
human rights.627 In order to redress such torts, the foreign state where a violation has 
occurred – or a third state with legal interest in the matter – can use diplomatic or 
economic retortions, peaceful countermeasures or recur to international adjudication, for 
                                            




instance through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the treaty-based semi-judicial 
procedures where applicable. 628  None of these measures of redress has been much 
forthcoming for transboundary violations of the human right to health or medicines. With 
regard to international adjudication, I could not find a case of transboundary violation of 
the human right to medicines (or, access to medicines within the human right to health) 
to be addressed by the ICJ629  or African Commission in its intra-state semi-judicial 
complaint procedure.630 Nonetheless, within the CESCR state-reporting procedure, states 
have occasionally reported about the influence of their action on access to medicines in 
other countries. For example India reported to the CESCR that it has been actively 
pursuing the implications of the implementation of the TRIPS regime on health for 
developing countries in various multilateral forums and in the WTO ministerial 
conferences [CESCR, E/C.12/IND/5, 2007: 137, para. 520]. However, the CESCR does 
not enquire systematically on the impact of intellectual property protection on access to 
medicines abroad.631  
                                            
628 See generally Cassese [2005: 241-310]. State responsibility is part of customary law, 
albeit not fully settled. See Chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
629 The right to health, as well as other human rights, are not habitual subjects of ICJ 
disputes. In recent years however a few cases have been filed regarding adverse effects 
on health of transboundary activity. In particular, in Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador 
v. Colombia), the applicant makes explicit reference to health and human rights [ICJ, 
Application of Ecuador, 2008: paras. 26, 38]. The case is pending. See also the ICJ case, 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), where the applicant makes 
reference to health but not to human rights [ICJ, Application of Argentina, 2006]. In the 
judgment of 20 April 2010, as well, there is no mention to the human right to health [ICJ, 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010]. Furthermore, the right to health has been clearly 
recognised by the ICJ as matter under protection in international law in the 2004 advisory 
opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory [ICJ, Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004]. Namely, 
“the Court is of the opinion that the construction of the wall and its associated 
regime…also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to 
health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child” [id.: para. 134]. Israel is part to both 
Conventions [id.: para 103]. 
630 Baderin has noted however that, until 2007, the African Commission had received 
only one interstate communication, that is, the 1999 Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda [Baderin 2007: 149].  
631 With regard to India’s reporting on patents, I could not find mention of the issues of 
patents or intellectual property in the accompanying documents, namely, in “List of 
issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the second to fifth periodic 
reports of India concerning the rights covered by articles 1 to 15 of the International 





6.4.3.2 Violations of the human right to medicines by home states 
International law provides for two procedures which can in principle be used by 
foreign states to enforce other states’ domestic obligations with regard to the human right 
to medicines:632 the action for obligations erga omnes and the action via human rights 
treaty bodies. All members of the international community have a legal interest, under 
international customary law, to redress violations of erga omnes obligations, by invoking 
the state responsibility of the wrongdoer.633 A violation of obligations erga omnes occurs, 
inter alia, when another state is responsible for a ‘gross’ and ‘large-scale’ violation of any 
internationally recognised human right [Cassese 2005: 59; 394]. 634  This procedure 
presents the problem of identifying a properly so-called violation of the human right to 
medicines. The lack of fulfilment of the human right to medicines is particularly difficult 
to judge as a violation. To begin with, the provision of medicines ultimately depends on 
the availability of resources – the fulfilment of the duty is to great extent subject to 
progressive realisation. The identification by the CESCR of a core obligation to 
immediately provide access to ‘essential medicines’ could be used as a criterion, but it 
has not been adopted generally outside the CESCR regime.635 Furthermore, this criterion 
is relative, as the identification of ‘essential medicines’ is ultimately made by the national 
authorities.636  
                                                                                                                                 
E/C.12/IND/Q/5, 26 May 2006] and the previous concluding observations [CESCR, 
E/1990/23, 1990; CESCR, E/C.12/IND/CO/5, 2008: para. 73].  
632 The possibility of (forcible) ‘humanitarian intervention’ falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. Also, I will not deal with the case of violations of the human right to medicines as 
part of international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.  
633  Cassese sees breaches of erga omnes obligations as entailing ‘aggravated 
responsibility’ whereby, unlike ‘ordinary’ state responsibility, accountability is not 
demanded for material or moral damages to another state, as “[w]hat matters is that the 
breach results in the infringement of a State’s right to compliance by any other State (or 
contracting State) with the obligation” [Cassese 2005: 263]. Therefore foreign states can 
intervene through diplomatic or economic retortions, peaceful countermeasures or recur 
to international adjudication, for instance through the ICJ [Cassese 2005: 394]. See 
Chapter 4 section 4.3.1.  
634 See Chapter 4 section 4.3.1. 
635 See Chapter 3 section 3.2.1.1. For example, the South African Constitutional Court 
rejected the idea of a state obligation to fulfil immediately access to a core of medical 
services [South Africa, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002: para. 35]. 




I have examined a few proposals in the literature in order to assess the realisation 
of the duty to fulfil. Kinney for example proposes three tools for holding states 
internationally accountable for the realisation of the right to health: 1) the definition of 
universal outcomes; 2) the establishment of a comparative reporting system to 
international bodies to monitor progress and compliance with international human rights 
obligations; and 3) the identification of civil rights violations, such as discrimination 
against protected groups [Kinney 2001: 1471-4]. The establishment of international 
reporting systems is illustrated in the following paragraphs. It is interesting to discuss 
beforehand the use of indicators as a gauge of fulfilment of the human right to medicines, 
also in relation to the enforcement of the right outside international bodies. The use of 
indicators is problematic. To begin with, a problem in using targets and indicators is the 
trade-off between, on the one side, standardisation, comparability and simplicity and, on 
the other side, accuracy, depth and contextualisation. Economic, social, political and 
cultural circumstances are very different worldwide, and standardised indicators may fail 
to appreciate such diversity. Indeed Tomasevski notes that international law accepts that 
government obligations should be divided into obligations of conduct and obligations of 
result but “this important legal difference does not easily translate into indicators” 
[Tomasevski 1995: 400]. 637  Furthermore, indicators are aggregative, overlooking 
individual situations. An emphasis on aggregative dimensions skews the human right to 
medicines to a collective – as opposed to subjective – right.  
Furthermore, it is noted that the procedure for the enforcement of obligations 
erga omnes may not be capable of providing substantial redress to the holders of the 
subjective right to medicines. In fact, reparations from state to state under state 
responsibility can be inconsequential for those whose rights have been violated in a gross 
and large-scale manner.638 Moreover, isolated instances of violation of the human right to 
medicines are not considered. In fact the rationale of obligations erga omnes is the idea 
that certain violations of international law, even if happening internally to a state, 
                                            
637 Nonetheless, Tomasevski maintains that “[t]he purpose of indicators is to capture two 
key factors: the willingness and the capacity of a government to protect and promote 
human rights” [Tomasevski 1995: 390 emph. orig.]. 
638 But, according to Cassese, “one may envisage the possibility that the responsible State 
may pay compensation to the victims, or to the relatives of the victims, of those gross 




damage all other members of the international community [Cassese 2005: 262].639 Indeed, 
the members are not obliged to take action; they have a legitimacy to do so. In effect, as 
far as I am aware, to date states have not enforced internationally the human right to 
medicines by denouncing state responsibility for the international human right to 
medicines.640  
Consequently, I look at the enforcement procedures offered by the human rights 
treaty bodies. International treaties sanctioning the human right to medicines offer 
alternative mechanisms for addressing the international compliance with the right 
sanctioned therein, as seen in Chapter 4. Particular cases of violations can be referred to 
the CESCR and the African Commission through the complaints procedures. Until 
recently the CESCR had no power to redress situations and did not hear complaints from 
individuals or groups.641 Some parties to the ICESCR have however become parties to an 
‘Optional Protocol’ which provides the CESCR with the capability to hear individual 
complaints, order ‘interim measures’ and establish an inquiry procedure, although the 
Protocol is not operational as of yet [ICESCR-OP, art. 5, 11]. 642  The African 
Commission examines violation complaints (‘communications’) also hearing individual 
and group cases [ACHPR: art. 30, 55-59, 62]. 643  Some African Commission cases 
relating to access to health care and medicines originated from the violation of non-
discrimination in health care.644 The lack of provision of medicines has been expressly 
recognised by the African Commission as a violation of the human right to health in one 
case concerning Zaire. 645  However, the compliance with the decision remains 
                                            
639 The responsibility for erga omnes human rights obligations originating from treaty 
law nonetheless, according to Cassese, is extended to minor or sporadic breaches of these 
obligations – thus it is not confined to the gross and serious breaches of the 
corresponding obligations originating from customary international law [Cassese 2005: 
276]. 
640 As Skogly points out, “... whether or not a foreign state may have a legitimate legal 
interest in the case based on obligations erga omnes is only half the story. The other 
half… is whether there are any corresponding obligation on the foreign state to take 
action” [Skogly 2002: 13]. 
641 See CESCR Revised General Guidelines [1991] and ECOSOC Resolution 17 (1985). 
642 See Chapter 4 section 4.2.1. 
643 See also Odinkalu [2001: 351]. 
644 See the Mauritania [AC, Mauritania, 2000] and the Media Rights Agenda and Others 
v. Nigeria cases [AC, Nigeria, 1998] in Chapter 5 section 5.2.2. 
645 In the Zaire case, the Commission found that “[t]he failure of the Government to 
provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of 




doubtful.646 In effect, the African Commission remained vague not making clear what 
Zaire positively had to do in order to remedy the shortage of medicines [AC, Zaire, 
1995]. Indeed, from a procedural point of view, the commission does not issue binding 
judicial decision and is not endowed with powers to enforce compliance with its 
pronouncements [Murray 2000: 22]. 647  To note, the aim of the communications 
procedures at the African Commission is an ‘amicable resolution’ to the controversies.648 
Interestingly, however, in 2006 the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
been instituted [AfCHPR, website, 2010].649 The Court, as opposed to the Commission, 
is set to deliver binding judgments and to provide remedies [Protocol to the ACHPR: art. 
30]. 650 So far the Court has only delivered one judgment in December 2009, not related 
to the human right to health and medicines.651  
                                            
646 See for example the scepticism expressed by ESCR-Net, considering the state of civil 
war which has struck Zaire (notwithstanding the peace deal reached on 23 January 2008) 
[ESCR-Net, website, Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, Comm. No. 
25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, last accessed 2010]. Doubts have also been expressed with 
regard to the redress of the Mauritania case on non-discrimination [ESCR-Net, 
Mauritania, last accessed September 2008]. Reportedly, even after the decision of the 
African Commission, the physical and mental health of political prisoners and the 
treatment of prisoners in pre-trial detention have continued to be worrying. Slavery and 
forced labour have also continued. The human rights situation in Mauritania has however 
apparently improved following a non-violent military coup in August 2005 [id.]. See also 
Baderin criticising the inaction of the Commission in cases of non-compliance with the 
recommendations, also noting that the purpose of naming and shaming with which the 
Commission findings are published on the website is betrayed by the fact that the website 
is not regularly updated [Baderin 2007: 149]. 
647 On the compliance of judicial decisions relating to economic, social and cultural 
rights see the tracking provided by ESCR-Net [ESCR-Net website]. 
648 As reminded by the African Commission in the Zaire case, “[t]he main goal of the 
communications procedure before the Commission is to initiate a positive dialogue, 
resulting in an amicable resolution between the complainant and the State concerned, 
which remedies the prejudice complained of” [AC, Zaire, 1995: para. 39].   
649 As per the 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [OAU, Protocol for 
Establishment of an African Court, 1998]. 
650 According to Article 30 of the Protocol, “[t]he States Parties to the present Protocol 
undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the 
time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution” [Protocol to the ACHPR: art. 
30].  
651 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights gave its first judgment in the matter 
of Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal in December 2009. The applicant, 
Yogogmbaye, a Chadian national, brought the action to prevent the government of 
Senegal from conducting the trial of the former Chadian head of state, Hissene Habre in 





Some international procedures are also in place for monitoring the realisation of 
the human right to health and other social rights. The Special Rapporteur on the human 
right to health presents annual reports to the Human Rights Council and to the UN 
General Assembly on the activities and studies undertaken in the view of the 
implementation of the mandate, communicating with states and other concerned parties 
with regard to alleged cases of violations of the human right to health [UNOHCHR 
website, Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, 2010]. Since the first session of the 
Human Rights Council in 2006 the Rapporteur has reported on the communication of 
sub-Saharan Africa countries only once, on Angola [Hunt 2008]. Both the CESCR and 
the African Commission monitor the realisation of, respectively the ICESCR and the 
ACHPR. These procedures are similar. The CESCR receives regular reports from the 
states parties and produces lists of issues for these states to respond to. Next, the CESCR 
considers the states’ responses and issues ‘concluding observations’ [UNOHCHR, 
website, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Monitoring the economic, 
social and cultural rights, 2010]. The African Commission as well receives reports on the 
measures taken by states for realising the ACHPR rights [ACHPR: art. 62]. Since 2001 
the African Commission has also started to issue concluding observations regarding the 
states’ reports [Bulto 2006: 84]. 
With regard to access to medicines the CESCR, in its general comment on the 
human right to health, recommends that in order to monitor, at the national and 
international levels, a state party’s obligations under article 12, national health strategies 
should identify appropriate right to health indicators and benchmarks [CESCR 2000 para. 
57]. The new 2009 reporting guidelines in effect ask to “[p]rovide information on the 
measures taken… To ensure affordable access to essential drugs, as defined by the WHO, 
including antiretroviral medicines and medicines for chronic diseases” [CESCR, 
Reporting Guidelines, 2009, para. 57, 57(f)]. As opposed to the 1991 guidelines, the 
2009 guidelines do not require states to report on the fulfilment of standard indicators on 
access to medicines.652 The African Commission does not ask to report explicitly on 
access to medicines but access to medicines should naturally be part of the information 
                                            
652  With the 1991 guidelines the CESCR envisaged national indicators (rather than 
international standards). The 1991 guidelines specifically requested to use as indicator 
the “[p]roportion of the population having access to trained personnel for the treatment of 
common diseases and injuries, with regular supply of 20 essential drugs, within one 




that should be provided on the “[c]omprehensive schemes and specific measures, 
including vaccination programmes to prevent, treat and control epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases and accidents in urban and rural areas… [and] [t]he main 
features of existing arrangements for the provision of medical care and methods of 
financing them” [AC, 1988-89: para. 36 (d), (f)]. The guidelines thus do not demand 
precise qualitative or quantitative data. Both CESCR and African Commission guidelines 
are therefore indicative and vague, not suitable for comparisons between countries and on 
the progress made within countries on the realisation of the human right to medicines.  
In practice, both commissions are quite selective about the issues they comment 
on. In particular, access to medicines does not receive systematic attention by the 
committees and is rarely addressed as an issue on its own. The sub-Saharan countries 
considered in the last five years (2004-2009) by the CESCR have been the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Angola, Kenya and Zambia [UNOHCHR, website, 2010(c)]. Out of 
those CESCR works, the only direct reference I could find on access to medicines was 
about antiretrovirals in Zambia.653 Issues indirectly affecting access to medicines, such as 
the use of user fees have been addressed other times.654 The African Commission has 
commented on access to medicines more frequently. Among the last four concluding 
considerations of state reports on Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, South 
Africa and Uganda, access to medicines was mentioned for South Africa, Uganda, and 
indirectly for Cameroon. The feedbacks are however brief remarks or notes of 
compliment.655  
Therefore, the analysis of the international enforcement of the human right to 
medicines illustrates how the human rights, the legal and the political subsystems are 
ultimately structurally coupled. The positivisation in the legal subsystem of human rights 
– both at the domestic and international level – confers legitimacy and power to 
governments. In turn, human rights undertakings are produced by the political initiative. 
However, such coupling also embeds the contingency of human rights law. The vague 
substance of the rights and the weak procedures render the enforcement of the rights 
contingent. At the international level, in effect, the realisation of the human right to 
                                            
653  See CESCR, List of Issues to Zambia [2003: para. 32-33]; CESCR, Concluding 
Report on Zambia [2005, E/C.12/1/Add.106: para. 30]. 
654 See e.g. Kenya [2008: paras. 20, 32, 33]. 
655 See AC, Concluding Observations – South Africa [2005: para. 13]; AC, Concluding 
Observations – Uganda [2006: para. 19], AC, Concluding Observations – Cameroon 




medicines is seldom assessed in international adjudication, let alone through binding 
decisions. Most procedures do not directly redress the situation of the subjective right-
holders; overall international enforcement (spanning prosecution, adjudication, remedy) 
is a political process between states.  
 
6.4.3.3 Violations of the human right to medicines by non-state actors 
This section reviews the implementation and contingencies of the enforcement of 
the duties of international organisations, NGOs and private actors (in particular, 
pharmaceutical companies) with respect to the human right to medicines. States parties to 
international organisations can be prosecuted individually for the actions they take within 
the organisations. Therefore, they can be subject to the procedures seen in sections 
6.4.3.1 and 6.4.3.2 above. Next, as seen in Chapter 4 section 4.4.2 international 
organisations and NGOs arguably have a duty to respect the human right to health under 
international customary law. However, I am not aware of any domestic claim against 
international organisations and NGOs for the lack of fulfilment of the human right to 
medicines (or health care, or access to medicines) in a country. Furthermore, it is recalled 
that non-state actors, normally, are not subject to the jurisdiction of international courts. 
Moreover, in furtherance to self-regulation, human rights violations could be redressed 
by semi-judicial means through monitoring and complaint procedures within the 
organisations. 656  For example, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, has addressed complaints regarding the alleged responsibility of the World 
Bank in cases concerning the health of people who received the bank’s assistance – 
although the cases have been presented in terms of damage or harm rather than as 
violations of the human right to health.657 Perusing the reports for the Human Rights 
Council sessions, nevertheless, I noted that the Special Rapporteur on the human right to 
health has in one instance investigated the alleged violations of the human right to health 
                                            
656 On self-regulation of international organisations see Chapter 5 section 5.3.2.1.  
657 See, e.g., the case relating the “Arun III Hydroelectric Project Nepal” reported by 
Toebes. Toebes remarks that “[a]lthough the right to health was not explicitly invoked in 
this case, governmental obligations involving resource allocations were addressed which 
are similar to the obligations protected by the right to health” [Toebes 1999: 180]. On the 
same case see also Skogly [2001: 182-5]. See the review by FIAN of the work of the 
Inspection Panel and the response of the World Bank to the case of the ‘Coal Mining 
Project Parej-East, India’ [FIAN 2006]. See also the Inspection Panel investigation in the 





by ‘other actors’. Namely Hunt exchanged communications with the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria on the withdrawal from Myanmar and with the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on the contamination of refugee 
camps [Hunt 2007(b): paras. 51-55]. The episode, however, is so far isolated. 
With regard to private for-profit actors, most duties concerning the human right to 
health and medicines can be prescribed and enforced indirectly, without mentioning 
access to medicines as a human right, by the home states through legislation which 
addresses the behaviour of these actors.658 Direct reference to the human right to health in 
order to decide in private law cases is rare.659 Furthermore, as seen in section 6.3, the 
CESCR identifies a duty of foreign states to prevent violations of the human right to 
medicines by third parties abroad. Extra-territorial jurisdiction concerning violations of 
health and access to medicines (even short of explicit reference to the human rights to 
health and medicines) by companies abroad is however exceptional. The literature 
concerning the extra-territorial adjudication of human rights violations by non-state 
actors usually refers to the uncommon example of the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 
relating to torts committed in violation of international law abroad.660 US courts have 
accepted jurisdiction under ATCA for certain violations of human rights by corporations 
but not for the human right to health or medicines.661 For the UK, Jägers identifies the 
1995 case Ngcobo & Others v. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd. & Others as ‘landmark’, as 
it held that British-based companies can be sued in English courts for harm to health 
caused abroad [Jägers 1999: 268]. However, in the case there was a nexus in the UK with 
the damage occurred in South Africa [United Kingdom, High Court, Ngcobo & Others, 
                                            
658 Violations of the right to health and medicines can also be redressed, indirectly, by 
international courts deciding of international crimes. For example, the International 
Criminal Court has subject-matter jurisdiction on ‘inhumane acts’ causing serious injury 
to health [ICC Statute art. 7(k)]. These violations, however, are special cases, falling 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
659 Toebes for instance reports that the Italian Constitutional Court held that the right to 
health applies in both public law and private relations, ruling that safeguarding health 
also imposes on individuals the duty to refrain from injuring or endangering by their 
behaviour the health of another person [Toebes 1999: 210]. The right to health has also 
been cited in the successful application to the South African Competition law case on the 
excessive pricing of medicines in South Africa [Tau et al 2002: para. 60]. See Chapter 5 
section 5.3.2.  
660 See Chapter 4 section 4.3.2.3. 




1995].662 No mention was made throughout the case to the human right to health or 
human rights in general.663  
It is normatively doubtful whether the extra-territorial adjudication of the human 
right to medicines should be expanded in order to redress the behaviour of 
pharmaceutical companies in relation to access to medicines. Extra-territorial jurisdiction 
is an attractive option if the assets of the respondent are based abroad or if part of the 
action with adverse effects originates abroad [Joseph 2005: 4]. In effect, pharmaceutical 
corporations providing medicines to African countries are mostly based in a foreign 
country. However, the adjudication of cases of violations of the human right to medicines 
is undermined by technical/procedural and substantive factors. To begin with, 
transnational corporations have a dispersed structure whereby parent companies are 
shielded through the separation of legal identity, and the courts are notoriously reluctant 
to lift the ‘corporate veil’.664  Next, the costs for the plaintiffs may be discouraging 
[Jägers 1999: 268-9]. Finally, according to the forum non conveniens doctrine, the state 
with the closest connection to the action has jurisdiction [id.]. Technical problems also 
relate to ‘enforcement jurisdiction’, for instance in gathering information abroad [Whish 
2005: 430].665 Substantively, in effect, as seen in chapters 3 to 6, there is no clarity 
regarding the prescriptions originating from the human right to medicines onto 
companies.  
In sum, uncertainty and unpredictability, in both substance and procedure, have 
been found concerning: the enforcement of transboundary violations of the human right 
to medicines committed by foreign states; the enforcement of the duties of home states 
by foreign states and treaty-bodies; and the enforcement of the duties of non-state actors, 
by home and foreign states. The subjective human right to medicines of African people, 
overall, is not effectively redressed through these procedures.  
                                            
662 The UK High Court examined the principle of forum non conveniens and allowed the 
suit to proceed in England, in fact holding that negligence occurred in England, therefore 
the plaintiffs may have had difficulty in presenting their case in South Africa [United 
Kingdom, High Court, Ngcobo & Others, 1995]. 
663 The case was about tortious liability. 
664 See also Joseph [2004:131].  
665 Some international agreements are in place on the matter. See e.g., Hague Convention 
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (Cmnd 3991, 1968) and the UK/US Mutual 
Assistance Treaty to criminal infringements of competition law (UK/US Mutual 
Assistance Treaty Cm 5374, 2001) [Whish 2005: 430-1]. See also Whish [2005: 449] on 








6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has critically analysed the possible operationalisation and 
implementation of the duties of extra-governmental actors in relation to the international 
human right to medicines. It has also made reference to the pertinent non-binding law, as 
the legal subsystem structurally couples to the meta-positive subsystem of human rights. 
Human rights law (e.g. treaties and national constitutions), often attributes ‘roles’ and 
‘responsibilities’ to non-state actors, which are ‘expected’ to collaborate to the 
realisations of these rights. Moreover, non-binding human rights duties appear, 
enthusiastically, in the soft law and self-regulations concerning the extra-governmental 
actors more relevant for the provision of medicines, that is, foreign states, international 
organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies. Many paradoxes and uncertainties 
have however been found. To begin with, the ‘human rights subsystem’ appeals to goals, 
‘programmes of humanity’ which actually require the collaboration of actors other than 
the states [Luhmann 1995(b): 231]. However, duties originally formulated for home 
states are not ‘textually’ applicable onto extra-governmental actors unless a watered-
down, ‘minimum common denominator’ approach is adopted. Luhmann, in effect, saw 
human rights as institutions for the functional differentiation of society, thereby keeping 
distinct in society the state bureaucracy and its function [Luhmann 2002/1965: 59-61, 
290; 2004: 135-6]. Therefore, human rights are meant to apply vertically between the 
state and the individual. Nevertheless, subjective human rights refer to the human rights 
‘utopia’, which does not consider the contexts and does not, to elaborate, confer perfect 
duties [Luhmann 1995(b): 231; 2004: 416-7]. Furthermore, as Luhmann noted, human 
rights cannot be realised as indisputable values, as values, interests, needs, and rights can 
clash [Luhmann 1997(b): 992-3]; the context is complex, contingent and rife with ethical 
dilemmas. The legal and ‘human rights subsystem’, in their autopoiesis, avoid those 





In particular, the analysis of the duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human 
right to medicines has revealed that, with regard to the respect, it is not clear which 
intellectual property international agreements and actions violate the respect of the 
human right to medicines in African countries. A univocal condemnation could not be 
expressed of the international financial institution’s structural adjustments programmes 
demanding restraint of the social welfare policies in African states (for example, through 
the imposition of cost sharing for health care and medicines). The operationalisation of 
non-discrimination is morally problematic, for example considering the frequent trade-
off between the observance of formal equality (whereby all have to be treated in the same 
way) and substantive equality (whereby different situations have to be treated differently). 
Furthermore, the provision of quality health services by extra-governmental actors is at 
odds with the possibility of the provision of these services to all. Some instances of 
international human rights law (and its commentaries) recommend attention to the 
vulnerable and the marginalised but such provision suffers from legal, practical and 
ethical flaws. With regard to protection, the international standardisation and control of 
the safety of medicines was found to be problematic given medical, scientific, contextual 
and operational contingencies. Major problems subsist in the operationalisation of the 
role of extra-governmental actors for the fulfilment of the human right to medicines. In 
effect, extra-governmental actors are not capable to fully realise the human right to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, as their resources are limited. The human right to 
medicines does not set clearly what priorities should be enacted. Legally speaking, 
certain prioritisations can conflict with the duties to respect and not to discriminate, but 
there is no certainty about the operationalisation of these injunctions in the law. In ethical 
terms, the interdisciplinary analysis has shown that prioritisation imposes contingent and 
morally sensitive biopolitical choices concerning which lives to foster and disallow to 
live. If isolated approaches can be at odds with equity and equality, some attempts to 
rationalise globally the interventions of extra-governmental actors arguably pay 
questionable attention to the aggregate status of a population.  
The uncertainty of the human right to medicines is epitomised by the weakness of 
its enforcement. Little practice could be found with regard to the enforcement of the 
duties held directly by extra-governmental actors and the enforcement by home states of 
the duties of foreign states. The enforcement by foreign states of the duties of (African) 
home states to fulfil the human right to medicines at home encounters the relevant 




implementation of the right is supposed to be progressive and conditioned on the 
availability of resources – which are particularly limited in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
utilisation of targets and indicators is aggregative and has to cope with the trade-off 
between, on the one hand, standardisation, comparability, simplicity and, on the other 
hand, accuracy, depth and contextualisation to the economic, social, political and cultural 
circumstances. In effect, the international procedures most frequently utilised to defend 
the human right to medicines do not produce legally binding decisions; decisions are in 
fact seldom complied with. Furthermore, the individual right-holder does not benefit 
directly from most of those procedures, which generally concern the aggregate dimension, 
ie group (or ‘gross’ and ‘large-scale’) violations. Some institutions and procedures have 
been recently created to address such shortcomings but, until now, they have not been 
very productive with regard to the human right to health and medicines.666 The subjective 
right to medicines of African people, therefore, is not consistently adjudicated either 
internationally or nationally. With regard to the monitoring of implementation of human 
rights treaties, the guidelines of the CESCR include access to medicines and the 
guidelines of the African Commission include vaccination and medical care. In practice, 
however, the monitoring has not been systematic – notwithstanding, for example, the 
prescriptions formulated by both bodies that states shall immediately realise access to 
essential medicines. 667  Thus it is evident how the legal subsystem and the political 
subsystem are ultimately coupled both at the domestic and at the international level. 
International enforcement (spanning prosecution, adjudication, remedy) is ultimately a 
political process between states. Law is also created by the political system. The 
indeterminacy of the law in identifying precisely legal/illegal situations a priori 
reverberates with the procedural uncertainties for its enforcement.  
So, “can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa?” Can and shall the framework of the human right to 
medicines be utilised to guide and adjudicate the realisation of the human right to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa? It can be contended that, on the one hand, the human 
right to medicines does not seem to have the power de facto to obtain the realisation of 
access to necessary medicines. The ‘expectation’ that extra-governmental actors would 
fill the gap in the shortcoming realisation of the right by African states is not satisfied – 
                                            
666 See the ICESCR Optional Protocol, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and CEDAW Optional Protocol. See section 6.4.3.2 and Chapter 4 section 4.2.3. 




although extra-governmental actors certainly do contribute to access to medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. The human rights framework instead revealed conspicuous paradoxes: 
not all actions of extra-governmental actors diminishing access to medicines violate the 
respect of the human right to medicines; and not all shortcomings in the protection and 
fulfilment of access to medicines violate this right. In effect the autopoietic legal 
subsystem and ‘human rights subsystem’ code the environmental contingencies, 
complexities and uncertainties through generalisations and simplifications. Uncertainty is 
ultimately mirrored in the hesitant adjudication of the right. On the other hand, the 
prescriptions of the human right to medicines may legitimate the power and biopower of 
extra-governmental actors, which are generally very poorly politically accountable to the 
subjects of their power. Indeed, the human right to medicines and the meta-positive 
‘human rights subsystem’ can attribute roles and responsibilities onto the extra-
governmental actors. However, by communicating on indisputable norms, they de-
problematise sensitive biopolitical predicaments. So is the human right to medicines a 
desirable feature? Should it be reinforced or dismissed? Chapter 7 will propose some 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter reports on the four contributions to knowledge that the 
thesis sought to achieve.668 The first contribution concerns the identification and analysis 
of the human right to medicines in international law, de jure. Indeed the international law 
literature is rather undeveloped with regard to the duties that international human rights 
law formulates in relation to access to medicines. I have mainly addressed this issue in 
Chapters 3 and 4, and I shall summarise my findings in section 7.2 below. The second 
contribution regards the study of the possible implementation of a human right to 
medicines, de facto, in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis therefore researched broader 
questions of human rights, health care, public health and development in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In effect, several contingencies relating to practical as well as ethical problems 
were found which challenged the identification of a ‘right’ operationalisation of the 
human right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Such analysis has been mainly 
undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6, and is summarised in infra section 7.3. 
The third contribution relates to socio-legal studies. The thesis builds on 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems, contributing to the critique of human rights by 
examining autopoiesis and contingency in the legal and political subsystems. Such 
framework is moreover utilised in order to analyse the exercise of power and biopower to 
control issues of life in a population through the use of law (including the human right to 
medicines) and politics. These themes have been presented throughout the thesis and will 
flow into section 7.4, which provides my response to the research question: “can a human 
right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa?”. The response will highlight two main limitations of the utilisation of the human 
right to medicines to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
noting that: first, the human right to medicines has limited capacity to realise the need of 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa; second, the right can in fact entrench power and 
biopower. It will be argued that a human right to medicines is in effect a second best with 
regard to other types of policies and regulation. 
                                            




7.2 The international human right to medicines de jure 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that an international human right to medicines can 
be identified as a short-hand expression for “fundamental component of the international 
human right to health regarding access to medicines”. The positive law I analysed, in 
effect, does not name a self-standing human right to medicines. Nevertheless, the law 
does enshrine human rights obligations with regard to access to medicines. In particular, 
important formulations of the international human right to health comprise access to 
medicines as a fundamental component. The expression ‘human right to medicines’ has 
consequently started to be used in the last decade by, among the others, soft law, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health, and publicists.669  
The main recipients for obligations under human rights law are home states. 
Chapter 3 has consequently analysed the obligations, de jure, of sub-Saharan African 
states. Treaties widely accessed by African states such as the UN International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) [ICESCR art. 12; ACHPR art. 16] enshrine a human right 
to health which states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil.670 Access to medicines is 
deemed to be a fundamental component of this right. In particular the CESCR and the 
African Commission (respectively, the treaty-bodies overseeing the ICESCR and the 
ACHPR) have identified the provision of ‘essential’ medicines as a minimum core 
obligation that states shall immediately realise in relation to the human right to health 
[CESCR 2000: para. 43 and note 5; AC Res. 141 (2008): para. 2(3)(i)]. It was also 
showed that many human rights such as the right to life and the right not to be subject to 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment can support a case against states for the 
recognition of the right to access to medicines. Furthermore, it was established that 
customary international law sanctions the respect of the human right to health and 
thereby medicines. I could not identify, instead, duties to protect or fulfil the human right 
to medicines as part of customary international law. Instead, several instances of soft law 
were found whereby states pledged for the realisation of access to medicines also 
referring to the human right to health, or pledged to realise human rights which arguably 
included the realisation of access to medicines.  
                                            
669 See also Chapter 1 section 1.3. 
670 Most African countries are parties to the ICESCR and all African countries are parties 




Chapter 4 demonstrated that the human right to medicines also prescribes duties 
onto extra-governmental actors (ie foreign states and non-state actors such as 
international organisations, NGOs, pharmaceutical companies, individuals). With regard 
to the obligations of foreign states concerning the enjoyment of the human right to 
medicines in other (sub-Saharan African) countries, widely-accessed human rights 
treaties obligate states to internationally respect and cooperate for the realisation of the 
human right to health, and thence medicines. Foreign states are instead not responsible 
for the full realisation/ fulfilment of this human right abroad. In effect foreign 
cooperation and assistance are prescribed in vague terms. The ICESCR regime, 
according to the CESCR, also demands states to protect the right internationally from 
third parties violations. With regard to the role of foreign states in the enforcement of the 
human right to health and medicines abroad, the treaties examined set up treaty-based 
bodies in order to monitor the conduct of the parties with regard to the human rights 
sanctioned therein. However, most treaty-based bodies do not exercise a judicial function 
proper. Procedures to redress the complaints of individuals are not envisaged by several 
treaties, included the ICESCR regime (the Optional Protocol redresses this shortcoming 
but is not in force as of yet). Reparations for individual situations are not envisaged by 
the treaties analysed. Furthermore, not all the bodies receive inter-state complaints. Even 
those who receive such complaints rarely have the power to issue actionable interim 
measures,671 and have no policing capacity.672 Under international customary law, which 
binds all states, foreign states have to respect access to medicines in other countries. A 
customary duty to internationally protect the human right to medicines instead could not 
be established. With regard to international fulfilment, it is hard to identify what states 
would be specifically prescribed to do under a potential customary duty to cooperate for 
realising the human right to medicines. ‘Paper practice’ and ‘factual practice’ were not 
consistent. It was noted that states are keen to pledge for the international realisation of 
human rights and access to medicines in soft law. Finally, with regard to enforcement, 
states are entitled to prosecute foreign states for the transnational effects of actions 
detrimental to their peoples’ access to medicines. Furthermore, they can act for violations 
of the human right to medicines taking place abroad claiming breaches of obligations 
erga omnes.  
                                            
671 For instance, within the ICESCR regime, interim measures are not provided in the 
Covenant but have been included in the (not yet operational) Optional Protocol (see 
above Section 4.2.1). 




With regard to non-state actors, several treaties declare that individuals, groups, 
international organisations should respect human rights and attribute to them 
responsibilities relating to the realisation of these rights. However, these duties are 
imposed on non-state actors indirectly: it is states that are ultimately liable internationally 
for the protection of human rights from third-party violations. Furthermore, the wording 
of the obligations concerning non-state actors is overall vague. The identification of 
duties from customary international law has proved to be extremely tentative. Indeed, I 
could not overcome the paradox of whose practice and whose opinio juris should be 
searched when seeking the inter-national custom binding non-state actors. It was 
proposed that, holding international legal personality, non-state actors can be liable for 
the respect of the human right to health sanctioned in international customary law. 
However such prescription is extremely vague. Short of customary law, the investigation 
in this area identified several instances of soft law, self-regulation and other quasi-law 
attributing responsibilities for human rights and access to medicines to the non-state 
actors which have considerable influence on access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, 
that is, international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies.  
Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that, from the perspective of Luhmann’s 
social systems theory, the human right to medicines is in some instances positivised in 
the legal subsystem. Sub-Saharan African countries are bound by international law to 
recognise and realise access to medicines as fundamental part of the human right to 
health. This is meant to produce legal effects in the domestic legal systems, as 
international and domestic law intertwine, and all the more with regard to human 
rights.673 It is therefore recalled that at the domestic level the human right to health or the 
human right to health care are recognized in the constitutions of at least 31 sub-Saharan 
African countries and 115 countries around the world [Kinney and Clark 2004; 
UNOHCHR and WHO 2008: 10].674 Foreign states also have duties with regard to access 
to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa under international human rights law. The duties of 
non-state actors with regard to the human right to medicines can instead be framed, 
generally, as communications of the meta-positive ‘human rights subsystem’: these 
duties are non-binding, and derive from treaties as well as soft law and self-regulation. 
The meta-positive ‘human rights subsystem’ is in effect prompter to prescribe obligations 
                                            
673 See Chapter 3 section 3.1. 




relating to the human right to medicines onto all actors (home states, foreign states and 
non-state actors). 
It was also showed in the thesis, furthermore, that the positive human right to 
medicines is affected by what I would call ‘systemic contingencies’ in the legal 
subsystem, that is, uncertainties, contradictions and paradoxes within the law 
(substantive and procedural), de jure. To begin with the law often does not prescribe 
clear and precise actions onto the duty-bearers. Uncertainty is also generated when the 
human right to medicines complements its indeterminacy by referring to non-binding 
sources, framed in other social subsystems (for example the meta-positive ‘human rights 
subsystem’, the political subsystem) through structural coupling. For treaties, the 
pronouncements of treaty bodies can be used to interpret – and develop – the law. 
However, the binding power of those sources is questionable. The treaty-bodies, in turn, 
have often referred to non-binding norms such as WHO’s recommendations on the 
identification of ‘essential medicines’. The assessment of customary law can be found to 
rest on the ‘paper practice’ of states, e.g. the adhesion to international declarations or 
pledges that are not in fact legally binding. To note, an open-ended approach to 
interpretation of the law introduces uncertainty in the law. Next, a paradox was found in 
that not all actions reducing access to medicines violate the respect of the human right to 
medicines. Not all shortcomings in protection and fulfilment of access to medicines 
violate this right. Human rights law often allows for some flexibility, a margin of 
toleration – but it is not clear generally where this margin is situated. In addition, the law 
can also be contradictory. Certain formulations by the ICESCR, the CESCR and the 
African Commission for example operationalised the human right to health and 
medicines as concerned with the collective dimension – populations and groups. This 
indication clashes with the principle that everyone has equal importance and dignity.675 
More specifically, the focus on collectivities conflicts with the formulation of the human 
right to health according to which everyone is entitled to the maximum attainable 
standard of health [ICESCR art. 12(1); ACHPR art. 16]. Indeed, a subjective human right 
to medicines (or health care, health) faces the paradox of referring to objective rights, 
                                            
675 See, e.g., ICESCR preambular paragraphs 1 and 3 [ICESCR preambular paras. 1, 3] 
and ACHPR article 2: “[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any 
kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other 




pertaining to categories.676 Finally, with regard to enforcement, the right is sanctioned by 
different sources of law, domestic and international, which present different procedures 
for redress. Therefore the obligations that – universal – human rights instruments 
prescribe have different legal consequences according to the legal systems utilised. 
Chapters 5 and 6 have consequently attempted to establish how the human right to 
medicines, with its de jure contingencies, can be put into practice. 
 
7.3 The human right to medicines and access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa de 
facto 
Chapters 5 and 6 critically enquired the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of the human right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to do so, the 
chapters studied the obligations of home states, foreign states and non-state actors to 
respect, protect, fulfil and enforce the human right to medicines. Where the legal 
subsystem refers by structural coupling to the ‘human rights subsystem’, some meta-
positive communications have also been considered. The operationalisation and 
implementation of the human right to medicines were consequently examined 
normatively through interdisciplinary and empirical research of access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa, including a two-month field-work in Tanzania. Such 
multidimensional analysis pointed out the limitations of the human right to medicines to 
guide and redress access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In particular, Chapter 5 analysed the operationalisation, implementation and 
enforcement of the duties borne by home states, at the national level. It demonstrated that, 
with regard to the duty to respect, questions are posed for example regarding the 
selection by states of the ‘essential’ medicines they make accessible in the public health 
facilities, as the medicines excluded can be nonetheless necessary for certain patients (see 
infra). The regulation of intellectual property is also delicate: the protection of 
intellectual property rights, and in particular patents on pharmaceutical medicines, can 
reduce the affordability of new medicines but can also promote pharmaceutical research 
and development. Furthermore, intellectual property rights can be morally warranted as 
they can reward the inventor’s efforts, and/or foster the economy at large. The 
prohibition of non-discrimination is problematic as formal non-discrimination does not 
                                            




solve the problem of inequality, while substantive non-discrimination is difficult to 
operationalise and implement. The principle of substantive non-discrimination attempts 
to dedicate different treatment to different situations. In fact, in order not to be 
discriminatory, it establishes ‘objective’ categories which fit with difficulty to the 
subjectivities of individuals. The implementation of the duty to protect with regard to the 
control of quality and safety presents practical and cognitive problems, as the safety and 
efficacy of medicines are not certain. Decisions need to be taken by the regulatory 
authorities on the threshold of risk that can be tolerated: certain medicines bring health 
benefits but can also cause dangerous side effects. Next, an adequate design of 
competition policies is uncertain. Doubts concern the identification of excessive prices or 
the ‘abuse’ of intellectual property. The implementation of the state duty to protect can 
clash with the private initiative for example by regulating the private health insurance 
policies or imposing price controls on medicines. Such clashes can also have adverse 
(‘self-defeating’) effects for access to medicines. Price controls for instance can 
discourage enterprise and reduce the availability of medicines.  
Finally, difficulties have been found in the operationalisation of the human right 
to medicines with regard to the fulfilment of the right in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
prescriptions of human rights law regarding these decisions are often indeterminate and 
paradoxical with respect to whose needs to respond, for instance referring to the 
individuals as well as populations and groups. In effect, as mentioned above, the 
identification of ‘essential’ medicines imposes sensitive ethical questions regarding the 
rationing of health assistance. These questions have been illustrated by analysing the 
three main competing principles which inform health-care prioritisation (at the macro 
level): aggregate health status of a population, individual health needs and equity. The 
justifications underpinning – and the arguments challenging – each principle were 
complex, based on practical, economic, moral, subjective reasons. These theoretical 
dilemmas also inform the design of alternative systems for the financing and distribution 
of medicines. As also seen in Chapter 2, none of these systems is perfect. For example, 
out-of-pocket expenditures are not affordable for the worse-off, free delivery by the 
public health system is affordable for the patient but is not affordable for the limited 
budgets of African states, cost-sharing is more affordable for the health facility, 
responsibilises the patient, but is less affordable for the patient than the free delivery of 
treatment. A main question is, ultimately, how much funds can the state request from the 




dilemmas, moreover, limited resources and bureaucratic inefficiencies affect the 
realisation of access to medicines by the state. Finally, with regard to enforcement, much 
uncertainty was revealed over the use of legal remedies, especially to redress the lack of 
fulfilment of the human right to medicines. Domestic courts are hesitant worldwide about 
recognising individual entitlements to medicines, even as part of minimum core state 
duties, considering the resource constraints. Whenever courts have decided that states 
violated the human right to health with regard to medicines, furthermore, the judicial 
remedies have not necessarily been effective for the claimants’ health needs (for example, 
the awards were too limited, and the sentences have not been enforced by the executive). 
In sub-Saharan Africa the only case I found where a home state has been declared guilty 
in a national court for not providing medicines, and thereby breaching the human right to 
health, has been TAC v. Ministry of Health [South Africa, Constitutional Court, Ministry 
of Health v. TAC, 2002].  
Chapter 6 subsequently undertook an analysis of the operationalisation, 
implementation and enforcement of the duties that extra-governmental actors bear with 
regard to the international human right to medicines. In particular, it searched possible 
relief from the limitations that were shown in the capacity of sub-Saharan African states 
to fulfil the human right to medicines at home. Indeed the human right to medicines, 
primarily binding on states, nurtures ‘expectations’ with regard to the roles and 
responsibilities of foreign states and non-state actors towards the realisation of the right. 
The legal subsystem, therefore, structurally couples to the ‘human rights subsystem’, 
which in effect communicates that foreign states and non-state actors bear human rights 
duties for access to medicines. Those non-binding duties are named in soft-law 
(including UN-sanctioned declarations and resolutions) and self-regulation of several 
international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies. Both positive and 
meta-positive obligations have been analysed in this chapter. 
 The analysis of the duties to respect, protect and fulfil the human right to 
medicines has revealed that, to begin with, it is not clear which intellectual property 
international agreements and actions by foreign states violate the respect of the human 
right to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the WTO/TRIPS will certainly 
impair the access to certain new medicines for sub-Saharan African countries. These 
countries indeed import extensively from countries such as China and India which have 




TRIPS flexibilities for importation/exportation (e.g. compulsory licenses and parallel 
importation), often presented as a solution to this problem, are in fact cumbersome to 
implement. However, the protection of the intellectual property worldwide can be 
justified as rewarding and stimulating innovation. Furthermore, other factors influence 
access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, besides the availability of generic medicines. 
A univocal condemnation could not be expressed about the international financial 
institutions’ structural adjustments programmes demanding restraint to the social welfare 
policies of African states (for example, through the imposition of cost sharing for health 
care and medicines). The implementation of the prohibition of discrimination is 
particularly problematic for extra-governmental actors if it is operationalised as 
demanding de facto and substantive non-discrimination. The contributions of these actors 
are by nature selective. Moreover, provision of quality health services is generally at 
odds with the possibility of the provision of these services to all. In relation to protection, 
the international standardisation and control of the safety of medicines was found to be 
difficult given medical, contextual and practical contingencies. Major problems subsist in 
the operationalisation of the role of extra-governmental actors for the fulfilment of the 
human right to medicines. Extra-governmental actors contribute to access to medicines in 
sub-Saharan African countries but are not capable of realising the human right to 
medicines in the region. Their resources are limited, therefore they select whose health-
care needs they will attend. The interdisciplinary analysis showed that prioritisation 
imposes contingent and morally sensitive biopolitical choices, as also seen in Chapter 5. 
In effect extra-governmental actors, taking these decisions, wield power and biopower to 
foster or disallow life. 677  Such powers are exacerbated by the fact that extra-
governmental actors are generally poorly accountable to the subjects of their influence in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
With regard to the enforcement, Chapter 6 investigated: 1) the enforcement of the 
duties held by foreign states 2) the enforcement by foreign states of the duties of (sub-
Saharan African) home states 3) the enforcement of the duties held by non-state actors. 
Little practice could be found for any of those categories of enforcement. I analysed with 
particular attention the enforcement by foreign states of the duties of home (sub-Saharan 
African) states to fulfil the human right to medicines in their jurisdictions.678  Such 
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death’ (‘faire vivre ou rejeter dans la mort’) [Foucault 1976: 138].  




enforcement, in principle, could provide legal remedy, internationally, to the lack of 
medicines affecting the African people. However at a closer look contingencies were 
found that discourage a reliance on this type of redress. A preliminary substantive 
problem is that the identification of ‘violations’ of the right may not be straightforward, 
considering that the implementation of the right is supposed to be progressive and 
conditioned on the availability of resources (which are particularly limited in sub-
Saharan Africa). The conduct and results in fulfilling the human right to medicines, it is 
sometimes proposed, can be measured through targets and indicators. However, they 
have to be designed taking into account the contingent trade-off between, on the one 
hand, standardisation, comparability, simplicity and, on the other hand, accuracy, depth 
and contextualisation to the economic, social, political and cultural circumstances. 
Furthermore, these gauges are generally aggregative, not relating about the situations of 
individuals. From a procedural point of view, moreover, it was showed that the 
international procedures most frequently utilised to defend the human right to medicines, 
ie treaty-bodies complaint procedures, do not produce legally binding decisions. 
Decisions are in fact seldom complied with. Moreover, the individual right-holder does 
not generally benefit directly from international procedures available to sub-Saharan 
Africa (also including international courts, state action against violations of erga omnes 
obligations etc.), which generally concern the aggregate dimension, ie group (or ‘gross’ 
and ‘large-scale’) violations. Some institutions and procedures have been recently created 
to address such shortcoming but, until now, they have not been very productive with 
regard to the human right to health and medicines. Furthermore, with regard to the 
monitoring of the implementation of human rights treaties, it was demonstrated that even 
though the reporting guidelines of the CESCR and the African Commission would 
warrant an attention to access to medicines, in practice, the monitoring has not been 
systematic.  
Thus, the legal, meta-positive, interdisciplinary and empirical study of the 
utilisation of the human right to medicines found no ‘indisputable’ path for the 
implementation of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the ‘good’ of the 
actions for access to medicines depended on the environmental contingencies of the 
human right to medicines relating to, inter alia: the circumstances of local African health 
systems (e.g., type of burden of disease, type of health care financing, available 
resources); the limits of steering of the legal and political subsystems;  the uncertainties 




regulatory interventions such as intellectual property protection; the causality and impact 
of economic phenomena such as development); the uncertainties about the science in 
medicine and pharmacy (e.g. uncertainties about: medicine; the safety and efficacy of a 
pharmaceutical product); the roles and behaviours of the different actors influencing 
access to medicines in a health systems; bioethical predicaments concerning which and 
whose health condition to treat; and ethical predicaments concerning the impact on other 
rights, needs, interests and liberties in society. The contingencies, problems and 
paradoxes identified through socio-legal analysis in Chapters 3-6 are further elaborated 
in the next session, which provides my answer to the research question. 
 
7.4 Can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa? 
So can a human right to medicines be utilised to solve the problem of access to 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa? As specified in Chapter 1 section 1.3 this question is 
two-fold asking if – descriptively – the right has the legal weight and if – normatively – it 
ought to be utilised to solve the problem of access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The answer to both facets of the question is that the human right to medicines has strong 
limitations.  
From a descriptive point of view, the human right to medicines, de jure, can be 
claimed in sub-Saharan Africa. The human right to medicines can be utilised, more 
precisely, by claiming the human right to health. Most African countries are 
internationally bound to recognise and realise the human right to health sanctioned in the 
ICESCR (which binds 43 African countries) and the ACHPR (which binds all African 
states) [ICESCR art. 12; ACHPR art. 16]. The obligations to respect, protect and fulfil 
the human right to health enshrined in these treaties also apply to access to medicines.679 
Such international obligations are meant to produce legal effects in the domestic legal 
systems: as discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.1 international and domestic law intertwine, 
and all the more with regard to human rights.680 Foreign states and non-state actors also 
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680 It is also recalled that the right to health or the right to health care are recognized in 
the constitutions of 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa [Kinney and Clark 2004]. See 




have international legal obligations with respect to the human right to medicines.681 
However, the law demonstrated systemic contingencies (uncertainties, contradictions and 
paradoxes) which make its application to access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, de 
facto, difficult. Importantly, with regard to an entitlement to medicines, the ICESCR and 
the ACHPR regimes include an obligation of home states to immediately provide 
essential medicines. However, apart from the fact that this obligation only relates to the 
medicines identified to be ‘essential’ by each state, the law is contradictory with regard 
to the provision of a subjective entitlement to medicines. While everyone has a right to 
health according to the CESCR, for example, the states’ minimum core obligation to 
satisfy access to essential medicines entails that “a State party in which any significant 
number of individuals” is deprived of essential medicines is, prima facie, failing to 
discharge its obligations under the Covenant [CESCR 1990(b): para. 10, emph. add.].682 
In effect, courts in sub-Saharan Africa have not accepted claims of a subjective 
(individual) entitlement to medicines or other medical treatment.683 The South African 
Constitutional Court has instead awarded a claim relating to access to medicines founded 
on the right to health in the judicial review of a government health-care policy (the 
provision of nevirapine) which was judged to be ‘unreasonable’ [South Africa, 
Constitutional Court, Ministry of Health v. TAC, 2002].684 Moreover, a case aiming at 
access to medicines and referring inter alia to the right to health has been successfully 
presented at the Competition Commission in South Africa [Tau et al 2002; Competition 
Commission 2003(a)].685 Worldwide, several cases have been awarded which granted 
access to medicines based on the human right to health and other human rights. The 
recognition of an individual entitlement to medicines has however been sporadic.686 
International treaty-bodies have decided in a few cases that the failure to respect access 
to medicines by African states was a violation of the right to health and other human 
rights.687 However, overall, there is no correspondence between the lack of medicines 
and the adjudication of access to medicines as a human right in courts. The adjudication 
of extra-governmental actors on issues relating to the human right to medicines was also 
found to be very rare. 
                                            
681 See Chapter 4 and section 7.2 above.  
682 See Chapters 3 and 4 and section 7.2 above. 
683 See Chapters 5 and 6.  
684 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.3. 
685 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.2. 
686 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.3. 




From a normative point of view, a human right to medicines presents, in principle, 
two interesting features for access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the 
recognition of access to medicines as a human right could give access to medicines the 
supremacy to overrule ordinary law and government policies. Secondly, the international 
human right to medicines could provide a regulatory and policy framework for a 
comprehensive approach to access to medicines, at the national and international level. 
As it was showed, indeed, access to medicines involves a variety of interwoven factors 
and actors. In fact, a critical and ethical analysis of the human right to medicines 
demonstrated that these normative arguments have limitations. With regard to the first 
idea the thesis has abundantly demonstrated the repercussions that medicine policies can 
have on other rights, interests, needs and liberties in society. Access to medicines is 
certainly imperative in sub-Saharan Africa, but at any cost? From a legal perspective it 
can be objected that there are other norms which have supremacy in the legal subsystem 
– and the resolution of conflicts between those norms is to great extent contingent. From 
an ethical perspective, indeed, Luhmann called ‘human rights fundamentalism’ the idea 
that human rights are natural, indispensable, based on principles, and are supposed to 
have unlimited validity [Luhmann 1997: 1022]. 688  Instead, there is nothing ‘fully 
independent of consequences’ in human rights.689 With regard to the second argument, it 
has not been possible to identify a convincing regulatory framework for access to 
medicines that should overrule the present laws, policies and behaviours. No ideal system 
for access to medicines was found, given the contingencies and complexities of access to 
medicines and health systems in sub-Saharan Africa.690  
Thus, normatively, the thesis identifies important limitations with regard to the 
utilisation of human rights to guide and redress access to medicines, as well as other 
‘fundamental’ measures of health care and health. In fact it is argued that human rights 
are a ‘second-best’, both as moral principles and legal instruments. The utilisation of 
human rights as moral principles, overall, suffers from the shortcoming that human rights 
communications tend to simplify contingencies and de-problematise ethical predicaments, 
                                            
688  Cited and translated in Moeller [2008: 139]. See also Luhmann [2008] on 
‘indispensable’ norms. As Luhmann observed, with regard to values, in effect, “values 
are necessary in order to give decisions indisputability. Decisions however bring the 
necessity into the form of contingency” [Luhmann 2008: 29]. On values see also Paterson 
[2008]. 
689  Luhmann defines indispensable norms as those norms ‘fully independent of 
consequences’ [Luhmann 2008: 19]. 




as the empirical and ethical enquiry in the thesis demonstrated. This is not a point about 
relativism vis-à-vis human rights universalism – or sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. Indeed the thesis criticised those approaches which, especially founded in 
the discourse of development, see developing countries as exceptions, therefore calling 
for exceptional measures such as ‘normalising’ their ‘populations’. The point maintained 
here is precisely what Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos noted reading Luhmann on human 
rights: “… this is not a preference for the particular over the universal, but a 
consideration… of the impossibility of capturing the particular through the universal and 
therefore a necessity of shifting focus… from the distinction particular/universal to that 
of social system/human consciousness” [Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 158]. 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos further remarked that a related aporia has been identified 
by Brown, in her feminist research, with regard to the possibility of utilising human 
rights for the emancipation of women: “[i]f too ‘universal’, generic and neutral, human 
rights simply reinstate the status quo; if too specific and particularised, they maintain the 
fence around identity and discrete components of suffering, with which women identify 
and in which they remain immured”.691 Thus, I resent the reduction of moral reasoning, 
including reasoning for policies, regulations and court decisions to arguments founded on 
human rights.692 Human rights, after all, are part of the autopoiesis of the political and 
legal subsystems, as recalled below. Next, as legal instruments, it was noted, the human 
right to health care is too ‘weak’ to guide and redress the need for medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. My conclusion does not suggest, however, reinforcing the utilisation of 
economic and social rights, for example by demanding courts to be more ‘activist’.693 
Too much, it was showed, cannot be decided in terms of the human right to 
medicines/health care/health. For example, it is hard to overcome the paradox of a human 
right to health care which is not possible to award comprehensively and is in effect 
exclusive. Why do people suffering from rare, expensive conditions not deserve to have 
their human right to health care realised in contexts of llimited resources? Human rights, 
consequently, are also inadequate to redress the use of power in relation to health care 
                                            
691 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos [2010: 156] referring to Brown [2002].  
692 See also the studies in the philosophy of law and ethics. For example some works 
enquire on which normative principles are best suited to inform morality – whether 
rights, duties or goals [Mackie 1984; O’Neill 1996; Raz 1984]. See also the works 
researching the moral foundation of rights [Steiner 1994; Sumner 1987]. 
693 See contra Bilchitz favouring an expanded role of the courts seeing human rights 
protection as the justification of judicial review and suggesting that courts should look, 
for economic and social rights, at overall budgets focussing on a minimum core approach 




and access to medicines. Indeed as Luhmann noted, “[a] subjective right offers a 
guarantee of freedom in a double sense: for the holder and for those against whom those 
rights are ineffective” [id.: 418].694  
In fact, the function of human rights in social systems fosters the very duty-
holders’ power and biopower. With regard to the role of states, in particular, human 
rights do not overcome their structural coupling to politics, which takes place through 
law. The ‘human rights subsystem’ structurally couples to law – human rights are often 
seen as the ‘foundation’ of the rule of law [Luhmann 2004: 414]. Human rights gain 
ascendancy through the (human rights) law. In effect, however, it is politics which 
establishes/‘recognises’ human rights in law. Human rights indeed do not hold a higher 
metaphysical legitimacy as they are in fact ‘product of society’ [Luhmann 1997(b): 35]. 
Human rights consequently act as gate-keepers of the subsystems’ autopoiesis. As 
Luhmann sharply noted, human rights limit the scope of politics, keeping it functionally 
differentiated form the other social subsystems (e.g., the legal, moral, economic 
subsystems) [Luhmann 2002/1965: 60-61]. Human (constitutional, fundamental) rights 
are inneed meant to be the ultimate guarantee against the assault of the state. At the same 
time, still, such differentiation is condition of existence (and autopoiesis) of politics. 
Without human rights the other social subsystems would collapse into the absolute power 
of politics [id.] – and politics itself would no longer be ‘politics’. The theory of social 
systems also suggests that the differentiation entrenched by human rights is – as well as 
communication produced within other subsystems – a communication produced within 
the autopoietic political subsystem. In effect the political subsystem through human 
rights designs its competence and legitimacy. States are communications/programmes of 
the human rights utopia (which incidentally includes also non-state actors), but the 
human rights utopia, is a communication/programme of the states.695 As Philippopoulos-
Mihalopouolos aptly put it: “[human] rights are part of the representation aspect of the 
political system towards its environment, a pivotal part of the arsenal of values in the 
nature of which the political system legitimises itself” [Philippopoulos 2010: 154, emph. 
orig.].696 Therefore, states are the recipients of duties as well as legitimate powers for the 
realisation of human rights. 
                                            
694 See also Luhmann [2004: 151, 165].  
695 See Luhmann [1997(b): 992-3]. 




The ‘politicisation’ of human rights is also evident as human rights, according to 
many human rights instruments, can in fact be limited for the ‘public’ – as it will be 
defined by politics – interest.697 Moreover, human rights often sanction a ‘margin of 
discretion’.698 Economic and social rights, in particular, are to be realised progressively, 
that which virtually concedes perpetual legitimacy to the shortcomings of state action. 
Also, with specific regard to health, it is recalled that the human right to health envisages 
the protection of public health, and this can constitute legitimate grounds for limiting 
human rights [Tomasevski 1995: 125].699 Indeed, Agamben notes that the state obtains 
legitimate biopower for intervening in public health and the health of the ‘bare lives’ 
from the inscription of the bare life (bios) in the juridico-political order which take place 
in human rights declarations: 
Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscription of natural 
life in the juridico-political order of the nation-state. The same bare life that in the 
ancien régime was politically neutral and belonged to God as creaturely life and 
in the classical world was (at least apparently) clearly distinguished as zoē from 
political life (bios) now fully enters into the structure of the state and even 
becomes the earthly foundation of the state’s legitimacy and sovereignty. 
[Agamben 1998: 127] 
Furthermore non-state actors, too, are attributed power and biopower whenever 
they are attributed a ‘public’ role, inter alia, by human rights norms. This power is not 
political/state ‘binding’ power, but can be influential and unfettered all the more as such 
actors are not politically accountable.  
It is recalled that the exercise of power is morally problematic for two main 
reasons:700 power is generally a reduction of liberty for the individuals subject to it and 
can impose morally undesirable policies and actions. The thesis has illustrated that the 
spectrum where power can be exercised in relation to the human right to medicines is 
                                            
697 See for example ICESCR article 4 [ICESCR art. 4]. On limitations to the international 
human right to health, for example in relation to ‘general welfare’ see also Toebes [1999: 
Chapter VI, text to notes 34-48]. With regard to national constitutional documents for 
example Bilchitz reports of the limitations contained in the South African Constitution 
[Bilchitz 2007: 175]. See also the TAC v. Ministry of Health judgment wherein the South 
African Constitutional Court read the human rights provisions in the South African 
Constitution as attributing powers to the state [South Africa, Constitutional Court, TAC v. 
Ministry of Health, para. 28]. 
698 See also CESCR [2000: para. 53]. 
699  Public health often demands to limit human rights such as the right to privacy, 
autonomy, or even the right to health of the individual, in favour of the collective interest 
[Beaglehole and Bonita 2004: 264-266; D’Oronzio 2001; O’Neill 2002: 36]. 




ample. States have to respect, protect, fulfil the human right to medicines – therefore they 
have to regulate and implement, inter alia, intellectual property rights, the safety of 
medicines, the modality of medicines financing (e.g. cost sharing, national insurance, 
general taxation), the selection of the medicines provided and the price of the medicines 
distributed. All those policies are consequential for health, but they are not precisely 
regulated by the human right to health. Thus, for example, the initiatives for access to 
medicines of states, international organisations, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies, 
while claiming to be non-discriminatory and objective (e.g. by pursuing aggregate 
DALYs of a population), may neglect individual medical needs or impose unwarranted 
public health policies.701  To note, states have a vested interest in the health of the 
‘population’ at the aggregate level, which is instrumental to ‘security’, and thence more 
power, as argued by Foucault [Foucault 2007].702 Human rights law, however, does not 
necessarily challenge such aggregative focus; in fact in some instances it sanctions a 
public health approach. Furthermore, the ethical problems of regulation and policies for 
access to medicines are not confined to health. Importantly, the implementation of the 
human right to medicines (as well as the human right to health care and other human 
rights) is costly, in terms of financial resources that have to be collected from the subjects 
and in terms of other legitimate interests, rights, needs and liberties that have to be 
forgone.   
Therefore, I argue that the differentiation of politics should be addressed critically 
with another sort of ‘de-differentiation’. Indeed, through the differentiation also enacted 
by human rights, politics remains autopoietic; human rights collaborate to distance 
politics from people, while coding people into politics according to the political 
communication – just as the legal subsystem re-constructs people in law as juridical 
subjects [Luhmann 2004: 417]). As Luhmann underlined, in effect: “autopoiesis 
precludes humanism, the reason being that there is no unity of all the autopoietic systems 
which make up the human being” [Luhmann 1986: 86]. Thus, while human rights can be 
seen as the fallback option against the assault of political power (although they are a 
paradoxical option, especially in those legal and political systems where they struggle to 
be recognised and enforced), the ‘first best’ is the questioning of politics (and law, and 
                                            
701 See also Porter on the use of quantification in order to justify public policies as 
objective [Porter 1995]. 
702 Accordingly, the best deal for a state is to focus on the least expensive interventions 




their structural couplings) without its autopoietic distinction – and defence – from society. 
The ‘binding decisions’ of the public administration should therefore be critically 
analysed through active democracy, participation, accountability and, when necessary, 
opposed through positive and ordinary law (tort law, criminal law, administrative law 
etc.).703 The problematisation of access to medicines (or health care and other social 
problems) has to be multidimensional, ‘interdisciplinary’, and take into account the 
ethical problems, operational contingencies and the limits of steering of politics and law. 
The human right to medicines instead de-problematises the complexities of action for the 
achievement of public goods. Too many issues in effect are not conclusively solved 
through the application of human rights: discussions relating to human rights risk being 
restricted to disciplined, inclusive yet exclusive channels. 704  Furthermore, the thesis 
demonstrated that, with regard to extra-governmental actors, human rights law as well as 
non-binding commitments to human rights are particularly vague, presenting serious 
challenges to the operationalisation, implementation and enforcement of such 
prescriptions. Other parameters and procedures of accountability are instead needed. 
In sum, I point out a fundamental limitation in that human rights can enhance the 
autopoietic distinction of politics and, by including the person in the juridico-political 
order, exclude her. Indeed, as observed by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, system theory 
suggests that: 
… human rights are a tangible representation, not of a full-on humanism, but 
precisely of the need to relocate the question from the human to the boundary 
between system and environment. In this respect rights constitute the 
actualisation of exclusion… human rights are predicated precisely on the 
exclusion of the human flesh and blood from society – otherwise the discourse 
would revert to a situation of total inclusion. [Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010: 
155, 157]  
Thus, the human right to medicines – or, the “fundamental component of the 
human right to health regarding access to medicines” – is ultimately affected by the 
paradox that it is not sufficiently human. Social systems theory has helped identifying the 
limits of rationalising the world and the individual according to autopoietic systems, as 
well as the constructed meanings that communications transmit in the different social 
systems. As Paterson remarked, in effect, “it is undoubtedly true that individuals are 
                                            
703 Recalling from Chapter 1 section 1.4, politics is the subsystem differentiated through 
communications power/non power, whose function is taking binding decisions [Luhmann 
2002/1965: 55, 58]. 




constructs of social systems but it is also true that social systems exist as constructs for 
individuals” [Paterson 1996: 89, emph. orig.]. I hope, therefore, that this thesis 
contributed to the identification and problematisation of the paradoxes, contingencies and 
limitations of human rights and access to medicines, in the sight of the ‘human flesh and 
blood’ in sub-Saharan Africa.705 Paradoxes in effect, as Luhmann suggested in his study 
on the paradoxes of human rights, are not ‘scandalous’, but rather the rule for social 
construction.706  
                                            
705 See Paterson defending social systems theory against Bankowski’s critique of the 
alleged demise of the person in the sight of autopoiesis [Bankowski 1996; Paterson 1996: 
82]. In fact Paterson uncovers ‘the importance of autopoiesis in the sight of the person’ 
[Paterson 1996: 89]. For the uncovering of the ‘flesh and blood’, and the ‘absences 
manifesting in the theory’, see Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos [2010: 8, 77-8, 157]. 




ANNEXE A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
List of the people I interviewed during my field work in Tanzania and Kenya, July-





Name  Role, Institution Place  Date 




Tuberculosis  and 
Leprosy Programme 
(NTLP) 
National Tuberculosis  
and Leprosy 
Programme, Ministry of 
Health and Social 
Welfare, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
20/07/09 





Control Programme,  
Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare; 






Assistant Director (Chief 
Pharmacist), Ministry of 
Health and Social 
Welfare 
Diamond Jubilee, 





















Dr George M. 
Kassiga 















Hamidi Njouvu Acting Municipal 
Director, Sumbawanga, 
Rukwa Region 










Procurement of medicines in the public and private sector 
 
Dr Eunice Gathitu Pharmacist, Provincial 
Hospital of Mombasa 
Provincial Hospital of 
Mombasa, Kenya 
20/08/09 
Hajiri Haruni Shopkeeper of 
‘Mwikola’ Duka la 






Cosmas Mwaifwani Director of Customer 
Services & Sales, 
Medical Stores 
Department (MSD)  
Medical Stores 
Department, Marajani, 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
20/07/09 
Miriam Mzirany Clinical Officer, 





Adrian Siwalima Regional Pharmacist of 





Cecilia Wanalwa Pharmacist, Kilifi 
District Hospital 





Tanzania civil society, consumer groups 
 















Director, WHO Essential 
Drugs Programme 
Tanzania 
WHO, Luthuli Road, 





Foreign cooperation, foreign aid 
 
Charles Llewelyn Health and Population 
Officer, USAID 
United States Embassy, 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
13/08/09 
Elise Jensen Head of USAID’s 
HIV/AIDS Office;  
Chair, USAID/ 
Development Partners 
Group (DPG) AIDS, 
Country Coordinating 
Mechanism of the 
Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and 
United States Embassy, 






Malaria   
Gregory Smith Consultant, Irish Aid  Movempick Hotel, Dar 





















Donata Dalla Riva 
 
Doctors with Africa 
Cuamm 
Doctors with Africa 
Cuamm, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
14/07/09 




Clinton Foundation,  
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
13/08/09 
Jafari Liana Management Science for 
Health (MSH), Tanzania 
Management Science 
for Health (MSH), Dar 




Management Science for 
Health (MSH), Tanzania 
Management Science 
for Health (MSH), 





JSI/SCMS Tanzania JSI/SCMS Tanzania, 
Zambia Street, Plot no. 
32 in Oyster bay, 
Tanzania 
15/07/09 
Tim Rosche USAID | DELIVER 
PROJECT – John Snow, 
Inc. (JSI) 
 
USAID | DELIVER 
PROJECT - John Snow, 
Inc. (JSI), 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
17/07/09 




Medeor TZ  
Action Medeor TZ, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania 
16/07/09 
Rosemary Silaa Clinton Foundation Clinton Foundation, 







Dr Janet Bulemela Acting Head of St. 
Francis Hospital 




Dr Mussa Makori General Practitioner, Dr 
Atiman Memorial 


















and Lecturer, Health 
Economics & Policy 
Health Policy Unit 
London School of 








Dr Flora Kessy Ifakara Health Institute Ifakara Health Institute, 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania  
10/08/09 
Felix Lubuga Ifakara Health Institute Ifakara Health Institute, 
Mikocheni Office, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania  
22/07/09 
Dr Vicki Marsh  Kilifi Research Unit Kenya Medical 
Research 
Institute/Wellcome 





Dr Dominick Mboya Ifakara Health Institute Ifakara Health Institute, 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania  
05/08/09 
Christopher Mshana Ifakara Health Institute Ifakara Health Institute, 




Medical Researcher  Ifakara Health Institute, 
Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania  
05/08/09 
Leka Tingitana Tanzania Training 
Centre for International 
Health (TTCIH), Ifakara 
Health Institute 




Frank Wafula Health Systems Research 
Group,  KEMRI/ 










Ashok Gupta Head – Formulation 
Development & DRA 
Department, Shelys 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd,  
Shelys Pharmaceuticals 






Professor Dr Klaus 
M. Leisinger 
President and Managing 
Director of the  
Novartis Foundation for 
Sustainable 
Development 







Pharmaceutical products regulating authorities 
 
Emmanuel Alphonce Inspection and 
Enforcement Manager, 
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority (TFDA) 
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 
(TFDA), Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
 
Brycesson Kibassa Acting Manager ADDO 
Programme, Tanzania 
Food and Drugs 
Authority (TFDA) 
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 
(TFDA), Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
14/08/09 






Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 
(TFDA), Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
17/08/09 




Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 
(TFDA), Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
17/08/09 





Commission, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania  
07/08/09 
Moses Nandonde Pharmacist Analyst, 
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority (TFDA)
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 






Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority (TFDA)
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 
(TFDA), Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
24/07/09 
Hiiti B. Sillo Director Medicines and 
Cosmetics, Tanzania 
Food and Drugs 
Authority (TFDA) 
Tanzania Food and 
Drugs Authority 































Estimates of Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost to different conditions in sub-
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